This document outlines a scenario for a crisis management exercise exploring the impacts of a major space weather event. The scenario is presented in two phases. Phase 1 deals with the initial warning period and impacts, including power grid disruptions. Phase 2 describes escalating impacts on critical infrastructure sectors like power, transportation and internet/communications. Participating groups are tasked with discussing response and coordination challenges across government and industry. The goal is to identify gaps and improve preparedness for a potential high-impact space weather crisis.

1. Crisis Management Scenario Exercise
APOLLO’S FURY
Prepared by Prof. Eric K. Stern, University at Albany

2. Purpose
• To encourage participants to explore an emerging risk scenario
with the potential to cause significant disruptions and cascading
effects across critical infrastructure sectors.
• To increase participants awareness with regard to the risk of
opportunistic attacks by adversaries taking advantage of societal
and government disruption/distraction.
• To identify potential gaps in public-private communication and
collaboration with regard to critical infrastructure crisis
management.
• To discuss ways of improving preparedness not only for crisis
response, but also for facilitating resilience and proactive, rapid
recovery.

3. Scenario Development
• Adapted from an exercise scenario originally developed for
the collaborative EU Joint Research Centre, Swedish Civil
Contingencies Agency, UK Met Office and US NOAA Space
Weather Prediction Center Workshop held November 29-30,
2016 in ISPRA Italy.
• The original scenario is described in the following
publication: Krausman, Andersson, Gibbs, and Murtaugh
(2016) Space Weather and Critical Infrastructures: Findings
and Outlooks. EU Commission JRC Science for Policy Report.

4. Format and Instructions
• A two part scenario will be presented. Each part of the scenario will
consist of a series of situation briefs delivered by powerpoint.
• Participants will alternate between work in small groups (Rapid
Reflection Teams) and plenary discussion moderated by the
Facilitator.
• Each team should begin by selecting a chair and a rapporteur.
• At the end of each scenario part, groups will be given tasks and
should be prepared to report briefly to the plenary following the
group work period.

5. Assignment
• You are an international member of a standing advisory group on
critical infrastructure risk and crisis management established by the
Government of Highlandia (a medium sized OECD country in North
Western Europe currently belonging to the EU but not to NATO).
• The advisory group consists of leading experts from government as
well as the private sector and academia. Note that members are
drawn not only from the national pool of talent, but also from key
international partner countries, major critical infrastructure
operators, and academic centers of scientific excellence.

6. Introduction to Space Weather
• https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/naturestrikes/spaceweath
er.jsp

7. Solar Fast Coronal Mass Ejection Detected

8. Phase 1: Warning Chain - 13 JAN 2018
• The Cabinet Office of Highlandia received the following joint
Space Storm Watch warning from :
NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center and the
UK Met Office Space Weather Operations Center,
 The warning was transmitted via national specialized agencies and
the European Space Agency to the Highlandia Cabinet Office Crisis
Management Unit, which in turn activated the
 Critical Infrastructure Risk and Crisis Management Advisory
Group

9. Extreme Space Storm Watch Issued!
• In conjunction with a high intensity solar “superstorm, a fast Coronal Mass Ejection (CME)
launched toward earth and is expected to arrive within 24 H.
• Initial indications suggest that the magnitude and terrestrial impact of the current event
could be significantly greater than that of the March 1989 and 2003 “Halloween” Storm
events (see below), though the impacts will depend on the orientation of the CME’s
magnetic field.
• The US NOAA and UK experts have thus far been hesitant to speculate regarding worst case
scenarios, but independent experts at the respected Highlandia Central University have
stated that their simulations suggest that should the CME’s magnetic field be oriented
southward, the geomagnetic disturbances will be many times more powerful than those
seen in recent major space storms and could approach those associated with the 1859
Carrington event (see below).

11. 2003 Halloween Solar Storm Event
• Oct. 19- Nov. 7, 2003 Solar ”Superstorm” with intense sunspots, solar
flares, Coronal Mass Ejection event etc.
• Connected with the complete loss of Japanese ADEOS 2 satellite carrying a
NASA Seawinds instrument (estimated cost of damages nearly
$800,000,000.)
• The solar storm interferes with high frequency radio communications,
increase radiation exposure to passengers and crew, and degrade GPS
navigation signals. Civilian aviation is rerouted away from the poles at
significant expense.
• Protective measures are taken in advance to protect the U.S. power grid.
• Power outage in Sweden (Malmoe); transformers damaged in S. Africa.
• Directional drilling for oil and gas in Alaska was disrupted.

12. 1859 “Carrington” Space Storm Event
Predicted Contemporary Impacts (Power Grid)
• A solar coronal mass ejection induced one of the largest geomagnetic storms on
record, September 1–2, 1859. Simulations suggest the GICs (geomagnetically
induced currents) produced could have been eight times that of the 2003
Halloween Storm.
• Observed by English astronomers Richard C. Carrington and Richard Hodgson, the
event caused telegraph systems across Europe and North America to fail, with
telegraph pylons throwing off sparks and shocking operators in some cases.
• Should such an event occur today, some estimates predict power outages for
~20-40 million people for durations ranging from 16 days to 1-2 years and a total
economic cost of 0.6 – 2.6 trillion USD.
• Major and potentially lasting disruptions of space-based and earth-based critical
infrastructures for communication and transportation (navigation and traffic
control) and cascading impacts on other sectors are also to be expected as well.

