DISSERTATION COMPLETE

UNDERSTANDING AL QAEDA’S TENTACLES
OF TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
GLOBAL PEACE AND STABILITY

AERSH DANISH
Department of Geopolitics and International Relations
Manipal University
Manipal
April 2015

Manipal University
Department of Geopolitics and International Relations
UNDERSTANDING AL QAEDA’S TENTACLES
OF TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
GLOBAL PEACE AND STABILITY
A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Geopolitics and
International Relations in Partial Fulfilment for Master’s Degree in
Geopolitics and International Relations
Supervisor
DR. RAVINDRANATHAN P.
By
AERSH DANISH
April 2015

II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The study would not have been possible without the help and support of numerous
individuals who have directly or indirectly contributed to my research since its
initiation to its completion.
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Ravindranathan P.
and my co-guide Dr. Praveen Kumar for their constant guidance and assistance,
without which this study would have been impossible. I would also like to express my
heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Arvind Kumar, Professor and Head, Department of
Geopolitics and International Relations, for his continued optimism and help at every
stage of this study. Also, I am grateful to Dr. Monish Tourangbam for being the
inspiration that he was when I was emotionally and physically exhausted. I am also
indebted to Dr. Nanda Kishor for providing various reference materials. My sincerest
gratitude to Air Marshal (retd.) Vinod Patney, Director General, Centre for Air Power
Studies (CAPS), New Delhi for his valuable inputs on the study. Also, I would like to
thank the entire staff and faculty of CAPS for all the help that they provided in the
course of this study.
And, finally but not in the least, I am ever so grateful to my parents and my friends
for standing by me and bearing with me at my worst, while this study was being
conducted. It would be ungrateful of me if I did not acknowledge my roommates for
all the help they provided during the course of this study. This study has been a
humbling experience, which has taught me that in order to rise up, one must learn to
bend down. I hope that this modest attempt adds an iota of knowledge to the vast
study of terrorism and counterterrorism.

III
ABBREVIATIONS
AHIF Al Hamrain International Foundation
AIAI Al Ittihad al Islamiya
AKT Al Akhtar Trust
AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQC Al Qaeda Core
AQI Al Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ART Al Rashid Trust
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CTC Counter-Terrorism Centre
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FTO Foreign Terrorist Organisation
GIA Islamic Group of Algeria
GICM Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
GIL Global Islamic League
GTD Global Terrorism Database
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
HM Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
HuA Harkar-ul-Ansar
HuJI Harkat-ul-Jihadi al Islami
HuM Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
IIPB Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade
IIRO Islamic International Relief Organisation
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IS Islamic State
ISI Inter Services Intelligence
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State
of Iraq and al Sham
J&K Jammu and Kashmir
JeM Jaish-e-Mohammad
JI Jemmah Islamiyah
JKLF Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
LeT Lashkar-e-Toiba
LoC Line of Control
MAK Maktab al Khidamat
MIRA Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
POTA Prevention of Terrorism Act
PULF People’s United Liberation Front
SJ Salafiya Jihadia
SPIR Special Purpose Islamic Regiment

IV
START National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(University of Maryland)
UJC United Jihadi Council
ULFA United Liberation Front of Asom
UN United Nations
US United States
USA United States of America
WTC World Trade Centre

V
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents Page
Declaration.................................................................................................................... I
Acknowledgement .......................................................................................................II
Abbreviations........................................................................................................III-IV
Table of Contents..................................................................................................V-VII
List of Tables/Figures ..............................................................................................VIII
Abstract..................................................................................................................IX-X
CHAPTER – 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 1-7
1.1 Background ............................................................................................... 2-3
1.2 Objectives of the Study ............................................................................. 3-4
1.3 Significance of the Study ..............................................................................4
1.4 Relevance and Importance of the Study.................................................... 4-5
1.5 Methodology .................................................................................................5
1.6 Analytical Framework............................................................................... 5-7
CHAPTER – 2 TERRORISM AND EVOLUTION OF TERRORIST
NETWORKS .......................................................................................................... 8-31
2.1 Evolution of Terrorism............................................................................ 9-11
2.2 Defining Terrorism................................................................................ 12-20
2.3 Understanding Transnational Terrorism................................................ 21-23
2.4 Why do Terrorist Organisations form Networks?................................. 24-26
2.5 Structure of a Terrorist Network ........................................................... 26-31
CHAPTER – 3 ORIGIN AND THE RISE OF AL QAEDA AND ITS
NETWORK........................................................................................................... 32-50
3.1 Al Qaeda – An Overview ...................................................................... 33-36
3.2 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Emergence of the
Mujahideen.................................................................................................. 36-40
3.3 Origin and Rise of Al Qaeda ................................................................. 40-44
3.4 Structuring the Terrorist Network of Al Qaeda..................................... 44-50
CHAPTER – 4 PROLIFERATION OF AL QAEDA’S INFLUENCE
IN BUILDING ITS NETWORK.......................................................................... 51-75
4.1 Al Qaeda – The Global Network.................................................................52

VI
4.2 Al Qaeda’s Terrorist Network in South Asia ........................................ 52-63
4.2.1 Lashkar-e-Toiba........................................................................ 53-55
4.2.2 Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami ............................................................. 56-57
4.2.3 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen............................................................... 57-58
4.2.4 Jaish-e-Mohammad................................................................... 59-60
4.2.5 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.................................................................. 61-62
4.2.6 Al Rashid Trust...............................................................................62
4.2.7 Al Akhtar Trust...............................................................................63
4.3 Al Qaeda’s Terrorist Network in Caucasus and Central Asia............... 63-66
4.3.1 Caucasus Emirates .................................................................... 64-65
4.3.2 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ............................................. 65-66
4.4 Al Qaeda’s Terrorist Network in North and East Africa....................... 66-69
4.4.1 The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group and Salafiya
Jihadia ................................................................................................ 67-68
4.4.2 Al Ittihad al Islamiya ................................................................ 68-69
4.5 Al Qaeda’s Terrorist Network in Jordan, Iraq and Surrounding
Regions........................................................................................................ 70-73
4.5.1 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula........................................... 70-71
4.5.2 The al Zarqawi Network and al Qaeda in Iraq.......................... 72-73
4.6 Al Qaeda’s Terrorist Network in Southeast Asia.................................. 73-75
4.6.1 Jemaah Islamiyah...................................................................... 73-74
4.6.2 Abu Sayyaf Group .................................................................... 74-75
CHAPTER 5 – SUSTENANCE OF TERRORIST NETWORK AND
THE FLOW AND TRANSFER OF RESOURCES............................................. 76-91
5.1 Sustenance – An Overview .........................................................................77
5.2 Understanding Recruitment Process and Expansion of Network.......... 78-80
5.3 Generation and Transfer of Resources .................................................. 80-91
5.3.1 The Need for Funding – Why are the Funds Needed?.............. 82-86
5.3.1.1 Direct Operational Costs .............................................. 83-84
5.3.1.2 Broad Organisational Requirements............................. 84-86
5.3.2 Raising Terrorist Funds – How are the Fund Obtained? .......... 86-89
5.3.3 Moving Terrorist Funds – How Funds are Transferred? .......... 89-91
CHAPTER 6 – EMERGING GEOPOLITICAL MILIEU AND
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON TERRORISM.......................................... 92-114
6.1 The Contemporary Scenario.................................................................. 93-94
6.2 Al Qaeda’s Phenomenal Rise – Organisation to Ideology.................... 94-95
6.3 The Global War of Terrorism (GWOT)................................................ 96-99
6.3.1 Defeat Terrorist and Their Organisation.........................................97
6.3.2 Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary.............................. 97-98
6.3.3 Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists seek
to Exploit..................................................................................................98
6.3.4 Defend US Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad........... 98-99
6.4 The GWOT – A Theoretical Analysis................................................. 99-101
6.5 Impact of the GWOT......................................................................... 101-103
6.6 The Development of ISIS.................................................................. 103-105

VII
6.7 Implications of the Rise of ISIS ........................................................ 106-109
6.8 Al Qaeda – An End?.......................................................................... 109-111
6.9 IS and Al Qaeda – Growing Rivalry in South Asia........................... 112-114
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 115-120
References...............................................................................................................i-viii

VIII
LIST OF FIGURES/TABLE
Figure Page
Figure 2.1 Hierarchical Structure of Al Qaeda Prior to 9/11.............................28
Figure 2.2 Chain Network..................................................................................29
Figure 2.3 Wheel or Hub and Spoke Network...................................................29
Figure 2.4 All Channel Network........................................................................30
Figure 3.1 Diagrammatic Representation of Al Qaeda’s Global
Network.............................................................................................46
Table
Table 5.1 Estimated Cost of Various Terror Attacks Caused by Al Qaeda.......83

