1. PDU Study 1/2015
The rise of populist and
extremist parties in the EU
The case of Hungary and Austria
project
democratic
union
for
PDUSTUDY
Veronika Czina & Teona Surmava

2. 2 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
The rise of Populist and Extremist Parties in
the EU
The Case of Hungary and Austria
PDU Study 1/2015
May 2015
Author: Veronika Czina (V.i.S.d.P.), Teona Sur-
mava
Editing: Daniel Schade, Ella Fuller
The authors would like to thank the attendees
of the 2014 UACES Student Forum conference
for their comments on earlier drafts of parts of
this study.
Cover image: By European People’s Party via
Flickr. Released under Creative Commons At-
tribution 2.0 generic.
© Project for Democratic Union, Munich,
2015
Project for Democratic Union (PDU)
Türkenstraße 17
80333 Munich
Germany
www.democraticunion.eu
munichoffice@democraticunion.eu

3. 3PDU Study 1/2015
5 Executive Summary
7 Introduction
I. The rise of the Orbán regime
8 Hungary’s turn towards democracy
10 The rise of Fidesz and its behaviour
15 Recent developments
18 Captured by autocracy?
II. The rise of the extreme right
20 Jobbik in Hungary
22 The Haider phenomenon in Austria
III. A European response
27 Conditionality
28 Article 7 TEU
30 Recommendations
Contents

4. 4 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU

5. 5PDU Study 1/2015
Executive Summary
This study analyses the phenomena of rising popu-
lism and extremism in the European Union, more pre-
cisely it focuses on the authoritarian, rule-breaking
behaviour of the Hungarian government along with
the rise of euroscepticism in Hungary. It begins with
a presentation of the situation in Hungary through
examining Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz: its
history and political guidelines during 25 years of the
party’s existence and how it changed the Hungarian
political scene since achieving a decisive majority in
the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2010.
The study also focuses on the rising tendency of eu-
roscepticism in the Central Eastern European coun-
try and discusses the case of Austria’s Freedom Party
as a similar case in comparison with the Hungarian
one. These examples are used to illustrate that some
important European politicians are often very close
to endangering the principles of liberal democracy
upon which the EU’s policy-making is supposed to
be built.
Although the Union has a constitutional toolkit for re-
acting to breeches of basic EU values, applying these
measures against EU members requires long and
complicated procedures. This is why the study con-
cludes with offering recommendations about what is
the best way to treat outlier Member States and to
reduce the popularity of extremist right-wing parties.
A closer cooperation with other international orga-
nizations, setting up and monitoring national action
plans and strengthening Article 7 TEU are only a few
of the options the EU has in order to find a long term
solution for its current problems in this regard.

6. 6 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU

7. 7PDU Study 1/2015
Introduction
The Project for Democratic Union believes that the
only viable future for the European Union lies in achiev-
ing a federal constitutional arrangement for which a
functioning democracy and common values among
its Member States are a must. These prerequisites are
sometimes endangered by events unfolding in some
of the EU’s Member States. Even if the EU has a con-
stitutional toolkit for reacting to a breach of some of
Europe’s basic democratic values, the application of
most of these measures against EU members is a long a
complicated procedure. This is why the reaction of the
EU and its other Member States often times falls short
of these measures, rendering its reaction even less ef-
fective.
This study focuses primarily on Hungary, whose cur-
rent government under the leadership of Prime Min-
ister Viktor Orbán has taken controversial measures in
conflict with some basic European democratic values
since 2010. Several major constitutional amendments
in a short period of time, rising EU-scepticism on the
part of the governing party and a straightforward open-
ing towards the East are a few examples of events un-
folding in Hungary, which have led to heated conflicts
with Brussels and most of the EU’s Member States. This
paper analyses the authoritarian and rule-breaking ten-
dencies of the Hungarian government alongside the
rise of EU-scepticism in Hungary. We compare the sit-
uation in Hungary to similar events in Austria’s recent
history and outline how the EU reacted to these phe-
nomena and how such problems could be solved with-
in the EU.
The structure of the study is as follows: The first chapter
presents the situation in Hungary by examining Viktor
Orbán’s Fidesz party, its history and political guidelines
during 25 years of its existence. It then outlines how
it changed the Hungarian political scene since achiev-
ing a decisive majority in the Hungarian parliamenta-
ry elections of 2010. The second chapter focuses on
the rising tide of EU-scepticism in this Central Eastern
European country and discusses the case of Austria’s
Freedom Party as a comparison. Chapter three exam-
ines the possible courses of action the EU has in order
to react to such Member State behaviour.

8. 8 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
1. Hungary’s turn towards
democracy
Domestic policy
The first democratic elections were held in
Hungary in 1990 after the disintegration of
the Soviet Union. This was a time at which the
country’s political landscape was completely reor-
ganized, giving citizens the possibility to engage
with newly-founded democratic political par-
ties.
The parliamentary elections ended with a
victory of the moderate conservative Hungarian
Democratic Forum (MDF – Magyar Demokra-
ta Fórum). However, it is important to note that
the regime change was highly influenced by the
efforts of the country’s new liberal parties, which
were mainly founded by young professionals and
legal experts.
One of these parties was The Alliance of Lib-
eral Democrats (SzDSz – Szabad Demokraták
Szövetsége), which came in second in the 1990
elections; the third largest number of seats went
to the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz – Fi-
atal Demokraták Szövetsége), the other newly
founded liberal party. Viktor Orbán was among
the founders of Fidesz, along with many other
politicians now holding significant positions in
the Hungarian political landscape.
From the events of the late 1980s-early 1990s,
it is apparent that Hungary’s current Prime Min-
ister, Viktor Orbán began his career with a com-
pletely different standpoint than the one he holds
now. As a liberal politician he worked very hard
with other young professionals in order to achieve
a smooth democratic transition in the coun-
try.
His first significant political appearance was a
speech in 1989 on the Heroes’ Square in Budapest
after the reburial of Imre Nagy and other martyrs
of the 1956 revolution. At this memorable event
he called for free elections and the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Hungary. In the 1990s, both as
a member of the opposition and in government,
Orbán was working hard to bring his country
closer to the West and specifically the European
Union.
The following parliamentary elections in 1994
led to a victory of the Hungarian Socialist Party
(MSzP – Magyar Szocialista Párt), which mainly
consisted of the reform wing of the former Sovi-
et-era Hungarian Socialist Labour Party. MSzP
entered into a coalition with SzDSz in order to en-
sure a stable majority.
In 1998 the Hungarian political scene wit-
nessed the victory of Fidesz and the first premier-
ship for Viktor Orbán. The party, which took the
name Hungarian Citizen Party (MPP – Magyar
Polgári Párt) and became Fidesz-MPP for a while,
started to move more and more to the right of
the political spectrum, which was proven by its
coalition with MDF and the Party of Indepen-
dent Smallholders (FKGP – Független Kisgazda
Párt).
This was also the time when Viktor Orbán
started to gain more and more power within his
party. Despite its first victory, Fidesz could not win
the next elections. Both 2002 and 2006 brought
renewed successes of the Hungarian Socialist Par-
I. The rise of the Orbán
regime

9. 9PDU Study 1/2015
ty, which was unique in the sense that no other
Hungarian party and Prime Minister was able to
win two consecutive elections since 1990.
While the country entered the European
Union during its first term, its second was rath-
er unsuccessful. A number of political scandals
led to the resignation of Prime Minister Ferenc
Gyurcsány (who was followed by Gordon Bajnai),
and Hungary was hit by the world economic cri-
sis.
Taking advantage of the situation, an even
more right-wing Fidesz started to claim that the
political transformation of Hungary had not yet
happened because the old communist elite still
infiltrated everyday political life. In contrast, Fi-
desz promised a real political change for their vot-
ers.
This strategy brought a sweeping victory
for the party in 2010. The party participated in
the elections in a grouping with the Christian
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP – Keresztény-
demokrata Néppárt) and secured a two-thirds
majority in the parliament.
This was an unprecedented victory for a Hun-
garian party to date; and it enabled the party to
profoundly change the country’s legal and polit-
ical system. In 2014 Fidesz renewed ist previous
electoral success.
Policy towards the EU
In order to fully understand the political environ-
ment in which Fidesz came to power it is indis-
pensable to sum up Hungary’s policy towards the
EU in the past 25 years.
In the 1990s, Hungary was among those Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries whose main
aim after the disintegration of the Soviet Union
was to make their way back to Europe.
The country’s cooperation with the Europe-
an Communities started in 1989 with the creation
of the Phare Programme which was a European
pre-accession instrument aiming at assisting the
economic recovery of first Hungary and Poland,
and later on other Central and Eastern European
countries so as to facilitate their accession to the
European Union.
After Hungary’s turn towards democracy
with the elections of 1990 a political consensus
emerged on the future of the country: all political
parties of the Hungarian Parliament agreed that
the country’s main foreign policy goal should be
to join the EU as soon as possible. When the Co-
penhagen criteria were established as pre-requi-
sites of accession to the Union in 1993 Hungary
started out as an elite candidate country as it suc-
cessfully met the criteria and quickly completed
the preparations for its eventual EU accession.
This progress was largely facilitated not only
by the internal political consensus on EU mem-
bership, but also by the EU’s system of pre-acces-
sion conditionality.
In April 2003, a referendum was held in the
country, where 83,76% of the participants voted
in favour of joining the Union1
. Hungary joined
the EU in the so-called “big bang enlargement” of
1 “EU Accession: Sentiment Ranges between Con-
fidence and Uncertainty,” Euractiv, April 18, 2003, http://
www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-accession-senti-
ment-ranges-confidence-uncertainty/article-110226 (ac-
cessed May 21, 2015).

