2018 Youth ResearchEdge Posters from the OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum

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Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus,
quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius
adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium
fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse
contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat
Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum,
quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde.
Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis
perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia
esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli?
Title
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Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam
referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse
iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad
Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi
subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est
militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius
perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit
esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum
ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano,
ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in
Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat,
ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et
verecunde.
Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais,
sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem,
ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote.
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LOGOS
THE REVOLVING DOOR FOR POLITICAL ELITES:
REGULATING OR SERVING FINANCIAL BUSINESSES?
ELISA MARIA WIRSCHING, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, EBRD
The Revolving Door for Political Elites:
Regulating or Serving Financial Businesses?
Elisa Maria Wirsching, Office of the Chief Economist, EBRD
Table 1: Professional experience of central bank governors and finance
ministers
Regulatory capture of public policy by financial entities,
especially via the revolving door between government and
financial services, has increasingly become a subject of intense
public scrutiny.
Well-known examples of influential policy-makers with
experience in private finance, such as Alan Greenspan or
Robert Rubin, seem to support the assumption that earlier and
prospective employment in the financial sector influences high-
ranking government officials in shaping financial regulation.
Yet, systematic evidence for the relation between such public-
private career linkages and public policy remains scare.
Are financial sector veterans in senior government posts in fact
more likely to deregulate the financial industry? And are policy-
makers rewarded with lucrative future industry employment if
they embark on deregulatory reforms during their time in office?
CONTEXT HYPOTHESES RESULTS
DATA & METHOD
Central Bank
Governors
Finance Ministers
Total Total
Among
left
Among
right
Finance
exp. before
office
49
(29.7%)
63
(16.1%)
11
(9.0%)
36
(17.7%)
Finance
exp. after
office
44
(26.7%)
42
(10.7%)
12
(9.8%)
22
(10.8%)
Finance
exp. both
before and
after office
12
(7.2%)
9
(2.3%)
2
(1.6%)
7
(3.4%)
N 165 392 122 203
High-level officials with a professional background in the
financial industry are socially conditioned to push for financial
deregulation whilst in office due to personal connections with
the industry and professional value-socialisation.
H1: Central bank governors/finance ministers with past
occupational experience in the financial sector pursue stronger
deregulatory reforms whilst in office than governors/ministers
without such experience (“career socialisation mechanism”).
The revolving door in finance encourages public officials to
accommodate the strong interests of the industry in order to
gain lucrative future careers in the sector.
 H2: The more central bank governors/finance ministers
deregulate the financial market during their time in office, the
more likely they are to gain employment in the industry after
their tenure (“career incentive mechanism”).
Central bank governors with past
experience in the financial
services industry are associated
with greater financial reform than
their peers who have been
socialised in different work
environments.
This effect cannot be
demonstrated for finance
ministers.
Finance ministers, especially from left-leaning parties, are more
likely to be hired by financial entities following their tenure if
they pursue liberalizing reforms during their time in office.
Figure 1: Marginal effects of prior
financial sector experience for central
bank governors
Figure 2: Marginal effects of deregulatory reforms for
finance ministers conditional on their partisanship
together with the density histogram
Data: Newly created dataset on financial regulation and
backgrounds of more than 400 central bank governors and
finance ministers from 32 OECD countries between 1973-2005.
Method:
• Career socialisation mechanism: Time-series-cross-sectional
approach with country-year observations for annual changes in
financial regulation and central bankers’/finance ministers’
professional background
• Career incentive mechanism: Linear probability model to
estimate propensity that a government official gains lucrative
employment in the industry as a function of her policy during
office

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LOGOS
STUDYING BRAZILIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION WEB APPS
BÁRBARA LUIZA COUTINHO DO NASCIMENTO AND PATRÍCIA DO COUTO VILLELA,
RIO DE JANEIRO STATE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
STUDYING BRAZILIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION WEB APPS
BÁRBARA LUIZA COUTINHO DO NASCIMENTO AND PATRÍCIA DO COUTO VILLELA, RIO DE JANEIRO STATE
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
Introduction
The first app lists the lawsuits by
municipalities and calculates the total
amount of money currently claimed in court
by local prosecutors against public and
private agents accused of corruption or
damaging the treasury. The app allows
citizens to simulate how that money could be
spent on public policies such as building
schools or hospitals, thereby revealing the
true cost of corruption.
The second app ranks municipalities by the
level of internal control maturity. To calculate
the level, the elements used are audit,
ombudsman, internal affairs, controller,
transparency, collaboration with external
control, structure, comprehensiveness,
autonomy, regulation, budget, planning,
evolution, extension, implementation of
public policies and praiseworthy initiative. By
choosing these as the elements to demand,
the project aims to fortify integrity.
Together, the two platforms use credible and relevant data to enhance accountability, publicity,
and transparency in the public sector, acting as mechanisms to prevent corruption because
parties and contracts questioned in court are exposed, as well as the damage caused by them.
Governments are also exposed, since the comparison shows the deficiency of each municipality,
outlining risks to integrity. It is noteworthy that the platforms tend to show an inversely
proportional relation, in such a way that cities ranked lower at Building Internal Control are those
exhibiting larger sums of money claimed in court in Citizen-Manager.
How can the exercise of citizenship on the Internet go beyond tweeting protest
statements? What kind of platform can be built to prevent corruption? Can it engage all
stakeholders?
The Rio de Janeiro state prosecutor’s office (Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de
Janeiro) has developed two web apps called Citizen-Manager (Cidadão Gestor) and
Building Internal Control (Edificando o Controle Interno) intending to be corruption
prevention mechanisms.
How does e-government enhance good governance?
By nature, e-government is a good governance enhancement tool. When correctly
used by the public administration, digital technologies add transparency and visibility
to the State’s actions and policies because data and information are made more
broadly available and accessible with pinpoint searches.
What are the advantages of online anti-corruption tools?
The web shortens physical distances and, as a consequence, reduces time and costs
both for the citizen to report corruption and for the control agencies to exercise their
duties, communicating with each other faster, receiving whistleblowing, and finding
information not only about contracts and transactions but also about investigated
persons and their networks of relations.
Besides, when data of public interest are inserted online, allowing immediate, ample,
and unrestricted access to them by any person, the principles of transparency and
publicity gain effectiveness, and the citizen becomes better informed. Additionally, the
user is able to oversee the activities of those institutions that have the task of fighting
corruption, fomenting accountability. Therefore, citizenship as a whole is fostered.
Why is preventing corruption better than repressing it?
It avoids losses and endless lawsuits, enabling the immediate use of public resources.
Problem Can web apps
be used to
effectively
curb
corruption?
Methodolgy
Case study
Citizen-Manager
App
Building Internal
Control App
Findings
Enhanced
good
governance
Prevention of
Corruption
Less
Corruption
Better
Internal
Control
Cases Studied
Citizen-Manager
Building Internal Control
Combined Analysis
- Publicity
- Transparency
- Accountability
- Citizenship
- Public trust
- Misuse and
misappropriation of
public resources
- Litigation
- Distrust of
institutions
Increased
Decreased
It is expected that the exposure will generate embarrassment in such a way that
politicians will not want to have their images linked to poor governance or
corruption. Therefore, they will work to enhance internal control and minimise
the bad publicity that comes from the disclosure of the mismanagement of
public money. That behaviour will, as a consequence, contribute to preventing
corruption from happening.
Conclusion
http://apps.mprj.mp.br/sistema/eci/
http://cidadaogestor.mprj.mp.br/