IX
ABSTRACT
The study, “Understanding Al Qaeda’s Tentacles of Terrorism: Implications for
Global Peace and Stability” is a modest attempt to understand the concept of network
formation among terrorist groups, taking al Qaeda as the case in point. Terrorism has
always been associated with demands for systemic changes – be it a left wing
revolutionary or a religious extremist. However, what differentiates contemporary
terrorism from the previous seen forms of terror is the idea of networking among the
various terrorist groups.
The new face of terrorism came to light with the 11 September 2001 attacks, which
was the grand revelation of al Qaeda’s capabilities. The scale of the attack provided al
Qaeda with instant recognition. Since its inception during the Soviet Invasion, al
Qaeda’s leader Osama Bin Laden had sought to create a global network to fund his
group. This attack gave him and his organisation the chance to declare its ideology of
a global Islamist Caliphate governed by Sharia. It also used this opportunity to reach
out to other terrorist outfits that were operating regionally and al Qaeda sought to
organise them under a single umbrella. This resulted in the formation of an intricate
network connecting various terrorist groups to each other with al Qaeda at the helm of
the network. Owing to its superior capabilities and resources, it was able to control
and coordinate the activities of the different terrorist outfits all over the world. This
allowed al Qaeda to execute as well as take responsibility of attacks conducted all
over the world, making it a serious threat to global security environment.
Exploiting the regional socio-political scenario, al Qaeda was able to expand its
network extensively covering South, Central, West and South East Asia and North
and East Africa. The growth of this network is a reflection of the spread of extremist
ideology in the world, making al Qaeda synonymous with the concept of Islamist
Terrorism. Various terrorist groups pledged their allegiances to al Qaeda not just on
ideological similarities, but also because aligning with a more powerful group gave
them moral support and access to better resources and training. Regional groups could
also use this global platform to project their causes at an international level, as was
seen in case of groups fighting in Kashmir and Chechnya while al Qaeda got access to

X
the local manpower and resources. The networking allowed terrorist groups to pool
their capabilities by allowing sharing of resources, manpower and knowledge, which
resulted in execution of well planned and coordinated attacks, which became a major
concern for global security and stability.
In order to sustain such a vast network, al Qaeda used a combination of various legal
and illegal activities to generate funds and transfer money and equipment within its
network. Organised crime, drugs and weapon smuggling and collection of funds from
donors helped achieve the financing of terrorism. The study of terror financing
exposes a nexus between terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and criminals and
smugglers all across the world, further aggravating the threat that emerges out of
terrorism.
However, the growing capabilities of al Qaeda drew severe responses from a number
of nation states, with retaliation seen in terms of the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
and political efforts seen at the United Nations. The biggest success of GWOT was
the killing of Osama Bin Laden. His death drew several observations from scholars all
over the world who were now debating if al Qaeda would be able to remain at the
helm of international terrorism. The formation of the Islamic State (IS), which grew
out of Al Qaeda’s network further raised questions regarding al Qaeda’s hold over its
affiliates. The contemporary global scenario is marked with the rise of IS reflecting a
new dimension of terrorism. With extreme brutality and indiscriminate violence, IS
has become a major threat to the global peace and stability. Its rise has also created
internal turmoil within al Qaeda’s network with terrorist groups changing allegiances
to IS and defecting from al Qaeda’s camps. This has led to an emerging rivalry
between the two groups, which is again a major challenge to the security and policy
framers all over the world.

2
INTRODUCTION
1. 1 Background
Terrorism is as phenomenon has been existent since the time humankind has organised
themselves into societies. However, the question of what constituted an act of terror has changed
drastically over the years. From the movements for self-determination to left-wing extremism, to
the more contemporary religious extremism, the nature of terrorism has shown numerous
transformations. Before Cold War, terrorism was a threat that usually limited to individual states.
This pattern of terrorism sought to replace the existing political set-up within that state with a
new one, as in the case of the French Revolution and also in the case of al Qaeda, which seek to
create and Islamic Caliphate. However, Cold War led to the development of a religiously driven
movement, which was created by the Americans to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. But, with
the end of Cold War, the political drive behind this movement was transformed from fighting the
Communist rule to establishing an Islamist rule in the world. This led to the development of the
contemporary terrorism, of which al Qaeda became the flag bearer.
There seems to be a dominant view among the members of the academic and strategic
community that terrorism today is no longer a threat posed only to some states. Instead, it has
become a global menace. Terrorist organisations today, operate in tandem with each other,
forming linkages and alliances, which are not just a result of convergence of ideologies but that
of pragmatic requirements. The interlinkages of the terrorist groups among themselves forms an
arrangement, which is held together by the flow of information and resources that increasingly
facilitates the planning and execution of terror attacks. The degree and dimension at which the
tentacles of terrorist organisations have grown over the years reflect the growing concerns of
peace and stability across the spectrum.
The contemporary world security environment is plagued by a number terrorist organizations
including al Qaeda, which have been intricately connected to each other, with al Qaeda at the
apex. Thus al Qaeda is able to influence and control moves of the other terrorist groups resulting
in the formation of a social network. This complex creation has transformed and developed

3
ideologies that have helped in the growth of extremist forces in the society. The network also
arranges for the flow of resources such as finance and weapons, sharing of information, training
and exchange of personnel, provision of safe haven and moral support.
The 11 September 2001 incident in the United States raised the debates and discussions about the
potential of the various terrorist networks and their intent and fundamental goals. The impact of
mushrooming of terrorist groups under the al Qaeda banner over the years needs to be assessed
and analysed for better understanding and clarity. Undisputedly, the creation of this network led
by al Qaeda is a matter of concern for the global peace and stability
Under this background, an attempt would be made to assess and analyse the challenges
emanating form terrorist groups and their networks. The overall manoeuvring of the various
terrorist groups largely managed by al Qaeda and its evolving networks and how al Qaeda has
been able to build the network will remain a part of the deliberations.
1.2 Objectives of the Study
The objectives of the study would be the following:
• To analyse the contemporary world security environment;
• To analyse and examine the concept of network of terrorist groups;
• To analyse the nexus between al Qaeda and its affiliates;
• To assess the challenges emanating from al Qaeda and the effect of its nexus with the
other terrorist groups and its implications for peace and stability;
• To study the manner in which the growing nexus leads to propagation of the extremist
ideology;
• To examine the mechanism by which flow of information and resources take place in
terrorist networks;
• To asses and analyse the evolving patterns of terrorist financing and its implications;
• To critically assess the threat to al Qaeda’s network vis-a-vis the rise of the Islamic State
(IS); and

4
• To assess the foreseeable future on the basis of the emerging security challenges from the
terrorist networks.
1.3 Significance of the Study
The study of the network of al Qaeda is significant because a comprehensive assessment will
help in understanding the manner in which terrorist networks operate. Al Qaeda has the largest
terrorist network in the world and an understanding of its various contours is critical to
comprehend the complexities of terrorist networks, such as to understand how the flow of
resources and information takes place within the network. Also, a critical analysis of terrorist
networks is essential to understand the growth and spread of the extremist ideology in the
society. These understandings will further provide for an explanation on the larger issues relating
to global peace and stability.
The study will also be significant to understand the salience of al Qaeda and its inter-
connectedness with the number of regional terrorist organizations. A critical assessment of al
Qaeda’s network can be used to study the networks of other terrorist groups. This has become
important with the rise of the Islamic State, whose evolution seems to be challenging al Qaeda’s
network.
A thorough and critical analysis is also essential from a policy point of view, because it would
help in formulation of counter-terrorism mechanisms.
1.4 Relevance and Importance of the Study
In the emerging global environment, the biggest fear for a state does not emanate from another
state, but from non-state actors such as terrorist organisations. Terrorism today has become the
biggest concern for global peace and security. The existence of the transnational nature of the
modern terrorist groups further increases the threat originating from these terrorist groups. It is in
this context that a study concerning a transnational terrorist organisation such as al Qaeda
becomes important.