10. 10 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
May 2004, when nine other countries also became
members.
Since its accession, Hungary has had a mixed
experience as both a partaker in European Union
policy-making, as well as being a subject of EU
obligations. While it almost began its membership
as a poster-child, it has begun to behave markedly
more self-centred and autonomous as the country
has not been afraid to take up legal and political
conflicts with the EU.
This new strategy must, however, be assessed
within its overall respectable compliance with EU
legislation and its willingness to ultimately re-
solve even the most controversial conflicts with
the EU.
2. The rise of Fidesz and its
behaviour
Hungary’s Presidency in 2011
When examining Hungary’s new, more con-
flict-seeking policy towards the EU, the
Hungarian Presidency of the EU Council in the
first half of 2011 cannot be left out of the analysis.
Hungary drafted a realistic and well-structured
program for its Presidency whose main priorities
were achieving tangible results or advancements
in the Danube Strategy, the Roma Strategy and
the integration of the European energy sector.
Some major steps were taken in these areas
due to the effective manoeuvring of Hungarian
politicians and experts, such as exemplified by the
role of the Hungarian MEP Lívia Járóka in defin-
ing the Roma Strategy. In the enlargement area,
Hungary successfully pushed the case of Croa-
tia’s EU accession quite successfully. The coun-
try also handled unexpected events such as the
Arab Spring quite smoothly, despite being a small
country with no direct geopolitical interest in
the area. When taking a look at these elements of
Hungary’s presidency one could come to a rather
positive assessment.
However, Hungary’s Presidency equally saw
some setbacks. One of the most important events
of the Presidency was meant to be the summit be-
tween EU and Eastern Partnership countries, but
the meeting was postponed to the semester of the
Polish Presidency, which meant that there was no
European Council meeting in Budapest in 2011.
The official reason behind postponing the event
was coordination problems, but it seems more
likely that the Hungarian did not prepare the Bu-
dapest meeting adequately2
.
Some politically sensitive issues equally cast
their shadow over the Presidency. The Hungarian
government adopted some legislative measures,
such as a new media law and a new constitution
in the face of heavy criticism from EU circles and
the Venice Commission.
The international concerns were mainly di-
rected against the alleged efforts of the Hungarian
government to damage the system of checks and
balances and to restrict media freedom through
the new constitution3
. During Viktor Orbán’s first
appearance in the European Parliament as the
Council president he already had to face harsh
criticism over his government’s acts4
. These ‘at-
tacks’ initiated a change in the PM’s rhetoric to-
wards Brussels, which became more and more
critical.
The Hungarian government’s intentional acts
could even have been perceived as insults, or sym-
bolic mistakes by the EU, such as not putting the
EU flag behind the Prime Minister while he held
his major speeches, and surrounding him with
only Hungarian flags instead5
.
Due to these acts international attention was
2 Péter Balázs: “The first Hungarian Council Presi-
dency“, in Achievements of the First Hungarian EU Council
Presidency, EU Frontiers Policy Paper, Center for EU En-
largement Studies 8 (June 2011): 7.
3 Attila Ágh: “The Hungarian Rhapsodies: The Con-
flict of Adventurism and Professionalism in the European
Union Presidency: The Hungarian Rhapsodies,” JCMS:
Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (September 2012):
71.
4 “Orbán Ready for Battle,” Hungarian EU Presiden-
cy Website, January 19, 2011, http://www.eu2011.hu/news/
ep-debate-orban-ready-battle (accessed May 12, 2015).
5 Balázs, “The first Hungarian Council Presidency”:
9.

11. 11PDU Study 1/2015
increasingly directed towards Hungary in the first
half of 2011. However, Hungarian policy-mak-
ers did not seem to mind this attention as their
strategy was to focus on the professional tasks of
the Presidency. This meant that they did not pay
much attention to a possible decrease of reputa-
tion and they were not afraid to stand up against
the EU.
The Hungarian Presidency can hence be char-
acterized by the ‘contrast between the political
activities of the government and the professional
activities of the administration.’6
The subsequent
sections will demonstrate that this characteristic
stretches further than the semester of the Presi-
dency.
The change in Prime Minister Viktor Or-
bán’s rhetoric first manifested itself in his speech
in 2012 on the Hungarian national holiday of
March 15. In this controversial speech he em-
phasized that Hungary insists on national sover-
eignty and does not need “unsolicited assistance
of foreigners.”7
Comparing the EU to the former
Soviet dominance of Hungary, he stated that for
his country “freedom means that we decide about
the laws governing our own lives, we decide what
is important and what is not.”8
Since starting his
term as a Prime Minister, Orbán used a harsh
tone towards Brussels several times, some exam-
ples of which will be discussed on the following
pages.
Hungary’s constitutional and
legal reforms
The most significant characteristic of the Hun-
garian government’s EU policy has been the
determined defence of its national positions in the
EU. This appeared in many different forms and
reached its peak in the conflict with the EU over
6 Ágh, “The Hungarian Rhapsodies”: 72.
7 Ian Traynor, “Hungary Prime Minister Hits out at
EU Interference in National Day Speech,” The Guardian,
March 15, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
mar/15/hungary-prime-minister-orban-eu (accessed May
13, 2015).
8 Ibid.
the country’s comprehensive constitutional and
legal reforms. With the 2010 victory, the Fidesz
government was given the possibility to enact
fundamental changes to the country’s constitution
and legislation as a whole. The party began to in-
troduce such changes soon after the elections and
were not always received well across Europe.
The changes brought about by the Fidesz gov-
ernment had important legal consequences, such
as the reduction of the retirement age of judges, or
the creation of a new media-supervising authori-
ty, while others had symbolic importance, such as
modifying the country’s official name to Hungary
(instead of the Republic of Hungary) and defin-
ing the concept of family in a way which could
be seen as discriminatory against individuals with
different sexual orientations.
Many of these changes were added to the
Hungarian Fundamental Law (formerly called
Constitution), which was amended many times
within a short period of time since the spring of
2010.
These subjects generated heated debates in
Europe. Not only different Member States, but also
international organizations, such as the Venice
Commission, condemned some of the develop-
ments in Hungary9
. The most heated discussions
took place between the Hungarian government
and the European Commission, represented by
its Vice President and Commissioner for Justice,
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, Viviane
Reding. She informed Hungary on several occa-
sions about her concerns with the recent changes
in the country, such as the reduction of the retire-
ment age of judges or the consistency of the new
Hungarian Fundamental Law with EU law and
the spirit of the EU’s Treaties10
.
The European Parliament also voiced its dis-
9 “Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fun-
damental Law of Hungary Adopted by the Venice Commis-
sion at Its 95th Plenary Session, Venice, 14-15 June 2013,”
Council of Europe Website, June 2013, http://www.venice.
coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2013)012-e
(accessed May 13, 2015).
10 “Viviane Reding’s Letter to Tibor Navracsics”, Eu-
ropean Commission, December 12, 2011, http://ec.europa.
eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/news/20120109_1_
en.pdf (accessed January 23, 2014).

12. 12 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
content with the situation of fundamental rights
in Hungary. First, the Parliament issued a reso-
lution in February 2012 about the “recent polit-
ical developments in Hungary” which suggested
the possibility of resorting to Article 7(1) of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) if the country’s
authorities do not respond to the concerns of the
EU11
.
This Article enables applying the strictest
sanctions against a Member State which is in
breach of rule of law and democracy in the EU,
including revoking its voting rights in the EU in-
stitutions. The EP resolution was followed by a
harsh controversial report on Hungary based on
a motion of MEP Rui Tavares in the summer of
2013.
The Tavares Report regarded the reforms of
the Hungarian government as unprecedented and
incompatible with the EU’s values and several
TEU Articles12
. It provided a detailed assessment
of the main concerns in several different political
areas, ranging from concerns about the w: ay in
which the new Fundamental Law was adopted to
the threats it may pose against the principles of
checks and balances, pluralism and freedom.
Resorting to Article 7(1) of TEU “in case the
replies from the Hungarian authorities appear
not to comply with the requirements of Article 2
TEU”13
(which defines the basic values of the EU,
such as freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of
law etc.) created a clear division between MEPs:
some of them, mainly politicians to the Left of the
political spectrum, supported Tavares in his crit-
11 “European Parliament Resolution of 16
February 2012 on the Recent Political Develop-
ments in Hungary (2012/2511(RSP))”, Europe-
an Parliament, February 16, 2012, http://www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2012-0053+0+DOC+PDF+V0//
EN (accessed January 23, 2014).
12 Rui Tavares, “Report on the Situation of Fun-
damental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hunga-
ry (pursuant to the European Parliament Resolution of
16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI))”, European Par-
liament, June 24, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+RE-
PORT+A7-2013-0229+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (accessed
January 24, 2014).
13 Ibid.: 37.
icisms against Hungary, while others considered
them to be an exaggeration.
This suggests that some points made in the
report were politically motivated. As a response
to this document, one day before the Report was
put up for a vote at the European Parliament,
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán paid
an unexpected visit to Brussels, where he sharply
criticized the report in front of the European Par-
liament for being “insulting” and “unfair” towards
the Hungarian people14
.
Moreover, he declared the proposal set forth
in the report to be a “serious breach of the Found-
ing Treaties” because it “would bring one of the
Member States of the European Union under con-
trol and guardianship.”15
According to Orbán, the
European Parliament’s support for such a report
would “mean a real danger for the future of Eu-
rope.”16
Despite the PM’s efforts, on 3 July 3 2013,
the European Parliament issued its resolution on
the Hungarian situation which reiterated most of
Tavares’s concerns17
.
The legislative body reacted to Orbán’s accusa-
tions by denying that it applied double standards,
and by reminding him that its opinion about basic
values and principles of the EU was valid to all
Member States of the European Union, not just to
Hungary. The recommendations of the European
Parliament included revoking the controversial is-
sues mentioned above.
The Hungarian government reacted with its
own parliamentary resolution accusing the Euro-
pean Parliament of overstepping its authority and
14 “Prime Minister Orbán’s Speech in the European
Parliament,” Website of the Hungarian Government, July
2, 2013, http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-of-
fice/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-or-
ban-s-opening-speech-in-the-european-parliament (ac-
cessed March 25, 2014).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 “European Parliament Resolution of 3 July 2013
on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and
Practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parlia-
ment Resolution of 16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI))”,
European Parliament, July 3, 2013, http://www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEX-
T+TA+P7-TA-2013-0315+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (ac-
cessed January 23, 2014).