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LOGOS
CORRUPTION, MIGRATION AND GENDER
ORTRUN MERKLE, JULIA REINOLD AND MELISSA SIEGEL
UNU-MERIT/MAASTRICHT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE
Corruption, Migration and Gender
Ortrun Merkle, Julia Reinold andMelissa Siegel -UNU-MERIT/Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Methodology and Data
Country of Origin
“If you made a conscious decision to migrate and a conscious decision to use an illegal route
then the degree of agency, cooperation, acceptance, indeed the degree of welcoming
corruption can be vastly different. There will be people who say I want to migrate from A to B,
legal systems don’t allow me to do it. So, I will use illegal systems and I am very grateful that
there are corrupt officials that can help me.” (Expert Interview NGO)
Corruption can have three kinds of direct and indirect effects on individuals in the country of origin:
1. Corruption in the origin country can lead to migration aspirations through…
• … affecting (democratic) institutions and social protection systems;
• … leading to unequal opportunities for citizens;
• … causing imbalances regarding access to power and resources;
• … directly and indirectly affect the seven dimensions of human security.
2. Corruption in the origin country can impede migration…
• … through increasing the costs of migration, for instance when high bribes are required to
obtain travel documents, thereby making it less affordable;
• … and cause involuntary immobility, referring to a situation in which in individual wants
to migrate, but is not able to do so.
Sextortion and the Role of Patriarchy
“The border guards see that there are women in your convoy, they stop the pick-up and take
the women. You can wait three or four days, sometimes one week, you never know how long,
until the time they can satisfy all their desires [pause] and they come back.” (Male Migrant
from Congo)
• Abuse of power to obtain a sexual favour
• Female bodies instead of or in addition to money and goods can become the means of
exchange…
• … to organise women’s individual journey;
• … to organise the journey of an entire group of migrants;
• … to organise the journey of families and secure access to basic services or
humanitarian aid.
• Intersection of corruption and sexual violence;
• Transactional sex can become a survival strategy for migrant women and their families;
• Far-reaching consequences on migrants’ mental and physical health.
Gender norms and power imbalances shape experiences of corruption during migration:
• Patriarchy is a system of social structures in which men dominate, oppress and exploit
women;
• Access to financial and social capital and information often depends on gender as
• Families mostly support the migration of male family members, while women often migrate
against the will of their family and consequently lack financial and emotional support;
• Women are used to allow family members and groups to get ahead in the migration journey;
• This leaves women more vulnerable to sextortion and increases their risk of becoming victims
of human trafficking.
Explorative research based on qualitative research methods:
• Desk research;
• 59 semi-structured interviews with experts (e.g. policy makers; representatives of
government organizations, IOs & NGOs; practitioners in the field of migration, corruption
& gender; academia);
• 8 semi-structured interviews with male and female migrants.
How are experiences of corruption
during migration gendered?
Abstract
This paper investigates migrants’ gendered experiences of corruption on route to Europe by
analysing how corruption can lead to migration and how experiences of corruption during the
migration process differ for men and women. The main population of interest are men and
women who migrated to Europe using the central Mediterranean route, including both forced
and irregular migrants. Research on migration and corruption is still in its infancy. This paper
adds to the literature on the migration-corruption nexus in two main ways. First, it furthers the
knowledge of gendered experiences during migration, which are still understudied, by
investigating in a comprehensive manner how women and men are affected by different forms
of corruption throughout the migration process. Second, it advances the small body of literature
discussing gendered forms of corruption.
3. Corruption in the origin country can enable internal and international migration…
• … through speeding up administrative processes (e.g. issuing travel documents);
• … through opening channels for irregular migration where options for regular
migration are limited (e.g. obtaining fake travel documents; bribing border officials,
etc.), including human smuggling; this can include female migration in patriarchal
societies where women cannot travel alone;
• … and thereby help overcome involuntary immobility while at the same time
increasing the risks of vulnerable populations to become victims of trafficking or other
forms of abuse and violence, especially where financial and social capital as well as
access to information are lacking.
During Transit
“There was a lot of police. When you get to the border they say stop. You bring money for
them and then if you didn’t give them money they would beat you, they will tell you to sit
down in the sun. You will be there until you find something on you or beg someone to just
give me some money[…] They will make sure that they will beat you as nastily as possible. Oh
god I hated it.” (Female Migrant from Nigeria)
• Corruption is a constant throughout transit;
• Lack of social networks increase vulnerability to corruption;
• Armed state and non-state actors expect corruption to let migrants pass check points in the
Sahara desert and cannot be differentiated;
• Corruption is necessary to organize the journey and access basic services like health care;
• Irregular migrants are most vulnerable to corruption at all stages;
• Lack of financial resources and inability to pay for corrupt demands leads to experience of
extreme violence, especially for men.
Figure: Corruption as a push factor for migration (Merkle, Reinold & Siegel, 2017)