5
Al Qaeda is one of the deadliest terrorist groups that the world has ever witnessed. Today, it does
not just act singularly. Instead, it coordinates the activity of the various other regional terrorist
groups in the world. This complex network further increases the threat to the contemporary
socio-political environment. Thus it becomes essential to study the nexus between al Qaeda and
the various other terrorist groups. This nexus is what poses the biggest matter of concern to the
world and an insightful study of this network will help in the formulation of policies in
combating terrorism.
1.5 Methodology
The methodology used in the research has been largely deductive and analytical. A number of
primary and secondary sources have been used in the study. Statistical data from various
databases, maintained by the South Asian Terrorism Portal, University of Stanford and
University of Maryland have been utilised to gather data on the activities of the various terrorist
groups all over the world. The study involved a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data
gathered from the databases and the various primary and secondary sources. Inferences
concerning the evolution of terrorist groups and the formation of the network were drawn based
on the analysis of the data.
1.5 Analytical Framework
The introductory chapter sets the background about the theme of the study. It attempts to explain
why the study of the structure of the network that exists between terrorist groups and al Qaeda is
important. The chapter also makes an attempt to study the relevance of this network in the
contemporary context, where terrorism is biggest threat to nation states as well as the
international system, setting the tone for the subsequent of the thesis to follow.
The second chapter, “Terrorism and Evolution of Terrorist Networks” explains the development
of contemporary terrorism, tracing its development from revolutionary movements to its
transformation into the fear-generating religious extremist movement – namely al Qaeda and its

6
affiliates. The rise of transitional terrorism, generated debates over who is a terrorist and what
constitutes terrorism etc. The chapter tries to bring the contemporary debates, with the analysis
of the most accepted definitions of terrorism. The modern nature of terrorism is characterised by
various terrorist outfits working together in tandem to form a live network. The chapter will look
into the concept of alliance between terrorist groups – as to why they cooperate and how
effective are these cooperation? A generic study of designs of networks has also been included to
generate the detailed understanding of al Qaeda’s network, which has been then been analysed in
the subsequent chapters.
The third chapter, “Origin and Rise of Al Qaeda and its Network” looks into the origin of al
Qaeda by providing some background information on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979. This invasion led to the emergence and rise of the Mujahideen with the help of the
American and the Pakistani Governments, which marked the birth of several outfits including al
Qaeda. The chapter provides a historical and socio-political analysis behind the inception of al
Qaeda and its rise as one of the most feared terrorist groups with the culmination of the 9/11
attacks. The chapter looks closely into the process of formation of al Qaeda’s global network and
its design and hierarchy. The chapter also explains the various relationships, which al Qaeda
enjoys with other terrorist organisations.
After establishing al Qaeda’s network design in the previous chapter, the fourth chapter
“Proliferation of al Qaeda’s Influence in Building its Network” looks at the nexus between the
central al Qaeda leadership core and its various affiliates all over the world. In this context, it
would study the various terrorist groups operating in South Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia, and
North and East Africa. The chapter looks at how al Qaeda was able to establish its bases in these
regions, while explain the links between the regional groups and al Qaeda core leadership with
the help of key leaders and their personal ties.
The fifth chapter “Sustenance of Terrorist Networks and the Flow and Transfer of Resources”
focuses on how terrorist networks sustain themselves. Sustenance for terrorist networks is based
on two components – personnel and finance. The chapter looks at how al Qaeda sought to recruit
more people to replace the members who were killed, caught by security forces and deserted the

7
movement. The other component of sustenance, finance is discussed under three aspects: why
funds are funds required? How these funds are obtained? And how the funds are transferred
within the network?
The sixth chapter “Emerging Geopolitical Milieu and Contemporary Debates on Terrorism”
deals with the changing dynamics of terrorism. Two major developments that have been seen
since the rise of al Qaeda i.e. – the launch of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) by America and
its subsequent impacts on Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The chapter delineates the matrix of
power tussle between the al Qaeda’s core leadership and its major affiliate al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI), the fallout between them, and the eventual formation of the Islamic State (IS). The
chapter looks at the impacts of both, GWOT and its impacts and the rise of IS and its subsequent
bearings.
The concluding chapter discusses the future trajectory of international terrorism, namely
analysing the two contemporary scenarios – the rise of the IS and the future probability of the
turf war and the major question of whether al Qaeda is now on the verge of its end. The chapter
also draws conclusions on all its preceding chapters, attempting to answer the research objectives
of the study. The major findings of the research has also be discussed with some suggestions that
can be taken into consideration while formulating counterterrorism strategies

8
CHAPTER TWO
TERRORISM AND EVOLUTION OF
TERRORIST NETWORKS

9
TERRORISM AND EVOLUTION OF TERRORIST NETWORKS
2.1 Evolution of Terrorism
The term terrorism first appeared into popular use during the French Revolution in the 18th
century. Since then, until the mid-twentieth century, the term was constantly used with activities
of revolutionary connotation. In fact, the concept of terrorism in French Revolution shared two
key characteristics in common with its modern-day variant. First was the idea of using fear as a
political tool. The fear factor was generated by targeted assassinations and not by indiscriminate
killing that is prevalent today. Second, its goal its justification, like that of contemporary
terrorism, was the creation of a “new and better society” in place of the existing system, which
the “terrorists” believed to be fundamentally corrupt. This revolutionary connotation remained
through the end of First World War, where the term was now used to describe state regimes that
used force and violence to establish its rule – namely autocratic regimes of Nazi Germany and
Stalinist Soviet Republic. With the end of the Second World War, and the advent of Cold War,
the term was reshaped by the West to look at the Communist Bloc. With the end of Cold War,
“terrorism” was revisited as a concept due to the rise of Islamist Terrorist groups.
Terrorism, as a phenomenon, throughout history has been viewed in relation to three principle:
ideology, violence emerging from the action, and the threat emerges from the violence. The state
has always maintained its control on the legitimate use of force, and considered the use of
violence by any other entity counted as a threat against the state. This has been fairly constant
throughout history, except at times when states were viewed as sources of terror. This was
visible during the Second World War in the case of Nazi Germany and in the case of USSR
during the Cold War.
Post Cold War period witnessed a major change in the ideology behind terrorism; from being a
revolutionary movement as in cases of French Revolution to a political grounding in case of
Communism and cold war to o an ideology based on religious extremism as is seen in case of
contemporary terrorism. But even then, terrorist groups, irrespective of ideology, have usually

10
operated singularly. It wasn’t until the rise of al Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks that networking
among terrorist groups began to be observed. This evolution of this concept of networking has
been explained in the subsequent chapters.
Terrorist organisations today, operate in tandem with each other, by forming linkages and
alliances. These are not always based on convergence of ideologies but on the basis of pragmatic
requirements. The connections of the terrorist groups to one another forms an arrangement that is
held together by the flow of information and resources that increasingly facilitates the planning
and execution of terror attacks. These connections form a network that spans the entire world.
The tentacles of terrorism grasp every state today and all nations have been its victim in some
way or the other, making it a transnational phenomenon. Transnational terrorism has developed
into a global adversary, which operates its forces all over the map coordinating its move from
one point while the execution occurs at another. This is not facilitated by a single organisation,
but with many groups working in tandem with each other, collaborating their strategies and
attacks.
The collaboration of terrorist groups is a new phenomenon, which evolved along with the rise of
al Qaeda. Although al Qaeda was formed in the early 1980s, it rose to sudden prominence
through the infamous 9/11 attacks. The well-coordinated attack on the World Trade Centre
provided them an impressive acceptance among the terrorist organisations. This opportunity
allowed them to create such a network with other similar minded groups, and also in influencing
their functions in some way or the other. The 9/11 attacks were successful in projecting a global
voice to its cause and extending its reach out to the other like-minded groups. By orchestrating
an attack of this grandeur, it was able to demonstrate its own power and convince other terrorist
groups by revealing its superior capabilities.
The limitations of means is a major problem for these local groups have always faced, and that
forced them to seek alliances with much more capable groups like al Qaeda. Collaborating
themselves with stronger groups such as al Qaeda, provides not only moral support, but also
ensures availability of greater resources. In return al Qaeda is able to expand and exercise its
dominance and control over a wider geographical space. This provides al Qaeda an access to

11
local workforce and regional resources, mainly in the form of information and funds generated at
regional level. Thus, the alliance provides benefits for both sides, thus making it very symbiotic.
There is also a certain hierarchy in the network, as al Qaeda is always in a position to dictate
over the other groups because of its wide spread capabilities and global leadership. This is the
emerging characteristic of the contemporary terrorist network.
Such networks operate at various levels by providing a hierarchical structure, which ensures a
flow of command. The complex nature of the network includes various elements such as terrorist
groups, some charity organisations and certain transnational bodies. So, the shadows of charity
groups and multinational organisations allows terrorists groups easily procure and transfer funds
and resources to execute attacks. This togetherness creates a complex mechanism to orchestrate
an attack with maximum efficiency, which poses a serious threat to global security.
Combatting terrorist networks requires a thorough understanding of such networks, which
includes the awareness about the development of the contemporary transnational terrorism, and
why and how terrorist groups ally to form networks.
This chapter will make an attempt to study and explain how the alliances are formed and how
they overcome of practical necessities and not just ideological compatibilities. This chapter will
study these networks, with an understanding of ways to combat the networks, which becomes an
essential component of combatting terrorism. The transnational nature of these threats cannot be
managed by a single state. Instead, it requires a cooperation of among nations to ensure that the
menace is contained. However, achieving cooperation among the states appears as a major
challenge because, states haven’t been able to reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism
itself. When states are not able to agree on the nature of the threat the formulation of a counter-
terrorism policy becomes difficult.

