A brief introduction do the Philosophy of Science for information scientists and technologists. This is also Chapter 1 of my course on Qualitative Research.
1. Research Methods II - 2018
PhDinInformationScienceandTechnologies
Philosophy
of Science
Information
Scientists and
Technologists
for
2. This course provides a framework of
core concepts and relationships
Once you become acquainted with the map, you
can build much more knowledge on your own
It works like a
map that you
check before you
set off to discover
a new place
3. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
3. WHAT IS SCIENCE?
4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
4. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
3. WHAT IS SCIENCE?
4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
5. No science is entitled to be called a
science if it is unable to justify the
validity of its statements
Jean-Louis Le Moigne
6. One of the major concerns of Philosophy, over the
centuries, has been to establish reliable means of
confirming the validity of human knowledge
Two branches of Philosophy have
proved essential in this respect:
ONTOLOGY - The study of what exists, of reality
EPISTEMOLOGY - The study of knowledge: the
nature, validity, limits, and value of knowledge
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
7. 1.1. ONTOLOGY
ONTOLOGY is concerned with the nature of reality
We deal with various kinds of realities: physical, online,
economic, organizational, sociological, mathematical, etc.
The study of different realities requires
different research approaches
The first major concern of the researcher is
to characterize the reality being handled
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
9. The realist vision corresponds to the common sense. External
reality and human mind (object and subject) are distinct.
External reality is independent from the human mind.
If I see a tree, that is because:
a) the tree has a real existence, independently from my imagination
b) the image I get from the tree is a faithful copy of the original tree
REALISM
IDEALISM
PHENOMENOLOGY
It was within a realist vision of the world, supported by
the progress of science, that the opposition between
rationalism and empiricism became one of the main
philosophical problems of the 17th century
1.1. ONTOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
10. REALISM
IDEALISM
PHENOMENOLOGY
1.1. ONTOLOGY
The idealist vision believes that everything of which
we have a perception is a product of the human mind
Since people only have access to their perceptions, no one
can say that reality corresponds to one’s own perceptions
Our perceptions can mislead us or distort
reality (we see the Sun going round Earth,
while the contrary is happening)
Our senses are limited and do not give
access to many dimensions of the real
(ultra-violet light is invisible to our eyes)
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
11. REALISM
IDEALISM
PHENOMENOLOGY
1.1. ONTOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
The most radical form of idealism, subjectivism
(George Berkeley), denies the existence of a reality
If we were unable to filter our perceptions of the world, we
would have a chaotic vision disturbed by all sorts of noise
To filter (to abstract) is to select part of the reality,
taking into account our aims, and ignore all the rest
In Kant’s moderate idealism, the real exists but is
presented to us through the mediation of mental categories
To filter is to “make sense” of the reality. The
role of the subject is essential in this process
12. REALISM
IDEALISM
PHENOMENOLOGY
1.1. ONTOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
The phenomenological approach asserts that our perception of
the world, both its tangible and abstract objects (like, e.g., a
mathematical formula), is built in, and by, our conscience
Example: The category “circle” is not a “fact” existing in reality
(no perfect circle exists). However, its not just a product of our
mind. We build the notion of circle form the round objects we see.
