Resilience ortenzi fp_fb_lg

RISE:
a method for the design of resilient infrastructures
and structures against emergencies
M. Ortenzi, Francesco Petrini*, F. Bontempi, L. Giuliani
*Associate Researcher, francesco.petrini@uniroma1.it
Sapienza – University of Rome
Department of Structural and Geotechnical Engineering
RISE:amethodforthedesignofresilientinfrastructuresandstructuresagainstemergencies

Background
This paper originates from a European research proposal.
Background2
F. Petrini. RISE: Resilient Infrastructures and Structures against Emergencies
ICOSSAR 2013, Columbia University, New York, 16-20 June 2013
francesco.petrini@uniroma1.it
Organization:
Groups involved: ~ 12 groups directly involved
1 advisory board of 2-3 experts (not directly involved)
Work packages: 7 technical work packages
2 additional work package for coordination and dissemination
Economical estimation:
Total budget: ~ 4.5 mil EUR (max. financing 3.5 mil EUR)
Time schedule:
Duration: 3 years (winter 2013 winter 2016)
Expected Impacts:
It is expected that action under this topic will improve the design of urban area and thus increase
their security against and resilience to new threats. It is expected that it will lead to a systematic
approach to resilience enhancements for large urban built infrastructures beginning at the design
stage.

Background
This paper originates from a European research proposal.
Background3
Organization:
Groups involved: ~ 12 groups directly involved
1 advisory board of 2-3 experts (not directly involved)
Work packages: 7 technical work packages
2 additional work package for coordination and dissemination
Economical estimation:
Total budget: ~ 4.5 mil EUR (max. financing 3.5 mil EUR)
Time schedule:
Duration: 3 years (winter 2013 winter 2016)
Expected Impacts:
It is expected that action under this topic will improve the design of urban area and thus increase
their security against and resilience to new threats. It is expected that it will lead to a systematic
approach to resilience enhancements for large urban built infrastructures beginning at the design
stage.

5
Resilience concept
Definition (not univocal):
A resilient community is defined as the one having the ability to absorb disaster
impacts and rapidly return to normal socioeconomic activity.
MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research), (2006). “MCEER’s Resilience Framework”. Available
at http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/resilience/Resilience_10-24-06.pdf
NEHRP (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program), 2010. “Comments on the Meaning of Resilience”. NEHRP
Technical report. Available at http://www.nehrp.gov/pdf/ACEHRCommentsJan2010.pdf
MCEER framework for resilience evaluation:
Initial losses Recovery time, depending on:
• Resourcefulness
• Rapidity
Disaster strikes
Systemic
Robustness

6
Definition (not univocal):
A resilient community is defined as the one having the ability to absorb disaster
impacts and rapidly return to normal socioeconomic activity.
MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research), (2006). “MCEER’s Resilience Framework”. Available
at http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/resilience/Resilience_10-24-06.pdf
NEHRP (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program), 2010. “Comments on the Meaning of Resilience”. NEHRP
Technical report. Available at http://www.nehrp.gov/pdf/ACEHRCommentsJan2010.pdf
(dQ/dt)
L0
TR
(dQ/dt)0
A R.I.S.E. focuses
on
L0 and (dQ/dt)0
MCEER framework for resilience evaluation:
Resilience is inversely proportional to the area A.
R.I.S.E. – Concept (I)

7
R.I.S.E. – Concept (II)
----- = ordinary node
= critical (active) node
in case of emergency
-----
= ordinary principal link
(e.g. road)
= ordinary alternative link
(e.g. underground)
= critical principal link
= critical alternative link
SCHOOL
HOSPI
TAL
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
SPORT
ARENA
SHOPPING
CENTER
EMBASSY
OFFICE
UNIV.
CAMPUS
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
FIRE
DEPT
Urban development
PLANT
Representation of an urban area as a network of nodes and links
- Nodes: relevant premises for urban activities, strategic and crowded buildings
- Links: interconnections between them, transport and supply systems

