2. Adria Warren
Foley & Lardner
awarren@foley.com
Tynan Olechny
PYA
tolechny@pyapc.com
Curtis Bernstein
Pinnacle Healthcare Consulting
cbernstein@askphc.com
Oncology Business Transactional Issues –
At the Point of Transaction and Over the Life
of an Affiliation
3. Adria Warren
Foley & Lardner
awarren@foley.com
Fair Market Value –
Why It Matters
4. Page 3
Fair Market Value
In the healthcare context,
-- FMV is generally defined to mean FMV for actual and
necessary items furnished or services rendered, based upon
an arm’s length transaction, and without taking into account,
directly or indirectly, the value of volume of any past or future
referrals or the ability to influence the flow of business
generated between the parties. (70 Fed. Reg., 4858, 4866
(2005))
-- Commercial Reasonableness is generally defined to
mean a sensible, prudent business arrangement from the
perspective of the particular parties involved, even in the
absence of referrals (69 Fed. Reg. 16093 (2004))
5. Page 4
FMV – Why It Matters Regulatory Framework
Federal Anti-Kickback Statute
Federal Stark Law
False Claims Act
Civil Monetary Penalty Law
Tax Exemption Issues
Private Benefit and Private Inurement
Intermediate Sanctions
State Laws
6. Page 5
FMV – Why It Matters Anti-Kickback Statute
Prohibits knowing and willful offer or receipt of
remuneration intended to induce or arrange
for referrals of business paid for by
Medicare/Medicaid programs
Civil monetary and criminal penalties
CMP of $50,000 per violation
Criminal penalties: $25,000 per violation
and/or up to five years in jail
Exclusion
7. Page 6
FMV – Why It Matters Anti-Kickback Statute
Any purpose test and problem of mixed motives
ACA § 6402(f)(2): violation does not require actual
knowledge of AKS or specific intent to commit a
violation
ACA § 6402(f)(1): claim for items or services resulting
from AKS violation constitutes a false claim under the
False Claims Act
Safe Harbors provide immunity
Safe harbors are not required
Many safe harbors require FMV and commercially
reasonable remuneration
8. Page 7
FMV – Why It Matters Anti-Kickback Statute
Is the purchase price a disguised kickback from the buyer
(overpayment) or seller (underpayment) to induce post-
deal referrals?
Valuation may help negate an adverse inference of
improper intent
To the extent that a payment exceeds FMV, it can be
inferred that the excess amount over FMV is intended as
payment for the referral of health-program business.
U.S. v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985)
9. Page 8
FMV – Why It Matters Stark Law
In general, if a physician has a direct or indirect financial
relationship with a DHS entity:
The physician may not make a referral to that entity for the
furnishing of designated health services (DHS) for which
payment otherwise may be made under Medicare
And the entity may not bill Medicare, an individual, or another
payor for the DHS performed pursuant to the prohibited referral
"Designated health services" include all inpatient and outpatient hospital
services; lab; imaging; pharmacy; DME; radiation therapy; PT; occupational
and speech therapy; parenteral and enteral drugs, nutrients, and supplies;
prosthetics; orthotics; and home health services
… unless a specific exception applies
10. Page 9
FMV – Why It Matters Stark Law
$15,000 civil monetary penalty assessed against physician for
each prohibited referral
DHS entity must refund DHS billed pursuant to a prohibited
referral
$15,000 civil monetary penalty assessed against DHS entity for
billing for service rendered pursuant to a prohibited referral,
unless it can show that it did not have actual knowledge and did
not act in reckless disregard or deliberate ignorance of the
prohibited referral
$100,000 civil monetary penalty for circumvention schemes
Requirement to report to HHS financial relationships with
physicians upon request; $10,000 penalty for failure to report
Potential exclusion
11. Page 10
FMV – Why It Matters Stark Law
Strict liability/zero tolerance law
Burden of proof is on defendant
Violations are not remedied until referring physician/DHS
entity repays excess compensation or arrangement is
terminated
Exceptions:
Isolated Transactions
Personal Services Arrangements
Bona Fide Employment
Rental of Space, Equipment
Fair Market Value Compensation
Indirect Compensation Arrangements
Multiple exceptions have fair market value requirement
12. Page 11
FMV – Why It Matters Stark Law 2016
2016 MPFS Nov. 16, 2015 – Helped reduce technical violations
Clarifications:
Existing policy
Additional explanation where it appears stakeholders would benefit
from clarification
New Exceptions:
Assistance to a physician to compensate a non-physician
practitioner
Timeshare arrangements
Revisions to existing definitions, exceptions, and other rules:
Signature requirement
Unlimited holdover arrangements
Renewing arrangements that qualify for the exception for FMV
compensation
13. Page 12
FMV – Why It Matters False Claims Act
Permits private persons -- “relators” or “whistleblowers,” to
recover damages on behalf of the United States from, any
person who:
Knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval;
Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
Conspires to [defraud the government]; or
Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the government or knowingly conceals…
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the government.
