2. - 2
Concept of safety (ICAO) doc 9859
• Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to
persons or property damage is reduced to, and
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through
a continuing process of hazard identification and risk
management.
3. SAFETY PERSPECTIVE
– Services given to the Airlines at AAI airports are safe
– Government is satisfied with the safety levels of AAI
– DGCA is satisfied with the safety levels of AAI
– Commitment to provide continuous safe services or
improve safe services
– Deploy right quantity and quality of manpower at
airports.
– Assess training, advanced training, refresher training
for manpower at airports.
4. What is a
Safety Management System
Safety Culture
Leadership
Commitment to resources
Balanced decisions
People Management
Willingness to learn
Willingness to share expertise
……………….
5. What is a
Safety Management System
Methodology
Documentation
Regulatory Compliance
Performance Indicators
Measuring Progress
Reviewing Processes
……………….
6. Change management is an element of the Safety Assurance
component of the SMS framework.
Change management is considered a proactive hazard
identification activity in an SMS.
A change management process is designed to ensure risk
management is applied to any Change of infrastructure (e.g.
airport expansion), Change of Operation (e.g. implementation of
bigger series of aircraft) or change of regulation (e.g. Annex-
14/DGCA –CAR) that have the potential to affect established
operational processes, procedures, products and services.
Change Management
7. Change Management
Changes made at airports most likely will impact Air Traffic
Operations and Procedures
• Runway Extensions
• Building Construction
• Taxiway Changes or Additions
Changes need to be identified upfront and early and assessed
in the design early to ensure proper mitigation are in place
Prior to implementing changes describe the arrangements to
ensure safety performance
8. Change Management
Process to identify & manage change
Identify potential hazards during
planning process
Assess & mitigate risk prior to change
implementation
9. Legislation
Rule 83(2) of Aircraft Rules 1937
While a license is in force, no
alterations to the landing area or to
the buildings or other structures on
the aerodrome which may affect
the safety of aircraft shall be
undertaken save with the previous
approval of the Director-General
and application for such approval
shall be addressed to the Director-
General and shall be accompanied
by full particulars with plans of any
such alterations including
alterations to surrounding
obstructions which may affect the
safety of aircraft.
10. h DGCA CIVIL AVIATION REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 1 – GENERAL SERIES 'C' PART I
a) identify changes within the organization
which may affect established processes and
services;
b) establish arrangements to ensure safety
performance prior to implementing changes;
and
c) eliminate or modify safety risk controls that
are no longer needed due to changes in the
operational environment
11. AAI Corporate Safety Management Manual
• AAI has developed a Corporate Safety
Management Manual wherein procedures
a) to ensure safety during concept phase, while
the change is in process and
b) At the time commissioning of a change in
infrastructure and procedure have been
explained.
12. Change Management
Managing change is a constant and familiar factor
in the ongoing expansion and development
Without change, there is no growth and no
development.
With change, there is always risk, but also
opportunity.
Adopting a formal change management process
will help you achieve your objectives and
maximise opportunity while minimising risk.
13. Change Management
Change can be regarded as a hazard
Failure to consider how change would
impacts, is a major source of problems
The solution is to follow the
established process to manage the
desired and undesired consequences
of change
Safety magnitude of Change must be
assessed by using Safety Case
Assessment and Reporting System
(SCARS)
14. Changes and Activities Requiring an Assessment
any change which has potential to impact safety;
change of category in facilities or equipment;
changes in a procedure documented in the
Aerodrome Manual;
changes to organisational structure or staffing
arrangements;
introduction of new entrant airlines;
introduction of new aircraft types; and
delivery of major projects
15. Change Management Process
Aviation organizations experience permanent
change due to expansion, introduction of new
equipment or procedures.
Changes can have the following output:
Introduce new hazards.
Impact the appropriateness of risk mitigation.
Impact the effectiveness of risk mitigation
16. Change management and
risk management
Whether change is to be brought about
through new projects, or through
modifications to operating procedures, it will
involve risks.
Strong link between change management and
risk management—the two processes support
each other and should be used in conjunction.
17. Risk Management
Risk management - The identification, analysis and
elimination (and/or mitigation to an acceptable or tolerable
level) of those hazards, as well as the subsequent risks, that
threaten the viability of an organisation.