Then, we assign to those objects the ideal form we have created
To understand that constitution process we must
ignore what we know about the world and concentrate
on the processes through which knowledge is built
13. REALISM
IDEALISM
PHENOMENOLOGY
1.1. ONTOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
One variation of phenomenology is social constructivism, which
claims that we build our perception of the world by belonging
and relating to social groups: reality is socially constructed
Social constructivism
diverges from the common
idea that reality is given to us
naturally and tries to clarify
the social and historical
roots of the phenomena
Example: The scientists agreed in the past that Pluto
was a planet. In 2006, they agreed that Pluto was not
a planet anymore, so Pluto ceased to be a planet
14. REALISM
IDEALISM
PHENOMENOLOGY
1.1. ONTOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
The scientists who recognize the phenomenological nature
of knowledge, namely its dimension of social construction,
attach particular attention to ontological issues
When they build a model (graphical, mathematical, or of any
other kind), this model is a “world”, a “reality”, that only
makes sense to the restricted communities that share it
The ontological nature of today’s research models is
so implicit in our language that we use the word
“ontology”, an ontology, not to refer to the branch of
philosophy, but to express “the formal explicit
specification of a shared conceptualization”
15. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
EPISTEMOLOGY is also known as the Theory of
Knowledge or Theory of Scientific Knowledge
Etymologically, it means discourse
(logos) about knowledge (epistema)
It is particularly concerned with the distinction
between valid knowledge and common belief
It is also concerned with the correct
methods to obtain valid knowledge
16. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
RATIONALISM
convergence between the two
EMPIRICISM
Three main traditions of epistemology
have developed over the years:
17. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
Rationalism asserts that knowledge can only be
built deductively by the faculties of reason
A priori knowledge exists that
does not need to be justified
by sensory experience
Plato, Descartes, Spinoza and
Leibnitz are frequently associated
to the rationalist tradition
RATIONALISM
EMPIRICISM
convergencebetweenthetwo
Knowledge does not result from the sensory experience
(which is misleading) but from rational processes
Mathematics is a classical
example of a science based on
this kind of reasoning
Absolute truth can be
deduced by reasoning
from axioms
18. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
Descartes established the four general rules of rational thought:
1. Do not accept as true anything that is not known to be true
2. Divide each difficulty into as many parts as possible
and as might be necessary to resolve it better
3. Begin with the simplest objects, and gradually climb
to the knowledge of the most complex, by assuming
the same order, even among those things which do
not naturally come one after the other
4. Make your calculations so complete and your
examinations so general that you would be
confident of not omitting anything
The rationalists maintain that
the valid method to obtain
knowledge is the deductive
method used within mental
constructions (concepts, laws,
theories) that have nothing to
do with the use of the senses
RATIONALISM
EMPIRICISM
convergencebetweenthetwo
19. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
Empiricism claims that knowledge can only be
built inductively, from sensory experience
To the empiricists, no a priori knowledge exists. The
only source of knowledge is sensory experience
The mind is a tabula rasa where
everything can be imprinted
The experimental sciences are the classical example
of sciences based on an empiricist vision
The names of Aristotle, John Locke, David Hume and John
Stuart Mill (and, in the 20th century, Bertrand Russell, Ayer
and Carnap) are frequently associated to this tradition
RATIONALISM
EMPIRICISM
convergencebetweenthetwo
21. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
In the 18th century, Kant tried to reconcile the two traditions,
claiming that knowledge results from the conjugation between
the logic of rationalism and the experience of empiricism
RATIONALISM
EMPIRICISM
convergencebetweenthetwo
To Kant, the human mind is not a mere tabula rasa, but an active
part in the reconstruction of sensory experiences and in the
creation of the concepts that make knowledge possible
In the 19th century, Hegel argued that knowledge begins with a
sensory perception, which becomes more subjective and rational
through the dialectical purification of the senses, to eventually
reach the stage of self-knowledge, the higher form of knowledge
22. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
In the second half of the 19th century, Marx renews the convergence,
proposing an integration of Hegel’s dialectics with a component of
the social sciences, which were just starting to emerge
RATIONALISM
EMPIRICISM
convergencebetweenthetwo
To Marx, perception is a dialectical interaction of mutual
adaptation between the subject (who knows) and the object (to be
known) – the object is transformed during the process
As to the subject, according to Marx, what the empiricists called
“feel” should be understood as “notice”, to express activity –
we notice the objects in the process of acting on them.