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LOGOS
INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN EUROPE:
SPECIFICS OF POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
KRISTÝNA BAŠNÁ – INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE CZECH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN EUROPE:
SPECIFICS OF POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Kristýna Bašná – Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences
Abstract
This paper analyses the relations between income inequality and corruption
(measured by Corruption Perception Index) in Europe and looks specifically on
post-communist European countries. It argues that in the case of post
communist countries, the associations between corruption and income
inequality are more complicated than in the rest of Europe and thus different
approach in combatting corruption must be taken.
Corruption in European countries is on average on a much lower level compared
to most of the world; particularly Scandinavian and Western European
countries consistently hold the top places as countries with the lowest levels of
corruption. On the other hand, countries with a communist history generally
have higher levels of corruption (Shleifer 1997) and political corruption there is
certainly a serious problem (Karklins 2005). It is suggested (Rose 2001, 105;
Rose-Ackerman 1999) that corruption is the greatest obstacle to progress and
to democratization in post-communist societies. Most of researchers agree that
there is a very important relation between income inequality and corruption;
they suggest that in countries that have higher corruption there is also higher
inequality (Treisman 2007; Husted 1999). Some authors also suggest that
containing inequality might be a plausible method for lowering corruption
(Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2006).
Theoretical claims of the influence between the level of corruption and income
inequality are tested by conducting a multilevel analysis on the 39 European
countries in the period 1995–2016; of the countries included, 19 have a
communist past and the rest (20) does not. In addition to corruption and
income inequality the model also controls for variables which were
hypothesised to influence the level of corruption such as GDP per capita, level
of democracy, or share of protestants in a country.
Hypotheses:
H1: Control of Corruption will be higher in countries with lower income
inequalities
H1a: In post-communist countries this relation will be weaker
Data
The findings of the analysis are supported by three types of models; firstly, by
analysing the relations between control of corruption and Gini coefficient by
time-waves since 1995, then by multilevel analysis (fixed effects and random
effects), and finally by analysing the change in these two indicators from 1995
to 2014.
Results show that there are huge differences between eastern European
countries with communist legacy and countries with a longer history of
democracy and rule of law, and that theories pointing out to the strong
correlation between corruption and Gini coefficient are not entirely correct. It
seems that this correlation is true for European countries, which have not
experienced communist rule, but it is not true for post-communist countries.
Interestingly, even though post‐communist countries as a group quickly caught up with income
inequality levels of the rest of European countries after the end of communism, analysis of
changes within the group of post‐communist countries actually shows a contrary, unexpected
effect. Countries, which have had the highest change in income inequality towards more
unequal societies are today the least corrupt countries among post‐communist countries and
vise versa.
Analysis
Source: World Bank. Note: Indicators varies from -3 to 3 with 3 meaning that the country is
successful in controlling corruption
Gini coefficient, selected countries
Variable Source
Control of Corruption World Bank
Income Inequality – Gini coefficient UNU Wider, Eurostat
GDP per Capita World Bank
Democracy Polity IV – Centre for Systemic Peace
Share of protestants ARDA
Source: World Bank
Model 3.2
Ln GDP per capita 0.26 (0.05)*
Gini coefficient ‐0.01 (0.004)*
Communist history ‐1.47 (0.25)*
Communist hist.*Gini coeff. 0.07 (0.006)*
Share of protestants 1.06 (0.207)*
Democracy 0.04 (0.007)*
Intercept ‐1.379
sigma_u 0.4
sigma_e 0.173
rho 0.795
Nb of observations 419
Nb of groups 39
F (Wald chi) 385.12
Prob>F 0.000
corr(u_i, Xb) 0 (assumed)
*p<0.05
Control of
Corruption in
Europe, 2016
Panel data - Determinants of Control of Corruption

Collectivisation of Anti-
Corruption Cause:
Harnessing structural and
functional properties of informal
social networks can help change
collective attitudes and behaviours
vis-à-vis corruption
(‘perceptions theory and social
norms approach’)
Making change visible
and palpable:
social repercussion for
corrupt transgression
(‘naming and shaming’),
combined with
institutional reforms
(‘celebrated success
stories’)
Power of social ties:
within-network
connectedness and
influenceability of social
referents acting as anti-
corruption champions,
opinion leaders and trend
setters to spread critical
information and new
behaviours
Social Influence Landscape
Social Influence Strategies for Anti-Corruption (‘Peer-Driven Interventions’)
HARNESSING SOCIAL NETWORKS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION
COSIMO STAHL AND SABA KASSA, BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE, UNIVERSITY OF BASEL, SWITZERLAND
What is the problem? (Petty) Corruption persists despite the presence of elaborate legal, institutional and
organisational anti-corruption frameworks in many developing countries
Ambivalence: Behaviours are infused with ambivalence due to a gap between what the formal legal framework
prescribes and the informal social rules dictate (Uganda and Tanzania).
Novel behavioural approach: Aims to understand context-specific drivers of corrupt behaviours, focusing on
the social fabric, cultural structures and other “non-rational” and “quasi-rational” decision-making factors
But social networks are double-edged due to the role of peer pressure: Rwanda - social performance
contracts (Imihigo) endorse values of integrity, “naming and shaming” approach to corruption (names of corrupt
offender - alongside the names of their parents and community of origin – are publicised)
Major finding: Field research conducted on behavioural drivers of corruption in the health sectors of Uganda,
Tanzania and Rwanda show that informal social networks play a role in spurring petty corrupt practices Opportunities for anti-corruption: Incorporating behavioural insights by harnessing the potential of social
networks to promote ant-corruption outcomes by means of social diffusion of critical (normative) behaviours
and new attitudinal and behavioural trends.

