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Stanford Closer LOOK series
Stanford Closer LOOK series 1
By David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan
june 24, 2016
Chairman and ceo
The controversy over board leadership structure
introduction
One of the most controversial issues in corporate governance is
whether the CEO of a corporation should simultaneously serve as
chairman of the board. According to Spencer Stuart, just over half
(52 percent) of companies in the S&P 500 Index are led by a dual
chairman/CEO, while 29 percent have an independent chair and
19 percent an executive or other outside chair.1
In recent years,
the trend has consistently moved toward separation; 10 years ago,
71 percent of S&P 500 companies were led by a dual chairman/
CEO and 15 years ago 77 percent were (see Exhibit 1).2
	 In theory, an independent chairman improves the ability of
the board of directors to oversee management. By separating the
positions, a company clearly differentiates between the roles of
the board and management, and gives one director clear authority
to speak on behalf of the board and to run board meetings.
Separation eliminates conflicts in the areas of performance
evaluation, executive compensation, succession planning, and
the recruitment of new directors. It also allows the CEO to focus
exclusively on strategy, operations, and organizational issues
while the chairman focuses on management oversight, board
leadership, and governance-related matters.
	 However, separation of the chairman and CEO roles is not
unambiguously positive. Mandating separation can be artificial,
especially when the company already has an effective dual
chairman/CEO in place. Separation can lead to duplication of
leadership, impair decision making, and create internal confusion,
particularly in times of crisis. It can also make the recruitment of
a new CEO difficult if qualified candidates expect to hold both
titles. This is especially true when the new CEO is an external
hire.
	 There is little research support for requiring a separation of
these roles. Most research finds that the independence status of
the chairman is not a material indicator of firm performance or
governance quality. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998)
provide a meta-analysis of 31 studies and find no relationship
between board leadership structure and firm performance.3
Krause, Semandeni, and Cannella (2013) review 48 studies and
find that the chairman status has little impact on performance,
managerial entrenchment, organizational risk taking, or executive
compensation.4
Balinga,Moyer, and Rau (1996) examinesituations
where companies change leadership status (through either a
combination or separation of the roles) and find no evidence that
this decision impacts subsequent performance.5
Dey, Engel, and
Liu (2011) find that forced separation due to shareholder pressure
is associated with a decrease in market valuation and lower future
operating performance, suggesting that mandatory separation can
actually be harmful.6
	 Despite this research evidence, shareholder activists and many
governance experts remain active in pressuring companies to
divide their leadership structure. For example, a representative of
CalPERS argued at the ExxonMobil annual meeting that having
a dual chairman/CEO is “like grading your own exam papers.”7
According to an activist at a Bank of America meeting, “The roles
of CEO and chair of the board have inherent conflicts, which
require the two posts to be separate and independent.”8
Proxy
advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services recommended
stripping JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon of his chairman
title, saying that “shareholders would benefit from the strongest
form of independent board oversight which an independent
chairman could provide.”9
To this end, shareholder activists have
steadily lobbied companies through the proxy-voting process to
have a fully independent chairman, although their efforts have
been met with little success (see Exhibit 2).10
chairman and Ceo structure
Given the controversy over chairman/CEO duality, we examined
in detail the leadership structures of publicly traded corporations
and the circumstances under which they are changed. Our sample
includes the 100 largest and 100 smallest companies in the
Fortune 1000 in 2016.11
The measurement period includes the 20-
year period 1996-2015. After eliminating mutual companies, our
final sample includes 187 firms and 3,525 firm-year observations.
Chairman and CEO
2Stanford Closer LOOK series
	 Consistent with the Spencer Stuart data above, companies
are much more likely to have a dual chairman/CEO than an
independent or separate chairman. Taking into account all 3,525
firm-year observations, 61 percent of the time companies had a
dual chairman/CEO, while 39 percent of the time they separated
the roles. Large companies (69 percent) are more likely than small
companies (53 percent) to have combined leadership, although
even among small companies duality is the prevailing standard.
	 We find that board leadership structures are not stable. Only
a third (34 percent) of companies made no changes during the
entire 20-year measurement period. Slightly under half of these
consistently maintained separate chairman and CEO positions
(such as Costco, Intel, and Walgreens); slightly more than half of
these consistently combined them (such as Amazon, Berkshire
Hathaway, and ExxonMobil). Still, these companies are the
exception rather than the rule. It is significantly more likely that a
company makes at least one change to board leadership structure
(combination or separation) over time. On average, companies
made 1.7 changes, or approximately 1 change every 12 years.