13. 13PDU Study 1/2015
calling the EU to treat Hungary on equal footing
with other Member States and to respect its sov-
ereignty18
.
Rhetoric or true policy?
The most difficult part of assessing the Hun-
garian situation, or any similar interaction
between the EU and a Member State, is deciding
whether the discussions taking place are truly a
matter of policy or rather mere rhetoric.
Some politically sensitive cases show that
both can be the answer. Such a politically sensi-
tive issue was the Tobin-case—a judicial case in-
cluding problems of criminal extradition between
Ireland and Hungary with additional involvement
of the European Commission.
A decision of the European Commission pub-
lished in the spring of 2014 shows that it may have
indeed had some serious concerns about the rule
of law in some EU Member States.
That is why on March 11, 2014, the Commis-
sion presented a new framework to safeguard the
rule of law in the European Union19
. The frame-
work would serve as a “tool to deal, at the EU lev-
el, with systemic threats to the rule of law” and it
would be complementary to infringement proce-
dures and Article 7. The most important feature
of the new procedure would be its early warning
mechanism which allows the Commission to en-
ter into a dialogue with the Member State in ques-
tion as early as possible.
The introduction of this mechanism suggests
that the concerns of the Commission about the
state of rule of law in some EU countries were le-
gitimate.
This framework could be advantageous for
the future because it would clarify the authority of
the Commission and would hopefully prevent po-
18 “69/2013. (VII. 5.) OGY Határozat,” http://www.
complex.hu/kzldat/o13h0069.htm/o13h0069.htm (accessed
March 12, 2014).
19 “EUROPA - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release -
European Commission Presents a Framework to Safeguard
the Rule of Law in the European Union,” Europa.eu, March
11, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-237_
en.htm (accessed March 23, 2014).
litically heated discussions and accusations about
the EU overstepping its authority, such as the ones
surrounding the Tavares Report.
Moreover, the introduction of this new mech-
anism also suggests that some Member State be-
haviour might endanger the future of the EU,
regardless of the country’s size: small and large
Member States can be obstacles to EU-wide val-
ues and the rule of law.
Legal proceedings against
Hungary
Aside from the above discussion on Hunga-
ry’s track record, some legal actions have also
been taken against the country, demonstrating
the most sensitive of the European Commission’s
concerns.
One of these ‘formal’ procedures against
Hungary was the Excessive Deficit Procedure
that the country has been under since 2004. The
resolution of this issue was among the biggest
aims of the Hungarian government since 2010,
and finally the European Commission recom-
mended the abrogation of the Procedure in May
2013, which the Ecofin Council agreed to in June
of that year20
.
The case was interesting because of the di-
vergent political interpretations that have been
proposed. The Hungarian government evaluated
lifting the Procedure as a success and stated that
with this step the Commission acknowledged
the economic achievements of the country21
.
Meanwhile members of the opposition and some
experts warned that this was only a result of the
EU’s pressure on Hungary to which the govern-
20 “EU Frees Hungary from Excessive Deficit Pro-
cedure after Nine Years,” Politics.hu, June 21, 2013, http://
www.politics.hu/20130621/eu-frees-hungary-from-exces-
sive-deficit-procedure-after-nine-years/ (accessed March
16, 2014).
21 “Hungary’s Economic Performance Is Acknowl-
edged: Excessive Deficit Procedure Lifted,” Website of the
Hungarian Government, May 29, 2013, http://www.korma-
ny.hu/en/news/hungary-s-economic-performance-is-ac-
knowledged-excessive-deficit-procedure-lifted (accessed
January 23, 2014).

14. 14 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
ment could only comply with introducing aus-
terity measures which increased poverty within
the country22
.
Another type of legal procedure launched
against the country several times was the in-
fringement procedure. Already in 2010, the
Commission declared to bring Hungary, along
with Portugal, before the European Court of Jus-
tice over introducing controversial taxes23
.
In January 2012, the European Commission
launched politically highly sensitive infringe-
ment proceedings against the country over the
independence of its central bank and data pro-
tection authorities, as well as over measures af-
fecting the judiciary. The Commission stated
that “Hungarian legislation conflicts with EU
law” at several points24
.
In November 2013, two new infringement
procedures were launched against Hungary, one
concerning its waste management problem, and
another regarding alleged market distortions of
mobile payment services25
.
However, these cases did not lead to sanc-
tions. Some of them were dropped because the
European Court of Justice decided that the mea-
sures are in line with EU legislation. In other
cases Hungary promised to act and modified the
22 “Excessive Deficit Procedure against Hungary to
Be Lifted,” Budapost - A Hungarian Press Review, May 31,
2013, http://budapost.eu/2013/05/excessive-deficit-pro-
cedure-against-hungary-to-be-lifted/ (accessed March 23,
2014).
23 “Commission Takes Portugal and Hungary to
Court and Asks France to Modify Its VAT Legislation,” Eu-
ropean Commission Website, March 18, 2010, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/
infringements/factsheet/2010/03/2010-03-296-hu-vat_
en.pdf (accessed March 16, 2014).
24 “EUROPA - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release -
European Commission Launches Accelerated Infringement
Proceedings against Hungary over the Independence of Its
Central Bank and Data Protection Authorities as Well as
over Measures Affecting the Judiciary,” Europa.eu, January
17, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-24_
en.htm?locale=en (accessed January 22, 2014).
25 “EU Launches Two New Infringement Procedures
against Hungary,” Politics.hu, November 22, 2013, http://
www.politics.hu/20131122/eu-launches-two-new-infringe-
ment-procedures-against-hungary/ (accessed March 16,
2014).
parts of its laws criticized by the Commission.
In April 2012, the Commission expressed its
satisfaction with the measures which Hungary
promised to take in the case of its central bank
statute26
.
In November 2013 the infringement pro-
cedure in the case of the retirement age of the
judges had also been closed27
, as well as the pro-
ceeding about Hungary’s special retail tax and
telecommunication tax due to the completion of
changes requested by the Commission28
.
Meanwhile, other, already ongoing proceed-
ings entered into a new phase recently: in April
2014 the Commission requested Hungary to en-
sure effective enforcement of competition law
regarding agricultural products, to apply a single
tax rate for spirits and to end measures that re-
strict the trade of tobacco products29
.
The Commission escalated the ongoing pro-
cedure on the lunch voucher monopoly against
Hungary to the ECJ and a new infringement
proceeding was launched concerning the ban
on building shopping malls with the aim of pro-
tecting SMEs. Other infringement proceedings
were begun as well, for example on the trade of
tobacco products and car leasing services, or the
use of agricultural land by cross-border inves-
tors, in which the Commission requested Hun-
26 “Hungary - Infringements: European Commission
Satisfied with Changes to Central Bank Statute, but Refers
Hungary to the Court of Justice on the Independence of
the Data Protection Authority and Measures Affecting the
Judiciary,” Europa.eu, April 25, 2012, http://europa.eu/rap-
id/press-release_IP-12-395_en.htm (accessed March 12,
2014).
27 “European Commission Closes Infringement Pro-
cedure on Forced Retirement of Hungarian Judges,” Europa.
eu, November 20, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-13-1112_en.htm (accessed March 15, 2014).
28 “Infringement Cases by Country - European Com-
mission,” European Commission Website, http://ec.europa.
eu/taxation_customs/common/infringements/infringe-
ment_cases/bycountry/#hungary (accessed November 29,
2013).
29 “April Infringements Package: Main Decisions.
European Commission - MEMO/14/293 16/04/2014,” Eu-
ropean Commission Website, April 16, 2014, http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-293_en.htm (accessed
May 30, 2014).

15. 15PDU Study 1/2015
gary to end certain measures to comply with EU
law30
.
So far in 2015 Hungary was under scrutiny
for its tax exemption on home-made alcohol-
ic drinks (pálinka)31
and also in regards to the
country’s energy regulations32
.
However, despite the picture depicted above,
Hungary’s performance indicator regarding
infringement procedures counts as average
among EU Member States. Based on the Euro-
pean Commission’s observations, the country’s
performance is considered good in the number
of pending infringement proceedings (which
means that Hungary has fewer open infringe-
ment proceedings than the EU average) and
the duration of the procedure since the Court’s
ruling; however if we look at the duration of the
proceedings altogether in months, an under-per-
formance can be detected33
.
These infringement procedures show that
while Hungary is using its leeway as much as it
can it nevertheless responds cooperatively to the
concerns of the European Commission.
30 “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES -
Press Release - Free Movement of Capital: Commission
Opens Infringement Procedure against Hungary on Rights
of Cross-Border Investors to Use Agricultural Land,” Eu-
ropean Commission Website, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-14-1152_en.htm?locale=en (accessed Jan-
uary 21, 2015).
31 “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES -
Press Release - Taxation: Commission Refers Hungary to
Court over Tax Exemption of Pálinka,” European Commis-
sion Website, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
138_en.htm (accessed March 18, 2010).
32 “The European Commission Launches Energy
Rules Infringement Procedure against Hungary”, Daily
News Hungary, http://dailynewshungary.com/the-europe-
an-commission-launches-energy-rules-infringement-pro-
cedure-against-hungary/ (accessed March 18, 2015).
33 “Infringement Proceedings,” European Commis-
sion Website, April 04, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/in-
fringements/index_en.htm (accessed June 18, 2014).
3. Recent developments
Hungarian and European
parliamentary elections
The Hungarian political arena experienced
two crucial events in the spring of 2014,
namely the Hungarian parliamentary elections
held on April 634
and the European parliamenta-
ry elections on May 25.
Not surprisingly, the first one was more im-
portant for the country and its government, not
only because the Hungarian participation rate
in the EP elections is usually significantly below
the participation rate in the national elections,
but also because the results of the European vot-
ing clearly reflected those of the national elec-
tions.
This year’s Hungarian elections were the first
to be held in accordance with the new Funda-
mental Law of Hungary and they brought a deci-
sive victory for Orbán’s Fidesz party. Out of the
199 seats available, the governing party received
133, the united leftist opposition (consisting of
MSZP-Együtt-DK-PM-MLP) 38, while the far-
right Jobbik received 23 and the green LMP
obtained 5 seats in the new Hungarian Parlia-
ment35
.
These results were to a certain extent repeat-
ed in the European elections, with the exception
that the united left broke its alliance and compet-
ed separately for the European seats. As a result,
out of Hungary’s 21 MEPs, 12 are coming from
Fidesz, 3 from Jobbik (Movement for a better
Hungary), 2 each from MSzP (Hungarian Social-
34 For a more detailed analysis of these particular
election results see the analysis on our website: “The ‘Hun-
garian Napoleon’ Remains Prime Minister,” Project for
Democratic Union (PDU), http://www.democraticunion.
eu/2014/04/hungarian-parliamentary-elections-demon-
strate-rightward-shift/.
35 “Országgyűlési Képviselő Választása 2014. Április
6.,” Nemzeti Választási Iroda, April 28, 2014, http://www.va-
lasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html (accessed
June 18, 2014).