Violations of the FCA are punishable by up to $21,583 per claim,
plus treble damages – more than doubled in 2016.
14. Page 13
FMV – Why It Matters Tax Exemption
IRC § 501(c)(3)
Entities tax-exempt under this section must operate exclusively for tax
exempt purposes and not engage in compensation practices that result
in private inurement
Penalties for non-compliance
Intermediate sanctions
Loss of tax exemption
Many hospitals, health systems, academic medical centers are tax
exempt
General guidelines
Compensation to physicians should be FMV for services provided
Total compensation paid should be reasonable for the market and
responsibilities
IRC § 162 – “reasonable” compensation is the amount that would ordinarily
be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances
15. Page 14
FMV – Why It Matters State Laws
State Law Issues
State self-referral laws
May apply to a broader scope of relationships than Stark (not just
physician financial relationships)
May apply to a broader scope of services than “DHS”
State anti-kickback issues
May apply with respect to all services, not just those payable by
Medicare or other Federal healthcare programs
May include “fee splitting” prohibitions
16. Page 15
FMV – Why It Matters
2005 OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance
for Hospitals
Arrangements under which hospitals (1) provide physicians
with items or services for free or less than fair market value,
(2) relieve physicians of financial obligations they otherwise
would incur, or (3) inflate compensation paid to physicians for
items or services, pose significant risk. In such
circumstances, an inference arises that the remuneration
may be in exchange for generating business. (70 Fed. Reg.,
4858, 4866 (Jan. 31, 2005))
17. Page 16
FMV – Why It Matters Enforcement
2015 OIG Fraud Alert: Physician Comp Arrangements May
Result in Significant Liability
Physicians who enter into compensation arrangements, such as medical
directorships, must ensure those arrangements reflect FMV for bona fide
services the physicians actually provide
Arrangement may violate AKS if even one purpose is to compensate the
physician for referrals
Government recently reached settlements with 12 individual physicians who
entered into questionable medical directorship and office staff arrangements
OIG believed it took into account referrals and did not reflect FMV because the
physicians did not actually provide the services contemplated
The “Yates Memo” (September 9, 2015)
DOJ policy seeks individual accountability in corporate wrongdoing
18. Page 17
FMV – Why It Matters
Fair Market Value is central to
the compliance analysis;
payments must be FMV,
commercially reasonable, and
cannot vary with anticipated
referrals.
19. Page 18
Outpatient Hospital Site Neutrality
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BiPA Section 603)
Budget compromise of November 2015 contained key provision
excluding any new off-campus hospital outpatient department (HOPD)
from Medicare’s outpatient hospital prospective payment system
(OPPS)
CMS Final Rule November 1, 2016
20. Page 19
Outpatient Hospital Site Neutrality
Highlights of the Final Rule
Exempt (grandfathered sites):
HOPDs in operation and billing Medicare under OPPS prior to
November 2, 2015
OPPS billing permitted for new off-campus departments that are
“dedicated emergency departments”
Cancer hospitals
“Mid-build” protection
Minor protection for those few operational HOPDs that provided
services but didn’t bill prior to November 2, 2015
21. Page 20
Outpatient Hospital Site Neutrality
Highlights of the Final Rule
Non-Exempt (non-grandfathered) off-patient sites:
Will continue to be able to bill on an institutional bill
Payment will be at 50% of OPPS rates, for now
Lose outlier payments, SCH and other benefits
Relocation kills exception!
For addresses with multiple units, unit # is part of address
Limited exceptions due to extraordinary circumstances (i.e., natural
disaster)
CMS states that non-exempted off-campus HOPDs would
continue to be considered as part of the hospital and deemed
provider-based
HRSA position still important
22. Page 21
Repeal, Replace, or Retreat?
Continuing relevance of the ACA?
Medicaid & coverage expansion
CMMI, other innovation models
ACOs
Other payment reform? MACRA?