Risk Management consists of the following three elements:
• Hazard identification
• Risk assessment
• Risk mitigation
21. Risk Analysis
Important to distinguish between:
Hazard – a condition
Consequence – result
Risk – likelihood & severity of the consequence
Analyzing risk involves the consideration of
both the likelihood and the severity of any
adverse consequences.
22. Hazard – Condition, object or activity with the
potential to cause injuries to personnel,
damage to equipment or structures, loss of
material, or reduction of ability to perform a
prescribed function.
Consequence– Potential outcome(s) of the
hazard.
A wind of 15 knots blowing directly across the
runway is a hazard.
The potential that a pilot may not be able to
control the aircraft during takeoff or landing is one
of the consequences of the hazard.
definition
23. Hazard Identification
A hazard is any real or potential condition…
that can result in injury, illness, or death to
people; damage to, or loss of, a system
(hardware or software), equipment, or
property; and/or damage to the operating
environment.
25. Examples of natural hazards
Severe weather or climatic
events:
hurricanes, major winter
storms, drought, tornadoes,
thunderstorms lighting, and
wind shear.
Adverse weather conditions:
Icing, freezing precipitation,
heavy rain, snow, winds, and
restrictions to visibility.
26. Examples of natural hazards
Geophysical events:
earthquakes, volcanoes,
tsunamis, floods and landslides.
Geographical conditions:
adverse terrain or large bodies
of water.
Environmental events:
wildfires, wildlife activity, and
insect or pest infestation.
Public health events:
epidemics of influenza or other
diseases.
27. Examples of technical hazards
Deficiencies concerning:
aircraft and aircraft components,
systems, subsystems and related
equipment.
an organization’s facilities, tools,
and related equipment.
facilities, systems, sub-systems and
related equipment that are
external to the organization.
28. Examples of economic hazards
Major trends related to:
Growth.
Recession.
Cost of material or equipment.
Etc.
29. Hazard identification
In order to identify hazards, consider:
Design factors, including equipment and task
design.
Procedures and operating practices, including
documentation and checklists.
Communications, including means, terminology
and language.
30. Hazard identification
Organizational factors, such as company
policies for recruitment, training,
remuneration and allocation of resources.
Work environment factors, such as ambient
noise and vibration, temperature, lighting
and protective equipment and clothing.
31. Hazard identification
Regulatory factors, including the applicability and
enforceability of regulations; certification of
equipment, personnel and procedures; and the
adequacy of oversight.
Defences including detection and warning systems,
and the extent to which the equipment is resilient
against errors and failures.
Human performance, including medical conditions
and physical limitations.
32. Sources of hazard identification
Internal
Flight Data Analysis
voluntary reporting system
Audits and surveys
External
Accident reports
State mandatory occurrence
system
As a reminder
Predictive
Proactive
Reactive
33. Hazard identification
By whom?
By anybody
By designated personnel
How?
Through formal processes
Depends on the organization
When?
Anytime
Under specific conditions
34. Hazard analysis
ABC of hazard analysis
A – State the generic hazard (hazard statement)
Airport construction
B – Identify specific components of the hazard
Construction equipment
Closed taxiways
C – Naturally leading to specific consequence(s)
Aircraft colliding with construction equipment
Aircraft taking wrong taxiway
35. Hazard analysis
Efficient and safe operations or provision of service
require a constant balance between production goals...
maintaining regular aerodrome operations during a
runway construction project
...and safety goals
maintaining existing margins of safety in aerodrome
operations during runway construction project
Aviation workplaces may contain hazards which may
not be cost-effective to address even when operations
must continue.