16. 16 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
ist Party) and DK (Democratic Coalition), and
LMP (Politics Can Be Different) and Együtt 2014
(Together 2014) both send 1 representative36
.
Unsurprisingly, both international and Hun-
garian media had much to say regarding the
Hungarian elections. Some outlets in the Czech
press were among the few that praised the results
and declared Orbán to be the most successful
European political leader.
Most reactions, however, were not so opti-
mistic. Zoltán Lakner, professor of ELTE Univer-
sity and political analyst, expressed his fears that
Hungarian citizens will give in to populist rheto-
ric and assist the government uncritically with all
its policies. As the New York Times evaluated the
outcome of the elections, Orbán cannot be calm
after his victory: according to them the biggest
worry he will have to face is that undecided vot-
ers may turn to the radical right37
. Reuters raised
concerns about the same issue and warned that
more hostile decisions are yet to come, referring
to the unorthodox economic measures of the
Hungarian government38
. In nearby Austria, the
leader of the social democrat SPÖ party went as
far as saying that these results reinforce a dark,
populist system and called the EU to monitor
closely the political developments in Hungary.
Despite these condemning voices, the majority
of the European leaders, such as Martin Schulz,
José Manuel Barrosso and Joseph Daul congrat-
ulated Orbán on his victory.
It is very important to highlight at this point,
that despite the close monitoring of the events
in Hungary and some warning from Brussels, no
serious consequences occurred in response to
the Hungarian government’s individualistic and,
36 “European Parliamentary Election Result: Hunga-
ry,” Europe Decides, n.d., http://europedecides.eu/results/
hu/ (accessed June 18, 2014).
37 “Election in Hungary Tests Nation’s Tilt to the
Right,” New York Times, April 5, 2014, http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/04/06/world/europe/election-in-hungary-
tests-nations-tilt-to-the-right.html?_r=1 (accessed May 17,
2015).
38 “Hungary Re-Elects Maverick PM, Far-Right
Opposition Gains,” Reuters, April 6, 2014, http://www.re-
uters.com/article/2014/04/06/us-hungary-election-idUS-
BREA3502V20140406.
at times, rule-breaking behaviour.
The reason for this is that even though Viktor
Orbán usually uses a blaming rhetoric towards
Brussels, especially when talking to his domestic
audience, the government in most cases coop-
erates with Brussels in the end, which shows its
general willingness to comply with EU legisla-
tion. It is not by chance that Article 7(1) of TEU
did not have to be applied in the case of Hungary,
because the country exerted many modifications
to its legal system where it was most pressed to
do so.
Thus, the Hungarian EU strategy in many
cases can be characterised as contradictory –
there is noticeable discrepancy between the
government’s communication towards the Hun-
garian citizens and its political actions at the Eu-
ropean level.
Special taxes in the 2015 budget
During the autumn of 201439
an additional
aspect of Hungary’s governance style came
to the front, namely a new kind of econom-
ic policy. The main driving force behind this
development was perceived domestic interests
of the country. The most significant actions of
this “particularist” Hungarian economic policy
included taxing the banks, nationalizing utili-
ty firms and inserting taxes in the 2015 bud-
get which were clearly directed against foreign
players present in the Hungarian economy (e.g.
advertisement tax). Even if the way of introduc-
ing these measures was legal, their aim, explic-
itly favouring national firms, was clearly against
EU rules.
The Hungarian political scene was in up-
heaval over a series of protests which were di-
rected against the introduction of a new and
unique tax on the internet. On October 21st
Mihály Varga, Minister for National Economy,
announced that the 2015 national budget would
include a tax on Internet data transfers. The tax
39 See the article on our website for a more detailed
analysis: “An Eventful Autumn for Hungary,” Project for
Democratic Union (PDU), http://www.democraticunion.
eu/2014/11/eventful-autumn-hungary/.

17. 17PDU Study 1/2015
was expected to hit internet and telecommu-
nication providers and their customers hard;
moreover the bill has been highly criticized,
with critics asserting that it would be harmful
for the country’s economic development, lim-
it access to information and hinder freedom of
expression. This was followed by widespread
protests (the largest attracted a crowd of around
20,000 people) in the capital and other major
cities in Hungary.
Besides the univocal critics against the
notion of taxing the number one information
provider of Hungarian citizens, the nature and
amount of the tax was also highly criticised.
The draft tax code foresaw internet providers
to pay a tax of 150 forints (50 eurocents) per gi-
gabyte of data traffic. This would have meant a
huge burden for most households, as according
to statistics, in 2013 almost 73% of Hungarians
used Internet on a daily-basis40
. After the first
protest (26 October 2014) the government an-
nounced a modification to the tax which would
include a monthly cap of 700 forints (approxi-
mately 2.3 euros) for individual subscribers and
5000 forints (approximately 16 euros) for busi-
nesses.
However, the active resistance of people
did not decline. Many expected the govern-
ment to completely revoke the tax and so an-
other protest rally was held on October 28.
During the main events surrounding the inter-
net tax, Prime Minister Orbán was nowhere to
be found, spending a family holiday in Switzer-
land. When he returned to Budapest on Friday
October 31st he announced that the tax would
not be introduced in its current form.
In reaction, a celebratory protest was or-
ganized for the same night, but was a subdued
affair in comparison to the earlier demonstra-
tions. Public outrage could be seen as the rea-
son behind this surprising turn of events on
the one hand, however the discontent of some
right-wing politicians and the lack of universal
support for the tax within the Fidesz party in
fact seemed to be more important motives.
40 “Internet Users (per 100 People) 2010-2014,”
Worldbank Website, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IT.NET.USER.P2 (accessed January 10, 2015).
A major corruption scandal
The announcement to revoke the tax might
have been welcomed by Hungarian citi-
zens; however, it also reinforced assumptions
that the tax was only a bone to chew on for the
citizens and media of Hungary in order to ob-
scure much more important political events, for
example, banning Hungarian officials affiliated
with the government from entering the United
States.
The move by the US to declare six public
officials suspected of corruption ineligible for
visas in the middle of October can be consid-
ered a serious diplomatic incident, adding fuel
to the already existing tensions between the two
countries: The scandal came less than a month
after President Barack Obama condemned
Hungary for its repressive actions against civ-
il society. The diplomatic relationship between
the two countries has not improved since these
events.
Hungary’s policy towards Russia
Another major action of the Hungarian gov-
ernment, which aimed at protecting the Hun-
garian economy through foreign policy, was initi-
ating bilateral economic talks with Russia despite
EU sanctions41
.
This raised questions over Hungary’s loyalty
to Europe’s collective policy. The country engaged
in these negotiations autonomously because as a
response to the EU sanctions, Russia introduced
an import ban on articles coming from the EU
which naturally negatively impacted the Hungar-
ian economy.
Hungary also introduced state measures to
support producers in order to improve the situ-
ation. As Hungary is also dependent on Russian
energy, the country continued engaging in the
41 For a detailed assessment of Hungary’s rap-
prochement to Russia see the analysis on our website:
“Hungary, Russia and Ukraine”, http://www.democraticu-
nion.eu/2014/10/hungarys-rapprochement-russia-impor-
tance-ukrainian-crisis-europe/.

18. 18 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
South Stream pipeline project despite the fact that
all related activities were suspended at the EU lev-
el42
.
Moreover, Hungary also reached a long-term
nuclear deal with Russia, which involves an im-
portant loan from Russia to finance the opera-
tion of a nuclear power plant in Hungary. As the
motives behind the Hungarian actions are clearly
economic, it can be assumed that the Hungarian
government disregards the objectives behind the
EU sanctions.
This notion was reinforced by the statement
of Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Economic
and Foreign Affairs, who said in an interview that
Hungary conducts a “Hungarian friendly” policy
which protects Hungarian interests. These words
clearly imply an element of disregard to the fact
that Hungary is a part of a collective system43
.
This tendency was further exposed by Pres-
ident Putin’s visit to Hungary in February 2015
which was an unusually highly anticipated event
in Hungary and was received with criticism by the
EU given the fact that the Russian President has
recently become a persona non grata in most EU
countries.
Whether or not the cases mentioned above
are related, they all highlight a growing distance
between Hungary and its Western allies. Perhaps
Prime Minister Orbán’s announcement in the
summer of 2014 about building ‘an illiberal new
state based on national foundations’44
and getting
closer to Russia should finally be taken serious-
ly.
The country’s isolation from the EU and the
42 Balázs Horváthy and Adrienn Nyircsák: “EU-Rus-
sia Sanctions War. Part II: Consequences of Restrictive
Measures for Hungary - National Interests and Questions
of Loyalty,” HAS CSS Lendület-HPOPs Research Grop, No-
vember 6, 2014, http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/en/blog/2014/10/
eu-russia-sanctions-war-part-ii-consequences-for-hunga-
ry.
43 “Szijjártó: A Diplomatákat Megilleti a Védettség,
de Erről Lemondhat a Küldő Állam”, Híradó, http://www.
hirado.hu/2014/12/08/szijjarto-a-diplomatakat-megille-
ti-a-vedettseg-de-errol-lemondhat-a-kuldo-allam/ (ac-
cessed December 17, 2014)..
44 “Orban Wants to Build ‘Illiberal State,’” Euob-
server.com, July 28, 2014, https://euobserver.com/politi-
cal/125128.
West is clearly a carefully planned strategy and
its long-term effects are questionable. However,
some predictions can already be made. The fact,
that in 2014 Tibor Navracsics, Hungary’s EU
Commissioner delegate was rejected by the Euro-
pean Parliament as Commissioner for Education,
Culture, Youth & Citizenship portfolio in the
first round; and the subsequent downgrade of his
portfolio by removing Citizenship is evidence that
there is a growing concern over the track-record
of the country.
4. Captured by autocracy?
The Orbán-phenomenon
Why are the Hungarian citizens putting their
trust in the Fidesz government again when
there is so much criticism coming from around
the world? The personality of Viktor Orbán plays
an important role in this seemingly unconditional
support.
Charles Gati, a senior fellow at Johns Hop-
kins’ Foreign Policy Institute compared Orbán to
Napoleon, stating that no European leader since
him has changed his positions more often than the
Hungarian leader. Having seen Orbán manage to
transform Fidesz from a leftist liberal pro-Euro-
pean party to a right-wing, nationalist, populist,
EU-critical party, one can only agree with Gati on
his statement.
Still, Orbán is a good politician with incred-
ible tactical skills and charisima who appeals to
most Hungarian voters. He made a very clear
choice to play the role of patriotic leader fighting
against foreign forces, which seems to please his
supporters. He perfectly understands the insecu-
rity of Hungarians concerning their relationship
with stronger European powers.
Citizens also enjoy positive effects on their
everyday lives under the Fidesz government as
personal income tax and household power bills
have fallen. Furthermore, public finances have
stabilized and Hungary met the European Union
goal of keeping the budget deficit under 3% of its
gross domestic product in 2012 and 2013. Recent-