Changes are more frequent among large companies (2.2 changes,
on average) than smaller companies (1.3 changes). In both cases,
companies are slightly more likely to separate the roles than to
combine them (see Exhibit 3). This is also consistent with the
trends observed in the Spencer Stuart data cited earlier.
	 Most separations occur during the succession process, with
the former CEO, founder, or other officer continuing to serve
as chair on either a temporary or permanent basis. Of the 171
separations in our sample, 134 (78 percent) are associated with an
orderly succession. This is true of both small and large companies.
However, large companies are significantly more likely to separate
the roles temporarily, whereas smaller companies are more likely
to do so permanently (see Exhibit 4). Researchers have long noted
that temporary separation can lend stability to the CEO succession
process, allowing the new CEO time to gain experience in one role
before adding the responsibilities of chairmanship.12
For example,
when Sam Palmisano was promoted to CEO of IBM in 2002,
outgoing CEO Lou Gerstner remained chairman for a 12-month
period before stepping down from that position as well and
passing the chairman title to Palmisano. In 2012, IBM replicated
the process, promoting Virginia Rometty to CEO, with Palmisano
remaining as chair for 10 months before promoting Rometty to
dual chairman/CEO. Other companies—such as Alphabet, Ford
Motor, and Microsoft—separated the roles permanently following
a CEO succession, with the outgoing CEO remaining chairman.
	 Approximately a quarter (22 percent) of separations are not
part of an orderly succession. Nine percent follow an abrupt
resignation of the CEO, 6 percent a governance issue (such as
accounting restatement or CEO scandal), 3 percent a merger,
2 percent a shareholder vote, and 2 percent are required of the
company as part of a government bailout. Hewlett-Packard
split the roles for 2 years following the sudden termination of
Carly Fiorina in 2005 and split them again for 4 years following
the termination of Mark Hurd in 2010. Boeing split the roles
following a procurement scandal in 2003, AIG following an
accounting scandal in 2005, and UnitedHealth following a stock-
option backdating scandal in 2006. Home-mortgage insurer
Freddie Mac was forced to separate the chairman and CEO roles
following conservatorship in 2008. (Ironically, its sister company
Fannie Mae, which joined Freddie Mac in conservatorship, had
already separated the roles following an accounting scandal in
2004.) In only one case in our sample did the CEO resign abruptly
but remain chairman. This occurred in 2010 when the CEO of
Newfield Exploration retired early as CEO of the company to
assume the role of interim chairman and CEO of Baker Hughes
following an accounting scandal at that company; still, he
remained non-executive chairman of Newfield Exploration.
	 The decision to combine the chairman and CEO roles tends
to be more uniform. The vast majority of combinations (91
percent) involve an orderly succession at the top. Only 9 percent
are associated with a merger, sudden resignation, or governance-
related issue. In 90 percent of combinations, the current CEO is
given the additional title of chair; in 10 percent of cases, a new
CEO is recruited to become dual chair/CEO (see Exhibit 5).
	 Most interesting, perhaps, is the frequency with which
companies “permanently” separate the leadership roles only
to recombine them at a later date. Slightly over one-third (34
percent) of companies in our sample permanently separated the
chairman and CEO roles and later recombined them during the
20-year measurement period (see Exhibit 6).13
Best Buy split the
roles for nearly 13 years when founder and chairman Richard
Schultze stepped down as CEO in 2002; Schultze eventually
resigned from the board and when his successor as chairman
retired in 2015, then-CEO Hubert Joly was given the additional
title of board chair. The company gave no public explanation of its
decision to recombine the roles. General Motors “permanently”
separated the roles following its government bailout in 2009 and
recombined them 8 months later when then-chairman Robert
Whitacre became CEO on an interim and then permanent basis.
(Whitacre explained the move by saying, “The board looked at the
potential candidates and decided that this place needs stability. We
don’t need any more uncertainty.”)14
Bank of America and Walt
Disney both separated the chairman and CEO roles following
Chairman and CEO
3Stanford Closer LOOK series
shareholder votes, and subsequently recombined them five and
nine years later, respectively, under different management. In both
cases, the board justified the decision to recombine as rewarding
the successful leadership of the current CEO.