36. Common Airside Hazards
Types of Hazards we face:
Vehicles
Pedestrians
Weather
Dangerous Goods
F.O.D
Runway incursions
Fuel spillages
Other Hazards
37. hazard: small foreign object debris (FOD) on
runway
effect: FOD can interfere with normal airport operation
severity: minor (depends on the size and material of FOD)
likelihood: frequent (several times per week)
risk: medium to pick up the FOD
Common Airside Hazards
38. hazard: jet blast
Effect : damage to other vehicles, blows off various
debris to runways and taxiways
Severity : major
Likelihood : probable (once per month)
Risk : high
Mitigations : move parking spots of planes further from busy
roads so that planes can be placed on a safe
distance from taxiways, runways, and roads used
by other vehicles; clear territory and warn
everybody in the nearby area before a plane starts
engines
Common Airside Hazards
39. hazard: power loss
Effect : system is down, lights are off, only visual
approach is used in assessment of situation on
the airfield
Severity : hazardous
Likelihood : extremely remote (once every 10-15 years) 12
Risk : medium
Mitigations : have a reserve source of power not dependent
on the main source; mobilize all human
resources to fix the problem as soon as possible
and help in dealing with planes still operating in
the air
and on the airfield
Common Airside Hazards
40. hazard: unauthorized vehicle on the airfield
Effect : creates potential danger of runway incursion
Severity : catastrophic
Likelihood : extremely remote (once every 10-15 years)
Risk : high
Mitigations : require clearance before any vehicle can
enter the airfield; get the vehicle out of the
airfield as soon as possible
Common Airside Hazards
49. Risk
Definition of risk
Risk management
Risk probability
Risk severity
Risk assessment and tolerability
Risk control/mitigation
50. Definition of risk
Risk – The assessment, expressed in terms of
predicted probability and severity, of the
consequence(s) of a hazard taking as reference
the worst foreseeable situation.
A wind of 15 knots blowing directly across the runway
is a hazard.
The potential that a pilot may not be able to control
the aircraft during takeoff or landing is one of the
consequences of the hazard.
The assessment of the consequences of the potential
loss of control of the aircraft by the pilot expressed in
terms of probability and severity is the risk.
51. 51
Levels of Risk
High - Catastrophic hazards – Unacceptable level of risk –
Proposal cannot be implemented or activity continued
without mitigation.
Medium Risk – Minimal acceptable level – Proposal may be
implemented or activity can continue, but tracking and
management are required.
Low Risk – Target level of risk – Acceptable without
restriction or limitation. Hazards not required to be
managed but are documented.
52. Risk
Risk is the composite of the predicted likelihood
or probability and the severity of each possible
consequence of each identified hazard.
Risk LevelProbability Severity
Consequence
Active Failure
Hazard Intolerable
Tolerable
Acceptable
53. Risk management
What is it?
The identification, analysis and elimination, and/or
mitigation to an acceptable level of risks that threaten
the capabilities of an organization.
What is the objective?
Aims at a balanced allocation of resources to address
all risks and viable risk control and mitigation.
Why is it important?
A key component of safety management systems.
Data-driven approach to safety resources allocation,
thus defensible and easier to explain.
54. Risk management
Intolerable region
class - I
Tolerable region
Acceptable
region
The risk cannot be
justified under any
circumstances
Drive risks toward the
broadly acceptable region
Risk reduction not likely to
be required as resources
likely to be grossly
disproportionate to the
reduction achieved
As
Low
As
Reasonably
Practicable
Class - II
Class - III
Class - IV
Residual risk tolerable
only if further risk
reduction is impracticable
55. Risk Analysis
Risk Probability
Probability – The chance that a situation of
danger might occur
Risk Severity
Severity – The possible consequences of a
situation of danger taking as reference that
worst foreseeable situation.
57. Risk probability
Questions for assessing the probability of an
occurrence:
Is there a history of occurrences like the one being
assessed, or is the occurrence an isolated event?
What other equipment, or similar type components,
might have similar defects?
58. Risk probability
… questions such as:
What number of operating or maintenance
personnel must follow the procedure (s) in
question?
How frequently is the equipment or procedure
under assessment used?
59. Risk CRITERIA
Severity of
occurrence
Meaning Value
Catastrophic Equipment destroyed
Multiple deaths
A
Hazardous A large reduction in safety margin, physical distress or a workload that operator
cannot be relied upon to perform their task accurately or completely.
Serious injury
Major equipment damage
B
Major A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of operator to
cope with adverse operating conditions as a result of increase in workload, or as
a result of conditions impairing their efficiency.
Serious incident
Injury to persons
C
Minor Nuisance
Operating limitations
Use of Emergency procedures
Minor incident
D
Negligible Little consequences E
60. Risk probability
Probability of occurrence
Meaning
Qualitative
definition Value
Frequent
Occasional
Remote
Improbable
Extremely
improbable
Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently)
Likely to occur some times (has occurred infrequently)
Unlikely, but possible to occur (has occurred rarely)
Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred)
Almost inconceivable that the event will occur
5
4
3
2
1
62. Risk severity
Define the severity in terms of consequences for:
Property
Finance
Liability
People
Environment
Image
Public confidence
63. Risk severity
Questions for assessing the severity of an
occurrence:
How many lives may be lost?