19. 19PDU Study 1/2015
ly, Fidesz has also started to claim that unemploy-
ment has decreased and new workplaces are being
created continuously.
Orbán repeatedly states that these changes
are aimed at turning Hungary into a “race car” af-
ter eight years of economic and political Socialist
mismanagement. As an independent analyst ar-
gued, Mr Orbán’s economic measures have played
a significant role in his success. “If I have to cite
one reason for which Fidesz can again win elec-
tions, it is the cuts in utility bills,” said Peter Kreko
of Political Capital, a Budapest research NGO.
Such economic steps by the government
created the expression ‘Orbanomics’, which has
become widely used in the European press. The
expression refers to Orbán’s economic policy,
which although it has helped Hungary emerge
from recession and has brought short-term ben-
efits for citizens, at the same time has discouraged
the type of investment that the country needs for
long-term growth by creating a hostile and unpre-
dictable business environment.
One of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s big-
gest strengths is his ability to engage the Hun-
garian citizens, or at least the majority of them.
He does so in his powerful, often campaign-like
speeches. In February, Fidesz lost its supermajori-
ty due to the result of a by-election in the town of
Veszprém. In his annual evaluation speech held
just a few days after the Veszprém elections, Or-
bán recognized this as a loss to his government
and called for increased cooperation from his par-
ty in order to avoid the return of a socialist gov-
ernment in the next elections.
Unsurprisingly he also defended his foreign
and economic policy and his government’s ac-
tions. Recently, and especially since the Charlie
Hebdo incident at the beginning of January, he
has started to adapt a hostile rhetoric towards
immigrants and he has repeatedly claimed that
Hungary belongs to the Hungarians and will not
welcome everybody who wants to settle down in
the country.
In his February 27 speech he said that the
Hungarians are a politically incorrect nation be-
cause they do not settle for the idea of multicul-
turalism which could have turned Hungary into a
refugee camp. He wants a country where no labels
belong to democracy, a statement which comes off
rather strange after his own insistence on illiber-
al democracy, and his desire to develop a country
which walks its own path and does not let foreign
powers control it.
The motivation behind Fidesz’s extreme right
turn and the key to Orbán’s success might also lie
in the fact that he manages to engage more and
more right-wing voters. Thus his anti-EU policy
(or at least rhetoric) enables him to detract some
voters from the extreme right-wing Jobbik par-
ty.
Another, even more dangerous scenario may
also possibly develop: a closer cooperation than
ever between Fidesz and Jobbik. Already after los-
ing its supermajority in parliament, Fidesz could
only secure its two-thirds in the house by getting
support from Jobbik during the voting process.
And this is, to put it bluntly, a coalition between
the two parties; an implicit and an occasional one,
but still a coalition.

20. 20 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
1. Jobbik in Hungary1
The European Parliamentary elections in 2014
were an indicator for the rise of the popularity
of far-right parties across Europe. The election re-
sults show a significant increase (50%) in the pop-
ularity of right-wing political parties compared to
the previous elections in 20092
.
In France the Front National gained a third
of the total number of French seats. Other coun-
tries like Denmark with the Danish People’s Party
and Austria with its Freedom Party also showed
significant support for racist and xenophobic par-
ties.
Furthermore, the last elections were equally
alarming for Europe as some neo-Nazi entered the
European Parliament, including the Greek Gold-
en Dawn and extreme far-right Jobbik in Hunga-
ry. A strong presence of these MEPs could enable
them to establish political groups in the European
Parliament that would entitle them to get public
EU funds and hence strengthen their influence.
The Parliament’s magazine raised awareness of
some of the potential issue by asking: “What if a
far-right MEP was to chair the civil liberties com-
mittee, in charge of fundamental rights issues?”3
1 For a more detailed account on extremism in Hun-
gary and Europe see also the following article on our website:
“The Rise of Extremism Among the Youth of Europe: The
Case of Hungary’s Jobbik Party,” http://www.democraticu-
nion.eu/2013/11/popularity-extremism-among-youth-eu-
rope-case-hungarys-jobbik-party/.
2 “‘Alarming’ Rise in Support for Far-Right Euro-
pean Parties”, the Parliment Magazine, https://www.thep-
arliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/alarming-rise-sup-
port-far-right-european-parties (accessed March 18,
2015).
3 Ibid.
These tendencies make it obvious that among
several difficulties facing the European Union
today, one of the most troubling phenomena is
the rise of extremism in several Member States.
A textbook example of such a case is Hungary’s
Jobbik party, whose popularity is constantly rising
in the country, attracting more and more young
supporters4
.
Jobbik, officially called Jobbik Mag-
yarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better
Hungary), became a party on October 24th 2003
under the leadership of Gábor Vona. The par-
ty did not run in the European Parliament elec-
tions in 2004 as a sign of their disapproval of the
Hungarian EU accession. In 2009, however, they
won three Hungarian seats (out of twenty-two)
in the European Parliament. The “success story”
of the party, which defines itself as a value-based,
conservative, radical, national-Christian party5
,
started back then. It later on culminated in the
Hungarian Parliamentary elections of 2010 where
it ended up as the third most successful party, re-
ceiving over 12% of the votes6
.
Jobbik quickly became known for its neo-Na-
zi ideology, openly anti-EU rhetoric and its rac-
ism towards the Roma population.
Since October 2013, however, Jobbik has at-
tempted a different campaign strategy for the
2014 Parliamentary elections, directed mainly at
4 “TÁRKI: A Kormánypártok Népszerűségvesztése,”
Tárki Website, November 26, 2014, http://www.tarki.hu/hu/
news/2014/kitekint/20141126_valasztas.html.
5 “Alapító Nyilatkozat - Founding Declaration,” Job-
bik.hu, October 24, 2003, http://jobbik.hu/jobbikrol/alapi-
to-nyilatkozat.
6 “Nemzeti Választási Iroda,” Valasztas.hu, http://
www.valasztas.hu/hu/ovi/455/455_0.html (accessed Janu-
ary 10, 2015).
II. The rise of the extreme
right

21. 21PDU Study 1/2015
attracting young people to the party. Their cam-
paign video published in 2014, “The Future Can-
not be Stopped,” is the most visible sign of this
shift.
The tone of the video is peaceful and hap-
py which stands in huge contrast to the party’s
main campaign video from three years ago, which
showed troubled political scenes and protests
from the streets, transmitting an unquestionably
grim atmosphere7
.Its main message was that Job-
bik had come to liberate and re-conquer Hunga-
ry from the dark forces of corruption, terrorism,
fraud and crime spreading through Hungary. This
change of message shows that the party seems to
realize that their aggressive rhetoric might not be
attractive to some Hungarians.
Moreover, as a Jobbik Parliamentary repre-
sentative explained to one Hungarian political
weekly journal, their strategy relies on the already
well-known and successful tactics which Hunga-
ry’s current governing party, Fidesz, applied in
19908
. Fidesz was able to gain popularity in the
first democratic elections after the regime change
by engaging young, first-time voters, and keeping
their trust over the years. The MP also explained
that Jobbik feels confident about this new strate-
gy because all the other parties are starting to age
and are thus less appealing to young people.
Jobbik has realized that their previous mes-
sage and hard nationalistic rhetoric can be intimi-
7 “Jobbik 2010 Kampányfilm - Movement for a Bet-
ter Hungary Campaign Movie,” YouTube, December 7, 2009,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDiUs_7RRzQ.
8 “Itthon: Fidesz-Módra Nyírná Ki a Fideszt a
Jobbik,” Hvg.hu, November 13, 2013, http://hvg.hu/it-
thon/20131113_Jobbik_fiatalok_kampany_celjai.
dating for some people. Thus in 2014, during their
electoral campaign, there were noticeably less vi-
olent expressions in their appearances, and more
of a focus on problems which reflect the primary
concerns of young people (e.g. unemployment,
and uncertainty about the future). The party also
builds on its existing voting base, and they claim
in their video and on their billboards that among
young people, Jobbik is already the most popular
party.
Hungary’s leading statistical research insti-
tute, Tárki, published a report at the end of 2013
which shows that Jobbik’s supporters are most nu-
merous among people between the age of 18 and
229
. Building the foundations of their campaign
upon the needs of young people therefore seems to
be strategically wise. This strategy can be danger-
ous, because the softer discourse and re-defined
goals may conceal the party’s real political agenda
and purposes. Indeed, Jobbik’s fascist views might
be hidden behind the less hostile faces and mes-
sages of their new campaign, yet these roots are
still present.
There is an important phenomenon in re-
cent Hungarian politics that also gives impetus to
Jobbik’s increase in popularity: the impotence of
the Hungarian left-wing opposition to make any
headway among young people.
The controversial governmental acts of the
ruling Fidesz party resulted in discontent from a
portion of the Hungarian population, as well as
from political actors, but there is a lack of alter-
9 “Minden Korban FIDESZ”, Tárki website, http://
www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2013/kitekint/20131118_fidesz.
html (accessed March 18, 2015).