	 In the cases of Bank of America and Walt Disney, the decisions
torecombinetheroleswerehighlycontroversial.(Accordingtoone
Bank of America investor, “They [the board] have flaunted the will
of shareholders. … It’s like the board poking their finger in the eye
of the investors.”)15
Across the entire sample, however, shareholder
response was unexpectedly varied. Best Buy, Comcast, and Merck
(which separated the roles following the significant litigation
over its pain-relieving drug Vioxx) faced almost no pushback
from shareholders when they subsequently recombined the
roles. Others such as Boeing, Anthem (Wellpoint), and McKesson
faced considerable shareholder criticism. Only 34 percent of the
companies that separated and recombined the chairman and CEO
roles were targeted by shareholder-sponsored proxy proposals
to require separation. Average support for these proposals was
33 percent, not significantly different from companies that
consistently maintain a dual chairman/CEO structure (34 percent
support) or that separate the roles temporarily during succession
(36 percent support). It was also not significantly different from
the average support across the total universe of companies that
face shareholder-sponsored proposals requiring separation (32
percent).16
	 Finally, it is interesting to note that pressure to separate the
chairman and CEO roles seems to center almost exclusively on
large companies. Only 3 of the 95 small companies in our sample
werethetargetofashareholderproposaltorequireanindependent
chairman over the entire 20-year measurement period, even
though their board leadership structures are not significantly
different from those of larger corporations. By contrast, a majority
(56 out of 92) of large companies were targeted at least once. This
suggests that the companies that shareholders target to advocate
for independent board leadership might not necessarily be those
with the most egregious governance problems but instead those
that are the most visible public targets.
Why This Matters
1.	 Many governance experts and shareholder activists believe
that the CEO of a corporation should never serve as chairman
of their own board. The research literature, however, contains
little evidence that chairman/CEO duality is on average
detrimental to future performance or governance quality.
Why do activists advocate that corporations—especially large
corporations—strictly separate the chairman and CEO roles?
How much of this activism is publicity-seeking rather than an
attempt to improve corporate governance?
2.	 Research evidence suggests that the benefits and drawbacks
of independent board leadership are situation-dependent. It is
not always clear, however, which situations benefit from shared
leadership and which benefit from combined leadership. What
factors should the board consider in deciding whether to
combine or separate board leadership? Which structure should
be the default setting for a company?
3.	 General Motors cited “stability” when justifying the decision
to recombine the chair and CEO roles in 2010. Is a combined
chairman/CEO structure more stable than separate leadership?
How can the board weigh the tradeoffs between stability of
leadership,efficientdecisionmaking,anddecreasedoversight?
1
	 Spencer Stuart Board Index (2015).
2
	 Spencer Stuart Board Index (2010).
3
	 Dan R. Dalton, Catherine M. Daily, Alan E. Ellstrand, and Jonathan L.
Johnson, “Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership
Structure, and Firm Performance,” Strategic Management Journal, (1998).
4
	 Ryan Krause, Matthew Semandeni, and Albert A. Cannella, Jr., “CEO
Duality: A Review and Research Agenda,” Journal of Management, (2013).
5
	 B. Ram Baliga, R. Charles Moyer, and Ramesh S. Rao, “CEO Duality
and Firm Performance: What’s the Fuss?” Strategic Management Journal,
(1996).
6
	 Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel, and Xiaohui Liu, “CEO And Board Chair
Roles: To Split or Not to Split?” Journal of Corporate Finance, (2011).
7
	“ExxonMobil Annual Shareholder Meeting,” FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire,
(May 25, 2016).
8
	 “Bank of America Corp Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting,” FD (Fair
Disclosure) Wire (September 22, 2015).
9
	 Neha Dimri and Amrutha Gayathri, “Proxy Firms Recommend
JPMorgan Shareholders Vote Against Pay Plan,” Reuters (May 6, 2015).
10
John Laide, “Issue Focus: Separate Chairman and CEO,” SharkRepellent
(September 18, 2015).
11
	We include both large and small companies to reduce distortions due to
company size.
12
	See James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles, and Gregg A. Jarrell, “Leadership
Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board,” Journal of
Corporate Finance, (1997).
13
	These figures exclude the temporary (one-to-two year) separations
during orderly transitions. They include all companies that were
“permanently” separated at the beginning of the measurement period,
merger-related separations, and all separations following disorderly
terminations or corporate governance-related scandals.
14
	Tom Krishner and Dee-Ann Durbin, “Whitacre Takes over CEO Job
on Permanent Basis after 7 Weeks as the Interim Boss,” Associated Press
Newswires (January 25, 2010).
15
	Christina Rexrode and Dan Fitzpatrick, “Investors Push Back at BofA’s
Reversal,” The Wall Street Journal (October 31, 2014).
16
	SharkRepellent, loc. cit. See Exhibit 2.
Chairman and CEO
4Stanford Closer LOOK series
David Larcker is Director of the Corporate Governance Research
Initiative at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and senior faculty
member at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford
University. Brian Tayan is a researcher with Stanford’s Corporate
Governance Research Initiative. They are coauthors of the books A Real
Look at Real World Corporate Governance and Corporate
Governance Matters. The authors would like to thank Michelle E.