13. Phase I Group Assignment
Your team has been asked to prepare responses (of roughly 2
minutes) to each of the following questions:
• How serious is the current hazard warning and to what extent could critical
infrastructure systems be affected in your country?
• How well prepared are your countries and organizations for this type of
hazard?
• What steps would you recommend that governments and private sector
organizations in Highlandia and other OECD countries take in response to this
warning?
Rapporteurs should be prepared to brief the responses to the plenary.

14. Phase II 15 JAN 2018
• The UK MET/NOA/ESA warning has now been upgraded to an
extreme space weather alert. Experts fear that additional more
or less serious disruptive solar events may occur in the days to
come.
• The extreme geo-magnetic storm has resulted in severe critical
infrastructure disruptions and cascading effects across Europe,
with lesser but still significant impacts in other parts of the world.
• Impacts on the internet have been modest thus far (primarily
reduced bandwidth and isolated pockets of reduced access
associated with localized power outages and cable failures) but
experts fear that additional degradation is likely should the
severe space weather persist

15. • The power grid is currently functioning at roughly 45% in the European Union as a
whole, though the effects are very unevenly distributed within and across countries
and some of the shortfall is due to reversible protective measures.
• Thus far Highlandia has a relatively favorable situation– roughly 80% of the power
grid is functioning and much of the reduced capacity is due to measures taken to
protect key LPTs.
• Initial estimates indicate that over one hundred LPTs have been severely damaged
across Europe, particularly in countries with aging power grid infrastructure lacking
automatic protection or that failed to take active steps to protect their power grids
in response to the initial warning.
• LPT reserves and production capacity are very limited and severe shortages and
long delivery times (to be measured in months or longer) are expected.
Phase II 15 JAN 2018

16. Large Power Transformers (variations)

17. Phase II: 15 JAN 2018
• Satellite-based systems for navigation (e.g. GPS and Galileo ) and
telecommunication have been affected. Both space-based and ground-based
components (e.g. including critical telecommunications cables) have been
damaged and signal quality and reliability have been reduced.
• Thousands of flights have been cancelled or delayed due to problems with air
traffic control systems, avionics and radio-communications.
• Additional emergency aviation safety measures– including traffic density
reduction and temporarily shutting down civilian air traffic-- are being
considered in response to a near mid-air collision between two passenger jets
in Dutch airspace and several other ‘near misses’ in the typically densely
populated European air space.

18. Large numbers of cancelled and delayed
flights…

19. Phase II: 15 JAN 2018
• Rail traffic has been heavily disrupted across the continent due to
transformer failures, problems with GPS based traffic management systems
and failures of crucial switch components. A tragic “wrong side” signal
error in Western Highlandia caused a deadly collision between a freight
train and a passenger train with 47 dead and 102 wounded. It is too early
to be sure that this was caused by space weather, though a number of rail
experts have raised the possibility that this may have been the case.
• Road congestion is unusually heavy in some urban areas and strategic
corridors (due to problems with traffic management systems) while fuel
shortages are becoming acute in areas where power outages are interfering
with fuel distribution.
• Should these problems persist, major supply chain disruptions are to be
expected with regard to foodstuffs, petroleum products, industrial
materials etc.

20. Widespread disruptions of rail traffic…

21. Phase II: (January 15, ctd.)
• Power grid operators in several European OECD countries
report cyber attacks on power grid control systems which, in
some cases, interfered with vital measures to protect the
grid.
• In one Baltic state, simmering ethnic tensions are stoked by
false reports circulated on social media sites suggesting that
areas heavily populated by Russian-speaking minorities were
deliberately deprived of power in favor of rerouting capacity
to other areas.

22. Phase II: Group Assignment
Your team has been asked to prepare responses (of roughly 2 minutes) to each
of the following questions:
• What additional steps need to be taken by government and the private
sector in Highlandia (and other OECD countries) in response to these
developments as well as their foreseeable direct and indirect effects?
• Highlandia has three modular LPTs held in reserve and urgent requests have
come in via the ERCC mechanism from several hard hit neighboring EU (and
EEA) countries seeking to access them. How should Highlandia respond to
these requests?
• What other types of coordination and cooperation will be required across
sectors and levels of government to facilitate effective response and
recovery?

23. Discussion Questions
• What are the key “sense-making” challenges associated with the different phases of
a (e.g. space weather related) critical infrastructure crises?
• What are some of the most important and difficult decisions that would have to be
made by public and private sector actors?
• What types of messages would need to be communicated and what are the political,
operational and technical challenges associated with communicating in such a crisis?
• What types of coordination difficulties are to be expected?
• What are some of the likely challenges with regard to short and long term recovery?
• What types of questions are likely to be raised in terms of political and legal
accountability and liability?
• What can be done in advance to improve organizational and societal preparedness
and resilience for such an event?