Employees
Passengers
Bystanders
General public
What is the environmental impact?
Spill of fuel or other hazardous product
Physical disruption of natural habitat
64. Risk severity
… questions such as:
What is the severity of the property or financial damage?
Direct operator property loss
Damage to aviation infrastructure
Third party damage
Financial impact and economic impact for the State
Are there organizational, management or regulatory implications
that might generate larger threats to public safety?
What are the likely political implications and/or media interest?
65. Risk severity
A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a
workload such that the operators cannot be relied upon to
perform their tasks accurately or completely.
Serious injury.
Major equipment damage.
Equipment destroyed.
Multiple deaths.
A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the
ability of the operators to cope with adverse operating
conditions as a result of increase in workload, or as a result
of conditions impairing their efficiency.
Serious incident.
Injury to persons.
Nuisance.
Operating limitations.
Use of emergency procedures.
Minor incident.
Little consequences
Meaning
Severity of occurrences
ValueAviation definition
Catastrophic
Hazardous
Major
Minor
Negligible
A
B
C
D
E
66. Risk assessment
Risk severity
Risk
probability Catastrophic
A
Major
C
Minor
D
Negligible
E
Hazardous
BB
Frequent 5
Occasional 4
Remote 3
Improbable 2
Extremely
improbable
1
5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
67. Risk tolerability
Assessment risk
index
Suggested criteria
Intolerable region
Tolerable region
Acceptable
region
5A, 5B, 5C, 4A,
4B, 3A
Unacceptable under the
existing circumstances
3E, 2D, 2E, 1A,
1B ,1C, 1D, 1E Acceptable
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D,
4E, 3B, 3C, 3D,
2A, 2B, 2C
Acceptable based on risk
mitigation. It might require
management decision
Risk management
68. Risk control/mitigation
Definition(s)
Mitigation – Measures to address the potential
hazard or to reduce the risk probability or
severity.
Risk mitigation = Risk control
(Mitigate – To make milder, less severe or less
harsh)
69. Risk Control = Risk Mitigation
A major component of any safety system is the
defenses (controls) put in place to protect
people, property or the environment.
These defenses are used to reduce the likelihood
or severity of the consequences associated with
any given hazard or condition.
70. Risk control/mitigation
Strategies
Avoidance – The operation or activity is cancelled
because risks exceed the benefits of continuing
the operation or activity.
Operations into an aerodrome surrounded by complex
geography and without the necessary aids are
cancelled.
71. Risk control/mitigation
Strategies
Reduction –The frequency of the operation or
activity is reduced, or action is taken to reduce
the magnitude of the consequences of the
accepted risks.
Operations into an aerodrome surrounded by
complex geography and without the necessary aids
are limited to day-time, visual conditions.
72. Risk control/mitigation
Strategies
Segregation of exposure – Action is taken to
isolate the effects of the consequences of
the hazard or build-in redundancy to protect
against it.
Operations into an aerodrome surrounded by
complex geography are limited to aircraft with
specific/performance navigation capabilities.
Non RVSM (Reduced Vertical separation
minimum) equipped aircraft not allowed to
operate into RVSM airspace.
73. Matrix-Based Risk Criteria
Class Action required and Sign off Authority
I Risk intolerable and cannot be justified on any grounds
II Risk must be reduced unless the cost of reducing the risk is
grossly disproportional to the benefits gained. Only accepted in
exceptional circumstances with the approval of the relevant
Executive Director (ED)
III Risk must be reduced unless the cost of reducing the risk is
disproportional to the benefits gained. May be accepted by the
relevant General Manager (GM) or Airport Director (APD)
IV Acceptable, Maintain current system, monitor and review.
