CCCXG Global Forum March 2017 BG2 2018 Facilitative dialogue: Information needed to take stock of collective mitigation efforts under Article 4.1 by Harro van Asselt

1. OECD CCXG comments Harro van Asselt (University of Eastern Finland/Stockholm
Environment Institute)
Breakout Group 2: How can the 2018 Facilitative Dialogue (FD2018) inform the
preparation of NDCs?
1. The facilitative dialogue need not consist of a single moment or event during the
second week of COP24, but it can consist of various activities taking place
throughout 2018. Connecting several activities can strengthen the outcome of the
FD2018, and the message it contains. Related to that, the facilitative dialogue will not
be the only major climate-related event that could inform the preparation of NDCs. To
name but a few things we can expect in 2018:
- completion of the Paris rulebook;
- the IPCC’s special report on 1.5C;
- a high-level event organised under the Global Climate Action Agenda by the
Champions at COP24;
- meetings of the Major Economies Forum, the G7 and the G20;
- the High-Level Political Forum under Agenda 2030;
- and a non-state actor climate summit.
Each of these events has the potential to either lay the groundwork or amplify the
narrative coming out of the facilitative dialogue.
2. On non-Party stakeholders. Limiting the possible role of non-Party stakeholders in to
the collection of information, i.e. in the input stage of the facilitative dialogue, is
insufficient. The role of non-Party stakeholders is not just about figuring out where we
are, where we need to go and how we get there, but they are also the same actors
who can help prepare and implement NDCs once everyone is going back home.
They can further highlight ongoing climate action, and in some cases help hold
countries to account at the national level. Non-Party stakeholders should therefore
not be seen as an optional add-on to the design of the FD2018, but we should be
thinking of ways of making them an integral part of the process – including in the
output and outcome stages. We of course need to keep in mind the need to keep the
process simple, but this does not mean excluding a role for non-Party stakeholders.
3. What kind of collective assessment would be of most use to Parties to inform their
NDCs? As this is basically about connecting the collective to the individual, some
form of disaggregation will be crucial. For instance, if the facilitative dialogue includes
some form of assessment of mitigation potential and barriers, such an assessment
could be broken down by sectors, such as agriculture, transport and energy. But
assessments could also be broken down by greenhouse gas – highlighting actions to
tackle methane and HFCs in addition to CO2 – or by also including other short-lived
climate pollutants such as black carbon. For both methane and black carbon, the
Climate and Clean Air Coalition and UNEP have already highlighted the many
mitigation scaling up opportunities, and this information could be highlighted. Another
form of disaggregation could be by country groupings. This could mean focused
regional dialogues during and/or after 2018, but we could also think about whether it
makes sense to organise the dialogue by country groupings according to the type of
target or NDC they have adopted.
4. In thinking about disaggregation, one of the processes we can build on is the
organization of the Technical Expert Meetings, and the related preparation of
Technical Papers by the Secretariat, which break down mitigation opportunities by
sector. By offering examples of which mitigation opportunities can potentially be
scaled up, these meetings and the papers could help inspire Parties in the
preparation of new and more ambitious NDCs.

2. 5. It may be helpful for at least some Parties if any collective assessment would focus
on multiple time frames, looking not only at 2025/2030, but also the next NDC cycle
and the period up to 2050, informed by the mid-century strategies. In this way, the
assessment could potentially also be useful for longer-term planning.
6. In what other ways can the FD2018 help Parties prepare NDCs? First, the facilitative
dialogue could help identify lessons learned from existing NDC preparation and
implementation processes, trying to help answer the question: how can we get better
NDCs, and how to improve their clarity, transparency and understanding (CTU)? It
may be that such a process will highlight not only existing capacity gaps in some
Parties, but it may also highlight some best practices among current NDCs.
7. Second, the FD2018 should not just be seen as a technical process assessing the
emissions gap, mitigation opportunities, and barriers, but also as a process for giving
strong and positive political signals and for building mutual trust. In this regard, it will
be important to think about how the FD2018 can send a positive signal. It can do so
in several ways:
- It could highlight successes in NDC implementation thus far. Nothing in a
facilitative process should stop us from naming high performers or overachievers,
and this could potentially create an incentive for a race to the top.
- It could also highlight mitigation action – whether completed, in progress or
committed – by non-Party stakeholders. The high-level champions’ work will have
a key role to play in distilling and presenting this information.
- It could further form an occasion to announce new cooperative initiatives
involving Parties and/or non-Party stakeholders.
- It could also form an opportunity for some Parties to announce scaled up support
these actions. Even though it may be unclear whether the dialogue itself includes
means of implementation, the extent to which the outcomes can help Parties with
their NDCs is related to it.
- And finally, it offers an important opportunity to highlight positive interlinkages
between climate action and Agenda 2030 and the achievement of the SDGs. For
many Parties this will be important, as climate change mitigation will not
necessarily be the main driver for climate action.
8. In terms of outputs of the FD2018, beyond reports by the Secretariat summarising
the discussions and synthesising options, we can think of a CMA decision that could
do at least the following:
- The decision could state the emissions gap based on the latest science,
underline the need for further ambition, and welcome action underway.
- The decision could also invite Parties that are willing to do so to revise current
NDCs before 2020. This would give at least some Parties an opportunity to do so;
- The decision could further identify and encourage specific sectoral or regional
opportunities for mitigation in the short term that bring about larger sustainable
development benefits, such as fossil fuel subsidy reform or tackling short-lived
climate pollutants.
- The decision could also highlight general gaps in information, requesting Parties
to fill those gaps and indicate capacity constraints where appropriate. Although
the CTU guidance needs to be finalised by 2018, I think it is likely that this
guidance needs to be updated based on learning by doing, and the facilitative
dialogue could distil useful lessons in this regard.
- The decision could request information on how new or updated NDCs will reflect
enhanced ambition by Parties.
- The decision could once again invite Parties to engage in new cooperative
initiatives, and strengthen existing ones.

3. While in the end technical outcomes can be helpful, I think it is ultimately mainly the
political narrative coming out of 2018 that will be helpful in preparing new NDCs.