Gutman for research assistance in the preparation of these materials.
The Stanford Closer Look Series is a collection of short case
studies that explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate
governance and leadership. The Closer Look Series is published
by the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at the Stanford
Graduate School of Business and the Rock Center for Corporate
Governance at Stanford University. For more information, visit:
http:/www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgri-research.
Copyright © 2016 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University. All rights reserved.
Chairman and CEO
5Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 1 — Independence Status of Board Chair
Note: Sample includes companies in the S&P 500 Index.
Source: Spencer Stuart Board Index.
71% 67% 65% 61% 63% 60% 59% 57% 55% 53% 52%
20%
23%
22%
23% 21%
21% 20% 20% 20%
19% 19%
9% 10% 13% 16% 16% 19% 21% 23% 25% 28% 29%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PercentageofCompanies
Dual Chair/CEO Executive or Non-Independent Chair Independent Chair
Chairman and CEO
6Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 2 — Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals Requiring Independent Chairman
Note: “Average support: shareholder proposals” includes the average support for all shareholder-sponsored proxy proposals across all
issues voted on during the year and is shown for comparison purposes.
Source: SharkRepellent. Sample includes all 14a-8 proposals tracked by FactSet.
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
Proposals voted 31 54 45 28 37 45 27 56 62 63 63 511
Pass 1 2 4 1 3 0 3 4 6 4 2 30
Fail 30 52 41 27 34 45 24 52 56 59 61 481
Failed but majority of yes/no 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
Avg support: Independent chair 28% 30% 27% 29% 32% 29% 33% 35% 32% 31% 29% 31%
Avg. support: Shareholder proposals 29% 32% 30% 30% 35% 34% 34% 35% 33% 31% 33% 32%
Chairman and CEO
7Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 3 — board leadership structure
Note: Sample includes 187 firms (3,525 firm-year observations) between 1996 and 2015, derived from the largest 100 and smallest 100
companies in the Fortune 1000 as of 2016. Mutual companies are excluded. Total changes to leadership structure include all changes made
during the entire sample of 3,525 firm-year observations.
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and Factiva. Calculations by the authors
 
All
Companies
Large
Companies
Small
Companies
Sample 187 92 95
Firm-year observations 3,525 1,894 1,631
Combined chairman/CEO      
% of firm-year observations 61% 69% 53%
# firms always combined 36 16 20
% firms always combined 19% 17% 21%
Separated chairman/CEO      
% of firm-year observations 39% 31% 47%
# firms always separated 27 7 20
% firms always separated 14% 8% 21%
Changes to leadership structure, total      
# of changes 325 205 120
# of separations 171 106 65
# of combinations 154 99 55
Changes to leadership structure, avg. per company      
# of changes 1.7 2.2 1.3
# of separations 0.9 1.1 0.7
# of combinations 0.8 1.1 0.6
Chairman and CEO
8Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 4 — separations and combinations
Separation of chairman and Ceo
Succession, temporary
Succession, permanent
Sudden resignation of CEO
Governance issue
Merger
Shareholder vote
Government requirement
 
All
Companies
Large
Companies
Small
Companies
Succession, temporary 47% 55% 35%
Succession, permanent 31% 20% 49%
Sudden resignation of CEO 9% 8% 11%
Governance issue 6% 8% 5%
Merger 3% 5% 0%
Shareholder vote 2% 3% 0%
Government requirement 2% 3% 0%
Chairman and CEO
9Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 4 — continued
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and Factiva. Calculations by the authors.
combination of chairman and Ceo
Succession, temporary
Succession, permanent
Sudden resignation of
chairman
Governance issue
Merger
 
All
Companies
Large
Companies
Small
Companies
Succession, temporary 55% 62% 42%
Succession, permanent 36% 30% 47%
Sudden resignation of chairman 4% 2% 7%
Governance issue 1% 0% 2%
Merger 5% 6% 2%
Chairman and CEO
10Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 5 — Impact of Separation/Combination on Current CEO
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and Factiva. Calculations by the authors.
 
All
Companies
Large
Companies
Small
Companies
Separation of chairman/CEO      
Former CEO remains chair, # 128 78 50
Former CEO does not remain chair, # 43 28 15
Former CEO remains chair, % 75% 74% 77%
Former CEO does not remain chair, % 25% 26% 23%
Combination of chairman/CEO      
Current CEO adds chair title, # 138 91 47
Current CEO not selected as chair, # 16 8 8
Current CEO adds chair title, % 90% 92% 85%
Current CEO not selected as chair, % 10% 8% 15%
Chairman and CEO
11Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 6 — Companies that Separate and then Recombine Chairman/CEO Roles
 
All
Companies
Large
Companies
Small
Companies
Companies that separate and then recombine, # 64 34 30
Companies that separate and then recombine, % 34% 37% 32%
Shareholder-sponsored proposals requiring separation 22 21 1
% vote in support of shareholder proposals 33% 33% 33%
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and Factiva. Calculations by the authors.

