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Mareike Kleine UNC-CH 20120907

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EU governance in times of crisis: the role of informality

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Mareike Kleine UNC-CH 20120907

  1. 1. Making Cooperation WorkInformal Governance in the EU and Beyond(forthcoming with Cornell University Press, 2013)Mareike KleineEuropean InstituteLondon School of EconomicsUNC Chapel HillCenter for European Studies7 September 2012
  2. 2. The EU as an International OrganizationBackgroundCommonalities:-  Organization of 27 states based on international treaties-  No monopoly of violence, although strong legal systemDifferences:-  Far more ambitious objective (a genuine Internal Market)-  Legislative process at its core constantly produces rules EU is most successful international organization to date
  3. 3. The “Community Method”(conventional wisdom)CommissionCouncilEuropeanParliamentCommissionNat. Admin.AgenciesAgenda Setting Decision-Making Implementation
  4. 4. The Puzzle: Why Informal Governance?AGENDA SETTINGVOTINGIMPLEMENTATION
  5. 5. The “Community Method”(reality)CommissionCouncilEuropeanParliamentEuropeanCouncilCOREPERWorking Groups ComitologyExpert groupsPresidencyNat. Admin.AgenciesEuropeanCouncilPresidencyCommissionPre-Setting Agenda Setting Decision-Making Implementation
  6. 6. Why Informal Governance?Central ArgumentInformal Governance (IG) adds flexibility to sometimes overlyrigid legal rules.It serves to resolve potentially disruptive conflicts thatcooperation may suddenly generate at the domestic level. Formal and informal rules complement each other in orderto sustain a level of cooperation that would otherwise beimpossible to sustain.
  7. 7. Structure of Talk1  Theory2  Empirical Strategy and Evidence3  Informal Governance and the Eurocrisis4  Positive and Normative Implications
  8. 8. Liberal Regime TheoryThe demand for added flexibility  Commitments create value by managing expectations.  But: Commitments are subject to shocks.  EU: Shocks to the domestic politics of collective action. Demand for situational flexibility
  9. 9. Liberal Regime TheoryThe supply of added flexibility  Informal norm of discretion: states should collectivelydepart from rules to accommodate gov under pressure  Norm remains informal b/c it serves to resolve conflictsthat are fundamentally political in nature.  Adjudicating government resolves tension betweencommitment and suspension of rules. Formal and informal elements complement each other toachieve and sustain level of economic integration.
  10. 10. Liberal Regime TheoryTestable Implications1)  Variation in practices of informal governance:  Issue-specific: with propensity for shocks  Over Time: simultaneously and constant2)  Institutions to cope with moral hazard:  Adjudicatory authority of “biased” government  Co-evolution of authority and informal governance
  11. 11. Making Cooperation WorkTable of Content  Introduction and Theory  Informal Governance in the EC (1959-2009)  Formal and Informal Governance  Agenda Setting  Voting  Implementation  Coping with Moral Hazard  Institutional Solutions to Moral Hazard  The Council Presidency  Agenda and Adjudication  Case Studies  Conclusion and Extension
  12. 12. Evidence IInformal governance in the EC (1959-2009)
  13. 13. Evidence IICoping with Moral Hazard  Descriptive Inference: The Council Presidencysystematically accompanies informal governance.  Multivariate Regression: Issues are dropped whenPresidency faces incentives to collude with claimant.  Case Studies: Presidency is denied authority when it facesincentives to collude with claimant.(cf. Kleine 2012, in Review of International Organizations)
  14. 14. Positive ImplicationsEU and IOs  Int’l law and politics: IG complements formal rules byadding political flexibility to them.  Institutions and time: IG renders commitments adaptableto dynamic strategic context.  Autonomy: Informal governance ensures collective statecontrol of supranational actors.
  15. 15. Normative ImplicationsEuropean Union  Input: IG makes EU more responsive, i.e. it includes thevoice of those that are most affected by int’l cooperation andreduces salience of EU politics.  Procedure: IG increases makes legislative process opaque.  Output: Domestic distributive effects of EU are weaker thanformal rules (and literature) suggests.
  16. 16. Implications for the Eurocrisis  IG (bailout, bond purchase) sustains formal commitment toEuro by adding political flexibility in times of crisis.  Informal governance ensures collective state control ofsupranational actors such as ECB.  IG has (so far) mitigated the domestic distributive impact ofthe Eurocrisis; yet  IG has made processes opaque and reduced accountability.