THE PYRAMID OF REDISTRIBUTIVE CORRUPTION:
EXPLORING MEXICO’S PARADOXICAL CORRUPTION
INEQUALITY TREND POSTINEQUALITY-2001
ETIENNE ROSAS, PARDEE RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL/ RAND CORPORATION
THE PYRAMID OF REDISTRIBUTIVE CORRUPTION :
Exploring Mexico’s Paradoxical Corruption-Inequality Trend post-2001
Etienne Rosas, Pardee RAND Graduate School/ RAND Corporation
POLICY ISSUE
➢ In OECD, Mexico scores lowest in corruption
measures, by far. This is despite transition into
democracy in 2000 and repeated policy efforts
to curtail corruption since.
➢ Mexico scores worst in measures of inequality
in OECD despite a regionwide moderate but
constant decrease since 2000. Pre- and post-tax
Gini coefficient change for Mexico is negligible.
➢ Studies frequently note a correlation between
corruption and inequality, and a mutually-
reinforcing dynamic:
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
➢ How has this inequality-corruption cycle
evolved in Mexico? What role did the end of
the 71-year rule of the PRI (Revolutionary
Institutional Party) play?
➢ What explains the persistent ineffectiveness
of anti-corruption measures in Mexico?
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
➢ Statistically significant inverse relationship between corruption and inequality
begins in 2001. A 1 point rise in the CPI, i.e. an improvement in corruption, is
associated with a .008 rise in the Gini Index, i.e. a worsening of inequality.
➢ This relationship is not present in the years preceding 2001 but neither do we see
any positive relation between corruption improvements and lower inequality as
theory would suggest. If we include all data points between 1995-2015, there is
no statistically significant relationship between corruption and inequality.
➢ The most important policy shock starting 2001 is the PRI losing its power grip on
the political structure and relinquishing the presidency to Vicente Fox of the PAN
party. Generally, the shock appears to have reshuffled incentives for corruption in
such a way that corrupt practices served to alleviate inequality in many sectors.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
➢ The PRI political-economic structure deeply
institutionalized corruption at every level.
Decentralization of power in 2000s brought
about “competitive corruption” opportunities
which distributed wealth more evenly.
➢ “Official” redistributive mechanisms,
especially in poorer areas, remain broken;
taxes are ineffective, so bribes are de facto
form of tax. Unofficial and informal channels
for many remain more effective modes of
redistribution and progress.
➢ Previous studies like Dobson & Ramlogan,
2009, have observed this phenomenon in
other Latin American countries. They
attribute it to 1) the large informal sector’s
increased transaction cost under corruption-
reducing policies, and 2) institutional reforms’
sudden cut back on redistributive measures
promoted by corrupt elements.
➢ Mexico seems caught in a structure where
redistribution is based on a longstanding
network of influence and corruption.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
➢ Dynamic between corruption and inequality is
relative to the political structure. Anti-
corruption efforts must adapt to address
perverse incentives, enhance formal
redistribution channels or risk backfiring.
➢ Unraveling of this corruption-based system
should focus on pressuring top-level operators.
Source: Transparency International
POLICY ISSUE
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
POLICY ISSUE
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

TO TOLERATE OR NOT TOLERATE BRIBERY: CAN A LACK OF CONTROL
OVER CORRUPTION DETERMINE TOLERANCE LEVELS?
PATTY ZAKARIA, PHD
This section tested the rule of law hypothesis, which predicted that individuals
in countries where the rule of law is strong would have less favorable attitudes
towards bribery than those in countries with the weak rule of law. The results
regarding the rule of law are presented in table 1 above. In models 2, the rule of
law coefficient was found to be negative and statistically significant at the ρ <
0.01 level. This outcome means that as the rule of law becomes stronger in each
society; it is expected that individuals will become less tolerant of corruption.
On the other hand, when the rule of law weakens in a society, this tends to make
individuals more accepting of corruption. Thus, the statistical results support the
rule of law hypothesis. Figure 2 presents the relationship between the rule of law
and individual-level tolerance for corruption, with a 95% confidence interval.
Hypotheses
The study tested the following hypotheses:
Control of Corruption: When governments have control over corruption,
individuals will begin to believe that corruption is less justifiable.
Rule of Law: Individuals in countries where the rule of law is strong will have
less favorable attitudes towards bribery than those in countries where the rule
of law is weak.
Results
Thisfindingsuggeststhatanegativecausalrelationshipispresentbetweencontrol
of corruption and individual-level tolerance for corruption, where greater control
over corruption by the government is associated with individuals becoming less
accepting of bribery among public officials.
What does this all mean? First, these results signify that individual-level
justification for bribery among public officials is dependent on the ability of
government to control corruption effectively, thus confirming that individual-
level perception is not fixed and can vary. Second, and perhaps most importantly,
these results reveal that perception is conditioned by the level of corruption
within society.
Abstract:
Most of the research on corruption has either focused on the impact corruption
has on economic growth, development, and investment, or the implications
of corruption on governance. However, limited research has focused on the
relationship between government control of corruption and individual-level
acceptance of bribery within society. This study uses the World Values Survey
and other observed data from a total of 55 countries to test whether high levels
of corruption cause individuals to be more accepting of bribery among public
officials. A Generalized Least Square Model was applied to test the effect of
government corruption on control and individual-level tolerance for bribery
between 1996 and 2015.
Keywords: GLS, Control of corruption, Individual-level tolerance, Bribery, Rule
of Law.
Research Question
What impact can government’s ability to deal with corruption have on individual-
level justification of bribery among public officials?
The literature argues, and the empirical literature finds that robust and durable
political institutions are associated with low levels of corruption. Lederman,
Loayza, and Soares (2005), for example, found that a country with political
stability, a free and independent press, and a democratic system tended to have a
lower level of corruption. By extending the above logic, a reduction in corruption
is associated with robust control of corruption by the government, which in turn
leads individuals to become less tolerant of bribery in society. When individuals
are accustomed to a transparent and corruption-free (limited corruption) society,
they are unlikely to be comfortable with bribery; rather, they will have been
conditioned by their corruption-free environment to reject this behavior.
If corruption is high and control of corruption by the government is weak, then
it can be assumed that individuals will be more tolerant of bribery. In this case,
individuals are consistently experiencing corruption or hearing about corruption
scandals in the media, and so they, like their counterparts in corruption-free
societies, will also be conditioned by their environment. However, in this scenario,
individuals will become desensitized to corruption and its negative attributes,
pushing them to become more tolerant of bribery among public officials. The
argument made here is akin to Wroe, Allen, and Birch’s (2013) assumption
and empirical test of how distrust can condition individual-level responses
to corruption in the United Kingdom. The authors confirm that “less trusting
individuals are always more likely than their more trusting counterparts to judge
politicians’ behavior as corrupt” (Wroe, Allen, & Birch, 2013, p. 13). This supports
the notion that certain factors in society can condition individual-level tolerance
for corruption.
Government Control of Corruption & Tolerance
Rule of Law & Tolerance