Further risk reduction is warranted only if cost is insignificant,
Signing off authority is relevant in-charge of ATM/CNS/Airport
75. LIFE CYCLE OF PROJECT / CHANGE
CONCEPT PHASE
DESIGN PHASE
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE
OPERATIONAL PHASE
CONCEPT & DESIGN PHASE
Stage I (Safety Assessment)
EXECUTION PHASE
Stage II (Safety Assessment
COMMISSIONING PHASE
Stage III (Safety Assessment
As per DGCA AD AC 1 of 2012 As per C-SMS Manual
76. DGCA Advisory Circular 1 of 2012
Process for communicating with the DGCA on
the planning, construction and commissioning of
changes to airport infrastructure, and major
maintenance programmes
• Stage-I (Design/ Concept Level)
• Stage-II (Execution Level)
•Stage-III (Commissioning Level)
77. • SCARS Form (AAI-SAF-103) is the first step in the
safety assessment process.
• SCARS provide guidance in choosing the right
steps for managing the change based on the
overall safety magnitude of the change.
• SCARS Form must be completed at the start of a
change process i.e. in Concept Phase, to ensure
that the safety assessment requirements of the
change are identified early in the project lifecycle
and the relevant documents are prepared.
Safety Assessment Process
78. SCARS Form – SAF 103
• The first page of the SCARS Form gives details about the
project.
Project Number: The Project Manager will allot a number to the
project and the number will be entered in this field.
File Number: The file number pertaining to the project will be entered
in this field. This number along with the project number will be
reference number for all correspondences regarding the project.
Project Title: A short title of the project will be entered in this field.
Location: Name of the airport / site (for off-airport sites) should be
entered
Unit: Section to which the process belongs (ATM / CNS / Airside
Operations)
Brief Description of the Project / Change: A brief description of the
project or change should be entered in this field. The contents should
be adequate to describe the project in a nutshell.
79. SCARS Form – SAF 103
Step 1 of SCARS Form helps to assess the size of the change.
Question 1 is Assess the significance (scope/scale) of the project/change within AAI.
More the affected areas, higher the rating.
Question 2 is Assess the significance of the project/change outside AAI.
More the affected areas, higher the rating.
Question 3 is Assess the level of new functionality introduced, or removed, by the
proposed project/change, as opposed to the existing system, facility or service.
Rating should be decided in accordance with the level of new functionality
introduced or removed.
Question 4 is Assess the safety significance of the systems, facilities or services
affected by the project/change?
Rating should be as per the level of Safety significance (either enhanced or reduced)
Question 5 is Assess the training component associated with implementing the
project/change?
Higher the associated training requirement, higher the rating.
Question 6 & last question is Assess the complexity of the transition from the
existing system, facility or service?
Higher the transition complexity, higher the rating.
80. • Step 2 of SCARS Form leads us to the Safety Outcome
of the Change.
This is achieved through a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA).
Hazards identified should be critical ones or a combination of high-
consequence and low-consequence ones.
Identification of a few low-consequence hazards only and ignoring the
high-consequence hazards will lead to a wrong assessment.
The safety outcome of change is calculated using the equation
Safety Outcome = Total Score X 100
(7 X No: of Hazards)
SCARS Form – SAF 103
81. • Step 3 of the SCARS Form is to find out the overall safety magnitude of the
change. The results of steps 1 and 2 should be plotted in the matrix to
obtain the value of overall safety magnitude of the change as MINOR,
MODERATE or MAJOR.
• Step 4 of the SCARS Form helps to determine the method of safety
reporting to be adopted based on the overall safety magnitude of the
change.
MINOR Change Safety Statement
MODERATE Change Safety Statement + HAZLOG
MAJOR Change Safety Plan + Safety Case + HAZLOG
• Step 5 of SCARS Form is for recording the Safety Statement. Safety
Statement needs to be written if the overall safety magnitude of the
change is either MINOR or MODERATE.
SCARS Form – SAF 103
82. • Step 6 of the SCARS Form is to provide details of the HAZLOG
(Risk Register) created for the new project. The details to be
entered in the SCARS Form are:
HAZLOG Title Name of the HAZLOG
Date Date of opening the HAZLOG
Location Airport / Location of the facility
Unit Name of the unit of the Project Manager
• Step 7 to 11 of the SCARS Form involve obtaining the details
of the officials involved in the process of completing the Form.
SCARS Form – SAF 103
83. Change Implementation
The safety assessments required for change
management, by providing the minimum
requirements for preparing:
Safety Statements;
Safety Plans; and
Safety Cases.