12
2.2 Defining Terrorism
The idea and the perception of terrorism have changed drastically from the world war period to
the time prior to 9/11. The 9/11 attacks revealed a new phase of terrorism, which once again
compelled nations to review what they perceived as terrorism. As a result the legal definition of a
terrorist and what constitutes an act of terrorism has also changed drastically, especially with
respect to the 9/11 attacks where al Qaeda revealed a new dimension of terror altogether.
Definition is the key step to flag off the discussions on any pertaining matter. The first step
towards combatting terrorism is to understand it, and definitions form the basis of such
understanding. However, agreeing to a definition has also been a major hurdle in the process of
studying terrorism. Historically, the evolution of terrorism has moved from state-driven
phenomenon a fight for self-determination or freedom, to a more anti-state driven concept, which
still remained majorly state focussed.1
And hence ideas to combat terrorism have also changed
accordingly.
The debates to define international terrorism started in early 1930s and various initiatives were
taken by states as well as international bodies such as the League of Nations to define what
constitutes an act of terrorism. However, then the focus was more on terrorist activities
originating in one state and targeting another. One of the oldest anti-terrorism precedents is the
1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. This
convention, was signed by twenty-four states (mostly European states), but never came into
force. The convention was a direct response to the assassination of King Alexander I of
Yugoslavia and the President of the Council of the French Republic, Louis Barthou, in
Marseilles in 1934 by Yugoslavian nationals who allegedly were harboured by Hungary. This
convention was mostly concerned with the repression of those acts that had occasioned it and
was primarily aimed at the protection of heads of state and other public figures. According to the
international law expert, John Dugard, “the drafters were clearly acting within their terms of
reference, namely the preparation of a convention to prohibit any form of preparation or

1
A prominent example of this could be the attacks against the Israeli Olympic team at Munich (1972)

13
execution of terrorist outrages upon the life or liberty of person staking part in the work of
foreign public authorities and services.”2
The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism defined terrorism as “Criminal
acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of
particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.”3
What constituted these criminal
acts were specified in Article 1 of the convention, as follows:
• Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to heads of state,
their spouses, or persons holding a public position when the act is directed against them
in their public capacity;
• Wilful damage to public property belonging to another contracting party;
• Any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the public;
• Any attempt to commit one of the above offences; and
• The dealing with arms and ammunition with a view to the commission of one of the
above offences in any country what so ever.4
In a broad sense, this definition of terrorism paved way for the any such future definitions. Even
the contemporary definition of terrorism that was adopted by the United Nations in 2004 speaks
on similar lines attempting to look at terrorism as an activities intended to create fear or
intimidate the public, government or any other organisation. The legal definitions of terrorism in
many countries including the US and India are drawn on similar lines and will be discussed later
in the section.
The Article 2 of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism then obliged
each of the contracting states to enact laws that make the provisions of Article 1, criminal
offences in their territories.

2
John Dugard, “International Terrorism: Problems of Definition”, International Affairs (Chatham House: London,
1974), v.50, n.1, p.68
3
“Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism” (League of Nations: 1937), p.6, see
http://dl.wdl.org/11579/service/11579.pdf, accessed on 7 April 2015
4
Ibid., pp.6-7, accessed on 7 April 2015

14
However, this convention brings two major issues of contentions, when defining terrorism. The
first and the most persistent problem is to differentiate a freedom fighter from a terrorist. In
specific case of this convention the Yugoslav national who assassinated the two leaders would be
looked down as terrorist as per the Article 1 of the Convention. However, he could also be
argued to be a revolutionary fighting for the separation of the Macedonia, which was then part of
Yugoslavia. The assassin was the member of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organisation (IRMO) that was fighting for seeking autonomy for the Macedonian and
Adrianople Regions from the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
The legal argument on what constitutes an act of terror, and who is a terrorist, is very complex.
Every terrorist fights for a cause, and for some, that cause may be genuine. For revolutionary
groups, attacks become a statement to voice their cause. Sometimes they resort to assassinate a
leader not only to make a mark but also prevent a major act, which the leader would otherwise
take, which the group might find against their interest. As H.H.A. Cooper, the former Staff
Director of The U.S. Task Force National Advisory Committee on Disorders and Terrorism
states: “However much you may buy into the freedom fighter argument, you are forced, if you
are intellectually honest, to the conclusion that whatever label it might bear, terrorism is a bad
thing. All you can sensibly say in its defence is that sometimes it may be necessary to do bad
things to other people, most usually with the apologetic justification that it is done to prevent or
deter them from doing bad or worse things to you.” 5
Thus, differentiating between a
revolutionary from a terrorist has been historically a challenge. Even in modern day, self-
determination has often been cited by political organizations such those in Palestine (like the
Palestine Liberation organization (PLO)) who have constantly pushed for the consideration of
political freedom struggles while looking towards defining terrorism. Countries such as the U.S.
considered the PLO to be a terrorist organisation until 1991, when it was seen as political group
seeking the establishment of the independent state of Palestine.6

5
H.H.A. Cooper, “Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited”, American Behavioural Scientist (Sage: USA,
2001), v.44, n.1, p.883
6
Michael Moran, “Terrorist Groups and Political Legitimacy”, (Council for Foreign Relations: Washington D.C.,
2006), see http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/terrorist-groups-political-legitimacy/p10159, accessed on 7 April 2015

15
The second is the problem of distinguishing a terrorist from a criminal. This complex situation
raises a good number of questions. If any person who indulges in the creation of panic, then
would serial killers also count as terrorists? Can a mass murderer who creates a reign of fear, in a
region, be prosecuted as a terrorist? Or is it just the extent of this region, over which the fear
prevails, forms the fine line between a terrorist and a criminal. Also, if a state resorts to violence
to quell protests or anti-state violence and hence creating a reign of fear, will it count as an act of
terrorism? The idea of terror or fear perceived by the state has to be differentiated from criminal
or political acts and an act of non-discriminatory mass violence towards a political end.
Differentiating between a criminal and terrorist act became more imminent after the 9/11 attacks
when many nations were compelled to reconsider many criminal acts as acts of terrorism, under
the wake of United Nations Resolution 1373 which calls on the individual states to take drastic
action against terrorism.
The answers to these questions are not simple and every state has to look into its own political
and legal system to understand what it perceives as terrorism. At the same time, international
bodies such as the United Nations should look towards building an internationally acceptable
definition of terrorism. As early as 1974, John Dugard suggested what any convention working
on the defining international terrorism should take into account:
• The convention should reaffirm that every state has a duty to refrain in all circumstances
from encouraging guerrilla activities in another state.
• The convention should prohibit acts of terrorism, which strike at the stability of the
international order, and not those acts that merely undermine the political order in any
particular country. The definition of international terrorism should therefore clearly
identify the international element that renders the act one of concern to the international
community.
• The convention should confine itself to death and bodily injury only. It should avoid the
temptation to which some national legislatures have succumbed of defining terrorism so
widely that it embraces any form of extra constitution conduct and thereby transform as
political opponent into a terrorist.
• The convention should expressly state that motive is irrelevant in determining whether an
act of terrorism has been committed.

16
• The convention should accept the principle that state that takes the alleged offender into
custody is obliged either to try him before its own courts or to extradite him to another
state having jurisdiction over the offence.
• The convention should reaffirm the international community's abhorrence of state-
controlled terrorism as expressed in the Nuremberg principles, the Genocide Convention
and those international instruments designed to protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms.7
At an institutional level, the United Nations (UN) has so far adopted 13 international conventions
used for the combat of terrorism. Included among these conventions are also declarations against
the taking of hostages in civil aviation and the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. The
changes in the approach of the UN have also been a reflection upon the changing nature of
terrorism. The drastic nature of the 9/11 attacks compelled the individual nations to come
together to combat terrorism. The UN as a global platform also took initiatives to interpret
terrorism and formulate counterterrorism strategies. For example, just after the attacks of 9/11,
the Czech Republic stated in the United Nations General Assembly that the Assembly should
make an attempt to provide a general definition of terrorism. It was argued that a definition
would help synchronise anti-terror activities of various countries. But even then, Jordan clearly
stated that a difference should be considered between the right of self-determination and the
“indiscriminate slaughter of civilians.” However, profound differences of opinion among the
member states have hampered the UN’s anti-terrorism efforts and created tensions among the
five permanent member states of the Security Council. Even in the General Assembly no
majority of member states agreed on a definition of terrorism, although all member states agreed
that terrorism was contrary to international peace and security.8
However, the pressure of 9/11 attacks forced the individual states to act on terrorism on the basis
of the measures adopted in the UN Resolution 1373. This resolution provides no legal definition
of terrorism yet it compels states to take drastic action against terrorism. It is widely believed
that the adoption of Resolution 1373 was largely due to US pressure on the members of the

7
n.2, p.68
8
Jori Duursma, “Definition of Terrorism and Self Determination”, Harvard International Review, See
http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/1757, accessed on 16 February 2015

17
United Nations Security Council. This can be argued because the UN Security Council
Resolution 1373, passed on 28 September 2001, mirrors almost exactly the strategy for fighting
terrorism as seen in the USA PATRIOT Act, which the US was drafting at the same time as it
was urging the Security Council to act. This pressure was a result of the 9/11 attacks and in the
aftermath of which the U.S. was taking stringent actions as responses to the event. For making
the American Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) effective, other states had to agree to tackle
terrorism, which was made possible by adopting the Resolution 1373. This resolution does not
speak of any terrorist group in particular and does not even mention al Qaeda, but it sets broad
guidelines for states to follow to combat terror.
In its first ever attempt to define terrorism, the Security Council adopted the Resolution 1566,
just after the hostage crisis and the subsequent murders in a Russian School on 7 October 2004.
This resolution, for the first time, provided a long definition of terrorism as acts, “including
against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and are under no circumstances justifiable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar
nature.”9
This was the first attempt, and has been so far the last attempt where an international definition
of terrorism has been provided by a supranational organization. However, this is a very vast
definition encompassing various criminal activities and still does not distinguish from the idea of
terrorism, the right to self-determination and the idea of just war. This has made international
cooperation very difficult, with countries like Iceland, Japan and Kuwait insisting that without a
common definition for terrorism, states cannot unite against it. Varying perceptions of the
phenomenon itself have prevented the states from achieving a common definition.

9
“UNSC Resolution 1566” (United Nations: 2004), see http://www.unrol.org/files/n0454282.pdf, accessed on 12
February 2015

18
Though the resolution 1566 was an action that emerged out of the Russian incident, it
emphasised on the other terrorist activities around the world, especially al Qaeda. The Resolution
condemns al Qaeda and the Taliban and reminds the member states of their counterterrorism
obligation. This could be seen as streamlining the approach of countering the face of terrorism
that developing around al Qaeda. Since the adoption of Resolution 1373 in 2001 to that of
Resolution 1566 in 2004, the U.S. through the U.N. had managed to establish various task force
to combat the threat. Specific groups such as the UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) now
looked into the war against terrorism and specifically the al Qaeda. All forms of terrorism were
condemned irrespective of their motivation – political or otherwise, which made it possible to
condemn Taliban, which was holding political power in Afghanistan.
Another issue that originated when considering the legal definitions of terrorism came with the
difference in practice of political culture in various states. As UN Resolution 1373 mandated the
states to adopt counterterrorism policies without defining terrorism, it left it upon the states to
seek their own definition. Even after Resolution 1566 was accepted, the states were free to
prepare their own definition of terrorism. As a result, some nations such as the United Kingdom
simply indicated that they were implementing Resolution 1373 with no definitional parameters.
Other nations Albania and Estonia declined to define terrorism but indicated that they were
complying with international treaties and other obligations that mandated counterterrorism
efforts. Some nations such as India and the U.S looked at their domestic legislation to define
terrorism.
For example, The USA PATRIOT Act, passed in the weeks immediately following the
September 11 attacks, offered an array of counterterrorism resources to the government. It
includes an increased surveillance powers and authority to government to conduct intelligence-
gathering operations in matters of suspected terrorism, as well as allowing for the civil seizure of
assets based only on probable cause. It also heightened punishments for any of the underlying
crimes related to the newly broadened understanding of “domestic terrorism,” which now stood
as: “Acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
of any State [that] appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a

19
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”10
This law provided for stronger action, and in a country like the US, which is known for
aggressive political practice, especially when it comes to national security. This act was
specifically passed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, not just to redefine the new face of terrorism
that had now emerged but also to streamline the various counterterrorism policies of the US.
This law allowed the state to take severe measures to counter terror. It also gave the government
greater flexibility in declaring foreign groups as terrorist organisations by removing various
hurdles and cross checks that were previously required before declaring a group as a foreign
terrorist organisation (FTO).
In comparison to the US laws that are strict, the Indian laws are seen as more moderate, aiming
to protect its sovereignty more than the physical state itself. The Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, defines a terrorist act as anything: “with intent to threaten
or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike
terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any
foreign country.”11
However, in 2010, India in its effort to strengthen its counterterrorism efforts
joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF is an intergovernmental body
seeking to fight money-laundering and terrorist financing. As a FATF member, India had to
make certain modifications in its anti-terrorism laws to incorporate the financial aspect of terror.
Hence, the 2008 act was further amended in 2012 to include “economic security, including
financial, monetary and fiscal stability”.12
A country like India is more careful when prescribing extreme actions for tackling terror,
because any such engagement would hamper the pluricultural fabric of the society. Also, for
India, prevention of terrorist activities within the national boundaries is more important than to

10
Sudha Shetty, “What’s in the Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years after 9/11”, Journal of
International Law (University of Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, 2011) v.33, n.1, p.18.
11
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, Government of India, see
http://mha.nic.in/hindi/sites/upload_files/mhahindi/files/pdf/UAPA-1967.pdf, accessed on 12 January 2015
12
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2012, Government of India, at http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-
in-pdf/032013.pdf, accessed on 12 January 2015

20
organise pre-emptive strikes, because that is synonymous with its political practice. This is in
contrast to the American Political Culture that has a comparatively more favourable opinion on
pre-emptive strikes. However the Indian law does provide the law enforcement agencies with
great powers to combat the threat, often bordering on the abuse of human rights. These powers
have been in effect since the other similar legislations such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA) of 2002, which was essentially passed to comply with the U.N. Resolution 1373. POTA
was later replaced by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, but the
executive powers of the law enforcements remained, citing the need to comply with Resolution
1373, which itself was a result of the 9/11 attacks.
The post 9/11 terrorism challenged the existing security measures and its transnational module
challenged the concept of counterterrorism. The situation forced the countries to have a
convergence in counterterrorism mechanism. Thus, reaching an agreement that includes the
needs and expectations of all the nations while defining terrorism has not been an easy task.
While states have actually converged towards looking at terrorism as a threat, differences still
remain. The primary reason for the convergence has been the 9/11 attacks and the significant
rise of al Qaeda, which is perceived as a threat by most states. Meanwhile, with the growth of al
Qaeda, the nature of terrorism has increasingly transcended borders. Such threats can now no
longer be addressed by a single nation or individual nations working in isolation and it has
become incumbent to reach a consensus on the defining terrorism. While formulising such a
definition, there is a need to understand the transnational nature of terrorism and a consensus
needs to be developed on how to address the threat. It requires an understanding of why terrorist
groups are growing in strength in spite of increasing awareness among the common populace. It
has been a common practice among terrorist group to exploit the illiterate and the ignorant
sections of the society. However, increasing awareness should, at least in theory, deter people
from joining terrorist movements. However this has not been the case and this requires research
to help combat terrorism. An effective counterterrorism strategy also needs to understand how
and why terrorist groups cooperate and to figure out the means, in which the flow of resources,
tools and manpower takes place in the network, as they are key in fighting Transnational
Terrorism.

21
2.3 Understanding Transnational Terrorism
Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks marked the beginning of this new face of terrorism. The attack on World
Trade Centre (WTC) was not just a symbolic destruction of the icon of western capitalism and
American hegemony, but was shocking in the manner in which civilian technology was used to
bring about massive destruction. The attack was innovative in the way it used a civilian aircraft
as a projectile to destroying the emblematic World Trade Centre. By attacking the most powerful
country, the US, al Qaeda tried to prove that they are capable to challenge anyone. The 9/11
attacks were successful in creating an environment of panic that engulfed the world and made al
Qaeda the most feared terrorist organisation. This provided al Qaeda with a platform to voice its
ideologies and abilities to the entire world, which generated influence over other terrorist groups.
Its abilities passed inspirations to the otherwise regionally limited terrorist organisation to set
globally oriented goals. These regional groups look up to the al Qaeda because its global
platform allowed the groups to associate themselves groups to associate themselves with a larger
cause than theirs and hence try to gain legitimacy and support. On the other hand, al Qaeda could
use these groups to increase their sphere of influence over a larger part of the world. As a result
al Qaeda was able to construct an intricate network connecting itself to the various terrorist
organisations and has since been able to influence their activities to varying degrees. So, without
al Qaeda’s direct presence, it became capable of executing its plans through one of its affiliate
groups in their name. The network facilitated coordination of planning with input from senior
leadership, who were mostly from al Qaeda.
This network resulted in attacks being planned in one geographical location while being
executed in another. Consequently, terrorist groups would not restrict its operation in the nation
where they were located, but were able to function beyond their geographical boundaries. This
need not mean that a group was physically present and active over more than one nation. Instead,
it referred to the fact that groups were capable of carrying out attacks whose consequences
transverse geographical and political barriers. Even if the attack was localised, its claim will
come from the bigger organisations and the impact would be far reaching. Instead of creating
fear locally, terrorist groups today, were, and are, successful in sending out broader message.
This is what defines the transnational nature of modern terrorism.

22
For example, in December 2001, security forces found blueprints in the residence of an al Qaeda
leader in Afghanistan, for attacks to be carried out in Singapore by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).13
This
example very well demonstrate how the terrorist groups are interlinked all over the world,
coordinating and executing attacks while providing assistance to one another. In this case, JI
contributed manpower, training grounds and safe haven outside the Middle East for al Qaeda
members, while receiving equipment, logistical expertise and training. Such cooperation allowed
the JI to execute attacks like the Bali Bombings.14
Similarly, the Mumbai attack of 2008 was not orchestrated by Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) alone.
Although the perpetrators were members of LeT, but the planning of the attack was done in
consultation with leaders of al Qaeda such as Ilyas Kashmiri15
, who coordinated with the
American (of Pakistani origin) terrorist David Coleman Headly, who had connections with
various other terrorist groups in the regions. There was also considerable input from state
agencies such Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI).16
The Mumbai attack was the result of months of planning, done by people transcending
borders.
These examples help to understand the transnational nature of contemporary terrorism. They also
reflect on the fact that terrorist groups do not wish to remain localised, but seek to wield
influence over a broader region. By carrying out attacks, which are severely damaging, they seek
an international recognition. This perception is then used to promote their ideology in a manner
that may influence other groups to join forces with them. Regional groups are also more than
willing to be participant in this widespread network because it grants them recognition in a wider
area when compared to the regions where they operate. Plus, such a network enhances the
functioning of the groups due to sharing of resources and information, as now help can be sought
out from the more experienced groups.

13
Summary of Case Against Jemaah Islamiyah (Singapore), Report, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
Singapore, 2002, p.1
14
Michael C. Horowitz and Philip B. K. Potter, “Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the
Consequences for Lethality”, Journal of Conflict Resolution (Sage: California, 2014), v.58, n.2, p.200
15
Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global Jihad (Brookings Institution Press:
Washington D.C., 2011), p.101
16
Jason Burke, “ Pakistan intelligence services ‘aided Mumbai terror attacks’”, The Guardian, 18 October 2010, see
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/18/pakistan-isi-mumbai-terror-attacks, accessed on 12 January 2015

23
Understanding the flow of finance and resources of the groups will help us to learn more about
the transnational nature of contemporary terrorism. Terrorism funding occurs through
complicated channels consisting of various non-governmental organisations, charities, private
donations and even legitimate enterprises. These charity organisations come in useful as money
collected in the name of charity is often diverted and transferred across borders in the name of
humanitarian relief or development and then reaches the subsidiaries of these charities from
where it reaches the terrorist organisations.17
Often, such charitable groups are legitimate bodies
and operate across many nations making the flow of funds even more difficult to track due to
differing legalities and the freedom provided to such groups. For example: groups such as the al
Hamrain Islami Foundation and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society have been involved in
financial transactions of terrorist groups operating in South Asia.18
Both these groups operate out
of the Persian Gulf region, where they are able to collect money from the wealthy patrons and
then are able to move the finances to South Asia where it reaches the terrorist outfits.
Thus, transnational represents the most troubling factor for the global peace and security scenario
of the world, because it is beyond the ability of one nation to combat and its span reaches into
multiple countries and operates by surpassing geographical and political barriers. When the
groups are operating from multiple countries simultaneously, such as planning in one while
operating in another country, they cannot be tackled by a single nation. Combating such
activities requires collaboration and cooperation between security agencies of various states with
help of intergovernmental bodies such as the Interpol, Europol etc. Similarly monitoring of the
finances of the terrorists group would require sharing of information of the activities of the
various corporations, charity organisations and other funding sources. The funding is achieved
by routing the money through several banking channels all over the world and hence its solution
cannot be rested upon the shoulders of one state and requires immense collaboration among the
monitoring agencies all over the world. Combating transnational terrorism and its financial
sources and elaborate network would require transnational solutions that transcends political and
geographical borders and is only possible if states come together to achieve this end.

17
Juan Miguel del Cid Gomez, “A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates”, Perspectives
on Terrorism (Terrorism Research Initiative: Massachusetts, 2010), v.4, n.4, see
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/113/html, accessed on 18 February 2015
18
Ibid., accessed on 18 February 2015

24
2.4 Why do Terrorist Organisations Form Networks?
When the transnational nature and activities of terrorist groups proliferated, many scholars
turned their attention to study the nuances of terrorist networks. Though there is no merit in
comparing a terrorist organisation to a state or a private transnational company, yet it will
provide a simplified understanding of why cooperation among terrorist groups can be founded in
an equivalent reason as to why business companies or state cooperate. Various nation states work
together to increase their capabilities. For example, cooperation among countries’ armies serves
to join resources and facilitates the transfer of weapons and knowledge, thereby bolstering
mutual power and security. Business companies cooperate to reduce operational costs and to
compete more effectively in a market place. The same is true for terrorist organisations. Just as
nations with common goals align, terrorist outfits come together due to similarity in ideologies,
which then facilitates cooperation in terms of sharing of resources and capabilities.
In the paper, written by scholars: Michael C. Horowitz and Phillip B. K. Potter observe that the
terrorist groups cooperate to increase their capability to launch effective attacks. By studying
different examples of cooperation among terrorist groups they inferred that cooperation increase
efficiency. They defined this efficiency as the “number of fatalities inflicted per attack.”19
According to them, fatalities can be used as a parameter to evaluate the efficacy of terrorist
groups because most terrorist organisations seek to demonstrate their capabilities mostly through
their ability to kill. This goes in collaboration with a terrorist group’s ideology to use violence as
a means to their ends. Thus terrorist groups with more linkages are more effective because
collaborations diversify the risks and improve capabilities.
Cooperation among terrorist organisations allows them to pool their resources towards a
common goal. But it requires different factors to form alliances apart from common ideologies.
Horowitz and Potter argue that, when groups seek cooperation, they try to seek out groups who
have higher capabilities. The demonstration of capabilities becomes the true benchmark for the
selection for the cooperation. This results in selective collaboration with only those groups that
have demonstrated their capacities. This is because groups with higher capacities have more to

19
n.14, p.210

25
offer than those with fewer capacities. This results in what they call: a core-periphery structure
where the core has higher capabilities than the periphery. Due to the selective affinity of groups
to ally with the core, the periphery gets left behind. This results in a situation that they describe
as the deadly getting deadlier.
This concept of core-periphery explains why sometimes various groups work together to achieve
strategic aims of the one group, primarily because it has higher capacity. This can be effectively
seen in the case of al Qaeda, where it has been effective in using the network for its own strategic
interests. Former CIA Analyst and Counterterrorism expert Bruce Riedel’s argues that this core-
periphery structure was very much evident in the case of Indian Parliament attack. According to
him, al Qaeda was major benefactor from the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament.20
The attack on the Indian Parliament was carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) operatives on
13 December 2001. At a cursory glance, this attack has no implication what so ever for al Qaeda.
However, if we were to examine the geopolitical scenario in the region, the role of al Qaeda
becomes more apparent. It was the time when the American forces had overthrown the Taliban
rule in Afghanistan and Bin Laden was on the run. An easy escape for him was to enter Pakistan
from Afghanistan. However, President Musharraf had also expressed his support for the
Americans, and hence the western borders of Pakistan were heavily guarded to minimise
infiltration from Afghanistan. At such a moment, the attack of that level, led to heightened
tension between India and Pakistan almost escalating to war like situation where both countries
started moving forces towards the border. This made Pakistani administration divert forces from
their western border to the eastern one, which eased the escape of Bin Laden, into Pakistan
where he was eventually killed in 2011. This possibility explains how JeM could have actually
executed the attacks on the Indian Parliament to facilitate al Qaeda’s interest to help Bin Laden
escape. Al Qaeda too could have demanded JeM to assist its planning this escape as a payment of
the help it provided to JeM for the hijackings. Either way, al Qaeda was successful in using its
network for its own objectives and goals.
Further arguments to support this relationship between JeM and al Qaeda can be seen in former
Indian Foreign Minster, Jaswant Singh’s memoirs. He states that JeM, Taliban and al Qaeda had

20
n.15, pp.69-70

26
strong linkages and argues that the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight IC 814 in 1998, by JeM
and facilitated with the support of al Qaeda and the Taliban could have been a rehearsal for the
September 11 attacks. JeM in return managed to arrange the release of its key leaders as the
ransom for the hostages. Thus, the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 could have been
JeM’s way of paying back to al Qaeda for the support it got to orchestrate the hijacking of 1998.
Both these premises shows how smaller groups (JeM in this case) work to facilitate the goals of a
more capable group (al Qaeda). Both sides benefited from this cooperation, but al Qaeda
achieved more than JeM by arranging safe transit for Bin Laden and learning from the hijacking
incident, a lesson that it definitely applied in the 9/11 attacks.
These observations help us to understand terrorist networks in details. One needs to understand
that by not acting in isolation, counter terrorism measures targeting single groups would be
futile. Instead targeting the network and the connections would be a far more effective way of
tackling terrorism. The counter-actions should be targeted towards understanding, tracking and
disrupting the networks and in order to be most effective, it should be driven towards central
nodes rather than isolated groups or those in the periphery.21
2.5 Structure of a Terrorist Network
Apart from the benefits of forming alliances as discussed above, the structure of the network also
serves the purpose to maximize the efficiency of the terrorist outfits. For that purpose, it
introduces hierarchy and creates a structure for the functioning of the groups. However,
hierarchy among groups based on capabilities need not be always defined in the network. It is
possible to have a flat network where all the groups are at the same level. However, in practice,
most groups have an organized hierarchy and command structure.
Second, networks increase resiliency. By creating a command structure, information and
resources can be compartmentalized and hence, if there is a breach, the damage can be minimal.
But this can only happen if the network is designed to be compartmentalize information. While a
large network may be more efficient, it also increases the vulnerabilities. Hence for large groups,

21
n.14, p.211

27
such as al Qaeda, it becomes crucial to protect vital resources and information. This is done by
using sleeper cells, which can organize and execute an attack while remaining cut off from the
vast majority of the network. A sleeper cell is usually a group trained with only a sole focus
objective and is provided enough information that is needed to achieve that objective. So in the
case of a crackdown, the network integrity is largely preserved.
Thus, designing a network becomes crucial for such groups. Hence an understanding of the
general structure of terrorist networks becomes essential for formulating counterterrorism
strategies. The exact nature of the structure of network created by al Qaeda has been explained in
the subsequent chapter. A general analysis of terrorist networks is essential to theorise the study
of terrorism and help formulate counterterrorism strategies. However, targeting specific groups
would require the study of their individual networks, to find the weakness that can be pursued by
security forces. In general, International Relations analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt
found that terrorist networks can be classified into four possible structures: hierarchical, chain
networks, hub networks, and all-channel networks.22
Their structural classification is as follows:
• Chain networks: in which information is passed from node23
to node;
• Star and Hub networks: in which a central node connects individually to the other node;
and
• All-channel networks: in which all nodes are connected to each other.
Every structure has its own advantage and disadvantage, and most terrorist groups do not
necessarily follow a single type of structure rigidly. Most of the time, they use a combination of
the above, depending on the need and the situation.
Hierarchical structure is the one of the most used network design, especially among state actors,
and was very prominent in the manner in which al Qaeda functioned prior to 9/11 This design

22
Summarised from John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar”, RAND Monograph Report
(RAND: Washington D.C., 1996)
23
In analysing networks, the term ‘‘node’’ refers to one or more people in the network who act as a transfer point
for information.

28
has an organized command structure and the information flows from the top executive or the
leadership to the base or laymen operatives, as depicted in Figure 2.1. Due its defined
organisational flow, it is easy to study and hence, counter-terrorism activity can also be easily
planned. However, depending upon how much of information is shared along the hierarchy,
intelligence missions need not always be successful. If the information and planning are
condensed to the upper levels, it can be become a challenge as then, wiping the upper echelon
would mean that the network would be left leaderless and would collapse. Thus to counter
hierarchical network, the security agencies only need to target the upper leadership, eliminating
all possible chances of succession.
Figure 2.1: Hierarchical Structure of Al Qaeda Prior to 9/11
Source: Devin R. Springer, James L. Regen and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Georgetown
University Press: Washington D.C., 2009) p.105
A Chain network consists of a design, where the information is passed on in the form of an end
to another as depicted in Figure 2.2. This creates a chain of groups where the interaction is seen
only among the two subsequent groups which otherwise do not interact with any other link of the
chain. Such designs are used mostly in smuggling as well as in courier operations and travel
facilitation where the goods or the information is passed from the source to the tail, via different
nodes. Al Qaeda leader and strategist, Yusuf al Ayiri, in his writings, advised the jihadists to use
chain networks to bring foreign fighters into Iraq from bordering countries (which he does not
name, for security reasons). Countering such a network requires the study of the design of the
network. Once the design is established, it can be easily countered as the flow of information can
be then blocked.

29
Figure 2.2: Chain Network
Hub networks, also called a wheel or star network, is when the design is such that it puts the
leadership in the central node, right in the centre of the network. As can be seen in Figure 2.3,
the subsequent levels are in direct contact with the centre and receive orders directly from the
central node and in order to communicate with each other, they have to go through the central
node. Such a design was commonly seen among the drug cartels of North America. One major
advantage is that the central leadership is in complete control over the functioning of the
network. This acts as the major disadvantage too, because elimination of the central leadership
can destroy the network completely.
Figure 2.3: Wheel or Hub and Spoke Network

30
With the advent of widespread access to computers and the Internet, the all-channel network is
the newest variant suggested for terrorist networking.24
It has a decentralized design, where all
the nodes are connected to all the other nodes in the structure as is shown in Figure 2.4.
However, universal connectivity automatically creates a tremendous amount of data duplication
and information redundancy, since localized and network-wide data are contained in each node.
The network works efficiently only when all the nodes are communicating regularly with each
other. This also means that the means of communication has to be in place, and ready to be used
in case of communication. The overall number of nodes and volume of communications within
an all-channel network can be a source of potential vulnerability. If the network becomes too big
it can become bogged down in heavy communications, causing confusion or greater
susceptibility to penetration by intercepting communications.
Figure 2.4: All Channel Network
University Press: Washington D.C., 2009) p. 100
Identifying and studying the network is the key to formulating the counterterrorism strategy. As
scholar Marc Sageman says that successfully counter a network, one needs to target at least 5 to
15% of the network.25
This is key to any counterterrorism strategy. Identification of the network
means that intelligence activities can be coordinated on the appropriate lines and hence with the
information achieved, proper formulation of the counterterrorism strategy can be achieved.

24
Devin R. Springer, James L. Regen and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Georgetown
University Press: Washington D.C., 2009), p.100
25
Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 2004), p.141

31
However, since most terrorist groups and especially al Qaeda, do not stick to a specific network
design, targeting the network requires a multi pronged approach. It is not easy to determine a
group’s network as it requires accumulation of vast amount of data to establish the design and
then the data has to be analysed to create counter strategies.

32
CHAPTER THREE
ORIGIN AND THE RISE OF AL QAEDA AND
ITS NETWORK

33
ORIGIN AND THE RISE OF AL QAEDA AND ITS NETWORK
“Al Qaeda is characterised by a broad based ideology, a novel structure, a robust capacity for
regeneration and a very diverse membership that cuts across ethnic, class and national
boundaries. It is neither a single group or a coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or
bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political
parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and
other responsibilities.”26
3.1 Al Qaeda – An Overview
The 9/11 attacks marked the grand revelation of al Qaeda by showcasing its devastating ability to
the world. Even much before those attacks by late 1980s onwards al Qaeda was characterized as
the new phenomenon in global terrorist network, distinct from the spatially confined terrorist
organisations that had existed earlier in the Middle East. Al Qaeda came into existence on 11
August 1988, when Osama bin Laden decided to create a “base” (al Qaeda literally means the
base) in order to organize the recruitment, funding and organization of the "Afghan-Arab"27
Mujahideen28
to fight off the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The group was among the other similar factions and was founded on the sole beliefs of Bin
Laden, who was against Soviets because he felt that Communism with its atheist principles was
against Islam. His efforts were actively supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who
provided his group with weapons and financial support, which was delivered with the help of
Pakistani intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) during the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. The period was marked by Cold War at its prime. The U.S. was fighting
the Soviets purely on principle, while the Pakistani leadership was wary of the possibility Soviet

26
Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Lotus Collection: New Delhi, 2011), p.54
27
Al Qaeda, Mapping Militant Organisations, Centre for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford
University, see http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21, accessed on 10 February
2015
28
Mujahideen, which translates into Holy Warriors in Pashtun, were the group of armed rebels who were fighting
the Soviets in Afghanistan

34
zone of influence in its neighbourhood. Hence, both the nations found it convenient to ally to
establish and support the Mujahideen resistance against the Soviets. Under the leadership of
Osama Bin Laden an elaborate network was created in the Arab World, the U.S and Europe for
the purpose of fund raising. The network was known as Maktab al Khidamat (MAK), which
according to many experts was the forerunner of the modern day al Qaeda. This can also be
considered as the inception of the broad network of al Qaeda because the leaders of the MAK
wanted to ensure the continuity of the large volunteer network that was created to fight against
the Soviets.
After the forced departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan, Bin Laden, directed his organisation
to fight against what he considered was the new threat that the Muslim world faced – the western
world and its influence. He felt that the survival of Muslim identity was threatened by spread of
the western ideology and to counter that he called for a “defensive strike” to rid the world of the
western influence and to set up an Islamic Caliphate that imposes strict Sunni interpretation of
the Sharia.29
The personality and the reach of Bin Laden was a big drive behind the working of al
Qaeda. As is discussed later in this chapter, his conservative upbringing and education shaped his
personality, where in he began looking at the western led globalization as a threat to Islam and
the Islamic way of life. In the process to establish what he thought should be the correct Islamic
lifestyle, Bin Laden and al Qaeda opposed all other interpretations of Islamic texts, including that
of the Shias, and condemned to death all those who followed, what they deemed as the “un-
Islamic” way of life.
Although al Qaeda originated in Afghanistan, it had to keep changing its base of operations due
to governmental pressures. Following the Gulf war in 1990, al Qaeda shifted its base from
Afghanistan to Sudan, where the group tried to exploit the political instability to garner support
for itself. But soon the international pressure on the Sudanese government compelled them to
deny a safe haven to the then mushrooming al-Qaeda, and it was forced to re-shift its base to
Afghanistan, where the Taliban regime was more than willing to support the group. The period
between 1990-1996 was characterised by al Qaeda’s attempt to build coalition by exploiting

29
Terrorist Organisation Profile: al Qaeda, START, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the
Response to Terrorism, see http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=6, accessed on 10
February 2015

35
politically volatile areas and associating itself with other organisations fighting for similar cause,
mostly violent militant groups based on Islamist ideologies. The result of this was emergence of
a vast network which spanned the entire world gradually, linking fellow militant Islamists from
the Abu Sayyaf group of the Philippines to the Islamic Group of Egypt and the Armed Islamic
Group of Algeria (GIA).30
The 9/11 attacks provided al Qaeda with the recognition of being the most feared terrorist group
and it used this moment to pitch its anti-west ideology to the world. Demonstration of its
capabilities had left the world in state of fear and shock and forced the government of United
States to retaliate by declaring the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). The operational capabilities
and the impact of al Qaeda in the western world gave it the chance and the platform to reach out
and convince other terrorist organisations. These groups were now more than willing to ally with
a group that had such a fearful image. This was due to two reasons. First, it was obvious to the
groups that they would not be able to stand against a force like the United States and its Global
War on Terror on their own. Hence cooperation became essential for the existence of the groups.
Second, the launch of the war itself justified the positions of al Qaeda that America is targeting
the Islamic states. This created a fear that the west was rising against the entire Islamic world and
Islam itself. This perception further grew as a result of a series of misinformation planted by
such terrorist groups and also due to the failure of the west to distinguish Islamist terrorism from
Islam itself. These factors were used effectively by al Qaeda to gain a foothold and drive its
ideology, which led to the formation of an intricate network connecting various terrorist groups.
Al Qaeda and Bin Laden personally used their resources to support other groups by setting up
training camps for them and also by sending out their own members to help those groups across
the world. Soon al Qaeda has cells in around 100 countries with dozens of allies and affiliates,
making its reach extensive and effective.31
In the subsequent sections, the rise of al Qaeda has been discussed from its origin in the context
of the Cold War and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to its development into the transnational

30
John Rollins, “Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence and Implications for U.S
policy”, Congressional Research Service, (Congressional Research Service: Washington D.C, 2011), see
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/156542.pdf, accessed on 12 February 2015
31
Ibid., accessed on 12 February 2015

36
phenomenon, as its stands today. The structure of the network created by al Qaeda has been
discussed with a reference to the structure of terror networks that was discussed in the previous
chapter.
3.2 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Emergence of the Mujahideen
The creation of modern Afghanistan took place in the 19th
century as the result of the great game
that was played between the British and the Russian empire. The idea was to create a buffer zone
between the two empires – the Russian empire that was successively moving down towards
Central Asia, and the British Empire ruling over the then colonized India. The rugged mountain
terrain of the region made it very difficult for either of the empires to conquer the region. This
isolation also resulted in economic and political underdevelopment of the region. However, after
the World Wars, the situation began to change due to the arrival of foreign aid from the USSR,
and to a certain extent, the USA. The Soviets, especially, were looking to have an influence over
the region and looked at it as their gateway into the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. The Second
World War changed the equation among prominent powers in the World and colonial Britain
paved the way to United States. So post the World War there now emerged a competition
between the USSR and the USA in this region. Thus Afghanistan was turning into a theatre for
Cold War, with Soviets looking for political as well as economic gains from Afghanistan.32
However, the Americans had not shown much interest in the region till then for reasons that are
still not understood.
With the development that resulted out of economic aids, an educated pro-democracy middle
class started emerging in Afghanistan, which led to abolition of the monarchy in Afghanistan
creating the first Afghan Republic in 1973, and eventually after some political turmoil, a pro-
Soviet government came to power under the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
in the year 1978. Nur Mohammad Taraki, a well-known novelist, became the President and his
key aide Hafizullah Amin became the Prime Minister. But the new government mostly portrayed
an intellectual and educated outlook, which was very distant from the rest of the populace and

32
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to
September 10, 2001 (Penguin: New York, 2004), p.43

37
hence the new government lacked any social base outside the educated citizenry of Kabul.33
The
government had launched a series of social reforms, which included initiatives to educate women
and promote a more liberal culture. Such steps further increased the gap between the government
and the people who now felt it as a direct attack on their traditional practices. The native tribal
groups were positioned against education of women and a more liberal society. Hence such
measure only created more backlash against the government and gradually protest movements
started developing all over Afghanistan.
The atmosphere of dissent was growing. However, most of it was sporadic and even though the
protests were widespread, it was still unorganized. The protest took a violent turn with the rise of
Islamic groups who called themselves as the Mujahideen, a word that translates into “Holy
Warriors”. The Mujahideen sought the ouster of Taraki government because the Communists
backed it. On March 24, 1979 the rebels killed a group of Soviet advisors and their family
members. This was perceived as retaliation to the government’s use of violence to stop the
protestors. The government had started deploying the army to subdue the protests and Prime
Minister Amin had his own secret police that would resort to force to crush rebellions.
From a geopolitical context, it is interesting to note how these Mujahideens transformed from a
self-determination movement to some of the deadliest terrorists groups by the end of the century.
Much of this transformation could be attributed to the power play between the two major power
blocs of the period, where Afghanistan ultimately became the theatre of the Cold War. The
Soviets had real interests in the region, which included access to the oil of the West Asian
region. Further, the Soviets were looking to develop the region as their sphere of influence and
hence they were concerned with the rising protests in the region. They tried advising the Afghan
government to not resort to violence, but it did not work.34
Things went out of control, when
Amin, in his ambition to take total control over the state had Taraki assassinated. Amin felt that
Taraki was more of a poet and intellectual and incapable of handling politics of leadership, and
was convinced that he would make a better leader. The Soviet leadership, after the several failed
attempts of negotiations, figured that Amin would not yield to them and made several attempts to

33
Ibid., p.73
34
Ibid., p.85

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