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Risk Management &
Corporate Internet Efforts

        Thomas A. Powell
        tpowell@pint.com
          www.pint.com
Our Plan Today
• Show some existing and emerging
  problems
• Present some possible solutions
• Illustrate all with examples and stories
• Have a little fun so it is
  memorable, because if you don’t
  remember much today you won’t act so
  … let’s get memorable
Risk Management
“Risk         management        is         the
identification, assessment, and prioritization
of risks followed by coordinated and
economical application of resources to
minimize, monitor, and control the
probability and/or impact of unfortunate
events or to maximize the realization of
opportunities.”
Translation – Avoid
          This




Instead – openly acknowledge what could happen
and actively decide to address it (or not)
A Root Cause for
Missing Many Risks?

• Who exactly owns the Web initiatives
• …and in turn the problems and risks
  they may face or create?
Everybody Does!
Mind the gaps!
     Diverse ownership often
     creates:
     • Duplicate (or unnecessary)
       expenditures
     • Diversity problems
     • Lots of gaps!
The Web Team
    Does!
BTW…The Web is
 the Real World
        • Everything is
          different online
          don’t you know?
        • Psst…don’t tell
          anyone
Things We
Do To Ourselves
    Sometimes we make poor
    decisions about:

    •   Development
    •   Design
    •   Hosting
    •   Security
    •   Social
    •   Analytics
Add To This Things
 Others Do To Us
      •   Impose rules on us
      •   Try to hack us
      •   Try to trick us
      •   Try to crash us
      •   Say bad things about us

      As well as any black swans of
      life we can’t account for
There Be Web Orcs!




    I can SQL injectz you!
And They Cause
   Troubles
Why – Ego
          Defacement




(Relax – Faked) This type of “tagging” for cred
Why - Hactivism




All fun and games until LOIC is aimed at your site
We’re Not Targets!
Why – 4 Lulz




Ok so it isn’t funny to you but it is to them
Nope, Never
 Happens

     After hacking PBS.com
     they added this article for
     the “Lulz”
Why – Spread
      Malware “Germs”




Put malware on your home page to infect others
Why – ID Theft




You (or your users) are a commodity
    (at least your id, IP or cc# is)
Come on not us!
      • If you get compromised
        legally per California SB
        1386 you are supposed
        to disclose
       • 40 other states have
         similar laws
       • That could be a lot of
         trouble and $!
Why – Zombie
     Recruiting




    Grow and army and then…
“Awake my Zombie army and attack!”
Really for sure not us!
Why – For The $£¥€!
Yes - Bad people are
        real




  credit: From Russia With Love - Fyodor Yarochkin and The Grugq - http://tinyurl.com/frmrussiawlove



 And they’re in your country too…
Reaction - Build Walls
Man the defenses!




“No worry, IT put a firewall in place”
We’re awake!




and what exactly do you see?
Just another day on the
       Internetz
The Toolbox is
 Overflowing
Attacker Type #1




 Stupid Bot Brigade - “Charge!”
  ../cmd.exe &1=1;droptable
Attacker Type #2




 “I’m just a lowly peasant HTTP
      request. May I pass?”
Hope Your Site
Owner Thinks Like a
    Bouncer?




 “Yer not on the list. Come on in?!”
The weak minded are
    easily tricked




“These are not the requests you are looking
                    for”
0-day to the Face!




“To get our new signature files you
    need a valid support plan”
The Appearance of
      Security




The Intent Thief: “How quaint a club!”
Real Security
 Tradeoffs




     This...
Security Tradeoffs




      ...or this?
We want it all!
Don’t Worry We Use
  Open Source!




It’s open code to “hackers” too and if
widely used becomes a big target
Zoinks!
But everyone uses
      that…
       Indeed that may be true

       I also evaluate my hamburger
       quality the same way
Evaluating By Looks
Custom Troubles
    • Reality: Site owners often their
      own worst enemy
    • Excessive customization by
      non-security minded devs
    • Now add in some third party
      components with their own
      troubles for good fun – It’s a 3rd
      Party Security Party!
Instead It’s A Target
 Rich Environment
You Must Trust No Inputs
Psst…your pants are
      down
Really…they’re down
Psst….This isn’t hidden
What’s The
 Password?




Keys to your Web Kingdom
No Try Limit = No
Security Eventually*



               No retry limits
             + No Easy Alerting
             Let a bot work on it
Password Policy
    Time!
     • Make your user’s have
       some strong password with
       letters, numbers, really
       long, etc.
     • So…they write it down then
     • Or they come up with one
       and use it everywhere…yes
       absolutely everywhere
They Hack There To
  Hack You Here




A user’s security posture may be weaker
on your other sites and...
Password Reuse +
      No Second Form =
            Fail


“Take this key and believe
you are secure”*
Who’s Watching?




• Enjoy your double cap, venti, packet
  captured browser session!
Better SSL All Your
Public WiFi Sessions




No SSL out in open = grab and go access
Always Easiest to
   Attack People!

                       Name : Jim
                        LaFleur
                   Occupation : Chief of Security
                   Organization: Dharma Initiative




Find Jim’s name/email in your site
comments, Linkedin, Facebook, etc.
Spear Phising

   • Executives are good targets
   • Often C-Level executives are
     not that “cyber savvy”
   • Be quite concerned about any
     systems with electronic fund
     transfer access
Rise of DoSing &
Electronic Sit Ins
This is Your
Site on DoS
Just Throw Money At
         IT



Sure it helps but there is no “silver bullet”
box especially without a posture change
Tech Just Can’t Solve
             All




And tech issues may lead to real corporate trouble…
Accessibility Risks
Privacy Risks
IP Risks
• Your content, site
  design, source, etc. is easily
  copied
• It can be quite hard to find all
  occurrences of it
• Recourse is tough particularly
  if international
BTW Ever Look What
  You Agreed To?
Delivery Really
    Matters
Speed Fail
Misinformation Risks
Vetting is for Losers!
Speed over
Substance about in the
 “Most of what is written
 tech world – both in blog form and old
 school media form – is bullshit.”
 “Most are stories written with little or
 no research done. They’re written as
 quickly as possible. The faster the
 better.”

  Right from the “horse’s mouth”
Advertising Risks
Click Fraud
GIGO™ Analytics
      • Are your analytics
        accurate?
      • Are you watching them
        real time or not?
      • Are you trying to find
        answers from reports or
        making reports to answer
        questions?
Did you know?

   • When it comes to Web analytics*
    • JavaScript Off = Invisible
      • Bad people, bots, etc. do this
    • Cookies off = Big Mess
    • Others can easily forge results
Trust But Verify
Social Media Risks
Watch Out Engaging the
 Thoughts of Crowds
        Mobs
Yeah That’s Not a
Good Use of Social
What do you call this
      again?
GeoSocial Risks
Emergency Web
Broadcast System
Just in case all that
wasn’t scary enough
Summary
• Have you had a security audit of your
  Web properties?
 • How hackable is your site?
 • What disclosure issues may you
    have?
• How aware of your site performance
  and uptime?
• How aware of what Google’s index
  about you and your sit are you?
Summary
• What information are you or your
  vendors collecting?
 • Is your privacy policy addressing it?
 • Are you aware of privacy regulations
    in the markets you serve
• Are you aware of accessibility concerns
 • Could you be a target?
Summary
• Do you have a social media policy?
 • Do you have a crisis communication
    plan?
• Are you actively watching your
  analytics?
• How active are you monitoring social for
 • Stock issues, HR issues, Customer
    Issues
Summary
• If you spend ad dollars online
 • How do you track effectiveness
 • How do you track fraud?
• Do you have an inventory of 3 Party
                                    rd

  Scripts / Services you use?
 • What are the QoS, Security and
   Legal terms of these   3rd   parties
Summary
• Are you disclosing information both
  technical and not that you should not?
 • Error pages, source code, social
    media profiles, etc.
• What is the fail point of your site or
  Web application?
• Are you ready for a DoS attack?
Questions?

 Thomas A. Powell
   tpowell@pint.com
    http://www.pint.com
     Twitter: PINTSD

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Risk Management & Corporate Internet Efforts

  • 1. Risk Management & Corporate Internet Efforts Thomas A. Powell tpowell@pint.com www.pint.com
  • 2. Our Plan Today • Show some existing and emerging problems • Present some possible solutions • Illustrate all with examples and stories • Have a little fun so it is memorable, because if you don’t remember much today you won’t act so … let’s get memorable
  • 3. Risk Management “Risk management is the identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events or to maximize the realization of opportunities.”
  • 4. Translation – Avoid This Instead – openly acknowledge what could happen and actively decide to address it (or not)
  • 5. A Root Cause for Missing Many Risks? • Who exactly owns the Web initiatives • …and in turn the problems and risks they may face or create?
  • 7. Mind the gaps! Diverse ownership often creates: • Duplicate (or unnecessary) expenditures • Diversity problems • Lots of gaps!
  • 8. The Web Team Does!
  • 9. BTW…The Web is the Real World • Everything is different online don’t you know? • Psst…don’t tell anyone
  • 10. Things We Do To Ourselves Sometimes we make poor decisions about: • Development • Design • Hosting • Security • Social • Analytics
  • 11. Add To This Things Others Do To Us • Impose rules on us • Try to hack us • Try to trick us • Try to crash us • Say bad things about us As well as any black swans of life we can’t account for
  • 12. There Be Web Orcs! I can SQL injectz you!
  • 13. And They Cause Troubles
  • 14. Why – Ego Defacement (Relax – Faked) This type of “tagging” for cred
  • 15. Why - Hactivism All fun and games until LOIC is aimed at your site
  • 17. Why – 4 Lulz Ok so it isn’t funny to you but it is to them
  • 18. Nope, Never Happens After hacking PBS.com they added this article for the “Lulz”
  • 19. Why – Spread Malware “Germs” Put malware on your home page to infect others
  • 20. Why – ID Theft You (or your users) are a commodity (at least your id, IP or cc# is)
  • 21. Come on not us! • If you get compromised legally per California SB 1386 you are supposed to disclose • 40 other states have similar laws • That could be a lot of trouble and $!
  • 22. Why – Zombie Recruiting Grow and army and then… “Awake my Zombie army and attack!”
  • 23. Really for sure not us!
  • 24. Why – For The $£¥€!
  • 25. Yes - Bad people are real credit: From Russia With Love - Fyodor Yarochkin and The Grugq - http://tinyurl.com/frmrussiawlove And they’re in your country too…
  • 27. Man the defenses! “No worry, IT put a firewall in place”
  • 28. We’re awake! and what exactly do you see?
  • 29. Just another day on the Internetz
  • 30. The Toolbox is Overflowing
  • 31. Attacker Type #1 Stupid Bot Brigade - “Charge!” ../cmd.exe &1=1;droptable
  • 32. Attacker Type #2 “I’m just a lowly peasant HTTP request. May I pass?”
  • 33. Hope Your Site Owner Thinks Like a Bouncer? “Yer not on the list. Come on in?!”
  • 34. The weak minded are easily tricked “These are not the requests you are looking for”
  • 35. 0-day to the Face! “To get our new signature files you need a valid support plan”
  • 36. The Appearance of Security The Intent Thief: “How quaint a club!”
  • 38. Security Tradeoffs ...or this?
  • 39. We want it all!
  • 40. Don’t Worry We Use Open Source! It’s open code to “hackers” too and if widely used becomes a big target
  • 42. But everyone uses that… Indeed that may be true I also evaluate my hamburger quality the same way
  • 44. Custom Troubles • Reality: Site owners often their own worst enemy • Excessive customization by non-security minded devs • Now add in some third party components with their own troubles for good fun – It’s a 3rd Party Security Party!
  • 45. Instead It’s A Target Rich Environment
  • 46. You Must Trust No Inputs
  • 50. What’s The Password? Keys to your Web Kingdom
  • 51. No Try Limit = No Security Eventually* No retry limits + No Easy Alerting Let a bot work on it
  • 52. Password Policy Time! • Make your user’s have some strong password with letters, numbers, really long, etc. • So…they write it down then • Or they come up with one and use it everywhere…yes absolutely everywhere
  • 53. They Hack There To Hack You Here A user’s security posture may be weaker on your other sites and...
  • 54. Password Reuse + No Second Form = Fail “Take this key and believe you are secure”*
  • 55. Who’s Watching? • Enjoy your double cap, venti, packet captured browser session!
  • 56. Better SSL All Your Public WiFi Sessions No SSL out in open = grab and go access
  • 57. Always Easiest to Attack People! Name : Jim LaFleur Occupation : Chief of Security Organization: Dharma Initiative Find Jim’s name/email in your site comments, Linkedin, Facebook, etc.
  • 58. Spear Phising • Executives are good targets • Often C-Level executives are not that “cyber savvy” • Be quite concerned about any systems with electronic fund transfer access
  • 59. Rise of DoSing & Electronic Sit Ins
  • 61. Just Throw Money At IT Sure it helps but there is no “silver bullet” box especially without a posture change
  • 62. Tech Just Can’t Solve All And tech issues may lead to real corporate trouble…
  • 65. IP Risks • Your content, site design, source, etc. is easily copied • It can be quite hard to find all occurrences of it • Recourse is tough particularly if international
  • 66. BTW Ever Look What You Agreed To?
  • 67. Delivery Really Matters
  • 70. Vetting is for Losers!
  • 71. Speed over Substance about in the “Most of what is written tech world – both in blog form and old school media form – is bullshit.” “Most are stories written with little or no research done. They’re written as quickly as possible. The faster the better.” Right from the “horse’s mouth”
  • 74. GIGO™ Analytics • Are your analytics accurate? • Are you watching them real time or not? • Are you trying to find answers from reports or making reports to answer questions?
  • 75. Did you know? • When it comes to Web analytics* • JavaScript Off = Invisible • Bad people, bots, etc. do this • Cookies off = Big Mess • Others can easily forge results
  • 78. Watch Out Engaging the Thoughts of Crowds Mobs
  • 79. Yeah That’s Not a Good Use of Social
  • 80. What do you call this again?
  • 83. Just in case all that wasn’t scary enough
  • 84. Summary • Have you had a security audit of your Web properties? • How hackable is your site? • What disclosure issues may you have? • How aware of your site performance and uptime? • How aware of what Google’s index about you and your sit are you?
  • 85. Summary • What information are you or your vendors collecting? • Is your privacy policy addressing it? • Are you aware of privacy regulations in the markets you serve • Are you aware of accessibility concerns • Could you be a target?
  • 86. Summary • Do you have a social media policy? • Do you have a crisis communication plan? • Are you actively watching your analytics? • How active are you monitoring social for • Stock issues, HR issues, Customer Issues
  • 87. Summary • If you spend ad dollars online • How do you track effectiveness • How do you track fraud? • Do you have an inventory of 3 Party rd Scripts / Services you use? • What are the QoS, Security and Legal terms of these 3rd parties
  • 88. Summary • Are you disclosing information both technical and not that you should not? • Error pages, source code, social media profiles, etc. • What is the fail point of your site or Web application? • Are you ready for a DoS attack?
  • 89. Questions? Thomas A. Powell tpowell@pint.com http://www.pint.com Twitter: PINTSD

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. And we promise – there will be no cat pictures today. A single example of one of our products and a few candidates for world’s worst pie charts
  2. Buying a box, list or service isn’t really going to secure that much if you aren’t aware and involved
  3. In particular we often run into an accountability gap
  4. Don’t You Understand!? We’re doing T-Business!!!
  5. This is the runner up in the worlds worst pie chart contestThe most common outcomes: 1) Information Leakage, 2) Downtime, 3) Defacement.Web Application Security Consortium (WebAppSec.org) Web Hacking Incident Database:http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  6. Relax I faked this … http://www.cornify.com/ - not real in this case but if you had an XSS hole don’t be surprised if the famous Konami code reveals this
  7. Common scheme seen it on sites where they hack wordpress to hack the database of a shared site to hack the home page to spread malware. You find out once Google starts blocking you
  8. http://www.focus.com/fyi/15-most-massive-data-breaches-history/
  9. All those 404s might be some nice poorly done hack attempts
  10. Here it is the world’s worst pie chart….The Big Three attack methods, according to WebAppSec.org: SQL Injection, XSS, and DoS.
  11. Secunia advisories for Drupal 6.x: http://secunia.com/advisories/product/17839/?task=advisories
  12. This is a well built house!
  13. A customer who shall not be named here.Uses Sitecore as their base CMS.External facing portal uses only a "published view"Sitecore admin and content generation performed from a separate system located behind the DMZ.Publishes pages to the outside portal
  14. The top weaknesses according to WebAppSec.org include:Improper Input HandlingImproper Output HandlingInsufficient Anti-AutomationInsufficient AuthenticationSee also the OWASP Top Ten:https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project1: Injection 2: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 3: Broken Authentication and Session Management 4: Insecure Direct Object References 5: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 6: Security Misconfiguration 7: Insecure Cryptographic Storage 8: Failure to Restrict URL Access 9: Insufficient Transport Layer Protection 10: Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
  15. Many of the sites we found with exposed login pages also failed to lock out a user after dozens of retries, open the door to dictionary attacks and brute forcing.
  16. For published Web sites that use authentication, you can also set password policies directly in ASP.NET (web.config), whether the membership provider is AD or SQL Server. See Sitecore CMS 6 Security API Cookbook (section 2.3)http://sdn.sitecore.net/upload/sitecore6/sc61keywords/security_api_cookbook_usletter.pdfAnd theMicrosoft here documentation:http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/whae3t94.aspx
  17. Sadly these guys got hacked even … But even if you have second form…. Be careful where you go
  18. The mean streets of starbucks might be a bit meaner than you think….public WiFi is the hackers best friend these days
  19. Meet Firesheep - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firesheep Easy to do this without but we keep lowering the bar for peopleWhy people don’t do SSL? Cert cost? Server scale
  20. Let’s assume we are going to avoid the impersonation move
  21. http://www.lunarpages.com/company/newsletter/your-business-website-and-ada-compliance/
  22. “process journalism is the posting of a story before it is fully baked, something the NY Times officially despises, but the do it to” – Mike Arrington of Techcrunch / AOL
  23. http://parislemon.com/post/17527312140/content-everywhere-but-not-a-drop-to-drink
  24. Google says it is 2% otherw say that it is > 20% http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/10/21/record-click-fraud-boosted-by-fake-video-cell-phone-traffic/
  25. Just cuz I sell you ads doesn’t mean I can’t run your analytics
  26. Southwest airlines darling of social media stumbles with Kevin Smith
  27. http://bloggingmebloggingyou.wordpress.com/2009/02/11/crisis-communications-dark-sites-101/http://collegewebeditor.com/blog/index.php/archives/2007/04/17/virginia-tech-tragedy-lessons-learned-in-crisis-communication-a-day-after-the-unthinkable/