All Safety Plans and Safety Cases must be sent to
and reviewed by Aviation Safety Directorate,
CHQ prior to implementation of any change.
84. Safety Assessment Process
The SCARS form must be used to determine the
safety magnitude of the change by assessing the
likely impact of the change in terms of likelihood
and safety outcome.
If the safety magnitude is minor:
a Safety Statement is completed in the SCARS
form by the initiator of the change and it is
accepted (signed off) by the Manager having
the safety accountability for that area
85. Safety Assessment Process
If the safety magnitude is assessed as
moderate :
a) a Safety Statement is completed in the SCARS
form by the initiator of the change and it is
accepted (signed off) by the Manager having
the safety accountability for that area; and
b) a HAZLOG Register is also completed and the
report from HAZLOG is attached to the SCARS
form for sign-off by relevant Manager.
86. Safety Assessment Process
If the safety magnitude is assessed as major:
a) a Safety Plan and a Safety Case must be
prepared and a HAZLOG Register for this
change must be developed.
b) These documents are accepted by Managers
at CHQ level.
87. SAFETY PLAN
Safety Plan preparation must commence early in the
project/ change life cycle, and be updated as appropriate
during the course of the project/change implementation.
A Safety Plan may be written for each stage of the project
lifecycle, for example a Design Safety Plan followed by an
Implementation Safety Plan
A Safety Plan is used to communicate essential
information to stakeholders about the proposed project or
change.
Safety Plans must be reviewed by the Aviation Safety
Directorate.
After the Safety Plan has been approved, it should be
communicated to all stakeholders
88. SAFETY PLAN
The Safety Plan must detail the:
Scope of the change in operational and organisational
context;
a)Description of the construction project:
Provide a full description of the planned construction project.
Assumptions, constraints and dependencies influencing the
safety outcome of the project/change;
a)Types & frequency of air traffic:
List the types of aircraft and number of daily movements anticipated
during the construction period.
b) Disruptions to air traffic:
What will be the impact on and disruptions to the air traffic as listed
above
89. SAFETY PLAN
C) Position and height of equipment (Relative to Runways &
Taxiways):
Provide the location and maximum working height of the construction
equipment or vehicles and where that equipment will be working in
relationship to the taxiway or runway edges/ends. This information is
required to asses the impact on Obstacle Limitation Surfaces and object is.
d) Work adjacent to Runway/Taxiway:
Temporary hazards on runway strips. Which zone will you be working in,
which restriction and operational conditions will apply to your project.
Responsibilities, titles and names of the people managing
the project/change;
List of person responsible for construction
90. SAFETY PLAN
Consultation and communication arrangements for the
project/change;
Every construction project requires a Communication Plan.
The Plan will cover communication with the airport’s clients/
users, ATS and CHQ during all phases of the project; #1: Planning
Phase, #2: Pre‐construction Phase #3: Construction Phase.
a)Airport Ops ↔ ATS;
b)ATS ↔ Construction Site;
c) Airport Ops ↔ Construction Site;
d)Airport Ops ↔ Users (Stakeholders;
e)Airport Ops ↔ CHQ
91. SAFETY PLAN
Safety management activities to provide the safety
assurance of the project/change;
a) Displaced and/or Relocated Thresholds:
If the project will require a displaced or relocated threshold, provide an
explanation as to why this is required, what percentage slope the
calculations are based on, how will the new threshold be marked and
lighted , what buffer is being provided for jet or prop blast,
consideration.
b) Declared distance during all phases:
Based on the above calculation what will be the revised declared
distances.
c) Access control, vehicle operations and Escorts:
How will vehicles and equipment access the construction site, will
Airport Vehicle operator Permit be issued, will vehicles be escorted,
whom will be providing escorts.
92. SAFETY PLAN
d) FOD control
e) Stocking of construction material on the airside
Timelines and milestones;
a)Stages/phases of the construction & schedules:
List the different stages of the construction activities with anticipated
start and finish dates.
Resources and facilities required;
a) Markings, barriers and lighting provided:
Describe all markings, barriers and lighting to be used to indicate
unserviceable areas of the airport.
93. SAFETY PLAN
Training and education requirements
Arrangements for any training and education requirements
Mistakes are more likely to be mitigated by training and procedures.