22. 22 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
natives for change. Thus, it comes as no surprise
that in the autumn of 2013, the ruling Fidesz par-
ty became even more popular than it was at the
beginning of the previous year10
, while the other
parties were unable to attract more voters.
Although the popularity of the governing par-
ty is currently in decline11
, in order for a govern-
ment change to come in 2018 the moderate oppo-
sition would need to clearly define their strategies.
Unfortunately, they usually resort to merely try-
ing to prove the incompetence of Fidesz. Even if
condemnation of the Orbán-regime’s controver-
sial deeds are justified, the opposition parties fail
to show any viable alternative. Their incapacity
to react to the events of autumn 2014 is not very
promising either.
The fact that there is no credible choice for
left-wing Hungarian citizens is only one phenom-
enon which makes analysts wonder about the fu-
ture of the country. Worryingly, there are more
and more critical voiceIbid.s coming from the
right as well. This might indicate that, without a
credible challenge to Orbán’s dominance, he will
not only accumulate too much power, but those
people who denounce his party’s political acts will
turn to Jobbik, which is already the second most
popular party in Hungary12
.
In Europe, this situation is not exclusive to
Hungary, and reflects the political, economic and
social maze in which many young people find
themselves; extremism seems a good way out. The
economic crisis, which brought an unprecedent-
ed level of youth unemployment, can only wors-
en this tendency as political forces demanding a
radical change can be very appealing to people in
desperation.
This has to be prevented, because a democrat-
ic Europe cannot be built on the foundations of
ultra-nationalist, neo-Nazi and fascist ideas. Par-
ties like Jobbik, or the Greek Golden Dawn, are
among those political forces whose views directly
10 “Lendületben a Fidesz,” Median.hu, October 30,
2013, http://www.median.hu/object.aa1da5a0-e054-4ffb-
8e6f-784e318108e1.ivy.
11 “TÁRKI: A Kormánypártok Népszerűségvesztése.”
Tárki website, November 26, 2014, http://www.tarki.hu/hu/
news/2014/kitekint/20141126_valasztas.html.
12 Ibid.
endanger many of the pillars upon which the uni-
ty of Europe was built: such as peace, solidarity
and social cooperation. The following pages will
show another example of the rise of a Euroscep-
tic party, although in a different context, given the
fact that Austria’s Freedom Party managed to get
into government through a coalition in 2000.
2. The Haider phenomenon in
Austria
For the past few years, Euro-scepticism has
been spreading throughout the EU Member
States. As we have already discussed the situa-
tion in Hungary, it is important to mention that
recently, voters in many European countries, in-
cluding Austria, France, The Netherlands and
Switzerland have tilted to extreme right-wing par-
ties. In the following pages, we will discuss the rise
of Euro-scepticism in Austria through the rise of
its extreme far-right Freedom Party.
Austria joined the EU club in 1995, but the
process had some peculiarities. After the Sec-
ond World War, Austria remained neutral and
therefore the EU membership and its precursors
served as a violation of its Declaration of Per-
manent Neutrality. During the 1980s economic
problems and the fact that almost 60% of Austria’s
exports were going to EU Member States resulted
in the consensus of Austrian authorities that the
country would benefit from EU membership13
.
In the referendum 66.6 % of citizens voted “yes”
to EU membership, which demonstrated public
opinion was in favour of the country’s accession.
However, these positive feelings towards mem-
bership did not last long and almost immediately
after the accession in 1995 the support dropped
to 40%, and in the autumn of the same year the
13 Martin Heinz Müller, “Taking Stock of the Aus-
trian Accession to the EU: With Regard to the Arguments
of Its Referendum Campaign in 1994,” GSi Europa Studies,
no. 57 (2009), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Pub-
lications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-
A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=96750.

23. 23PDU Study 1/2015
figures showed support as low as 29%14
.
Some analysts suggest that such a high
“yes” vote in the referendum can be ex-
plained by a well-organized and orches-
trated campaigned in which the Freedom
Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Ös-
terreichs – FPÖ) and the Greens were not
involved15
. As the data from Eurobarom-
eter surveys show, currently the support
for the EU is consistently lower than in
other Member States16
.
Some scholars stress the idea that a
strong national identity that has devel-
oped in Austria and a lack of education, which
creates a fertile basis for the false perceptions of
the EU, are the reasons behind the high level of
Euro-scepticism17
. In the end, the Eurosceptic po-
litical parties such as FPÖ take advantage of the
false perceptions of the EU. Moreover, if we look
at the voting results in the European Parliamen-
tary elections, we will see that the dissatisfaction
with the EU was expressed in voters’ behaviours.
Table 1 shows that FPÖ gained a respectable share
of the votes in the first two elections. In the last
European Parliamentary election FPÖ got 19.72%
of voters’ support. The Austrian People’s Party
(ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria
(SPÖ) are pro-EU political parties18
.
As Table 1 illustrates that FPÖ’s share of votes
compared to previous years increased in the last
three elections.
14 Franz Fallend, “Euroscepticism in Austrian Polit-
ical Parties: Ideologically Rooter or Strategically Motivat-
ed?,” in Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics
of Euroscepticism., ed. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak,
vol. Vol.1: Case studies and country surveys (Oxford ; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
15 Jamie Sanders, “The Freedom Party of Austria
and the Rise of Euroscepticism,” accessed March 18, 2015,
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/31/the-freedom-party-of-
austria-and-the-rise-of-europscepticism/.
16 “European Election Studies,” GESIS - Eurobarom-
eter:, accessed March 19, 2015, http://www.gesis.org/euro-
barometer-data-service/topics-trends-question-retrieval/
eb-trends-trend-files/european-election-studies/.
17 Oliver Rathkolb, The Paradoxical Republic: Austria
1945-2005 (Wien: Bergbahn Books, 2010).
18 Sanders, “The Freedom Party of Austria and the
Rise of Euroscepticism”.
In Austria 41 % of the population is enthusi-
astic about EU membership but this result is way
below the EU average19
. As economic frustration
has increased, opposition to the whole European
project has risen too. The negative perceptions of
the EU have been used by the far-right political
parties. This is a worrying situation for the EU, as
far-right political parties gain more power across
Europe.
The Freedom Party of Austria
The Freedom Party of Austria formerly head-
ed by Jörg Haider is a right-wing populist and far
right political party in Austria, which is consid-
ered to be a descendant of the pan-German and
national liberal camp. The party is considered to
be a successor to The Federation of Independents
(VDU), which was founded in 194920
. VDU was
founded by two liberal journalists from Salzburg,
who aimed to stay clear of the socialist and Catho-
lic camps. In the 1949 elections VDU won 16 seats
in the National Council. The party was represent-
ing the interests of former Nazi Party members.
Although FPÖ was not an extremist party at that
time, it attracted many former Nazis, who were
not comfortable with the domination of Austrian
politics by the socialist-clerical coalition govern-
19 Ibid.
20 Amir Abedi, Anti-Political Establishment Parties:
A Comparative Analysis. (London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 2004).
ÖVP SPÖ FPÖ GRÜNE
1996 29.7 29.2 27.5 6.8
1999 30.7 31.3 23.4 9.3
2004 32.7 33.3 6.3 12.9
2009 30 23.7 12.7 9.9
2014 27 34.1 19.7 14.5
Table 1: Breakdown of European Parliament votes by
political parties (in percent)

24. 24 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
ment21
and believed that Austrians should belong
to a greater German culture.
FPÖ was founded in 1956 by Anton Rein-
thaller, who had served in the Seyss-Inquart na-
tionalist government formed in collaboration with
Hitler. After the death of the founder, Friedrich
Peter became the chairman of FPÖ in 1958. Un-
der his leadership, ties to the SPÖ were developed
and the liberal wing increased its influence. How-
ever, the party did not enjoy mass public support
and had a limited opposition role in parliament.
The Party was a third party with few supporters
until it entered into government together with the
Social Democratic SPÖ after the elections of 1983.
In 1983 SPÖ lost its majority and during the peri-
od of 1983-1986 FPÖ and SPÖ formed a coalition
government. During this brief experience of being
in power, the FPÖ-SPÖ coalition was mostly frus-
trating because of the constant crisis. Haider, who
successfully launched a campaign against Norbert
Steger, the party’s leader between 1980 and 1986,
managed to become the new chairman in 1986.
The Economist dedicates one of its articles to Jörg
Haider, saying “if you wanted to see a Nazi in Jörg
Haider, it wasn’t difficult”22
, clearly demonstrating
how his image was presented in the media.
Political activity
In 1999 FPÖ came second in the Austrian
national elections, with the support of 26.9% of
the voters. Taggart and Szczerbiak provide the
definition of Euro-scepticism as “the idea of con-
tingent or qualified opposition, as well as incor-
porating outright and unqualified opposition to
the process of European Integration”23
. This suc-
cessfully fits the position of the Freedom Party of
Austria. FPÖ believes that critical changes should
21 “Austria - The Freedom Party of Austria,” accessed
March 18, 2015, http://countrystudies.us/austria/120.
htm.
22 “Jörg Haider”, The Economist, accessed March 18,
2015, http://www.economist.com/node/12415006.
23 Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul A. Taggart, eds., Oppos-
ing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepti-
cism (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008),
7.
be made, however it does not back the idea of
Austria’s withdrawal from the Union.
Now, when almost half a century has passed
since the establishment of FPÖ, it represents a dif-
ferent political party led by politicians born after
the end of the Second World War. According to
Pelinka’s argumentation, “the party’s electoral suc-
cess cannot be explained by pointing to a revival
of the old type of Nazism.”24
But, interestingly, the
FPÖ‘s electorate are young, relatively less educat-
ed and secular citizens. It is important to mention
that the Austrian political coalition has been char-
acterized by some contradictions. The first one is
that when ÖVP was pushing Austria towards EU
membership in 1989s, it convinced SPÖ as well of
the advantages of membership.
Since the 1950s, FPÖ changed its political
course when the SPÖ- ÖVP coalition applied for
EU membership and became the opponent of the
EU project. Currently, ÖVP represents the most
pro-EU political stance, while FPÖ is the most ac-
tive opponent of the EU. The second contradiction
is that FPÖ is a clear example of “postmodern”
politics, which, as Pelinka evaluates, is “charac-
terized by sound bites, video-clips, and entertain-
ment”25
. FPÖ successfully attracts people who are
not especially interested in politics and manages
to attract those voters without having a consistent
platform or agenda.
Some authors elaborate on the argument that
immigration waves in the second half of the twen-
tieth century have greatly contributed to the rise
of an “anti-foreigners” attitude in Austria26
. They
argue that the historical settlement of immigrants
in Austria can serve as a valid instrument to ex-
plain Euro-scepticism in Austria. Recently, the
Austrian right-wing party said they want to pre-
vent Vienna from being an “immigrant magnet”
24 Anton Pelinka, “The Haider Phenomenon in
Austria: Examining the FPO in European Context,” The
Journal of the International Institute 9, no. 1 (2001).
25 Ibid.
26 Martin Halla, Alexandra F. Wagner, and Josef
Zweimuller, “Does Immigration into Their Neighborhoods
Incline Voters Toward and Extreme Right? The Case of the
Freedom Party of Austria,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 6575,
May 2012.