8
R.I.S.E. – Concept (II)
SCHOOL
HOSPITAL
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
MALL
SHOPPING
CENTER
EMBASSY
OFFICE
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
FIRE
DEPARTMENT
PLANT
EXAMPLE: CHAIN HAZARD
Tsunami after an Earthquake = flood action
= earthquake action
= blast action
= fire action
Actions due to different hazards
= chain
actions
= concurrent
actions
Actions combination (multiple)
accidental actions & multiple hazards

9
HOSPITAL
PLANT
SCHOOL
EMB-
ASSY
OFFICE
MALL
HOUSE
Urban area
R.I.S.E. – Concept (III)
Advantage of this model:
-Accurate: describes single responses
of nodes and links (local level) in term
of both SERVICEABILITY and INTEGRITY
-Complete: accounts for INTERACTIONS
between single structures or services
and assesses the resilience of the
infrastructure as whole (network level)
-Flexible: can be applied to all
types of large-scale infrastructures

10
L0
(dQ/dt)0
MESO- LEVEL: Contribute of the single premise
(e.g. hospital, by considering the interrelations
with proximity elements)
MACRO- LEVEL:
- Convolution of the meso-level contributes
dLi
R.I.S.E. – Concept (IV)
-Multi-scale: resilience is evaluated at
meso- and macro-scale levels

11
HOSPITAL
PLANT
SCHOOL
EMB-
ASSY
OFFICE
MALL
HOUSE
Urban area
R.I.S.E. – Concept (III)
Hospital
-Multi-scale: resilience is evaluated at
meso- and macro-scale levels
-Powerful: the analysis output be used
for the analysis of larger scale
infrastructures

12
RISE – Concept resume
MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering
Research), (2006). “MCEER’s Resilience Framework”.
-- = ordinary node
= critical node in case of emergency---
= principal link (e.g. road)
HOSPITAL
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
MALL
SHOPPING
CENTEROFFICE
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
FIRE
DEPARTMENT
NUCLEAR
PLANT
HOSPITAL
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
MALL
SHOPPING
CENTEROFFICE
HOUSE
AGGRGATE
FIRE
DEPARTMENT
NUCLEAR
PLANT
= earthquake action
= blast action= fire action
Representation of a large infrastructure as a network of nodes and links
Nodes: relevant premises of the infrastructure Links: local and access roads, pipelines and supply system
Initial losses
Recovery time:
• Resourcefulness
• Rapidity
Disasterstrikes
A
L0
(dQ/dt)0
LOCAL- LEVEL:
Contributeof the single
premise(e.g. hospital,
by considering the
interrelations with
proximity elements)
NETWORK- LEVEL:
- Convolution of the local-level contributes
dLi
Quantitative definition of Resilience (MCEER) R.I.S.E. Multiscale philosophy
Disaster strikes --> Hazard scenario

13
RISE–Framework
Load
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Local
Level
Network
Level
Local resilience indicators Network resilience indicators
ASSESSMENTandMITIGATION
(Analysisforeachnodeandlink)
Scenario output before mitigation
Scenario output after mitigation
ResISt
framework for resilience assessment
Structure performanceA
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Damage
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
Status of nodes and links
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
Interactions effects (quality drop)B
L0
i TR
i
Quality (network level)
Combination of local indicators
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
Local resilience indicators are evaluated for
each node and Link and for each scenario
Network resilience indicators are evaluated for
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Resilience Assessment
Network
Level
1
2 System Recovery functionD
** Picture taken from:
Decò A., Bocchini P., Frangopol D.M.. A probabilistic approach for the prediction of seismic resilience of bridges.
Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics, Wiley, DOI: 10.1002/eqe.2282
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE

15
Case study: an urban area under Earthquake
Hospital
Residential
complex
Energy and water
supply infrastructure
-----

16
Hospital
Residential
complex
Energy and water
-----
Z
Y
X
70m

17
Hospital
Residential
complex
Energy and water
-----
Z
Y
X
70m

18
Energy and water supply infrastructure: representation
WU
WD
HY
CBCR
CU
RETAINING WALL UP (WU) RETAINING WALL DOWN (WD) HYDROELECTRIC POWER STATION (HY)
CONDUIT UP (CU) CONDUIT ROSALBA
CONDUIT PAVONCELLI BIS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3
4 5 6
7
HYDRAULIC JUNCTION
ELECTRICITY
WATER
Infrastructure plan view Individuation of the system/network components Representation of the system
Outputs
Load
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Network
Level
ResISt
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE
framework for resilience assessmentLoad
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Local
Level
Network
Level
ResISt
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Damage
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
Level
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE

19
Energy and water supply infrastructure: scenarios
FLOW REDUCTION (U)FLOW REDUCTION (R)
ELECTRIC POWER INTERRUPTIONTOTAL FLOW INTERRUPTION (R+U)
Consequencescenarios
Load
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Network
Level
ResISt
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Local
Level
Network
Level
ResISt
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Damage
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
Level
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE

20
WU FAIL
HY
FAIL?
CU
FAIL?
Y
WU + WD +HY+ CU
TOTAL FLOW
TOTAL FLOW
TOTAL FLOW
NO R + E
CR
FAIL?
WU
WU + WD
WU + WD + HY
WD
FAIL?
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
CR
FAIL?
CR
FAIL?
CR
FAIL?
NO R
NO R
NO U + E
NO U+ E + R
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Fault-Treeanalysis
Criticalseriesofcomponents
WU
WD
HY
CBCR
CU
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3
4 5 6
7
HYDRAULIC JUNCTION
ELECTRICITY
WATER
Outputs
Energy and water supply infrastructure: scenarios
Load
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Network
Level
ResISt
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Local
Level
Network
Level
ResISt
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Damage
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
Level
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE

Load
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Local
Level
Network
Level
ResISt
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Damage
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
Level
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE
22
Load
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Local
Level
Network
Level
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Damage
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
Level
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
Critical series of components: retaining walls
WU
WD
HY
CBCR
CU
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3
4 5 6
7
HYDRAULIC JUNCTION
ELECTRICITY
WATER
Outputs
(0,0) (92,0)
(92,29)
(0,29)
(0,54)
(0,62) (28.5,62)
(53,56)
(63,45)
(92,32)
(92,34)
Critical series of components
FE model

23
Individual components: seismic fragility
(0,0) (92,0)
(92,29)
(0,29)
(0,54)
(0,62) (28.5,6
2)
(53,56)
(63,45)
(92,32)
(92,34)
record ID Earthquake Station Record/Component HP (Hz) LP (Hz) PGA (g)
1 P1047 Kobe 1995/01/16 20:46 0 OKA KOBE/OKA-UP 0.05 null 0.038
2
P0189
Imperial Valley 1979/10/15
23:16
5052 Plaster City IMPVALL/H-PLS135 0.1 40 0.057
3 P1047 Kobe 1995/01/16 20:46 0 OKA KOBE/OKA000 0.05 null 0.081
4 Imperial Valley El_Centro#13 NGA_no_176_H-E13230 0.138
5
P0210
06:58
5169 Westmorland
Fire Sta
IMPVALL/F-WSM180 0.25 40 0.171
6
P0027 Hollister 1961/04/09 07:23
1028 Hollister City
Hall
HOLLISTR/B-HCH271 0.11 11 0.196
7 Loma Prieta AndersonDam NGA_no_739_AND250 0.244
8 LomaPrieta HollisterDiff.Array NGA_no_778_HDA165 0.278
9 P0169
23:16
6617 Cucapah IMPVALL/H-QKP085 0.05 null 0.309
10 LomaPrieta WAHO NGA_no_811_WAH090 0.36996
11 Kobe, Japan Nishi-Akashi NGA_no_1111_NIS000 0.50275
12 Kobe, Japan Takatori 0.61126
13 CHI-CHI CHY028 NGA_no_1197_CHY028-E 0.65301
14 Loma Prieta AndersonDam NGA_no_739_AND250 0.6832
15 LomaPrieta HollisterDiff.Array NGA_no_778_HDA165 0.7228
16
23:16
6617 Cucapah IMPVALL/H-QKP085 0.05 null
0.8034
17 LomaPrieta WAHO NGA_no_811_WAH090 0.8509
18 Kobe, Japan Nishi-Akashi NGA_no_1111_NIS000 0.90495
19 Kobe, Japan Takatori 1.10026
20 CHI-CHI CHY028 NGA_no_1197_CHY028-E 1.17542
EDP:
1) Max bending moment in the
concrete wall
2) Max drift
3) Final drift
IM: PGA
METHODOLOGY:
Set of seismic records
Zhang J., Huo Y. (2009). Evaluating effectiveness and optimum design of isolation devices for highway bridges using the
fragility function method. Engineering Structures 31; 1648-1660

