SlideShare utilise les cookies pour améliorer les fonctionnalités et les performances, et également pour vous montrer des publicités pertinentes. Si vous continuez à naviguer sur ce site, vous acceptez l’utilisation de cookies. Consultez nos Conditions d’utilisation et notre Politique de confidentialité.
SlideShare utilise les cookies pour améliorer les fonctionnalités et les performances, et également pour vous montrer des publicités pertinentes. Si vous continuez à naviguer sur ce site, vous acceptez l’utilisation de cookies. Consultez notre Politique de confidentialité et nos Conditions d’utilisation pour en savoir plus.
Making Cooperation WorkInformal Governance in the EU and Beyond(forthcoming with Cornell University Press, 2013)Mareike KleineEuropean InstituteLondon School of EconomicsUNC Chapel HillCenter for European Studies7 September 2012
The EU as an International OrganizationBackgroundCommonalities:- Organization of 27 states based on international treaties- No monopoly of violence, although strong legal systemDifferences:- Far more ambitious objective (a genuine Internal Market)- Legislative process at its core constantly produces rules EU is most successful international organization to date
The “Community Method”(conventional wisdom)CommissionCouncilEuropeanParliamentCommissionNat. Admin.AgenciesAgenda Setting Decision-Making Implementation
The Puzzle: Why Informal Governance?AGENDA SETTINGVOTINGIMPLEMENTATION
The “Community Method”(reality)CommissionCouncilEuropeanParliamentEuropeanCouncilCOREPERWorking Groups ComitologyExpert groupsPresidencyNat. Admin.AgenciesEuropeanCouncilPresidencyCommissionPre-Setting Agenda Setting Decision-Making Implementation
Why Informal Governance?Central ArgumentInformal Governance (IG) adds flexibility to sometimes overlyrigid legal rules.It serves to resolve potentially disruptive conflicts thatcooperation may suddenly generate at the domestic level. Formal and informal rules complement each other in orderto sustain a level of cooperation that would otherwise beimpossible to sustain.
Structure of Talk1 Theory2 Empirical Strategy and Evidence3 Informal Governance and the Eurocrisis4 Positive and Normative Implications
Liberal Regime TheoryThe demand for added flexibility Commitments create value by managing expectations. But: Commitments are subject to shocks. EU: Shocks to the domestic politics of collective action. Demand for situational flexibility
Liberal Regime TheoryThe supply of added flexibility Informal norm of discretion: states should collectivelydepart from rules to accommodate gov under pressure Norm remains informal b/c it serves to resolve conflictsthat are fundamentally political in nature. Adjudicating government resolves tension betweencommitment and suspension of rules. Formal and informal elements complement each other toachieve and sustain level of economic integration.
Liberal Regime TheoryTestable Implications1) Variation in practices of informal governance: Issue-specific: with propensity for shocks Over Time: simultaneously and constant2) Institutions to cope with moral hazard: Adjudicatory authority of “biased” government Co-evolution of authority and informal governance
Making Cooperation WorkTable of Content Introduction and Theory Informal Governance in the EC (1959-2009) Formal and Informal Governance Agenda Setting Voting Implementation Coping with Moral Hazard Institutional Solutions to Moral Hazard The Council Presidency Agenda and Adjudication Case Studies Conclusion and Extension
Evidence IInformal governance in the EC (1959-2009)
Evidence IICoping with Moral Hazard Descriptive Inference: The Council Presidencysystematically accompanies informal governance. Multivariate Regression: Issues are dropped whenPresidency faces incentives to collude with claimant. Case Studies: Presidency is denied authority when it facesincentives to collude with claimant.(cf. Kleine 2012, in Review of International Organizations)
Positive ImplicationsEU and IOs Int’l law and politics: IG complements formal rules byadding political flexibility to them. Institutions and time: IG renders commitments adaptableto dynamic strategic context. Autonomy: Informal governance ensures collective statecontrol of supranational actors.
Normative ImplicationsEuropean Union Input: IG makes EU more responsive, i.e. it includes thevoice of those that are most affected by int’l cooperation andreduces salience of EU politics. Procedure: IG increases makes legislative process opaque. Output: Domestic distributive effects of EU are weaker thanformal rules (and literature) suggests.
Implications for the Eurocrisis IG (bailout, bond purchase) sustains formal commitment toEuro by adding political flexibility in times of crisis. Informal governance ensures collective state control ofsupranational actors such as ECB. IG has (so far) mitigated the domestic distributive impact ofthe Eurocrisis; yet IG has made processes opaque and reduced accountability.