Antitrust & Transactions
Enforcement
Tax Reform, Cash Repatriation
27. Page 26
Collaboration Opportunities
Clinical Affiliation
Agreement for organizations to collaborate on an initiative or provide a specific service
together that may involve local, regional, or national partners
Regional Collaborative
Flexible umbrella structure for partnering on specific initiatives and building the foundation of
potential future integration; often encompasses many independent organizations in a common
geographic area
Accountable Care Organization
Independent entity formed for entering into risk-based contracts; owned by constituent
organizations; creates shared accountability among participating providers
Clinically Integrated Healthcare Network
Collection of hospitals that enter into joint payer contracts to improve care coordination and
clinical outcomes
Mergers & Acquisitions
Formal purchase of one organization’s assets by another or the combination of two
organizations’ assets into a single entity
29. Page 28
Physician Employment Considerations
Base compensation
wRVU or other productivity-based compensation model
Professional net revenue model
In-office ancillary services
Quality/performance compensation
Chemotherapy administration supervision compensation
Mid-level supervision compensation
Practices losses
30. Page 29
Physician Employment (continued)
Compensation level entirely disproportionate to productivity
level
Example: productivity metrics (e.g., wRVUs) below median,
but total compensation exceeds 90th percentile
Unusual compensation
Example: In addition to salary and incentive compensation,
physician receives atypical forms of compensation (i.e., car
payment paid by hospital)
Compensation exceeds collections
Example: Physician is compensated at levels that far
exceed the collections associated with his/her personally
performed services
Consideration of benefits
31. Page 30
Physician Employment (continued)
Hematology/
Oncology
Radiation
Oncology
Source: Medical Group Management Association
32. Page 31
Professional Services Agreements (PSA)
Arrangements by which hospitals enter into agreements with
physicians to acquire necessary professional services
Physicians retain practice entity
Agreements for clinical services may include professional
staffing, call coverage, clinical and risk management
leadership, infusion, and midlevel supervision
Agreements may also include administrative services such as
medical directorships, service line development, and/or
coordination
Other potential services may include clinical research, etc.
Physicians provide professional services and hospital bills and
collect for professional and technical services
Hospital hires or leases clinical staff and purchases or leases
space and equipment
33. Page 32
Co-Management Agreement
Hospital and physicians enter into an agreement where physicians are jointly
responsible with hospital for managing a defined service line
Purpose is to recognize and appropriately reward achievement of defined
goals and responsibilities typically associated with developing, managing,
improving service line quality and efficiency
Compensation may not take into consideration the volume or value of
referrals
Benefits include
Physician engagement
Focus on quality, efficiency, and outcomes
Physicians have authority to implement change
Physicians may remain independent and collect professional fees
Physicians have greater day-to-day oversight
Potential of physicians to have ownership interest in management company
34. Page 33
Co-Management Legal Structures
Direct contract model
Agreement directly between physician/medical group and
hospital
Separate company
“NewCo” or management company formed to execute the
co-management agreement with the hospital and to
manage the service line
May be physician-owned or a joint-venture with
physicians/hospital
Physicians provide initial capitalization of NewCo (or
physicians and hospital if management company is to be
jointly owned)
35. Page 34
Co-Management Services
Leadership
• Medical Director
• Advisory
Committee
• Coordinating &
reporting to
hospital
Budget &
Finance
• Budget
development
• Financial
oversight &
monitoring
Strategic
Planning
• Development/
implementation
of service line
• New program
development
• Strategic
planning process
36. Page 35
Co-Management Services (continued)
Operations
• Service line
operations
• Staffing &
scheduling
• Patient & staff
work flow
• Equipment
procurement &
materials
management
• Credentialing
• Case
management
• Policies &
procedures
Human
Resources
• Review of staffing
levels &
recruitment &
retention plans
• Input on the
appointment &
evaluation of
clinical & non-
clinical staff
Other
• Medical staff-
related activities,
including
committee
participation
• Patient &
community
outreach &
education
• Assistance with
accreditation
37. Page 36
Co-Management Compensation Structures
Base Compensation
Hospital pays a fixed base fee for provision of pre-defined
management services or limits compensation to a maximum
amount based upon actual hours worked at a pre-determined rate
Fee must be consistent with time and effort associated with the
scope of services provided
Incentive Fee or Bonus
Hospital pays an at-risk incentive bonus if the service line meets
pre-defined, mutually agreed upon, objectively measurable
performance targets (quality, satisfaction, efficiency etc.)