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Second subtitle
LOGOS
ASSESSING INTEREST GROUPS’FINANCIAL DONATIONS TO
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S POLITICAL PARTIES & FOUNDATIONS
ALEXANDER KATSAITIS
ARENA CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Research Premise
Financial links between interest groups and policy-makers reveal strategic
choice, influence, and socio-political cleavages.
Significantly, they provide measures of integrity for the policy-making
environment and its democratic credentials.
Since 2008, the European Union’s (EU) political parties and foundations can
receive private financial donations as a part of their annual budget, which raises
two questions.
Are the EU’s political organizations receiving donations from interest groups?
How does the party agenda impact donations?
Top 20 Interest Group Donors, total
amount of donations in euros (2008-2015).
Methodology
This is the first study that systematically maps and analyses the private
financial donations received by EU level political parties and foundations. It
does so by assesing their budgets, available online, from 2008 to 2015.
Donations received by EU level political foundations, political parties, and total,
per year (amounts in euros).
Main Results
● Donations are progressively playing a greater role in EU level party financing.
● Business organizations outspend all other donors.
● Donations are highly skewed to the right side of the political spectrum, and are
concentrated among a few political parties and affiliated foundations; including
Eurosceptic parties.
Donations and membership fees received by EU level political foundations per
year (amounts in euros).
Implications
● The plethora of donors and the increasing amounts of donations, create the
need for additional clarity over the sources channelling money in EU politics
and its impact.
● We are likely to observe donations’ further institutionalization, normalizing
the process while crystalizing cleavages at the EU level.
● The EU’s parties, at least a part of them, seem to be moving away from the
European‘public utility paradigm’.
● Donations provide an alternative conceptual frame for EU lobbying beyond
information-exchange models, moving closer to US hybrid-resource models.
Distribution of total amount of donations received by EU level political
foundations (2008-2015).
ASSESSING INTEREST GROUPS’ FINANCIAL DONATIONS TO
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S POLITICAL PARTIES & FOUNDATIONS
ALEXANDER KATSAITIS
ARENA CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Association pour la
fondation pour l'Europe
des Libertes et de la
Democratie
0%
Centre for European
Studies
0%
Institute for European
Democrats
0%
Transform Europe
0%
Green European
Foundation
0%
Centre Maurits
Coppieters
0%
Foundation Politique
Europeene pour la
democratie
0%
Foundation for
European Progressive
Studies
1%
Europa Osservatorio
sulle politiche
dell'unione
1%
Fondation pour
une Europe des
Nations et des
Libertes
1%Foundation
for EU
Democracy
4%
European Liberal Forum
5%
Christian Political
Foundation for Europe
5%
Organization for
European Interstate
Cooperation
5%
European Identity &
Traditions
7%
Institute for Direct
Democracy
9%European Foundation
for Freedom
14%
New Direction -
Foundation for
European Reform
47%
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
AT&T
Cassae & Schembri Ltd.
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Bayer
Notat
Food World Ltd
Open Europe
Triple A Analytics
The Atlas Economic
Harmonies Economiques
Uscom Ltd
Jalte Holding BV
CI Consult & Research
The A Partners
German Marshall Fund
Arx Studios s.r.o.
European Institute of Healthcare
Medaf Ltd.
Pershing LLC
Syngenta
CBI of Turkey
Ocean & Sky Logistic
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Donations to Foundations Membership Fees Foundations
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Donations to Foundations Donations to Parties Donations Total

EMBRACING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF CROSS-
JURISDICTIONAL WHISTLEBLOWING
DR ASHLEY SAVAGE, LECTURER IN LAW, UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL, UK
A lives and works in a jurisdiction which has a whistleblowing law
allowing him to obtain protection if he raises a concern to the anti-
corruption agency. A’s company, however, is based at the other side of
the globe, in a country without similar protection. The anti-corruption
agency in A’s jurisdiction lacks the resources to mount a joint
investigation on a matter not affecting their home jurisdiction. The best
place for A to raise his concern so that it may be acted upon is to the
anti-corruption agency in the jurisdiction where the company is based,
but if he does so he loses the right to whistleblower protection.
Despite the rapid rise in whistleblower
protection laws there is no universally
accepted definition of the term
‘whistleblower.’ Different national
approaches make it difficult for
whistleblowers to navigate a fractured
and uncertain landscape.
Whistleblower protection laws most often apply when the individual needs to obtain legal protection for suffering some form of
detrimental treatment or dismissal. Whistleblowers often not need to use these laws unless things go wrong. Anti-corruption
bodies can utilise practical steps to help ensure that things do not. Here are some suggestions:
Provide clear practical guidance to whistleblowers: Explain how concerns may be raised, what will happen to the
information and any legal protection which may apply. Exercise caution in providing advice or instructions which only apply to
individuals raising concerns domestically. Consider providing different advice where concerns are received from outside of the
jurisdiction.
Provide a range of communication methods but also advise of the risks: Secure drop-boxes may offer a good way of
obtaining disclosed documents and may be consistent with the national law of that jurisdiction, but they may also place
whisleblowers raising concerns from other jurisdictions at risk of prosecution. Clear and prominent guidance should be issued
to warn of potential risks.
Be pro-active and prudent with the information: Reduce risks by not requiring whistleblowers to disclose documents
where to do so may render the individual in breach of the law. Consider whether it is more appropriate to obtain the
documents through co-operation with anti-corruption bodies based in the other jurisdiction.
Use investigatory tactics to shield the whistleblower: Avoid disclosing the identity of the whistleblower unless authorised
to do so. Exercise caution when acting on information which is only known by a small number of individuals so as not to
expose the whistleblower’s position. Investigators could deliberately widen the scope of the investigation and/ or include the
whistleblower as one of those investigated in order to shield the individual from exposure as the source.
Sharing good practice: Work towards a shared understanding on how to deal with whistleblower concerns. Aim to develop
base-line standards which acknowledge international good practice but also allow for differences in legal institutional
frameworks.
A lives and works in a jurisdiction which has a whistleblowing law
allowing him to obtain protection if he raises a concern to the anti-
corruption agency. A’s company, however, is based at the other side of
the globe, in a country without similar protection. The anti-corruption
agency in A’s jurisdiction lacks the resources to mount a joint
investigation on a matter not affecting their home jurisdiction. The best
place for A to raise his concern so that it may be acted upon is to the
anti-corruption agency in the jurisdiction where the company is based,
but if he does so he loses the right to whistleblower protection.
Despite the rapid rise in whistleblower
protection laws there is no universally
accepted definition of the term
‘whistleblower.’ Different national
approaches make it difficult for
whistleblowers to navigate a fractured
and uncertain landscape.
Whistleblower protection laws most often apply when the individual needs to obtain legal protection for suffering some form of
detrimental treatment or dismissal. Whistleblowers often not need to use these laws unless things go wrong. Anti-corruption
bodies can utilise practical steps to help ensure that things do not. Here are some suggestions:
Provide clear practical guidance to whistleblowers: Explain how concerns may be raised, what will happen to the
information and any legal protection which may apply. Exercise caution in providing advice or instructions which only apply to
individuals raising concerns domestically. Consider providing different advice where concerns are received from outside of the
jurisdiction.
Provide a range of communication methods but also advise of the risks: Secure drop-boxes may offer a good way of
obtaining disclosed documents and may be consistent with the national law of that jurisdiction, but they may also place
whisleblowers raising concerns from other jurisdictions at risk of prosecution. Clear and prominent guidance should be issued
to warn of potential risks.
Be pro-active and prudent with the information: Reduce risks by not requiring whistleblowers to disclose documents
where to do so may render the individual in breach of the law. Consider whether it is more appropriate to obtain the
documents through co-operation with anti-corruption bodies based in the other jurisdiction.
Use investigatory tactics to shield the whistleblower: Avoid disclosing the identity of the whistleblower unless authorised
to do so. Exercise caution when acting on information which is only known by a small number of individuals so as not to
expose the whistleblower’s position. Investigators could deliberately widen the scope of the investigation and/ or include the
whistleblower as one of those investigated in order to shield the individual from exposure as the source.
Sharing good practice: Work towards a shared understanding on how to deal with whistleblower concerns. Aim to develop
base-line standards which acknowledge international good practice but also allow for differences in legal institutional
frameworks.

THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
CORPORATE BRIBERY CASES
KASPER VAGLE, PHD CANDIDATE, NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (NHH),BERGEN, NORWAY
KASPER.VAGLE@NHH.NO
Context
The opportunity to offer accused corporations a negotiated
settlement implies a broadening of prosecutors’ range of
tools available for acting on complex forms of corruption.
Negotiated settlements change the structure of criminal
enforcement and can be used in ways that reward
corporations for their self-policing and self-reporting
initiatives (Arlen and Kraakman, 1997). The increased use of
negotiated settlements can encourage remedial actions,
compensation of victims and efficient compliance programs,
depending on the principles, predictability and aims behind
enforcement.
Research Goal
The purpose of this article is to investigate the level of
prosecutor’s discretion in negotiated settlements of
corporate bribery cases in 62 countries, and examine the
level of discretion among countries that have similar
performance on development indices.
The further aim of the research project is to understand the
drivers of discretion, and what degree of discretion for
prosecutors can be associated with efficient and legitimate
law enforcement systems
Findings
The study finds that different countries apply very
different degrees of prosecutorial discretion, and there is
no clear trend that countries are moving in the direction
of United States practices and regulations regarding
settlements when it comes to prosecutorial discretion (Fig.
1-4). However, we see some indications that more
discretion and independence is given to countries that
have a stronger rule of law more generally (Fig. 1-2). More
discretion is also given to prosecutors in countries that do
well on other good governance indicators, including on
corruption, business regulations, and democracy (Fig. 3-4).
The survey results reveal a difference between de jure and
de facto discretion for prosecutors who negotiate
settlements with corporations. Most jurisdictions with
high de jure discretion also have high de facto discretion.
However, there are some countries that have low de jure
discretion combined with high de facto discretion. Which
means that there is significant deviation between the
written law and practice.
Data
This study applies data provided by Makinwa and Søreide
(2018). The data was collected with the help of the
Structured Criminal Settlements Subcommittee (SCSS) of
the International Bar Association (IBA), and is the result of
a survey among its members conducted in 2017. The
survey is part of the project Towards Global Standards in
Structured Criminal Settlements for Corruption Offences.
Lawyers from 62 different countries contributed with
insights about how negotiated settlements are regulated
and the prosecutor’s degree of discretion in their
jurisdiction.
Figure 1: De jure discretion vs. Rule of law Figure 2: De facto independence vs. Rule of law
Figure 3: De jure discretion
vs. Ease of doing business
Figure 4: De facto independence
vs. Ease of doing business

Behavioral Results Physiological Results
Summary and conclusions
People employ cheating in strategic ways to justify their self-interests and
promote their goals
- Increase cheating to benefit close others
Altruistic Justifications increase dishonesty and diffuse its associated
psychologicaltension(ethicaldissonance),thusallowingguilt-freedishonesty
War against corruption must focus on identifying and preventing different
types of justifications
Introduction
• According to the psychological model of dishonesty, cheating behavior creates
a psychological tension termed ETHICAL DISSONANCE
• This tension stems from the conflict between the desire to be honest and the
competing desire to increase (material) gain.
• The tension is resolved if the level of unethicality is restricted, or alternatively,
if cheating behavior is justified
Research question
Does Altruistic cheating (cheating to benefit others) serves as a justification to
cheat, and how it effects the physiological tension associated with cheating
behavior
Method
1. The Flexible dots task
Which side has more dots?
Would you choose the correct side or the highest paying side?
2. Lie-detector test
Physiologicalarousalmeasurestonegativeresponses
on the question: “Did you cheat in the dots task”?
Conditions:
IDEOLOGICAL-ALTRUISTIC CHEATING -
TESTING ROBIN HOOD IN A LIE DETECTOR
DAR PELEG¹, GUY HOCHMAN², SHAHAR AYAL², DAN ARIELY³
1 TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY ISRAEL. 2 INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER (IDC) HERZLIYA ISRAEL. 3 DUKE UNIVERSITY U.S.A.
3 ag 30 ag