Knowledge is obtained by manipulating the things through
action and their truth must be demonstrated in practice
23. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
INDUCTIVISM
DEDUCTIVISM
Two traditional methods for
knowledge acquisition:
24. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
The inductive method departs from a finite number
of particular cases to conclude for any case or to
reach a general conclusion (generalization)
INDUCTIVISM
DEDUCTIVISM
Inductive inferences look plausible quite often, but the
truth of the parts can never guarantee the truth of the
whole, since the whole is often much more than the parts
David Hume argued against the inductive method,
pointing out the paradox of taking as a true the
possibility of concluding from the particular to the
general when that same truth is based on a conclusion
taken, itself, from the particular to the general: one
can not prove induction through induction
The Black Swan Theory. People
believe that no black swans exist, but
no one who consistently observes
millions of white swans, and not a
single black swan, can guarantee that
one is not going to show up one day
25. 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
The hypothetico-deductive method (considered the
“scientific method” par excellence) departs from the
knowledge of a theory, formulates a general hypothesis
within that theory, and than confirms or disproves the
hypothesis through observation and experimentation
INDUCTIVISM
DEDUCTIVISM
In its modern formulation, the hypothetico-deductive
method falls within Karl Popper’s view of the scientific
method, which claims that the repeated confirmation
of a hypothesis only confirms its truth provisionally
We must keep conducting a critical discussion,
systematically trying to disprove it, so that it can only
be said to be true while it is not proved wrong
26. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
3. WHAT IS SCIENCE?
4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
27. THE FOUR QUESTIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is the nature of reality?
What can be known?
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is knowledge?
What knowledge can we get?
3. METHODOLOGICAL QUESTION
How can knowledge be developed?
What methods to build knowledge?
4. AXIOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is the value of knowledge?
What is the ethics of knowledge?
The main streams of the Philosophy of Science
can be described by how they answer the four key
questions of the Philosophy of Science:
29. POSITIVISM
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is the nature of reality?
What can be known?
Answer: realist hypothesis
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is knowledge?
What knowledge can we get?
Answer: deterministic hypothesis
3. METHODOLOGICAL QUESTION
How can knowledge be developed?
What methods to build knowledge?
Answer: analytical modeling / sufficient reason
4. AXIOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is the value of knowledge?
What is the ethics of knowledge?
Answer: value exclusion / extrinsic ethics
30. The realist hypothesis postulates that:
• the reality we may know is independent from us
The realist hypothesis is so ingrained in
occidental scientific culture that it is rarely
seen as requiring any confirmation
1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
POSITIVISM
• It is explainable by immutable laws
• is potentially knowable, in a cumulative manner
• It exists before we try to know it
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
31. POSITIVISM
In Information Science and Technologies, this vision
influences strongly the way we see reality:
• INFORMATION and DATA are realities that
are external and independent from us
• INFORMATION SYSTEMS are tools independent from us
• HUMAN BEINGS have their actions determined by the
natural and technical environments that surround them
• TECHNOLOGY has its own laws, which cannot be changed by men
• ORGANIZATIONS have stable structures and follow universal rules
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
32. POSITIVISM
The determinist hypothesis establishes that
reality is characterized by determinism:
According to Descartes, all realities, even the most complex,
can be decomposed in “long chains of reasons, all simple
and easy”, so that, provided “one always kept to the order
necessary to deduce one thing from another, there would
not be anything so far distant that one could not finally
reach it, nor so hidden that one could not discover it”
• once we know a given reality, we may find out its cause
• the only knowledge we can get results from our
inquiries into the causes of the problems
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
33. POSITIVISM
The determinist (or causalist) hypothesis expresses, not only
the possibility of describing a reality whose existence we
postulate (ontological hypothesis), but also the possibility of
explaining it in a unique and permanent way
This belief has played such an important role in the
progress of science in the last four centuries that it
has become a sine qua non condition for science
Within this perspective, to produce science is to find out
the causes that explain the problems posed to science
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
34. POSITIVISM
Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causes: material
causes, the materials out of which things are made;
formal causes, the statements of essence; efficient
causes, the agents or forces that produce change; and
final causes, or purposes for which things exist
Example: a bronze statue. The material cause is the bronze in which
the statue is cast; a formal cause is the (human) shape leading to the
statue; an efficient cause is the sculptor who makes the statue; a final
cause is the symbolic meaning the statue is made to represent
In positivist science, only efficient causes can produce change
and be taken into account. Final causes are irrelevant
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
35. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
1. Analytical modeling
2. Sufficient reason
POSITIVISM
The principle of analytical modeling, formulated by
Descartes, states that to explain any reality we must
“divide each difficulty (…) into as many parts as
possible and necessary to resolve it better”
A problem of analytical modeling is that by
decomposing reality into parts we lose the
relationships that let us understand the whole
Another problem is that as we concentrate on
the parts we lose the sense of the whole (we
“see the tree but lose sight of the forest”)
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
36. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
1. Analytical modeling
2. Sufficient reason
POSITIVISM
The principle of sufficient reason, formulated by
Leibnitz, holds that there is no effect without a cause
or no change without a reason for change
Besides reaffirming the deterministic hypothesis
of epistemology, this principle establishes a
privileged disciplinary status for deductivism
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
37. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
1. Value exclusion
2. Extrinsic ethics
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
POSITIVISM
The principle of value exclusion establishes that
values have no role to play in knowledge construction
Values are “seen as confounding variables that
cannot be allowed a role in putatively objective
inquiry” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p.114)
In positivist science, the values should be ignored
38. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
1. Value exclusion
2. Extrinsic ethics
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
POSITIVISM
The principle of extrinsic ethics states that
ethics is formally controlled by external
mechanisms, such as professional codes of
conduct and human committees, and should
therefore be excluded from research
In other words, ethics is excluded
from positivist research
The methodology adopted must remove
subjectivity and bias, and that is all that
matters as far as ethics is concerned
39. CONSTRUCTIVISM
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is the nature of reality?
What can be known?
Answer: phenomenological hypothesis
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is knowledge?
What knowledge can we get?
Answer: teleological hypothesis
3. METHODOLOGICAL QUESTION
How can knowledge be developed?
What methods to build knowledge?
Answer: complexity / intelligent action
4. AXIOLOGICAL QUESTION
What is the value of knowledge?
What is the ethics of knowledge?
Answer: value inclusion / intrinsic ethics
40. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
CONSTRUCTIVISM
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
The phenomenological hypothesis states that we know
reality by constructing it through our interactions with the
world, in an emergent process that changes knowledge
and ourselves as we keep interacting with the world
We do not know the things themselves, but the
representations of the interactions they have with us
and our context; we build knowledge through action
The phenomenon we perceive and the knowledge we
build from it are interdependent. From our initial
representation of the phenomenon, we build a new one,
and from it we build another new one, and so on
41. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Hegel, in his phenomenological hypothesis (or
interactionist hypothesis), declared that we only
know the things through their interactions
Bachelard: “nothing is given, all is constructed”
Antonio Machado, in his poem, suggests that
we know by gradually interacting with reality
Caminante, son tu huellas
el camino, y nada mas;
caminante, no hay camino
se hace el camino al andar.
Al andar se hace camino,
y al volver la vista atras
se ve la senda que nunca
se há de volver a pisar.
Caminante, no hay camino,
sino estelas en la mar.
Antonio Machado, Campos de Castilla
"Traveler, your footprints
are the path, and nothing else;
Traveler, there is no path
the path is made as you walk.
As you walk, you make the path,
and when you turn and look back
you see the path before you
that you’ll never travel again.
Traveler, there is no path,
but just foam trails in the sea"
CONSTRUCTIVISM
42. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
The phenomenological hypothesis expresses three
characteristics of knowable experience (or of the real):
1.The irreversibility of cognition. Action implies
temporality. Temporality is irreversible: “No one
can bathe twice in the same river” (Heraclitus).
2.The dialectics of cognition. Knowledge creation
occurs through interactions between organizer and
organized: everything is “caused and causing, helped
and helping, mediate and immediate” (Pascal).
CONSTRUCTIVISM
43. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
3. The recursivity of cognition. The representation
of a knowable phenomena emerges as an
active representation that recursively
transforms the knowledge we have about it
M.C. Escher, Drawing hands M.C. Escher, Three spheres
CONSTRUCTIVISM
44. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
• INFORMATION and DATA allow subjective
interpretations and serve to build reality
• INFORMATION SYSTEMS are eminently social
• HUMAN BEINGS are autonomous and
responsible (e.g.: Theory X vs Theory Y).
• TECHNOLOGY is manageable by men, though,
sometimes, through complex social processes
• ORGANIZATIONS allow reality be built and given sense
In Information Science and Technologies, this vision
influences strongly the way we see reality:
CONSTRUCTIVISM
45. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
This is a natural consequence of the
phenomenological hypothesis and of the role attached
to the subject in the construction of knowledge
By assigning to the subject an essential role in the
construction of knowledge, the phenomenological hypothesis
forces us to take into account his/her intentionality
While the determinist hypothesis of positivism was associated to
Aristotle’s efficient causes, the teleological hypothesis of
constructivism is associated to Aristotle’s final causes
The teleological hypothesis postulates that
knowledge is what gets us to an intended result
CONSTRUCTIVISM
46. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
the intelligence of a cognitive being is often
better activated by the latter than by the former,
namely when no clear causes can be found
To know in terms of plausible ends is at least as reasonable
as to know in terms of probable cause, specially when we
cannot be sure that a phenomenon has a certain cause
Heinz von Foerster reminds us that the answer to the question
“why?” can have two different kinds of answer:
• “because” and
• “in order to”
CONSTRUCTIVISM
It is often better to design a computer system “in order to” obtain some
intended change than to design it “because” a problem exits
47. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
1. Complexity
2. Intelligent action
CONSTRUCTIVISM
The principle of complexity states that to build knowledge
we must see the world as complex and in constant flux,
characterized by both stability and change, the whole
being more than the sum of the parts, chaos coupled with
order, and parts interacting with each other in an
emergent and often unpredictable fashion often supported
by processes of self-organization and co-creation
The study of organizational complexity is
grounded in Complexity Sciences, Psychology and
Sociology, and tries to make sense of a large range
of theories about human organizations
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
48. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
1. Complexity
2. Intelligent action
CONSTRUCTIVISM
The principle of intelligent action establishes that human
reason can, in a reproducing way, elaborate and transform
intelligible representations of the phenomena of dissonance
to which it is confronted, creating responses in the form of
“intelligent actions” adapted to reduce these dissonances
Inspired by John Dewey’s concept of “intelligent
action”, this principle finds one of its more suggestive
expressions in the work of Donald Schön on
“reflective action” and “reflection-in-action”
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
In reflective action work progresses through a trajectory of trial and error, of
reformulating problems as they are solved, in a permanent dialogue
between the problem solver and the problematic situation being solved
49. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
1. Value inclusion
2. Extrinsic ethics
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
CONSTRUCTIVISM
The principle of value inclusion asserts that
values have an essential role to play in any
emergent process of knowledge construction
This is in agreement with the phenomenological
hypothesis. If the role of the subject as orchestrator
and facilitator disregarded values, it would risk
letting down the interests of the weaker audiences
50. 1. ONTOLOGICAL
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL
3. METHODOLOGICAL
4. AXIOLOGICAL
1. Value exclusion
2. Intrinsic ethics
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
CONSTRUCTIVISM
The principle of intrinsic ethics states that ethical
behavior is constructed by each researcher in the
persistent search for the common good
As maintained by Varela (1992), the ethics of
phenomenology is much closer to the oriental
traditions of wisdom, in their inner pursuit of
the common good, than to the occidental
traditions of obedience to external norms
51. QUESTIONS
ANSWERS
POSITIVISM CONSTRUCTIVISM
ontological question
what can be known?
realist hypothesis
we can know reality, which is external to us,
independent from us, and driven by immutable laws
phenomenological hypothesis
we know the world by interacting with it in an emergent
process that changes knowledge as we keep interacting
epistemological question
what is knowledge?
deterministic hypothesis
knowledge is what we learn by exploring
the causes of the problems we face
teleological hypothesis
knowledge is what gets us to an intended result
methodological question
how can knowledge be built?
principle of analytical modeling
to explain reality we must divide each difficulty into
as many parts as possible and necessary to resolve it better
principle of complexity
we build knowledge by recognizing the world as complex
and in constant flux, embodying stability, change, chaos,
and order, the whole exceeding the sum of parts and the
parts interacting in the shared, emergent and largely
unpredictable construction of reality
principle of sufficient reason
there is no effect without a cause and no
change without a reason for change
principle of intelligent action
human reason can transform intelligible representations
of the dissonances to which it is confronted by creating
responses in the form of “intelligent actions” adapted to
reduce these dissonances
axiological question
what is the value of
knowledge?
principle of value exclusion
values have no role
to play in knowledge construction
principle of value inclusion
values have an essential role to play in the emergent
process of knowledge construction
principle of extrinsic ethics
ethical behavior is formally policed by external mechanisms
principle of intrinsic ethics
ethical behavior is constructed by each researcher in the
persistent search for the collective good
2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
52. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
INTERPRETIVISM
Interpretivism satisfies all the tenets of constructivism, as described
earlier, with the sole exception that it answers to the epistemological
question with the hermeneutical hypothesis: knowledge is what
we learn by following continuous circles of interpretation of the
actions of human beings and of the products of those actions
The hermeneutical hypothesis is inspired in the traditions
of interpreting the biblical texts by continuously going
over them in search of increased meaning
In the hermeneutical hypothesis, the search for meaning is applied
to the human actions, which the interpretivists, such as Dilthey,
classify as categorically different from natural phenomena
53. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
CRITICAL THEORY
Critical Theory believes that research should be
conducted for the emancipation of individuals
and groups in an egalitarian society
In this way, the aims of research should be to change
reality (or human behavior), rather than merely
understanding reality (or human behavior)
From the ontological point o view, reality is socially
constructed through media, institutions and society
Reality tends to be an outcome of illegitimate and
oppressive factors, so the role of research is to act
in order to denounce and overcome these factors
54. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
CRITICAL THEORY
From the epistemological point of view, critical
theory sees knowledge as socially constructed
through media, institutions and society
What counts as worthwhile knowledge is often
determined by the social and positional power of the
advocates of that knowledge. Knowledge is produced by
power and is an expression of power, rather than truth
From the methodological point of view, critical
theory believes that knowledge must be build
though ideological combat and critically
denouncing illegitimacy and oppression
55. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
CRITICAL THEORY
From the axiological point of view, critical theory (just as constructivism
and interpretivism) claims that research is not value free
However, it takes a stronger stance, maintaining that
research should actively challenge interpretations
and values in order to bring about change
In this sense, some accuse critical theory of transforming
the search for knowledge into a political agenda
whilst others argue that politics and inquiry are
inseparable and that an agenda of reform can transform
the lives of all the participants for the better
56. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
3. WHAT IS SCIENCE?
4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
57. 3. WHAT IS SCIENCE?
Every scientist must be able to prove that the
knowledge he/she produces is scientifically valid
How can we distinguish between scientific and
non-scientific knowledge? How can we
distinguish a science from a pseudo-science?
Karl Popper, a prominent 20th century philosopher,
claims that what distinguishes a science from a
pseudo-science is the acceptance of falsification
58. 3. WHAT IS SCIENCE?
To say that a theory is falsifiable (refutable) does not mean
that it is wrong, but that it is open to the experimental
confirmation of the legitimacy of its statements
As long as the statements of a theory are not falsified, the
theory is said to be valid. When its statements are falsified
through experimentation, the theory ceases to be valid
Popper claimed that Psychoanalysis and the Theory of
Historical Marxism were pseudo-sciences because, whatever
the phenomenon they wanted to explain they had always an
explanatory theory for it. The same applies to Astrology
59. 3. WHAT IS SCIENCE?
Whatever the tests that are done to confirm the legitimacy
of their theories, the answer is always that the theories are
right. So, in the case where some of their theories were
wrong, there would be no way of proving them wrong
The principle of validity proposed by Popper is that a
theory is valid while it is falsifiable and not falsified
As a corollary, the task of a scientist in confirming the
validity of a theory is not to prove that it is right but to try to
prove that it is wrong. As long as the attempts to prove the
theory wrong are unsuccessful, the theory is said to be valid
60. 2. STREAMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
3. WHAT IS SCIENCE?
4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
61. 4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
Thomas Kuhn, a prominent historian of science, radically
changed the traditional notion of scientific progress
The traditional notion was that science progressed
continuously through consecutive improvements
introduced by successive scientists over the years
In his main book, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962), he claimed that the major
progresses of science do not result from mechanisms
of continuity, but from mechanisms of rupture
62. 4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
When a science evolves continuously, it is
going through a phase of its development
that defines it as a Normal Science
During this phase, the world in which the
science applies is seen through the same
perspective by all its practitioners
Everyone shares the same vision
63. 4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
Until the 16th century, both scientists and common citizens firmly believed in
the geocentric paradigm, which put the Sun and other celestial bodies turning
around the Earth. All the mathematical calculations of the time, based on
available means of observation, confirmed the correctness of the paradigm.
However, throughout the 15th century, scientists trying alternative approaches
to the calculations began to identify contradictions suggesting that the paradigm
was wrong. In spite of strong social rejection and accusations of heresy, they
gradually ventured into defending the alternative heliocentric paradigm, which,
following the 16th century, progressively became universally accepted
64. 4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
At a given moment, some of its practitioners start to
identify internal contradictions and gradually begin
to feel that the worldview of that science is not
adequate anymore. They start to claim that the world
should be looked through a different perspective
Kuhn called paradigms the different ways of seeing the
world. When someone finds a new paradigm on which it
is possible to base the development of a science, and
this paradigm starts to gain acceptance, the science is
said to be, in this period, a Revolutionary Science
65. 4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
According to Kuhn, a science evolves through
alternate phases of normal science and revolutionary
science, and the revolutionary ruptures represent the
most important phases in the progress of the science
Any science that has already established its core
paradigms is considered by Kuhn a normal science
Since it grows in full agreement with unifying
paradigms, it tends to develop incrementally
by routinely solving its emergent problems
66. 4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
Kuhn argued that a normal science does
little more than solve its own “puzzles”
For Kuhn, major progress only occurs in a
science when its own paradigms are
challenged or replaced by new paradigms
A science going through the process of
breaking with its ruling paradigms and adopting
new ones is said to be a revolutionary science
67. 4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
The concept of paradigm became very
popular following Kuhn’s proposals and it
means, today, a way of seeing the world
The concept of paradigm is very helpful to
understand, not just the progress of
science, but the whole of social life
68. 5. REFERENCES
Figueiredo, A. D. & Cunha, P. R. (2007). Action Research and Design in Information
Systems: Two Faces of a Single Coin. Ned Kock (Ed.), Information Systems Action
Research: An Applied View of Emerging Concepts and Methods (pp. 61-96), Springer
[suggestion: read section 4 of this chapter]
NOTE – This is CHAPTER 1 - Philosophy of Science of my course on QUALITATIVE RESEARCH.
The remaining chapters are: CHAPTER 2 - Qualitative Research Design; CHAPTER 3 - Qualitative
Research Approaches; CHAPTER 4 - Qualitative Research Process; CHAPTER 5 - Computer
Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis; CHAPTER 6 - Mixed-methods Research
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225919951_A
ction_Research_and_Design_in_Information_Systems