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Chairman and CEO: The Controversy over Board Leadership Structure

  • 1. Stanford Closer LOOK series Stanford Closer LOOK series 1 By David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan june 24, 2016 Chairman and ceo The controversy over board leadership structure introduction One of the most controversial issues in corporate governance is whether the CEO of a corporation should simultaneously serve as chairman of the board. According to Spencer Stuart, just over half (52 percent) of companies in the S&P 500 Index are led by a dual chairman/CEO, while 29 percent have an independent chair and 19 percent an executive or other outside chair.1 In recent years, the trend has consistently moved toward separation; 10 years ago, 71 percent of S&P 500 companies were led by a dual chairman/ CEO and 15 years ago 77 percent were (see Exhibit 1).2 In theory, an independent chairman improves the ability of the board of directors to oversee management. By separating the positions, a company clearly differentiates between the roles of the board and management, and gives one director clear authority to speak on behalf of the board and to run board meetings. Separation eliminates conflicts in the areas of performance evaluation, executive compensation, succession planning, and the recruitment of new directors. It also allows the CEO to focus exclusively on strategy, operations, and organizational issues while the chairman focuses on management oversight, board leadership, and governance-related matters. However, separation of the chairman and CEO roles is not unambiguously positive. Mandating separation can be artificial, especially when the company already has an effective dual chairman/CEO in place. Separation can lead to duplication of leadership, impair decision making, and create internal confusion, particularly in times of crisis. It can also make the recruitment of a new CEO difficult if qualified candidates expect to hold both titles. This is especially true when the new CEO is an external hire. There is little research support for requiring a separation of these roles. Most research finds that the independence status of the chairman is not a material indicator of firm performance or governance quality. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) provide a meta-analysis of 31 studies and find no relationship between board leadership structure and firm performance.3 Krause, Semandeni, and Cannella (2013) review 48 studies and find that the chairman status has little impact on performance, managerial entrenchment, organizational risk taking, or executive compensation.4 Balinga,Moyer, and Rau (1996) examinesituations where companies change leadership status (through either a combination or separation of the roles) and find no evidence that this decision impacts subsequent performance.5 Dey, Engel, and Liu (2011) find that forced separation due to shareholder pressure is associated with a decrease in market valuation and lower future operating performance, suggesting that mandatory separation can actually be harmful.6 Despite this research evidence, shareholder activists and many governance experts remain active in pressuring companies to divide their leadership structure. For example, a representative of CalPERS argued at the ExxonMobil annual meeting that having a dual chairman/CEO is “like grading your own exam papers.”7 According to an activist at a Bank of America meeting, “The roles of CEO and chair of the board have inherent conflicts, which require the two posts to be separate and independent.”8 Proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services recommended stripping JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon of his chairman title, saying that “shareholders would benefit from the strongest form of independent board oversight which an independent chairman could provide.”9 To this end, shareholder activists have steadily lobbied companies through the proxy-voting process to have a fully independent chairman, although their efforts have been met with little success (see Exhibit 2).10 chairman and Ceo structure Given the controversy over chairman/CEO duality, we examined in detail the leadership structures of publicly traded corporations and the circumstances under which they are changed. Our sample includes the 100 largest and 100 smallest companies in the Fortune 1000 in 2016.11 The measurement period includes the 20- year period 1996-2015. After eliminating mutual companies, our final sample includes 187 firms and 3,525 firm-year observations.
  • 2. Chairman and CEO 2Stanford Closer LOOK series Consistent with the Spencer Stuart data above, companies are much more likely to have a dual chairman/CEO than an independent or separate chairman. Taking into account all 3,525 firm-year observations, 61 percent of the time companies had a dual chairman/CEO, while 39 percent of the time they separated the roles. Large companies (69 percent) are more likely than small companies (53 percent) to have combined leadership, although even among small companies duality is the prevailing standard. We find that board leadership structures are not stable. Only a third (34 percent) of companies made no changes during the entire 20-year measurement period. Slightly under half of these consistently maintained separate chairman and CEO positions (such as Costco, Intel, and Walgreens); slightly more than half of these consistently combined them (such as Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and ExxonMobil). Still, these companies are the exception rather than the rule. It is significantly more likely that a company makes at least one change to board leadership structure (combination or separation) over time. On average, companies made 1.7 changes, or approximately 1 change every 12 years. Changes are more frequent among large companies (2.2 changes, on average) than smaller companies (1.3 changes). In both cases, companies are slightly more likely to separate the roles than to combine them (see Exhibit 3). This is also consistent with the trends observed in the Spencer Stuart data cited earlier. Most separations occur during the succession process, with the former CEO, founder, or other officer continuing to serve as chair on either a temporary or permanent basis. Of the 171 separations in our sample, 134 (78 percent) are associated with an orderly succession. This is true of both small and large companies. However, large companies are significantly more likely to separate the roles temporarily, whereas smaller companies are more likely to do so permanently (see Exhibit 4). Researchers have long noted that temporary separation can lend stability to the CEO succession process, allowing the new CEO time to gain experience in one role before adding the responsibilities of chairmanship.12 For example, when Sam Palmisano was promoted to CEO of IBM in 2002, outgoing CEO Lou Gerstner remained chairman for a 12-month period before stepping down from that position as well and passing the chairman title to Palmisano. In 2012, IBM replicated the process, promoting Virginia Rometty to CEO, with Palmisano remaining as chair for 10 months before promoting Rometty to dual chairman/CEO. Other companies—such as Alphabet, Ford Motor, and Microsoft—separated the roles permanently following a CEO succession, with the outgoing CEO remaining chairman. Approximately a quarter (22 percent) of separations are not part of an orderly succession. Nine percent follow an abrupt resignation of the CEO, 6 percent a governance issue (such as accounting restatement or CEO scandal), 3 percent a merger, 2 percent a shareholder vote, and 2 percent are required of the company as part of a government bailout. Hewlett-Packard split the roles for 2 years following the sudden termination of Carly Fiorina in 2005 and split them again for 4 years following the termination of Mark Hurd in 2010. Boeing split the roles following a procurement scandal in 2003, AIG following an accounting scandal in 2005, and UnitedHealth following a stock- option backdating scandal in 2006. Home-mortgage insurer Freddie Mac was forced to separate the chairman and CEO roles following conservatorship in 2008. (Ironically, its sister company Fannie Mae, which joined Freddie Mac in conservatorship, had already separated the roles following an accounting scandal in 2004.) In only one case in our sample did the CEO resign abruptly but remain chairman. This occurred in 2010 when the CEO of Newfield Exploration retired early as CEO of the company to assume the role of interim chairman and CEO of Baker Hughes following an accounting scandal at that company; still, he remained non-executive chairman of Newfield Exploration. The decision to combine the chairman and CEO roles tends to be more uniform. The vast majority of combinations (91 percent) involve an orderly succession at the top. Only 9 percent are associated with a merger, sudden resignation, or governance- related issue. In 90 percent of combinations, the current CEO is given the additional title of chair; in 10 percent of cases, a new CEO is recruited to become dual chair/CEO (see Exhibit 5). Most interesting, perhaps, is the frequency with which companies “permanently” separate the leadership roles only to recombine them at a later date. Slightly over one-third (34 percent) of companies in our sample permanently separated the chairman and CEO roles and later recombined them during the 20-year measurement period (see Exhibit 6).13 Best Buy split the roles for nearly 13 years when founder and chairman Richard Schultze stepped down as CEO in 2002; Schultze eventually resigned from the board and when his successor as chairman retired in 2015, then-CEO Hubert Joly was given the additional title of board chair. The company gave no public explanation of its decision to recombine the roles. General Motors “permanently” separated the roles following its government bailout in 2009 and recombined them 8 months later when then-chairman Robert Whitacre became CEO on an interim and then permanent basis. (Whitacre explained the move by saying, “The board looked at the potential candidates and decided that this place needs stability. We don’t need any more uncertainty.”)14 Bank of America and Walt Disney both separated the chairman and CEO roles following
  • 3. Chairman and CEO 3Stanford Closer LOOK series shareholder votes, and subsequently recombined them five and nine years later, respectively, under different management. In both cases, the board justified the decision to recombine as rewarding the successful leadership of the current CEO. In the cases of Bank of America and Walt Disney, the decisions torecombinetheroleswerehighlycontroversial.(Accordingtoone Bank of America investor, “They [the board] have flaunted the will of shareholders. … It’s like the board poking their finger in the eye of the investors.”)15 Across the entire sample, however, shareholder response was unexpectedly varied. Best Buy, Comcast, and Merck (which separated the roles following the significant litigation over its pain-relieving drug Vioxx) faced almost no pushback from shareholders when they subsequently recombined the roles. Others such as Boeing, Anthem (Wellpoint), and McKesson faced considerable shareholder criticism. Only 34 percent of the companies that separated and recombined the chairman and CEO roles were targeted by shareholder-sponsored proxy proposals to require separation. Average support for these proposals was 33 percent, not significantly different from companies that consistently maintain a dual chairman/CEO structure (34 percent support) or that separate the roles temporarily during succession (36 percent support). It was also not significantly different from the average support across the total universe of companies that face shareholder-sponsored proposals requiring separation (32 percent).16 Finally, it is interesting to note that pressure to separate the chairman and CEO roles seems to center almost exclusively on large companies. Only 3 of the 95 small companies in our sample werethetargetofashareholderproposaltorequireanindependent chairman over the entire 20-year measurement period, even though their board leadership structures are not significantly different from those of larger corporations. By contrast, a majority (56 out of 92) of large companies were targeted at least once. This suggests that the companies that shareholders target to advocate for independent board leadership might not necessarily be those with the most egregious governance problems but instead those that are the most visible public targets. Why This Matters 1. Many governance experts and shareholder activists believe that the CEO of a corporation should never serve as chairman of their own board. The research literature, however, contains little evidence that chairman/CEO duality is on average detrimental to future performance or governance quality. Why do activists advocate that corporations—especially large corporations—strictly separate the chairman and CEO roles? How much of this activism is publicity-seeking rather than an attempt to improve corporate governance? 2. Research evidence suggests that the benefits and drawbacks of independent board leadership are situation-dependent. It is not always clear, however, which situations benefit from shared leadership and which benefit from combined leadership. What factors should the board consider in deciding whether to combine or separate board leadership? Which structure should be the default setting for a company? 3. General Motors cited “stability” when justifying the decision to recombine the chair and CEO roles in 2010. Is a combined chairman/CEO structure more stable than separate leadership? How can the board weigh the tradeoffs between stability of leadership,efficientdecisionmaking,anddecreasedoversight? 1 Spencer Stuart Board Index (2015). 2 Spencer Stuart Board Index (2010). 3 Dan R. Dalton, Catherine M. Daily, Alan E. Ellstrand, and Jonathan L. Johnson, “Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Firm Performance,” Strategic Management Journal, (1998). 4 Ryan Krause, Matthew Semandeni, and Albert A. Cannella, Jr., “CEO Duality: A Review and Research Agenda,” Journal of Management, (2013). 5 B. Ram Baliga, R. Charles Moyer, and Ramesh S. Rao, “CEO Duality and Firm Performance: What’s the Fuss?” Strategic Management Journal, (1996). 6 Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel, and Xiaohui Liu, “CEO And Board Chair Roles: To Split or Not to Split?” Journal of Corporate Finance, (2011). 7 “ExxonMobil Annual Shareholder Meeting,” FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, (May 25, 2016). 8 “Bank of America Corp Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting,” FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire (September 22, 2015). 9 Neha Dimri and Amrutha Gayathri, “Proxy Firms Recommend JPMorgan Shareholders Vote Against Pay Plan,” Reuters (May 6, 2015). 10 John Laide, “Issue Focus: Separate Chairman and CEO,” SharkRepellent (September 18, 2015). 11 We include both large and small companies to reduce distortions due to company size. 12 See James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles, and Gregg A. Jarrell, “Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board,” Journal of Corporate Finance, (1997). 13 These figures exclude the temporary (one-to-two year) separations during orderly transitions. They include all companies that were “permanently” separated at the beginning of the measurement period, merger-related separations, and all separations following disorderly terminations or corporate governance-related scandals. 14 Tom Krishner and Dee-Ann Durbin, “Whitacre Takes over CEO Job on Permanent Basis after 7 Weeks as the Interim Boss,” Associated Press Newswires (January 25, 2010). 15 Christina Rexrode and Dan Fitzpatrick, “Investors Push Back at BofA’s Reversal,” The Wall Street Journal (October 31, 2014). 16 SharkRepellent, loc. cit. See Exhibit 2.
  • 4. Chairman and CEO 4Stanford Closer LOOK series David Larcker is Director of the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and senior faculty member at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University. Brian Tayan is a researcher with Stanford’s Corporate Governance Research Initiative. They are coauthors of the books A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance and Corporate Governance Matters. The authors would like to thank Michelle E. Gutman for research assistance in the preparation of these materials. The Stanford Closer Look Series is a collection of short case studies that explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance and leadership. The Closer Look Series is published by the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University. For more information, visit: http:/www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgri-research. Copyright © 2016 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
  • 5. Chairman and CEO 5Stanford Closer LOOK series Exhibit 1 — Independence Status of Board Chair Note: Sample includes companies in the S&P 500 Index. Source: Spencer Stuart Board Index. 71% 67% 65% 61% 63% 60% 59% 57% 55% 53% 52% 20% 23% 22% 23% 21% 21% 20% 20% 20% 19% 19% 9% 10% 13% 16% 16% 19% 21% 23% 25% 28% 29% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 PercentageofCompanies Dual Chair/CEO Executive or Non-Independent Chair Independent Chair
  • 6. Chairman and CEO 6Stanford Closer LOOK series Exhibit 2 — Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals Requiring Independent Chairman Note: “Average support: shareholder proposals” includes the average support for all shareholder-sponsored proxy proposals across all issues voted on during the year and is shown for comparison purposes. Source: SharkRepellent. Sample includes all 14a-8 proposals tracked by FactSet.   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Proposals voted 31 54 45 28 37 45 27 56 62 63 63 511 Pass 1 2 4 1 3 0 3 4 6 4 2 30 Fail 30 52 41 27 34 45 24 52 56 59 61 481 Failed but majority of yes/no 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 Avg support: Independent chair 28% 30% 27% 29% 32% 29% 33% 35% 32% 31% 29% 31% Avg. support: Shareholder proposals 29% 32% 30% 30% 35% 34% 34% 35% 33% 31% 33% 32%
  • 7. Chairman and CEO 7Stanford Closer LOOK series Exhibit 3 — board leadership structure Note: Sample includes 187 firms (3,525 firm-year observations) between 1996 and 2015, derived from the largest 100 and smallest 100 companies in the Fortune 1000 as of 2016. Mutual companies are excluded. Total changes to leadership structure include all changes made during the entire sample of 3,525 firm-year observations. Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and Factiva. Calculations by the authors   All Companies Large Companies Small Companies Sample 187 92 95 Firm-year observations 3,525 1,894 1,631 Combined chairman/CEO       % of firm-year observations 61% 69% 53% # firms always combined 36 16 20 % firms always combined 19% 17% 21% Separated chairman/CEO       % of firm-year observations 39% 31% 47% # firms always separated 27 7 20 % firms always separated 14% 8% 21% Changes to leadership structure, total       # of changes 325 205 120 # of separations 171 106 65 # of combinations 154 99 55 Changes to leadership structure, avg. per company       # of changes 1.7 2.2 1.3 # of separations 0.9 1.1 0.7 # of combinations 0.8 1.1 0.6
  • 8. Chairman and CEO 8Stanford Closer LOOK series Exhibit 4 — separations and combinations Separation of chairman and Ceo Succession, temporary Succession, permanent Sudden resignation of CEO Governance issue Merger Shareholder vote Government requirement   All Companies Large Companies Small Companies Succession, temporary 47% 55% 35% Succession, permanent 31% 20% 49% Sudden resignation of CEO 9% 8% 11% Governance issue 6% 8% 5% Merger 3% 5% 0% Shareholder vote 2% 3% 0% Government requirement 2% 3% 0%
  • 9. Chairman and CEO 9Stanford Closer LOOK series Exhibit 4 — continued Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and Factiva. Calculations by the authors. combination of chairman and Ceo Succession, temporary Succession, permanent Sudden resignation of chairman Governance issue Merger   All Companies Large Companies Small Companies Succession, temporary 55% 62% 42% Succession, permanent 36% 30% 47% Sudden resignation of chairman 4% 2% 7% Governance issue 1% 0% 2% Merger 5% 6% 2%
  • 10. Chairman and CEO 10Stanford Closer LOOK series Exhibit 5 — Impact of Separation/Combination on Current CEO Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and Factiva. Calculations by the authors.   All Companies Large Companies Small Companies Separation of chairman/CEO       Former CEO remains chair, # 128 78 50 Former CEO does not remain chair, # 43 28 15 Former CEO remains chair, % 75% 74% 77% Former CEO does not remain chair, % 25% 26% 23% Combination of chairman/CEO       Current CEO adds chair title, # 138 91 47 Current CEO not selected as chair, # 16 8 8 Current CEO adds chair title, % 90% 92% 85% Current CEO not selected as chair, % 10% 8% 15%
  • 11. Chairman and CEO 11Stanford Closer LOOK series Exhibit 6 — Companies that Separate and then Recombine Chairman/CEO Roles   All Companies Large Companies Small Companies Companies that separate and then recombine, # 64 34 30 Companies that separate and then recombine, % 34% 37% 32% Shareholder-sponsored proposals requiring separation 22 21 1 % vote in support of shareholder proposals 33% 33% 33% Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and Factiva. Calculations by the authors.