STAGE 2
VETTING POTENTIAL POSITIVE OUTLIERS
Puzzle: Are the cases identified in stage 1 reflections of
real-world success?
Desk research was used to vet 5 cases to assess whether
the positive performance picked up statistically reflected
reality. This is important as errors may cause the analyses to
identify false-positives.
We reviewed the literature and conducted telephone
interviews with people familiar with the cases to vet them.
STAGE 3
UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION
REDUCTION
Puzzle: What processes are responsible for corruption
reduction?
In-depth qualitative fieldwork was conducted in 2 cases:
Uganda’s health care sector and South Africa’s police sector.
Field research assessed what factors most likely encouraged
bribery reduction.
WHAT WORKED?
LEADERSHIP DISRUPTION
UGANDA: HEALTH CARE
Strengthened accountability mechanisms.
Through a highly visible fight against corruption in the
sector,therelativelyrecentlyestablishedHMUlikelyreduced
bribery by making health workers especially cautious.
SOUTH AFRICA: POLICE
A shock to the system.
BriberyreducedmostinLimpopo.Thenationalgovernment’s
intervention into the province, which targeted high level
corruption,likelyinadvertently changedlocalpolice’sbribery
patterns by making them more cautious.
“SUCCESS” STORIES?
NOT SO FAST. UNEXPECTED, VALUABLE
LESSONS FROM OUR POSITIVE OUTLIERS.
UGANDA: HEALTH CARE
Bribery reduction has not strengthened the sector. The
‘effective’ anticorruption approach may be (unintentionally)
weakening the sector by making the working conditions of
health workers even more challenging.
SOUTH AFRICA: POLICE
The national government stopped its intervention in
Limpopo, and bribery seems to be on the rise again in
the sector. Something else will need to be done to ensure
sustained progress.
STAGE 1
STATISTICAL IDENTIFICATION OF
POTENTIAL POSITIVE OUTLIERS
Puzzle: Which sectors have surprisingly reduced
corruption?
Potential positive outliers are identified as statistically
significant outliers using simple regression analyses.
Positive outliers are sectors wherein the bribery rate reduced
far more than what was predicted, given how bribery
changed in other sectors in the same country over the same
period of time.
We identified 18 potential positive outliers
SEARCHING FOR SUCCESS: SUMMARISING A MIXED METHODS APPROACH
TO IDENTIFYING POSITIVE OUTLIERS IN BRIBERY REDUCTION
CARYN PEIFFER, SCHOOL FOR POLICY STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL
6.3%
7.7%
9.3%
10.0%
16.2%
Mongolia (land)
Indonesia (health)
Sierra Leone (education)
South Africa (police)
Uganda (health)
What is the difference?
(predicted - actual change in bribery)
† < 5% chance of occurring; * < 1% chance of occurring
  FEAR
WHY POSITIVE OUTLIERS?
Learning what contextual factors promote success can inspire new thinking about how to best
tackle corruption. We focus on potential success stories in anticorruption. We develop and use a
novel 3-stage approach to identify and examine sectors in otherwise systemically corrupt countries
that beat the odds by successfully reducing bribery.
http://www.dlprog.org/research/islands-of-integrity-understanding-the-politics-of-corruption-reduction.php

Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
verecunde.
Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
Second subtitle
LOGOS
A TWO-FACTOR MODEL FOR ETHICAL CULTURE
AZISH FILABI AND CATERINA BULGARELLA, ETHICAL SYSTEMS
A Two-Factor Model for Ethical Culture
Azish Filabi and Caterina Bulgarella
Outcomes
• These are the organization’s goals – to increase ethical behavior, improve ethical decision-
making and employee commitment to the organization
• They are influenced by the opposing forces of the negative and positive elements of
culture. These outcomes are likely to be observed when a company scores low on the
Disqualifiers (left side) and high on the Qualifiers (right side)
Qualifiers
• The Qualifiers embody the active
investments organizations need to
make to build ethical assets
• The higher a company scores on these
components, the stronger its ethical
focus
Disqualifiers
• Disqualifiers can also be thought of as
minimum requirements. They rep-
resent the ethical debt companies
must pay off in order to create the
foundations for a strong ethical focus
• Companies that score high on these
five areas present foundational
weaknesses that should be addressed
thoroughly and before any other type
of culture work is started
The Five Dimensions of Culture
Social Contract
The set of shared perceptions
about how the organization
relates to people and people
relate to each other
Leadership Behaviour
The influence of leadership and
management on the org-
anization’s ethics
Organizational Ethos
Deep-rooted beliefs that people
hold about themselves and
others, such as basic
assumptions about bene-
volence
Individual Perceptiveness
Awareness of ethical issues is a
necessary precondition of
ethical decision-making. Each
individual brings a level of
insight to bear on their day-to-
day choices
Response to Misconduct
Highlights how people react
when they observe unethical
behavior. It’s immediately
relevant to ethical outcomes, so
it can be viewed as an acid test
of a company’s ethical focus

NATURAL RESOURCES AND MONEY LAUNDERING
DAVID MÜHLEMANN AND STEFAN MBIYAVANGA, UNIVERSITY OF BASEL
Despite its scarcity of natural resources, Switzerland is one of the world’s
largest trading hubs for commodities and precious metals. This, however, brings
along considerable exposure to the many risks associated with natural resource
extraction.
Several traders domiciled in Switzerland have been alleged to have engaged in
illegal practices at the place of mining. However, while the flow of commodities
– at least on paper – continues to stream through Switzerland, there have not
been any natural resources-related trials for money laundering in Swiss Courts.
In addition, the Swiss government, thus far, has been rather unwilling to take
progressive steps towards an adequate supervision and regulation of the natural
resource trade.
Based on the findings of our research, we would like to present the following ideas to legislators and policymakers in Switzerland and elsewhere:
Considering the example of gold, a money laundering scenario can arise in the
following constellation:
(A) a public official or rebel militia corruptly or forcefully acquires control over
a gold mine. Then, the gold ore – which now is a proceed of crime – is sold
and the earnings are misappropriated.
(B) The Swiss refiner acquires the gold and refines it. Thereafter, the gold is no
longer traceable to its source.
(C) Lastly, the refined gold is sold to banks, investors or jewellers on the
international market.
Subject
commodity
traders should be subjected
to anti-money laundering law. In
comparison to banks, the traders
are better positioned to identify
money laundering risks in
their trades.
“Swiss made”
should signify good quality,
honesty and compliance with the law.
This should also apply to the commodity
sector. We should protect traders who life
up to these ideals and make it more
difficult for those who do not.
Switzerland can push
these topics up the agenda
of international policymaking
fora, such as the FATF.
The international regulators
should take the money
laundering risks in the
commodity sector
seriously and improve
the regulatory
framework.
Switzerland
should recognize
the responsibility and
influence that come along with
being a market leader for
commodities and precious metals:
If Switzerland introduces effective
AML-regulation in the sector, it
could motivate other trading
hubs to follow suit.

Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
verecunde.
Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
Second subtitle
LOGOS
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY & INTEGRITY
IN EUROPEAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
CLARA VOLINTIRU (BUCHAREST UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMIC STUDIES), VALENTINA DIMULESCU (ROMANIAN
ACADEMIC SOCIETY), AND MAT TROMME (BINGHAM CENTRE FOR THE RULE OF LAW )
15.73%
13.95%
15.73%
12.76%
18.69%
23.15%
Conflict of interest
Decisions contrary to public interest
Abuse of Power
Clientelistic distribution of goods and services
Nepotism
Favoritism in public procurement
EaP
18.18%
18.18%
15.15%
16.67%
13.64%
18.18%
Abuse of Power
Nepotism
CEE
4.88%
13.01%
17.07%
19.51%
20.33%
25.20%
Abuse of Power
Nepotism
Balkans
Figure 2. Types of corruption in the Western Balkans
Figure 3. Types of corruption in the Eastern Partnership
Figure 4. Types of corruption in the Central and Eastern Europe
Figure 5. Administrative capacity at Local Governments’ (LG) level
1.49%
4.80%
5.56%
5.65%
6.30%
6.40%
7.20%
7.46%
7.46%
7.58%
23.88%
29.69%
32.84%
33.60%
33.33%
27.42%
36.22%
13.60%
53.60%
53.73%
53.73%
60.61%
55.22%
42.19%
65.67%
61.60%
61.11%
66.94%
57.48%
80.00%
39.20%
38.81%
38.81%
31.82%
20.90%
28.13%
0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00%
Political Parties - CEE
Courts - Balkans
Assembly - Balkans
Executive - Balkans
Bureaucracy - Balkans
Political Parties - Balkans
Police - Balkans
Assembly - CEE
Executive - CEE
Bureaucracy - CEE
Police - CEE
Courts - CEE
Strong Average Weak
Figure 1. Institutional capacity at LG level

Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
verecunde.
Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
Title
Subtitle
Second subtitle
LOGOS
THE WEB OF ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTIONS
AND CORRUPTION CONTROL IN BRAZIL
ANA LUIZA ARANHA, PHD IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, UFMG. RESEARCHER AT FUNDAÇÃO GETÚLIO VARGAS AND
CONSULTANT AT TRANSPARÊNCIA INTERNACIONAL BRASIL
How to Measure Corruption?
Corruption as exclusion  There is NO PLAUSIBLE
JUSTIFICATION accepted by accountability
institutions
FOCUS
Institutions at anti-corruption agenda in Brazil:
Administrative Field  Office of the Comptroller
General (CGU); Federal Court of Accounts
(TCU); Government Ministries
Judicial Field  Public Prosecutor's Office
(MPF); Federal Police (PF); Federal Justice (JF)
Innovative Theoretical Claim
CORRUPTION means failed ACCOUNTABILITY,
which means failed DEMOCRACY – “the empowered
inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and
actions”
Methodology
Test claim of “No Interactions”  Inspections
from Public Lotteries Programme  CGU randomly
monitors federal funds transferred to municipalities
Longitudinal approach  followed for 12 years the
trajectory of the irregularities
Unprecedented Dataset:
Random sample from CGU
reports: 322 municipalities,
19.177 irregularities
Process-tracing  64 semi-
structured elite interviews
with those who work directly
in the control of corruption
Main Findings
• Did the irregularities generate any reaction (proceedings)
from the administrative and/or judicial arenas?
Objective
For the first time, map out the flux of corruption control
in the Brazilian web of accountability institutions:
Monitoring  Investigating  Sanctioning
Research Questions
1) Do accountability institutions interact in Brazil in
order to control corruption cases or the lack of
coordination prevails?
2) Which are the interaction patterns?
The web is able to coordinate itself in order to hold
public officials accountable (something new in the
country), but not in a homogeneous way across all
institutions (something the literature has missed).
The Flux
TCU-MPF
TCU-
Local
TCU-PF
CGU-PF
CGU-MPF
CGU-Min
MPF-Min
Judiciary
CGU-TCU
MPF-PF
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y Frequency

MODELS AND LESSONS FOR THE MULTIVARIATE
ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS BRIBERY RISK
ROBERT CLARK AND VIRNA DI PALMA, TRACE INTERNATIONAL
Models and Lessons for the Multivariate
Assessment of Business Bribery Risk
What Contributes to
Business Bribery Risk?
Is “Bribery Risk” Different
than “Corruption”?
What Can We Learn from
the Underlying Data?
• While an index’s top-level scores get
the most attention, carefully
analysing the underlying inputs can
significantly improve our
understanding:
• clarifying the scores’
meaning;
• testing the model’s rigour;
• improving the index’s
methodology.
• Corruption indexes are typically
produced by aggregating expert
opinions over a range of topics; their
aim is to capture an essential quality of
society or governance.
• The concept of bribery risk is both more
specific and more pragmatic: it concerns
only the practical danger of
encountering bribery demands.
• This has an implication for selecting
data sources: corruption is manifested
in the data, but risk is merely correlated
with the data.
• Evaluating bribery risk requires a
multi-dimensional perspective to
capture the full range of contributing
factors, including:
• the extent of opportunity;
• the degree of deterrence;
• the amount of transparency;
• the robustness of oversight.
www.TRACEinternational.org
Robert Clark andVirna Di Palma,TRACE International
www.TRACEinternational.org

2018 Youth ResearchEdge Posters from the OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum

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2018 Youth ResearchEdge Posters from the OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum