cyber security and impact on national security (3)
1. CYBER WARFARE & NATIONAL SECURITY:
IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES
DR TUGHRAL YAMIN
ASSOCIATE DEAN CIPS, NUST
2. AIM
TO HIGHLIGHT THE STRUCTURAL & POLICY
SHORTCOMINGS WITH REGARDS TO CYBER
SECURITY IN THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK OF
PAKISTAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY
3. NATIONAL SECURITY
CONCEPT
• NATIONAL SECURITY CALLS UPON A
GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH ITS
PARLIAMENT TO PROTECT THE STATE
AND ITS CITIZENS AGAINST ALL KIND OF
THREATS THROUGH A VARIETY OF
POWER PROJECTION MEANS, SUCH AS
– POLITICAL POWER
– DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE
– ECONOMIC CAPACITY
– MILITARY MIGHT
• MANY COUNTRIES INCLUDING PAKISTAN
ARROGATE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
COORDINATING NATIONAL SECURITY
MATTERS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL (NSC)
SLICES OF NATIONAL
SECURITYTERRITORIAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMIC
ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES
HOMELAND
HUMAN
ENVIRONMENTAL
CYBER
FOOD
4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK
• STRONG LEADERSHIP TO
PROVIDE
– VISION
– ACROSS THE BOARD
COORDINATION
• CLEAR CUT POLICY &
STRATEGY WITH PRECISE
MISSION STATEMENT
• ADEQUATE FUNDS &
HUMAN/MATERIAL
RESOURCES
• UNAMBIGIOUS SET OF
LAWS & LAW
ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY
LEADERSHIP
RESOURCES
POLICY &
STRATEGY
LAWS
5. CYBER SECURITY
REFERS TO PROTECTION OF OFFICIAL AND
PERSONAL COMPUTER AND DATA PROCESSING
INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATING SYSTEMS
(OS) FROM HARMFUL INTERFERENCE, FROM
OUTSIDE OR INSIDE THE COUNTRY
INVOLVES NOT ONLY NATIONAL DEFENSE & HOMELAND
SECURITY BUT ALSO LAW ENFORCEMENT
6. CYBER WARFARE & CYBER ATTACKS
DEFINITION
AN INTERNET-BASED
CONFLICT INVOLVING
ATTACKS ON THE
ADVERSAY’S INFORMATION
& INFORMATION SYSTEMS
PURPOSE OF CYBER ATTACKS
DEFACE
WEBSITES
DISABLE
NETWORKS
DIRUPT/
DISABLE
ESSENTIAL
SERVICES
STEAL OR
ALTER DATA
CRIPPLE
FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS
7. MANIFESTATION OF CYBER ATTACK
• SECURITY
BREACHES
• ECONOMIC
LOSSES
• PSYCHOLOG
ICAL
TRAUMA
• PHYSICAL
DAMAGE
DISRUPTION
OF
COMPUTER
SYSTEMS –
LONG DOWN
TIME
FEAR &
PANIC
FLIGHT
KNEEJERK
REACTION
SMALLSCALE
ID THEFTS
MASSIVE
DATA
BREACHES
FRAUD
LARGESCALE
MONETARY
THEFT
8. HOW CAN CYBER ATTACKS HURT
NATIONAL SECURITY?
CYBER ATTACKS CAN:
• PARALYSE THE
GOVERNMENT’S
DECISION MAKING
SYSTEMS
• CRIPPLE A NATION’S
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
• CAUSE MASSIVE PANIC &
TRIGGER INADVERTENT
WARS
PARALYSIS
COLLAPSE
PANIC
9. TYPES OF CYBER ATTACKS
• VIRUSES
• WORMS
• TROJAN HORSES
SYNTACTIC
ATTACKS
• MISLEADING
INFORMATION TO
DISTRACT OR COVER OWN
TRACKS
SEMANTIC
ATTACKS
10. CYBER TARGETS
• PERSONAL COMPUTERS
• COMPUTER NETWORKS
MANAGING THE
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
OF ORGANIZATIONS,
BUSINESSES, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ETC
• CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE (VITAL
ASSETS OF A NATION –
VIRTUALLY/PHYSICALLY)
CONTROLLED BY
SUPERVISORY CONTROL &
DATA ACQUISITION
(SCADA)
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
COMPUTER
NETWORKS
PERSONAL
COMPUTERS
11. HOW DOES A TYPICAL CYBER ATTACK
TAKES PLACE?
MALICIOUS ACTS
ORIGINATING FROM
AN ANONYMOUS
SOURCES
HACKING INTO A
SUSCEPTIBLE SYSTEM
TO EITHER
• STEAL
• ALTER OR
• DESTROY A SPECIFIED
TARGET
12.
13. WHO CAN LAUNCH CYBER ATTACKS?
• STATE ACTORS
• NON STATE ACTORS
• CRIMINALS
• HACKTIVISTS
• FREELANCERS
• KID IN THE BASEMENT
• INSIDERS
14. PROBLEMS WITH CYBER RESPONSES
NO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
PROBLEM IN DETERMINING A
PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE
DIFFICULTY IN ATTRIBUTION
16. US CYBER SECURITY AGENCIES
• OFFICE OF THE CYBER
SECURITY
COORDINATOR
• DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
(DHS)
• NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY (NSA)
• CYBER COMMAND
(CYBERCOM)
21. LEVEL AUSTRALIA UK
STRAT CYBER SECURITY POLICY & COORD
COMMITTEE (LEAD AGENCY: THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT)
FUNCTION: INTERDEPARTMENTAL
COMMITTEE THAT COORDS
DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER SECURITY
POLICY FOR THE GOVT
OFFICE OF THE CYBER SECURITY
(OCS)
FUNCTION: PROVIDES STRAT
LEADERSHIP & COHERENCE
ACROSS ALL DEPTS OF THE
GOVT
TAC CYBER SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTRE
(UNDER DEFENCE SIGNALS
DIRECTORATE)
FUNCTION: PROVIDES GOVET WITH ALL
SOURCE CYBER SITREP
CYBER SECURITY OPS CENTRE
(CSOC)
FUNCTION: ACTIVELY
MONITORS THE HEALTH OF
CYBERSPACE & COORDS
INCIDENCE RESPONSE
OP CERT AUSTRALIA GOVCERTUK
22. PM OFFICE/ CABINET
SECY (PMO/ CAB
SEC)
MINISTRY OF HOME
AFFAIRS (MHA)
MINISTRY OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(MEA)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE (MOD)
MINISTRY OF
COMMON INFO
TECHNOLOGY (MCIT)
NON GOVT
ORGANISATION
(NGO)
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL (NSC)
NATIONAL CYBER
COORD CENTRE
(NCCC)
AMBASSADORS &
MINISTERS
TRI SERVICE CYBER
COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF
INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY (DIT)
CYBER SECURITY AND
ANTI HACKING
ORGANISATION
(CSAHO)
National Technical
Research Org (NTRO)
Directorate of
Forensic Science
(DFS)
Defence Attaches Army (MI) Department of
Telecom (DoT)
Cyber Society of India
(CySI)
National Critical Info
Infrastructure
Protection
Centre(NCIIPC)
National Disaster
Mgt Authority
(NDMA)
Joint Secretary (IT) Navy (NI) Indian Computer
Emergency Response
Team CERT-IN
Centre of Excellence
for Cyber Security
Research &
Development In India
(CECSRDI)
Joint Intelligence
Group (JIG)
Central Forensic
Science Lab (CFSLs)
Air Force (AFI) Education Research
Network (ERNET)
Cyber Security of
India(CSI)
National Crisis
Management
Committee (NCMC)
Intelligence Bureau
(IB)
Def Info Assurance &
Research Agency
(DIARA)
Informatics Center
(NIC)
National Cyber
Security of India
(NCS)
Research & Analysis
Wing (RAW)
Defence Intelligence
Agency (DIA)
Centre for
Development of
Advanced Computing
C-DAC
Cyber Attacks Crisis
Management Plan of
India (CACMP)
Multi Agency Center
(MAC)
Defence Research
Dev Authority
(DRDO)
Standardisation,
Testing and Quality
Certification (STQC)
National Information
Board (NIB)
CYBER SECURITY HIERARCHY IN INDIA
23. USFOCUSONITSECURITY
COMPUTERS/ICT FORM THE FOUNDATION OF US ECONOMY AND
DRIVE THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE THAT ALLOWS SMALL AND
MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESSES TO COMPETE IN THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE
ECONOMIC GROWTH IS THREATENED BY A CORRESPONDING
GROWTH IN CYBER THREATS
INCREASING DATA BREACHES, THEFT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
THROUGH CYBER MEANS, AND CYBER ATTACKS ARE RESULTING IN
REAL COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
US GOVERNMENT IS TAKING ACTIONS TO BETTER PREPARE ITSELF, ITS
ECONOMY, AND THE NATION AS A WHOLE TO DEFEND AGAINST
GROWING CYBER THREATS
CYBER THREATS POSE ONE OF THE GRAVEST NATIONAL SECURITY
DANGERS TO THE US
24. US BUDGETARY STRATEGY FOR
CYBERSECURITY
SEVERAL BUDGETARY,