Review process
Arrange for a review of the Safety Plan by ASD, and send the approved
copy to all stakeholders.
Approval authorities and requirements for the resultant
safety documentation
94. SAFETY PLANCHECKLIST
• Scope of work to be performed, including proposed duration of work.
• Runway and taxiway marking and lighting.
• Procedures for protecting all runway and taxiway safety areas, obstacle-
free zones (OFZs), object-free areas(OFAs), and threshold citing criteria
This includes limitations on equipment height and stockpiled material.
• Areas and operations affected by the construction activity, including
possible safety problems.
• NAVAIDs that could be affected, especially critical area boundaries.
• Methods of separating vehicle and pedestrian construction traffic from
the airport movement areas.
• Procedures and equipment, such as barricades (identify type), to delineate
closed construction areas from the airport operational areas, as necessary.
• Limitations on construction.
95. SAFETY PLAN CHECKLIST
• Required compliance of contractor personnel with all airport safety and
security measures.
• Location of stockpiled construction materials, construction site parking, and
access and haul roads.
• Radio communications.
• Vehicle identification.
• Trenches and excavations and cover requirements.
• Procedures for notifying ARFF personnel if water lines or fire hydrants must be
deactivated or if emergency access routes must be rerouted or blocked.
• Emergency notification procedures for medical and police response.
• Use of temporary visual aids.
• Wildlife management.
96. SAFETY PLAN CHECKLIST
• Foreign object debris (FOD) control provisions.
• NOTAM issuance.
• Inspection requirements.
• Procedures for locating and protecting existing underground utilities,
cables, wires, pipelines, and other underground facilities in excavation
areas.
• Procedures for contacting responsible representatives/points of contact
for all involved parties.
• Vehicle operator training.
• Penalty provisions for noncompliance with airport rules and regulations
and the safety plan.
97. • Safety Cases can be of three types depending on the phase(s) of the
project lifecycle. They are:
Design/Concept Phase Safety Case (AAI-SAF-104)
Implementation (Execution + Commissioning ) Phase Safety
Case (AAI-SAF-112)
All Phases Safety Case (AAI-SAF-113)
• Each of these phases has slightly different emphasis on the
objectives for the Safety Case report and the types of issues
involved. These phases are not necessarily clear cut and can
overlap.
Safety CASE
98. GUIDANCE ON SAFETY CASE
Project aspect Safety Case types
Large project scope Concept/Design and
Implementation
Long project time frames
involved
Concept/Design and
Implementation
Significant stakeholder interest Concept/Design and
Implementation
Significant design component Concept/Design and
Implementation
Small to medium project scope All phases
Short time frames involved All phases
99. Concept/design SAFETY CASES
• The purpose of a Concept/Design Phase Safety Case is to show that the new
concept, new system, facility or service, a new standard, or a new way of
operating will be adequately safe “in principle” before trying to implement it.
The Safety Case should describe the process used to develop the design
solution.
Include information on the standards and design methods employed for
error.
Hazard avoidance, detection and elimination during the development of
the design.
Functions and operation of the new system, facility or service.
Process by which the design of the new system, facility or service was
determined.
Systematic processes to identify the risks and determine the risk controls.
Risk controls and mechanisms identified in these processes.
Arguments that, when implemented with the identified controls, the
proposed change will be adequately safe
100. Implementation phase SAFETY CASES
• The Implementation or “Transition” phase of a project is when we
actually move to implement a design which has already been
determined to be adequately safe.
The process by which operational and engineering readiness is
achieved and signed off.
The systematic processes used to determine the risk controls for
the implementation.
The risk control mechanisms identified in these processes.
The Safety Requirements identified as “essential” in these
processes.
Confirmation that the design has met its Safety Requirements
The arguments that, when implemented with the identified Safety
Requirements and controls, the proposed change can be safely
operated.
101. SAFETY CASES
A Safety Case is a report that presents a structured and
comprehensive argument, together with evidence, that a
project or change proposal can be safely implemented into
the ATS and Airports system.
Safety Cases must be reviewed by Aviation Safety Directorate
prior to being approved.