25. 25PDU Study 1/2015
and voted to fight radical Islam in kindergartens27
.
Furthermore, the party demanded zero tolerance
for Islamist symbols and threatened jihadist sup-
porters with “instant citizenship loss”.
The very positive image of immigration of the
1960s and 1970s radically changed in the mid-
1970s. It was the period when the first oil shock
caused a recession in Austria. As a response, in
1975 the Austrian government endorsed the
Aliens Employment Act which aimed to control
immigration. Alongside the rise of FPÖ, there was
a second wave of immigration in the late 1980s28
.
After Haider became the leader of FPÖ in 1986,
the party actively supported anti-immigration
sentiments. Austria experienced another influx of
migrants during the early 1990s and consequent-
ly, in 1993, FPÖ launched an “Anti-Foreigner-Ref-
erendum” and as a result of political pressure, the
Austrian government approved a new, tighter im-
migration policy in the 1990s.
Another important phenomenon is that FPÖ
represents the most Austrian of the Austrian
parties, offering a new idea of specific Austrian
national identity to the electorate. Compared to
ÖVP, which is traditionally a very structured par-
ty, FPÖ represents a party with more of an em-
phasis on elections and voters. “FPÖ has become
a political party that concentrates solely on cam-
paigning”29
. Overall, we can say that this charac-
teristic of a populist agenda and the populist phe-
nomenon is one of the factors behind the FPÖ’s
success30
. Their vision is that they are the succes-
sors to the pan-German tradition, including the
27 “Radical Islam Should Be Rooted out at Kin-
dergarten Level – Austrian Far-Right Party Leader”,
Russia Today, accessed March 18, 2015, http://rt.com/
news/208387-austria-islam-kindergarten-muslim/.
28 Halla, Wagner, and Zweimuller, “Does Immi-
gration into Their Neighborhoods Incline Voters Toward
and Extreme Right? The Case of the Freedom Party of
Austria.”
29 Pelinka, “The Haider Phenomenon in Austria: Ex-
amining the FPO in European Context.”
30 K.J. Danner, “‘Austrians First!’ – Election Cam-
paigns by Right-Wing Populist Parties. A Comparative
Case Study between the Austrian Freedom Party and the
Austrian People’s Party in the National Legislative Elec-
tions 2013.,” 2014, http://essay.utwente.nl/65544/1/Dan-
ner_BA.pdf.
years of Nazi hegemony in Austria.
During 1978 and 1986 the party successfully
accepted the idea of Austrian patriotism, which
supported the idea of separating Austrian nation-
al identity from Nazism, but after Haider became
the leader of the party, they revisited the pan-Ger-
man traditions. Haider called the Austrian nation
an “ideological monster” which was in the heart
of pan-German traditions and never allowed the
idea that Austria could have a different, non-Ger-
man character.
However, in the 1990s, the party leader aimed
to bring together the pan-German ideas and Aus-
trian patriotism. FPÖ’s attempt to abandon the
pan-German orientation was a smart move to
attract the young population of Austria31
. In the
end, FPÖ became the party that fused together
German nationalism and Austrian patriotism.
The rhetoric used by party members is extremely
aggressive and aims to exclude themselves from
“others”: Haider uses the term “parasites” to ex-
plain the problem of unemployment and other
social problems. The parallel can be drawn to the
Nazi period, when terms like “parasites” where
actively used in reference to Jews.
In 2000 Haider’s Freedom Party and the Peo-
ple’s Party formed a coalition government and
ruled the country for five years, which caused
widespread outrage both in Austria and across Eu-
rope. At the end of February 2000, Haider stepped
down from the leadership of the FPÖ. This was
perceived as a cynical move to appease European
criticism. However, he continued to control the
Freedom Party from behind the scenes.
The Parliamentary elections of November
2002 revealed the fall in Freedom’s popularity
from 27 % in 1999 to 10 % in three years32
. After
some negotiations, the Freedom Party re-joined
the coalition with the OVP, but this time not as a
leader party. Since, Wolfgang Schuessel, the chan-
cellor of OVP, has sought to tackle several thorny
economic issues by attempting privatization,
timing pensions, and keeping a tight rein on the
31 “Austria - The Freedom Party of Austria.”
32 “Austria”,FreedomHouse,accessedMarch18,2015,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/
austria#.VPl9FJ3HOIUots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-
2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=96750.

26. 26 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
budget. “In 2004, Austria’s government pushed
economic reforms, which contributed to a mod-
est economic recovery from 2003 but also cost the
government somewhat its popularity. The free-
dom Party, a far-right party involved as a junior
partner in government, continued its moderating
trend at the national level, but did poorly in local
and European Parliament elections.”33
As a result
of the struggle with the economic crisis, FPÖ con-
tinued to lose its public support in 2004.
Although, Haider was re-elected as a gover-
nor of Carinithia in March 2004, the party itself
showed worsening results in another state elec-
tion that same day and failed in the European
Parliament elections in June too. Compared to the
EP elections of 1999, when FPÖ captured 23% of
the votes, in 2004 the Freedom Party received just
6%34
. In the national elections of Austria the party
achieved a result of around 10% both in 2002 and
2006, but its popularity has been rising since then
and in 2013 they have achieved 20,5% in the Na-
tional Council35
.
Despite the fact that all far-right parties across
Europe differ from each other and hold different
political strategies, they are a part of a similar pro-
cess emerging in Europe. So far, the EU’s response
to these populist parties has been limited. This is
caused partially because of the limits of existing
EU mechanisms and partly due to a lack of politi-
cal will amongst Member States.36
In 2000, the success of the FPÖ in the Aus-
trian national elections alarmed those within the
European Union and resulted in bilateral relations
33 Ibid.
34 “Results of the 2014 European Elections - Results
by Country - Austria,” European Parliament Website, ac-
cessed March 19, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elec-
tions2014-results/en/country-results-at-2014.html.
35 “Election Resources on the Internet: Federal Elec-
tions in Austria - Elections to the Nationalrat,” accessed
March 19, 2015, http://www.electionresources.org/at/.
36 “The European Union and the Challenge of Ex-
tremism and Populism - How to Protect Democracy and the
Rule of Law in Europe?”, European Humanist Federation,
October 2013, 3, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assis-
es-justice-2013/files/contributions/24.europeanhumanist-
federationtheeuandthechallengeofextremismandpopulism_
ehf_en.pdf.
between Austria and EU being downgraded. The
European Commission declared that “if the Aus-
trian government violated any of the common
European values, it would not hesitate to start the
procedure leading to the cancellation of Austria’s
voting rights in the Council”37
. The Portuguese
Council Presidency issued a statement “on be-
half of 14 Member States” which announced that
“the governments of the fourteen Member States
will not promote or accept any official bilater-
al contacts at the political level with an Austrian
government integrating the FPÖ; there will be
no support for Austrian candidates seeking po-
sitions in international organizations; Austrian
Ambassadors in EU capitals will only be received
at a technical level.”38
The European Commission
clearly stated that as the guardian of the Treaties,
it would monitor the process of protecting the
union’s core principles: liberty, democracy, rule
of law, fundamental freedoms and the respect for
human rights.
The reason behind this unusual European re-
sponse is that the EU declares the Freedom Par-
ty as having “an openly racist and xenophobic
agenda”39
and is dedicated to prevent such parties
from having a significant role within the EU club.
It should be pointed out that, in response, the Aus-
trian government threatened to block EU reforms
at the domestic level40
. The following chapter dis-
cusses what the official tools of the EU are when
dealing with situations like the Austrian one.
37 Pelinka, “The Haider Phenomenon in Austria: Ex-
amining the FPO in European Context,” 1.
38 Gerda Falkner, “The EU14’s ‘Sanctions’ Against
Austria: Sense and Nonsense” (Demokratiezentrum Wien,
2001), 2, http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/fileadmin/
media/pdf/falkner_sanctions.pdf.
39 Pelinka, “The Haider Phenomenon in Austria: Ex-
amining the FPO in European Context,” 3.
40 Falkner, “The EU14’s ‘Sanctions’ Against Austria:
Sense and Nonsense.”

27. 27PDU Study 1/2015
The Union has different types of sanctions it
can impose on Member States if they do not
abide by EU rules. Some of them only need to be
mentioned briefly, as they are connected to eco-
nomic issues, rather than the democratic values
we focus on in this paper.
The first one is related to macroeconomic sta-
bility: the EU can suspend the provision of cohe-
sion funds to a country if it fails to adopt measures
which are recommended under the instruments
of macroeconomic coordination. This has hap-
pened, for instance to Hungary more than once;
first, in 2012 in connection to the country’s ex-
cessive government deficit1
and then in 2013 over
failings in Hungary’s financial control systems2
.
The blocking of funds is lifted once the country
meets its respective obligations.
Secondly, the aforementioned infringement
procedures are also tools used actively by the EU
to monitor domestic legislation and the imple-
mentation of EU rules. However, infringements
are not directed towards protecting constitution-
al values and democratic principles, rather being
applied mainly in order to protect the rules of the
Single Market.
1. Conditionality
As mentioned before, in the summer of 2014,
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán de-
clared that he wanted to abandon liberal democ-
racy in favour of an “illiberal state”, citing Russia
1 “Hungary: Council Lifts Cohesion Fund Suspen-
sion”, Council of the European Union, June 22, 2012.
2 “EU Suspends Funding to Hungary over Weak
Controls”, EurActiv, accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.
euractiv.com/central-europe/eu-suspends-funding-hunga-
ry-weak-news-529822.
and Turkey as successful examples3
. He stated in
his speech that the global financial crisis revealed
gaps in liberal democratic states which hindered
their ability to remain globally competitive. “I
don’t think that our European Union membership
precludes us from building an illiberal new state
based on national foundations” he added4
.
The Prime Minister’s speech raised concerns
that he was distancing himself from values shared
across Europe. Furthermore, his statement was
criticized because Hungary relies on funds from
the European bloc and the infrastructural projects
in Hungary are mainly dependent on EU funds.
“Orbán’s comments are very controversial and
closer to what we’re used to hearing from Presi-
dent Putin of Russia than from a leader of a Euro-
pean democracy”, said Paul Ivan, an analyst at the
Brussels-based European Policy Centre5
. Despite
the fact that recently Orbán distanced himself
from labelling democracy, such thoughts coming
from a European head of state are worrying.
The European Union has some tools to deal
with such rebellious behaviour both before and af-
ter the accession of a Member State. Any country
willing to join the European Union must meet the
requirements set out by Article 49 and the prin-
ciples laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU)6
. The membership crite-
ria were established by the Copenhagen European
3 “Orban Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy
in Hungary”, Bloomberg Business, accessed March 18, 2015,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-28/
orban-says-he-seeks-to-end-liberal-democracy-in-hunga-
ry.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union”, Official Journal of the European Union, March 30,
2010.
III. A European response