PROGRAMMATIC &
LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES
TO IMPROVE THE
CYBERSECURITY
INFRASTRUCTURE AND
COMBAT GROWING
CYBER THREAT
DOMESTICALLY AND
GLOBALLY
UPDATED CYBERSECURITY
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
THAT WILL PROVIDE THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND PRIVATE SECTOR THE
NECESSARY TOOLS TO
IMPROVE NATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY
IN FY 2016, THE
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
PROPOSES $14 BILLION IN
CYBERSECURITY FUNDING
FOR CRITICAL INITIATIVES
AND RESEARCH
25. US STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS IN
CYBER SECURITY
DHS TO LEAD
IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE
CONTINUOUS
DIAGNOSTICS &
MITIGATION
(CDM)
NATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY
PROTECTION
SYSTEM BETTER
KNOWN AS
EINSTEIN
CYBERSECURITY
CROSS-AGENCY
PRIORITY GOAL
AND IMPLEMENT
POSTWIKILEAKS
SECURITY
IMPROVEMENTS
ON CLASSIFIED
NETWORKS,
PURSUANT TO E.O.
13587
$582 MILLION
26. US PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FY 2016
OUTREACH TO
PRIVATE
SECTOR
SHAPING THE
FUTURE CYBER
ENVIRONMENT
NATIONAL
SECURITY
AND CYBER
THREATS
$149
MILLION
$243
MILLION
$514
MILLION
27. CYBERCOM
XXXX
TO
BE
BROUGHT
TO FULL
STRENGTH
US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BUDGET
FEDERAL
CIVILIAN CYBER
CAMPUS
$227
MILLION
TO FUND
THE 1ST
PHASE OF
CONSTRUC
TION
CYBER
INTELLIGENCE
INTEGRATION,
ANALYSIS &
PLANNING WITHIN
THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
$35
MILLION
28. 2015 US CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL
THREE CENTRAL ELEMENTS AIM AT ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY, WHILE ALSO PROTECTING THE
PERSONAL DATA AND PRIVACY OF CITIZENS BY:
• FACILITATING GREATER VOLUNTARY SHARING OF CYBER THREAT INFORMATION BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR
• INCENTIVIZING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATIONS
TO IMPROVE THE VOLUNTARY SHARING OF CYBER THREAT INFORMATION WITHIN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
AND BETWEEN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE GOVERNMENT. PROTECTS THE PRIVACY OF AMERICANS
BY REQUIRING PRIVATE ENTITIES THAT SHARE VOLUNTARILY UNDER THE PROPOSAL'S AUTHORITY, TO
COMPLY WITH CERTAIN PRIVACY RESTRICTIONS, SUCH AS REMOVING UNNECESSARY PERSONAL
INFORMATION IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR LIABILITY PROTECTION ESTABLISH DATA BREACH STANDARDS
• ESTABLISHING A SINGLE FEDERAL STANDARD FOR NOTIFYING INDIVIDUALS IN A TIMELY, CONSISTENT
WAY WHEN PRIVATE SECTOR DATA BREACHES OCCUR; THIS HELPS BUSINESSES AND CONSUMERS BY
SIMPLIFYING AND STANDARDIZING THE EXISTING PATCHWORK OF 47 STATE LAWS THAT CONTAIN DATA
BREACH REPORT REQUIREMENTS INTO ONE FEDERAL STATUTE. THIS IS PART OF OUR COMMITMENT TO
BALANCE SECURITY AND PRIVACY, ENSURING CITIZENS RECEIVE TIMELY INFORMATION ON THEIR DATA
IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH. THIS WILL:
– PROVIDE A SINGLE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION
– ESTABLISH DEADLINES FOR NOTIFICATION OF CYBER INCIDENTS
29. US POLICY TO MODERNIZE LAW
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
• ENSURE LAW ENFORCEMENT HAS THE TOOLS TO
INVESTIGATE, DISRUPT & PROSECUTE CYBERCRIME
• ALLOW PROSECUTION FOR THE SALE OF BOTNETS
• ENABLE LAW ENFORCEMENT TO PROSECUTE THE
OVERSEAS SALE OF STOLEN FINANCIAL INFORMATION
LIKE CREDIT CARD AND BANK ACCOUNT NUMBERS
• EXPANDS FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY TO
DETER THE SALE OF SPYWARE USED TO STALK OR
COMMIT ID THEFT
• COURTS TO BE GIVEN THE AUTHORITY TO SHUT DOWN
BOTNETS ENGAGED IN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE
ATTACKS AND OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
31. INDIA’S CYBER-SECURITY BUDGET
‘WOEFULLY INADEQUATE’: EXPERTS
• INDIA'S CYBER-SECURITY BUDGET WAS MORE THAN DOUBLED LAST YEAR.
YET, IT IS “WOEFULLY INADEQUATE” IN THE WAKE OF REVELATIONS MADE
BY US NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CONTRACTOR EDWARD
SNOWDEN AND INCREASING CYBER-ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE, ACCORDING TO EXPERTS.
• IN 2014-15, THE DEPARTMENT OF IT HAS SET ASIDE RS 116 CRORE FOR
CYBER SECURITY. THE COUNTRY HAS PROPOSED TO SET UP A NATIONAL
CYBER COORDINATION CENTRE (NCCC) WITH A SEPARATE BUDGET OF RS
1,000 CRORE. THE COORDINATION CENTRE IS STILL AWAITING CABINET
CLEARANCE. “ALLOCATION IS WOEFULLY INADEQUATE GIVEN SNOWDEN'S
REVELATIONS - WE NEED AT LEAST 10 TIMES THAT AMOUNT,” SAID SUNIL
ABRAHAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AT CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY.
THE ECONOMIC TIMES
28 JANUARY 2015
32. CYBER SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE
& COORD MECHANISM
CYBER SECURITY POLICY
CYBER LAW
CYBER EMERGENCY
RESPONSE
SLOW PROGRESS
LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS
SURROUNDED BY CONTROVERSY
LITTLE PROGRESS
CYBER FUNDS ?????????
WHITHERCYBERSECURITYINPAKISTAN?
33. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR CYBER SECURITY
IN PAKISTAN?
NO
DESIGNATED
LEAD AGENCY
MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS
GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY ACADEMIA
CIVIL SOCIETY PUBLIC
34. CYBERSECURITY STAKEHOLDERS
GOVERNMENT
• CABINET COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY
• NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSA: LTG N.K. JANJUA)
• SENATE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
(CHAIR: SEN. M.H. SAYED)
• SENATE COMMITTEE ON TECH & IT
(CHAIR: SEN. SHAHI SAYED)
• NA STANDING COMMITTEE ON TECH &
IT (CHAIR: CAPT SAFDAR)
• MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
• MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
• MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
• MINISTRY OF IT
• JS HQ
• INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
PUBLIC
• PAKISTAN SOFTWARE HOUSES
ASSOCIATION (PASHA)
• INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTAN
(ISPAK)
• PAKISTAN INFORMATION
SECURITY ASSOCIATION (PISA)
• E COMMERCE ENTREPRENEURS
• DIGITAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS (BOLO
BHI)
• SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVISTS
• ORDINARY CITIZENS
35. SENATE COMMITTEE FOR DEFENCE
ACTION PLAN FOR CYBER SECURE PAKISTAN
(JULY 2013)
• POINT 1. RELEVANT LEGISLATION TO PRESERVE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE PAKISTAN’S CYBER
SECURITY
• POINT 2. CYBER SECURITY THREAT TO BE ACCEPTED AND RECOGNIZED AS NEW, EMERGING
NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, SIMILAR TO THREATS LIKE
TERRORISM AND MILITARY AGGRESSION
• POINT 3. ESTABLISH A NATIONAL COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (PKCERT).
• POINT 4. ESTABLISH A CYBER-SECURITY TASK FORCE WITH AFFILIATION WITH MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE, MINISTRY OF IT, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF
INFORMATION AND OUR SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS PLUS RELEVANT AND LEADING
PROFESSIONALS FROM THE PRIVATE SECURITY SO THAT PAKISTAN CAN TAKE STEPS TO COMBAT
THIS NEW EMERGING THREAT AND FORMULATE CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY FOR PAKISTAN.
• POINT 5. UNDER THE OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE, AN INTER-
SERVICES CYBER COMMAND SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO COORDINATE CYBER SECURITY AND
CYBER DEFENCE FOR THE PAKISTAN ARMED FORCES.
• POINT 6. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SAARC, PAKISTAN SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO
INITIATE TALKS AMONG THE 8-MEMBER STATES PARTICULARLY INDIA TO ESTABLISH ACCEPTABLE
NORMS OF BEHAVIOR IN CYBER SECURITY AMONG THE SAARC COUNTRIES SO THAT THESE
COUNTRIES ARE NOT ENGAGED IN CYBER WARFARE AGAINST EACH OTHER.
• POINT 7. SPECIAL MEDIA WORKSHOPS ON CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS
36. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY COUNCIL
BILL (INTRODUCED 14.04.2014)
• WITHIN SIXTY DAYS OF THE ENACTMENT OF THIS ACT, THE SENATE STANDING
COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE SHALL CONSTITUTE THE NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY
COUNCIL
• NO ACT OF THE COUNCIL SHALL BE INVALID BY REASON ONLY OF THE EXISTENCE
OF ANY VACANCY AMONG ITS MEMBERS OR ANY DEFECT IN ITS CONSTITUTION
DISCOVERED AFTER SUCH ACT OR PROCEEDING OF THE COUNCIL: PROVIDED THAT
AS SOON AS SUCH DEFECT HAS BEEN DISCOVERED, THE MEMBER SHALL NOT
EXERCISE THE FUNCTIONS OR POWERS OF HIS MEMBERSHIP UNTIL THE DEFECT
HAS BEEN RECTIFIED
• THE COUNCIL SHALL MEET AT LEAST ONCE IN EACH QUARTER OF A YEAR
• THE COUNCIL MAY FROM TIME TO TIME DELEGATE ONE OR MORE OF ITS
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS TO ONE OR MORE OF ITS MEMBERS, HOWEVER, UNDER
NO CIRCUMSTANCE SHALL BE FURTHER DELEGATED.
• DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL SHALL BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS.
• SAVE AS PROVIDED HEREIN, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHALL BE SUCH AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED.
• CHAIR. CHAIRMAN SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
• MEMBERS
– FEDERAL GOVT (21)
– PRIVATE SECTOR (9)
37. MANDATE OF THE NATIONAL CYBER
SECURITY COUNCIL
• DEVELOP POLICY, RENDER ADVICE, CONDUCT RESEARCH AND ESTABLISH START UP INITIATIVES
• ESTABLISH A NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY WHICH MAY BE UPDATED FROM TIME TO TIME, AS AND WHEN
DEEMED APPROPRIATE, BUT NOT LATER THAN EVERY THREE YEARS
• ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY WHICH MAY BE UPDATED FROM TIME TO TIME, AS
AND WHEN DEEMED APPROPRIATE BUT NOT LATER THAN EVERY THREE YEARS
• UNDERTAKE INITIATIVES AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 6;
• DEVELOP AND DRAFT POLICY, GUIDELINES AND GOVERNANCE MODELS RELATED TO EVER EMERGING CYBER
SECURITY THREATS;
• ADVISE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SENATE AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, JUDICIARY AND ALL
MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS AND BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT ON POLICY AND LEGISLATION WITH RESPECT TO
CYBER SECURITY;
• MONITOR LEGISLATION AND PROVIDE ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING
THAT LEGISLATION REFLECTS INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO CYBER SECURITY;
• ADVISE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS ON MECHANISMS TO IMPLEMENT
POLICIES RELATED TO CYBER SECURITY AND MONITOR AND HAVE PERFORMANCE AUDIT CONDUCTED THEREOF;
• MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR ADOPTION EITHER THROUGH POLICIES AND REGULATORY
MEANS OF STANDARDIZATION, HARMONIZATION AND ACCREDITATION WITH REGARDS TO CRITICAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE;
• COORDINATE AND CONSULT WITH ALL REPRESENTATIVE STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF
POLICIES, INITIATIVES AND LEGISLATION ON CYBER SECURITY;
• FACILITATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES, ACADEMIA, CYBER
SECURITY EXPERTS THROUGH MULTI-STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS HELD WITH SUCH FREQUENCY AS DETERMINED
NECESSARY BY THE COUNCIL;
38. • ESTABLISH THE ADVISORY GROUPS AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 10 TO PROVIDE NON BINDING INPUT
TO THE NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY COUNCIL ON STRATEGIC PLANS AS AND WHEN CALLED UPON
TO DO SO FROM TIME TO TIME;
• IN PARTICULAR ADVISE, ASSIST, COLLABORATE AND COORDINATE WITH NATIONAL SECURITY
APPARATUS OF THE STATE OF PAKISTAN FOR CONTINUALLY IMPROVING THE STATE OF CYBER
SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO ALL ASPECTS AND INTERESTS OF THE STATE;
• COORDINATE, COLLABORATE AND CONDUCT EXCHANGES WITH INTERNATIONAL BODIES, FORA
AND ENTITIES, INTERALIA, IN CONNECTION WITH THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS HEREIN;
• CAUSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO BE CONDUCTED WITH RESPECT TO KALEIDOSCOPIC
CYBER SECURITY THREATS, DEVELOPMENTS, BEST PRACTICES AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND
OBLIGATIONs;
• PROMOTE GENERAL AWARENESS WITH RESPECT TO CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS, PARTICULARLY
THE IN-HOUSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATE ENTITIES AND
ORGANIZATIONS ;
• DEVELOP A TEN YEAR AND TWENTY YEAR VISION WITH REGARDS TO CYBER SECURITY;
• LEGISLATE AND UPDATE SUCH RULES FOR THE INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS OF
THE COUNCIL, ITS PERSONNEL AND ADVISORY GROUPS, AS IT MAY CONSIDER APPROPRIATE FOR
CARRYING OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT;
• INCLUSIVELY, COLLABORATE WITH THE CORPORATE ENTITIES, PRIVATE SECTOR, CYBER SECURITY
ACADEMIA, PROFESSIONALS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES;
• THE COUNCIL MAY DELEGATE THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS TO ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE
ADVISORY GROUPS, AS IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE.
39. 2015 JOINT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT BARACK
OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER NAWAZ SHARIF
CYBERSECURITY
• RECOGNIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES PRESENTED
BY INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, TECHNOLOGIES
PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER SHARIF AFFIRMED THAT
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE
CYBERSPACE SECURE AND STABLE
• BOTH LEADERS ENDORSED THE CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE 2015
UN GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF
INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
• THE LEADERS LOOKED FORWARD TO FURTHER MULTILATERAL
ENGAGEMENT, AND DISCUSSION OF CYBER ISSUES AS PART OF THE
US-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
40. ARCHIT
ECTURE
POLICY &
LAWS
FUNDS &
RESOURCES
AWARENESS &
PREPAREDNESS
DEVELOPMENT PLAN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY
COUNCIL TO BE MADE
PART OF THE NSA
PK CERT TO BE
ESTABLISHED WITHOUT
FURTHER DELAY
COMPREHENSIVE CYBER
SECURITY POLICY TO
COORDINATE & ENSURE
ALL CYBER MATTERS
WHILE ADDRESSING THE
CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
GOVERNMENT
SHOULD ALLOCATE
ADEQUATE FUNDS
& RESOURCES FOR
CYBER SECURITY
PROPOSALS
CYBER SECURITY
AWARENESS TO BE
CREATED WITHIN THE
GOVT, CORPORATE
SECTOR, INDUSTRY,
PRIVATE BUSINESSES
& ACADEMIA
•DEVELOP OWN
HARDWARE &
INFRASTRUCTURE
•DEVELOP
INDEPENDENT OS
FOR THE ARMED
FORCES &
SECURITY
ORGANIZATIONS
•IN THE
LONGTERM
DEVELOP OWN
INTERNET
•BRING FORTH NATIONAL VIEWPOINT ACCURATELY IN THE UN
GGE & OTHER INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS
•CONCLUDE CYBER CBMs WITH INDIA (SAARC SUMMIT 2016)
43. EXAMPLES OF CYBER ATTACKS & THEIR
IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY
THE CASE OF ESTONIA (APRIL 2007)
• ESTONIA RELOCATED THE BRONZE SOLDIER OF TALLINN, A SOVIET-
ERA GRAVE MARKER TO THE ANNOYANCE OF THE RUSIANS
• A SERIES OF CYBER ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST ESTONIA
SWAMPING WEBSITES OF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE
PARLIAMENT, BANKS, MINISTRIES, NEWSPAPERS AND BROADCAST
STATIONS
• DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) LAUNCHED AGAINST
THE GENERAL PUBLIC, RANGING FROM SINGLE INDIVIDUALS USING
VARIOUS METHODS LIKE PING FLOODS TO EXPENSIVE RENTALS
OF BOTNETS USUALLY USED FOR SPAM DISTRIBUTION
• SPAMMING OF BIGGER NEWS PORTALS COMMENTARIES AND
DEFACEMENTS INCLUDING THAT OF THE ESTONIAN REFORM
PARTY WEBSITE
44. CYBER & PHYSICAL ATTACK ON GEORGIA
• 20 JULY 2008. ZOMBIE COMPUTERS ATTACK GEORGIAN NETWORKS. WEBSITE OF THE
GEORGIAN PRESIDENT SUFFER OVERLOAD & IS TAKEN DOWN FOR 24 HOURS. TRAFFIC
DIRECTED AT THE WEBSITE INCLUDED THE PHRASE "WIN+LOVE+IN+RUSIA”.
• 5 AUGUST. GEORGIAN NEW AGENCIES AND TELEVISION STATIONS HACKED.
• 5 AUGUST. TERRORIST ATTACK ON BAKU–TBILISI–CEYHAN PIPELINE SUBJECTED TO A
TERRORIST ATTACK NEAR REFAHIYE IN TURKEY COUPLED WITH A SOPHISTICATED
COMPUTER ATTACK ON LINE'S CONTROL AND SAFETY SYSTEMS THAT CAUSE AN
INCREASE IN PRESSURE AND EXPLOSION.
• 7-8 AUGUST. MANY GEORGIAN INTERNET SERVERS UNDER EXTERNAL CONTROL
• 9 AUGUST. KEY SECTIONS OF GEORGIA'S INTERNET TRAFFIC REROUTED THROUGH
SERVERS BASED IN RUSSIA AND TURKEY, WHERE THE TRAFFIC IS EITHER BLOCKED OR
DIVERTED. RUSSIAN AND TURKISH SERVERS ARE ALLEGEDLY CONTROLLED BY THE
RUSSIAN HACKERS.
• 10 AUGUST. RIA NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY'S WEBSITE DISABLED FOR SEVERAL HOURS
• 10 AUGUST. MANY ONLINE GEORGIAN SITES SUSPECTED TO BE FAKE
• 11 AUGUST. GEORGIA ACCUSES RUSSIA OF WAGING CYBER WARFARE ON GEORGIAN
GOVERNMENT WEBSITES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A MILITARY OFFENSIVE
• 14 AUGUST. CEASEFIRE
45. NORTH KOREAN ATTACK ON SONY
PICTURES• NOVEMBER 24, 2014. CONFIDENTIAL DATA
BELONGING TO SONY PICTURES
ENTERTAINMENT RELEASED
• DATA INCLUDES PERSONAL INFORMATION
ABOUT THE EMPLOYEES AND THEIR
FAMILIES, E-MAILS BETWEEN EMPLOYEES,
INFORMATION ABOUT EXECUTIVE SALARIES,
COPIES OF (PREVIOUSLY) UNRELEASED SONY
FILMS, AND OTHER INFORMATION
• HACKERS CALLING THEMSELVES GUARDIANS
OF PEACE (GOP) DEMAND CANCELLATION OF
PLANNED RELEASE OF THE INTERVIEW, A
COMEDY FILM ABOUT A PLOT TO
ASSASSINATE NORTH KOREAN LEADER KIM
JONG-UN
• US BLAME NORTH KOREA FOR THE HACKING.
NORTH KOREANS DENY COMPLICITY. SOME
CYBERSECURITY EXPERTS CAST DOUBT ON
THE EVIDENCE, ALTERNATIVELY BLAMING
CURRENT OR FORMER SONY OFFICIALS FOR
THE BREACH
47. STUXNET ATTACK
• STUXNET, A COMPUTER WORM WAS DISCOVERED IN JUNE 2010
• IT IS DESIGNED TO ATTACK INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC
CONTROLLERS (PLCs)
• PLCs ALLOW THE AUTOMATION OF ELECTROMECHANICAL
PROCESSES SUCH AS THOSE USED TO CONTROL MACHINERY ON
FACTORY ASSEMBLY LINES, AMUSEMENT RIDES, OR CENTRIFUGES
FOR SEPARATING NUCLEAR MATERIAL
• EXPLOITING FOUR ZERO-DAY FLAWS, STUXNET FUNCTIONS BY
TARGETING MACHINES USING THE MICROSOFT
WINDOWS OPERATING SYSTEM AND NETWORKS, THEN SEEKING
OUT SIEMENS STEP7 SOFTWARE
• STUXNET IS TYPICALLY INTRODUCED TO THE TARGET
ENVIRONMENT VIA AN INFECTED USB FLASH DRIVE
• STUXNET COMPROMISED IRANIAN PLCs, COLLECTING
INFORMATION ON INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AND CAUSING THE FAST-
SPINNING CENTRIFUGES TO TEAR THEMSELVES APART, DESTROYING
ALMOST ONE-FIFTH OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR CENTRIFUGES
48. SPOOFING OF AMERICAN DRONE
OVERFLYING IRAN
• ON 4 DECEMBER 2011 AN
AMERICAN RQ170 SENTINEL UAV
WAS SPOOFED AND FORCED TO
LAND IN EASTERN IRAN
• AIRCRAFT WAS DETECTED IN
IRANIAN AIRSPACE 225
KILOMETERS (140 MI) FROM THE
BORDER WITH AFGHANISTAN
• ON 9 DECEMBER 2011, IRAN
LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT
TO THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL OVER THE UAV
VIOLATING ITS AIRSPACE
• ON 12 DECEMBER 2011, US
ADMINISTRATION ASKED IRAN TO
RETURN THEIR DRONE. IRANIANS
REFUSED.
49. WHAT IS SPOOFING?
• SPOOFING IS THE CREATION OF TCP/IP PACKETS
USING SOMEBODY ELSE'S IP ADDRESS
• ROUTERS USE THE DESTINATION IP ADDRESS IN
ORDER TO FORWARD PACKETS THROUGH THE
INTERNET, BUT IGNORE THE SOURCE IP ADDRESS
• THAT ADDRESS IS ONLY USED BY THE
DESTINATION MACHINE WHEN IT RESPONDS
BACK TO THE SOURCE
50. DATA BREACH – US OFFICE OF THE
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (OPM)
• DATA BREACH STARTING MARCH 2014, AND POSSIBLY EARLIER, NOTICED
BY THE OPM IN APRIL 2015
• IN JUNE 2015, OPM ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD BEEN THE TARGET OF
A DATA BREACH EFFECTING THE RECORDS OF AS MANY AS FOUR MILLION
PEOPLE. LATER, FBI PUT THE NUMBER AT 18 MILLION.
• INFORMATION TARGETED IN THE BREACH INCLUDED PERSONAL
INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, AS WELL AS NAMES,
DATES AND PLACES OF BIRTH, AND ADDRESSES.
• THE HACK ALSO INVOLVED THEFT OF DETAILED BACKGROUND SECURITY-
CLEARANCE-RELATED BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF PEOPLE DEPLOYED
ON SENSITIVE MISSIONS
• ON JULY 9, 2015, THE ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF STOLEN RECORDS
INCREASED TO 21.5 MILLION. THIS INCLUDED RECORDS OF PEOPLE WHO
HAD UNDERGONE BACKGROUND CHECKS, BUT WHO WERE NOT
NECESSARILY CURRENT OR FORMER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.
• SOON AFTER, KATHERINE ARCHULETA, THE DIRECTOR OF OPM, AND
FORMER NATIONAL POLITICAL DIRECTOR FOR BARACK OBAMA'S 2012
REELECTION CAMPAIGN, RESIGNED
51. CYBER WARGAME SCENARIO
IN A CYBER WARGAME CONDUCTED IN THE US IN JULY
2015
• THE SCENARIO IN THE WAR GAME BEGAN WITH A
MAJOR EARTHQUAKE HITTING SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
• FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF COORDINATED
CYBERATTACKS, INCLUDING OIL AND GAS PIPELINE
DISRUPTION
• INTERFERENCE AT A MAJOR COMMERCIAL PORT IN
THE U.K.
• ATTACKS ON PENTAGON NETWORKS
• A FREEZE ON ACCESS TO CASH AT BANKS AND LONG
LINES FOR FOOD AT STORES.
53. CYBER CBMs
• CYBER SECURITY IS A NON-CONTERVERSIAL
AREA BUT HAS THE POTENTIAL OF CONFLICT
• THERE IS NO CYBER SECURITY COOPERATION
IN SOUTH ASIA
• ISSUE NEEDS TO BE PUT ON THE AGENDA OF
THE NEXT SAARC SUMMIT