Safety Cases must detail the:
scope of the change in operational and organisational context;
validation of any assumptions, constraints and dependencies affecting the
safe outcome of the project/change;
responsibilities, titles and names of the people managing the
project/change;
consultation and communication arrangements for the project/change;
and
outcomes of the safety management activities prescribed in the Safety
Plan including the:
102. SAFETY CASES
hazard identification and risk management activities, tools,
procedures and standards used to provide safety assurance, for
normal and abnormal modes of operation;
HAZLOG Register Report detailing the identified hazards and risk
controls/safety requirements, including their status;
acceptance by the appropriate level of management of the various
levels of risk associated with each hazard;
arrangements for any training and education requirements;
timelines and milestones for the ongoing safety management of the
change pre and post implementation;
argument that, when implemented with the identified controls, the
proposed change will be adequately safe; and
arrangements and timing for the Post Implementation Review (PIR)
of the change following implementation.
103. STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION
Stakeholder consultation should be designed to
ensure that:
The assessment of hazards and risks associated
with the proposed project is an accurate
reflection of actual field practices; and
Personnel are aware of the potential risks to
which they may be exposed and their role in
controlling those risks.
104. AUTHORITY OF APPROVE ASSESSMENT
Aerodrome (Design change) ED (ARA Planning)
ATM (National Change) ED (ATM)
ATM (Local Change) GM (Aerodromes)/ATS in-
charge
CNS (National Change) ED (COM)
CNS (Local Change) GM (CNS)/ CNS in-charge
Airports (Local Change) ED (Ops)/Airport Director/
Airport Incharge
105. RISK ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITY
Class Authority
Cat I Risk Unacceptable, action required to treat the
risk
Cat II Undesirable but may be accepted in exceptional
circumstances with the approval of the
appropriate Executive Director
Cat III Tolerable, may be accepted by the appropriate
General Manager
Cat IV Risk Acceptable with conditions with the
approval of ATM/CNS/Airport In-charge
106. Post Implementation Review (PIR)
the review of the HAZLOG Register(s) relating to
the change;
the arrangements for the ongoing management
of hazards / controls;
details of any new safety issues identified
resulting from the change; and
details of any safety lessons learnt.
Eliminate/modify the safety risk controls that are
no longer needed or effective
109. 109
HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS:
Tall but relatively low visibility units such as
cranes or drilling equipment in safety areas or
approach zones.
Hazardous Condition - Excavation adjacent
to runways, taxiways and aprons
117. 117
Barricades/Red Lights
Barricades used to mark construction areas or closed pavement must be as low as
possible to the ground; low mass; easily collapsible upon contact with an aircraft or
any of its components; and weighted or sturdily attached to the surface to prevent
displacement from prop wash, jet blast, wing vortex, or other surface wind currents.
This particular barricade is designed to be filled with water.
119. 119
The use of concrete jersey barricades in the movement areas (adjacent to taxiways)
is not acceptable.
Barricades/Red Lights
Non-movement Area
120. SPECIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Temporarily closed runway/taxiway
Disconnect all lighting circuits.
Obliterate threshold, designation, and touchdown
zone markings.
Place a temporary cross at each runway end,
covering the numbers.
Place a cross at entrances to each closed taxiway.
Usually have NAVAIDs removed from service.
121. Airport Construction
Is the work coordinated with other airport activities (air traffic, apron
management, security, etc.)?
Is construction area clearly marked, signaled and isolated?
Is the construction job going to affect airport operations?
Will NOTAMs be required?
Are temporary access routes identified?
Are temporary threshold and operational areas clearly marked before
opening to operations?
Are construction workers adequately trained and briefed regarding the
airport operations and hazards?
Is the area cleaned and inspected before the area is opened to
operations
Is there a safety coordinator in the contractor team?
Has there been a pre-construction conference and safety issues for the
project were extensively discussed
122. 8
Radome $19,712
Main Entry Door
$171,220
Cargo Door $58,327
Inlet Cowl $329,203
Inlet Cowl Segment $5,151
Aileron & Tab Assembly $183,545
Outboard Flap Assembly
$255,845
Inboard Flap
Assembly $224,872
Elevator
Assembly
$264,708
L.E. Slat Assembly
$52,863
Wingtip Assembly $28,872
Ramp Damage Has Big Price
Tag For Airlines
TAT Probe
$6,583
Pitot Static Probe
$5,157
AOA Vane
$4,300
Side cowl
$161,407
Parts prices only