28. 28 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
Council in 1993. To join the EU, a new Member
State must meet the following criteria:
• Political criteria: stability of democratic insti-
tutions, the rule of law, respect and protection
of human rights and minority groups;
• Economic conditions: existence of free and
competitive market and the capacity to
cope with competitive pressure within the
Union;
• Harmonization of the Community acquis:
ability and readiness to take on the obliga-
tions of membership, complying with all EU’s
standards and rules7
.
All of the above mentioned requirements are
quite clear-cut and objectively measurable, how-
ever it is doubtful whether they can effectively
protect the EU from democracy-endangering
behaviour because they only refer to the pre-ac-
cession status of the country. After becoming a
member of the club, some flexibility in the poli-
cies conducted by Member State governments is
present. This is why the EU needs a post-acces-
sion tool as well, to ensure that its members re-
spect the most important constitutional values of
the community.
2. Article 7 TEU
As the Hungarian case illustrates, the EU has
very limited means to prevent the slide to au-
thoritarianism. Moreover, the irony is that con-
ditionality loses much of its teeth once countries
join the club. From the constitutional perspective,
the key question is: under what legal principles is
the EU justified to intervene in the domestic con-
stitution of its Member States? The next question
here would be where should we draw a line be-
tween thoroughly domestic politics and political
affairs related to the EU and European values?
The fact that the Hungarian Fundamental
7 “EU Glossary - Copenhagen Criteria,” Summaries
of EU Legislation, accessed March 18, 2015, http://europa.
eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_co-
penhague_en.htm.
Law contains elements which do not necessarily
comply with European values and goals, such as
excluding the possibility of officially recognized
homosexual partnerships or determining that
Hungary’s currency is the forint (which would
make the introduction of the euro significantly
more difficult), suggests that the boundaries be-
tween the competence of the EU and strictly do-
mestic politics are quite blurry.
The EU offers some legal options to deal with
non-compliance or activities endangering the
functioning of European democracy which are
connected to Article 2 and Article 7 of the Treaty
on European Union. Article 2 provides the defi-
nition of the basic values of the Union, which are
“respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights, including the rights of persons belonging
to minorities.”8
Article 7 offers the “legal ways” to
sanction violations of Article 2.
However, the procedure determining the vio-
lation is a complicated one. “On a reasoned pro-
posal by one third of the Member States, by the
European Parliament or by the European Com-
mission, the Council, acting by a majority of four
fifths of its members after obtaining the consent
of the European Parliament, may determine that
there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Mem-
ber State of the values referred to in Article 2.”9
To put it simply, a very long and complicated
procedure, which involves all the major EU insti-
tutions, might result in issuing sanctions against
the country, such as suspending its voting rights.
Although the European Commission attempt-
ed to reform the procedure and secure a precise
framework for the protection of the rule of law, no
changes have been seen in the procedure yet, as
Article 7 has not been applied so far.
The relevant question here is whether the
Hungarian “unconstitutional constitution” or the
activities that we experience in the case of Austria
are a clear threat to the constitutional principles
of Article 2, and here is where we find the weak-
8 “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union”: 83/17.
9 Ibid.: 83/19.

29. 29PDU Study 1/2015
est point of Article 7. What can be considered as
a clear threat is a very subjective and occasional
decision. This is why Article 7, although the most
important safeguard of Member State unity, is be-
ing criticized from so many angles. However, if we
accept the fact that the EU is more than a single
market, and it has to be the guardian of its dis-
tinctive model of democracy, then it seems clear
that the EU’s current toolkit to deal with extrem-
ism and outlier Member State behaviour is insuf-
ficient.
The Maastricht Treaty defines that any Eu-
ropean state can still apply for EU membership
with the condition that applicants have to respect
the core values of the EU. By now, the Treaty on
European Union provides no provision to ex-
clude existing members for ignoring the princi-
ples laid down in Article 2. Article 7 TEU is one
of the strongest instruments at the disposal of
the EU and is still a very complicated procedure
which leads to the suspension of certain rights of
the Member State only if several conditions are
met.
It is important to point out that in the Aus-
trian case this was at no point initiated, because
Austria was not “in serious and persistent breach”
of the TEU key principles. However, the concerns
were about the distinction between actual breach-
es of principles and potential threats. Further-
more, another issue arising from this case is the
“difference between acting against such principles
as human rights in actual deeds versus only using
verbal insinuations in such directions (in electoral
campaigns).”10
Compared to Austria, the Hungar-
ian case is not about the accession of a far-right
party to the government, but about “the author-
itarian drifting of a moderate government [and
the abuse] of its majority to restrict democratic
checks and balances”11
.
Some concerns about the legitimacy of sanc-
tions proposed by Article 7 might arise and can be
related to the idea that the members of national
governments make up the core body on the deci-
10 Falkner, “The EU14’s ‘Sanctions’ Against Austria:
Sense and Nonsense”: 2.
11 “The European Union and the Challenge of Ex-
tremism and Populism - How to Protect Democracy and
the Rule of Law in Europe?”: 3.
sion-making level and have means to block cru-
cial initiatives. Also, it should be mentioned that
“bilateral” measures of the Member States seemed
questionable and premature and their design has
been widely criticized.
In the Austrian case, the Council Presidency
was used to declare the multi-national decision.
Strategically and content-wise the plan lacked
an exit strategy; the character of the “sanctions”
lacked an exit option and was oriented on a break-
down of the Austrian center-right government.
As for the content-related problems, the second
measure (non-support of Austrians in Interna-
tional organizations) has been analysed most con-
troversially since one of the EU’s core policies is
“non-discrimination on grounds of nationality”.
Hence, the second point of the “sanctions” could
have affected “persons who had never in their life
voted for the FPÖ or who even protested against
the center-right government”12
.
Furthermore, these measures can encour-
age the development of radical populism in Eu-
rope. The Fourteen developed an exit option five
months after the decision to impose the “sanc-
tions”. They criticized the FPÖ but confirmed that
the new government “had not acted against Eu-
ropean values”. Consequently, the Member States
decided to withdraw the “sanctions” without any
follow-up procedures. What this case actually
means for Austria as well as for the EU remains a
subject for debate.
As the first chapter has already mentioned, in
the case of Hungary no sanctions were applied,
despite the fact that there was a European Parlia-
mentary resolution, which provisioned the possi-
bility of resorting to Article 7 if a serious breach
in EU values was to be experienced. Concern-
ing Hungary, besides the macroeconomic con-
ditionality measures and infringements, the EU
continued to employ resolutions and diplomatic
soft tools, such as some European politicians ex-
pressing worries about the development of certain
events in the country.
However, due to recent developments in Hun-
gary, one could ask the question whether the EU
12 Falkner, “The EU14’s ‘Sanctions’ Against Austria:
Sense and Nonsense”: 3.

30. 30 The rise of populist and extremist parties in the EU
could impose sanctions if a Fidesz-Jobbik “secret
coalition” was to clearly develop in the Hungarian
Parliament. If the two parties were to cooperate in
the majority of the parliamentary votes, then the
situation would not be that different from what
happened in Austria from 2000.
The most important question that remains is:
if Article 7 is not used, how can European coun-
tries protect democracy within the EU? EU cit-
izens, in case their national governments violate
their rights, may turn to the European Court of
Justice and demand the protection of their rights.
But Luxemburg rulings are less likely to make an
impact on illiberal governments; hence this option
is unlikely to happen. “While the EU is particular-
ly keen on assessing the respect of Copenhagen
criteria by candidate countries which include the
respect of the stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and pro-
tection of minorities, it lacks efficient instruments
to monitor their respect by Member States”13
.
3. Recommendations
The examples of Hungary and Austria have
shown that some tendencies in European Mem-
ber States give grounds for concern and highlight
the importance of protecting European constitu-
tional values such as democracy, freedom, equal-
ity and the rule of law. EU citizens’ fundamental
rights and European values should be protected,
but it should be done in a democratic way. Mea-
sures that will exclude these parties from political
participation would be undemocratic and thus,
ineffective. Ignoring democratic solutions will
simply encourage radical populism and will not
serve as a wise solution in the long term. This is
why the European Union should start considering
the options outlined below:
➢Joint action: Xenophobic violence, hate
speeches and populist discourses should be
addressed collectively at the European level
13 “The European Union and the Challenge of Ex-
tremism and Populism - How to Protect Democracy and
the Rule of Law in Europe?”: 6.
and Europe should express stronger political
will, engaging all institutions and actors.
➢Through deciphering and undertaking in-
depth analysis of the key causes of populism
in Europe, the EU should launch a common
strategy to handle populism. The First-Vice
President of the European Commission for
Better Regulation, Interinstitutional Rela-
tions, Rule of Law & the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights should be responsible for car-
rying out this detailed action plan/strategy for
protecting the constitutional principles of the
EU and preventing extremism in Europe.
➢Article 7 should be amended and rendered
stronger by introducing a shorter and less
complicated procedure, defining what “clear
risk” and “serious breach” mean and last but
not least, inserting the possibility of ending
the EU membership of the rogue Member
State.
➢Closer cooperation should be established
between the institutions of the EU, Mem-
ber States and other international organiza-
tions/institutions such as the Council of Eu-
rope or the Helsinki Committee, in order to
strengthen the political pressure and ensure
the successful implementation of policies
fighting against extremism, radicalism and
violence.
➢Educational and training policies should be
supported with the purpose of protecting the
constitutional principles and democratic val-
ues of the EU.
➢National plans and strategies to prevent ex-
tremism should be encouraged and support-
ed by the EU.

31. 31PDU Study 1/2015

32. One Future. One Europe.
www.democraticunion.eu