24
Individual components: seismic fragility
(0,0) (92,0)
(92,29)
(0,29)
(0,54)
(0,62) (28.5,6
2)
(53,56)
(63,45)
(92,32)
(92,34)
EDP:
1) Max bending moment
in the concrete wall
2) Max drift
3) Final drift
LS threshold values:
1) WU=WD=850848.8 N*m
2) WU=0.3m; WD=0.4m
3) WU=0.3m; WD=0.4m
WU
WD
P(EDP|IM)
IM (g)
WU
IM (g)
WD
P(EDP|IM)

25
Interactions on seismic fragility
Load
Network Model for
resilience
Multi-hazard
Scenarios
Local
Level
Network
Level
ResISt
B Recovery
E.g. Repair time
Damage
Action
Damage/Disservice
% of rescued
Action values
IM
A
IM
100 %
People safetyB
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
---- = comment
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
Infrastructure
representation
Hazard
Analysis
Protection
analysis
Performance
analysis
Network
Level
1
Recovery
analysis
**
3
RISE
azard
arios
e performance
y
air time
Damage
Action
Disservice
alues
IM
IM
afety
Quality
Indicator
(no interaction)
A
Quality
Indicator
L0
i TR
i
Indicator
L0 TR
Resilience ∞ 1 /A
C
each scenario
---- = Output
Quality
L0 = initial losses
TR = recovery time
ction
ysis
mance
ysis
Network
Level
System Recovery functionD
Recovery
analysis
**
3
IM (g)
P(EDP|IM)
WU WD+

26
Hospital
Residential
complex
Energy and water
-----
DIRECT LOSSES
INDIRECT LOSSES

28
Considered deteriorations
RECOVERY
TIME
DETERIORATION
TIME
quality %
t0 t1 time
FULLY FUNCTIONAL
DETERIORATION
ΔQ
ΔL

29
Pushover analysis
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Mmax
λ
dependence on concrete
"C12-15 load g"
"C25-30 load g"
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Mmax
λ
depedance on steel behaviour
"50% steelload g"
"100% steelload g"
MATERIAL
CONCRETE FROM C25/30 TO C12/15
STEEL FROM 100% AREA TO 50% - 75%

30
Considered deteriorations
C25/30 C12/15 50%steel 75%steel
g 2.425 2.5 1.675 2.15
g+0.2g 1.375 1.375 <1 1.1
C25/30 C12/15 50%steel 75%steel
g 2.425 2.5 1.675 2.15
g+0.2g 1.375 1.375 <1 1.1
BENDING MOMENT CURVATURE
0.000
1.000
2.000
3.000
cls 25/30
cls 12/15
50% steel
75% steel
λ at first plasticity
g g+0.2g

31
Performance-basedwinddesignoftallbuildingsequippedwithviscoelasticdampers
Conclusions
• An effective multi-scale framework for resilience evaluation of the large scale
urban built infrastructure has been proposed.
• The resilience of all large critical infrastructures is first assessed (local level of
nodes and link). The resilience of the whole system (network level) is evaluated
on the basis of the interdependencies between its components and of the
repercussion of the failure of one component on the other elements.
• Further investigations are required to assess the impact of different
assumptions in the analysis process, namely:
• definition of appropriate analytical and probabilistic methodologies in order to deal
with multiple-hazard scenarios;
• definition of appropriate methods for handling so-called “low-probability, high-
consequence events”;
• development of appropriate methods for the correct evaluation of the recovery
function;
• improved evaluation of indirect losses occurring in urban developments in
consequence of natural disasters.

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