38. Page 37
Incentive Compensation
Achievement of quality, operational efficiency,
patient/satisfaction goals
Baseline levels determined using the facility’s historical and
clinical data and/or comparable national or regional data, with
incentives paid to reflect incremental improvement
May be targeted toward identified areas of need
Can be based on improvement or on achievement of specific
targets
Incentives should be objective, verifiable, supported by
credible medical evidence, and individually tracked
Provide for partial payment for attainment of incremental goals
39. Page 38
Key Considerations
Common elements include:
Base compensation
Productivity threshold (i.e., wRVU level)
Incentive compensation for productivity
Incentive compensation for quality outcomes
Sign-on or retention bonus
Compensation for excess call coverage
Compensation for supervision or teaching services
Administrative compensation
Hospitals and other organizations continue to utilize complex
compensation models, often with multiple layers of compensation
for multiple services sometimes referred to as “stacking”
40. Page 39
Assessing the Risk
• More moving parts
• Higher total compensation
• Ensuring the correct
benchmarks are considered
• Assessing each part and
the whole package
How risky is this agreement?
=
41. Page 40
Employment Considerations
Proper understanding and use of survey data (compensation per wRVU,
compensation-to-collections ratio, etc.)
Reliance on data from one survey versus multiple surveys
What data are represented/included in each survey?
wRVU data and the “match” to compensation percentile
Is there a “safe” percentile for compensation – 50th percentile/75th percentile?
(settlements of the last year say: perhaps not)
Historical compensation--what does it mean for FMV?
Commercial reasonableness
Compensation exceeds collections
Ex: Physician is compensated at levels that far exceed the collections associated with
his/her personally performed services
Unusual compensation
Ex: In addition to salary and incentive compensation, physician receives atypical forms of
compensation (i.e., car payment paid by hospital)
42. Page 41
PSA and Co-Management Considerations
Ensuring that compensation matches duties (e.g., clinical versus
administrative)
Increased demand on physicians
The 80-hour work week
Compensation for identifiable services
Are we paying for the same thing twice?
Survey data – do they include compensation for everything for which
we are planning to pay?
Using the correct survey(s)
Commercial reasonableness
43. Page 42
Compensation for Research/Consulting Activities
Sunshine reporting requirements when compensation originates from
a manufacturer (pharma, medical device, etc.)
Importance of clinical research activities in the current world – e.g.,
to meet Cancer Center Standards
Defining the scope of a physician’s activities - e.g., investigator
versus physician who merely identifies subjects for a study; speaker
versus advisor on product development
Source of compensation affects the stakes– pharma funding,
hospital/health system funding, laboratory service provider (registry
study), etc.
Keeping in mind guidance from OIG advisory opinions and
compliance guidance
Reasonable payment structure – e.g., annual or monthly stipend, per
subject amount, percentage of research budget, fee for service,
hourly compensation, etc.
46. Page 45
Task vs. Time-Based Valuations
Need to align incentives for providers
Fee for service does not work in a world of bundled payment
reimbursement
Quantifying actual time spent managing costs is
impossible
Outside of meetings and other administrative-only time
Determining the ability to reduce cost has been studied
by actuaries, regulators, hospitals, and providers
Limited data on tying improved performance to reduced cost
9
48. Page 47
Task vs. Time-Based Valuations
Emergency Room Visits
in Last 30 Days of Life
Metrics for improvement
Develop interventions to decrease ED usage
Develop tools to analyze admissions within 21 days of
chemo
Proper use of palliative care
9
10% 20%
49. Page 48
Establishing Metrics
Quality measures
CMS
Specialty organizations (ACoS, ASTRO, ASCO, ACP)
AMA – PCPI (Physician Consortium for Performance Improvement)
NCCN
NCQA
NQF
Private payers
Satisfaction measures
Patient satisfaction survey results
Staff satisfaction survey results
Program development
Achievement of identified milestones (not measured by volumes)
Process of care measurements
8
50. Page 49
Midlevel Supervision Compensation
Considerations for midlevel supervision compensation
Number of midlevels supervised (i.e., state requirements)
Midlevel productivity
Number of hours spent supervising
Benchmark considerations
Prevalence of supervision
Number of midlevels supervised
Method of compensation
7
51. Page 50
Infusion Supervision Compensation
Considerations for chemotherapy administration supervision
Service providers (i.e., MDs or MLPs)
Scope of practice requirements
Oncology and non-oncology (i.e., rheumatology, GI) services
Location and number of infusion centers supervised
Infusion center hours
Infusion center volumes
Multiple groups providing services
Benchmark considerations
6
53. Page 52
Value of Data
Cost to compile reports
Personnel/Staffing
Technology/Software Expenses
Start-Up/Infrastructure Costs
Key Drivers of Value for Data
Type of Data Providing – Breaking Down the
Record
Aggregated Categorical Data
Observation Variable Data
Amount of Data Provided
4
54. Page 53
Valuing Other Intangible Assets
Work Force in Place
Medical Records / Data
Brand Names
Licenses
Non-Competes
3
55. Page 54
Read the fine print
Valuation:
Duration
Assumptions
2