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Using and Extending Vega




       David Mirza, Subgraph
             Montreal




         www.subgraph.com
Introduction
                  Who We Are

   Open-source security startup
   Based in Montreal
   Experienced founders:
    • Secure Networks Inc.
    • SecurityFocus (Symantec)
    • Core Security Technologies
    • Netifera
    • REcon
                     www.subgraph.com
Open Source and Security
 Kerckhoffs’ principle
     Auguste Kerckhoffs: 19th Century Dutch
      linguist and cryptographer
     Made an important realization:



      “
      “
       “The security of any cryptographic
         The security of any cryptographic system does
        system doessecrecy, it in itsbe able to fall
         not rest in its
                         not rest must secrecy, it
        mustthe enemy’s hands without inconvenience.
         into be able to fall into the enemy’s
        hands without inconvenience”
       The adversary knows the system (Claude
         The adversary knows the system
        Shannon)              (Claude Shannon)
                                                 ”
                                                 ”
     As opposed to “security through
      obscurity”
                           www.subgraph.com
Open Source and Security
 Kerckhoffs’ Principle
      Well understood in the world of
       cryptography
      New ciphers not trusted
    Because cryptography is a
     “black box”
    Once in a while, less now,
     companies try to market
     proprietary ciphers
        There’s a term for this: “snake oil”
      Kerckhoffs’ principle can be
       understood as “open source is
       good security”


                              www.subgraph.com
Commercial Web Security Software
 Advantages
     Ease of installation, upgrade, use
     User experience
     Quality assurance, bug fixes
     Documentation and help
     Development driven by demand and need
 Disadvantages
     Expensive
     Sometimes bizarre licensing restrictions
     EOL, acquisitions, other events
     Proprietary / closed source



                                 www.subgraph.com
Open Source Web Security Tools
 Let’s just talk about disadvantages..
     No integration / sharing between tools
     Poor or non-existent UI, documentation / help
     Painful, broken installations
   Code is of inconsistent quality
   Developer / contributor unreliability
   Developer interest driven by interest, skill level, whim
   Forks
   Abandonment 
        Developer finished college, got a job
        Successfully reproduced



                            www.subgraph.com
i hurt



                      myself



                       today

    www.subgraph.com
Our Vision
 One web, one web security tool
    Open source
    Consistent, well-designed UI
    Functions really well as an automated scanner
         Shouldn’t need to be a penetration tester
         Advanced features for those who are
      User extensibility
         Community
      Plus all that boring stuff
         Documentation, help, business friendly features
 We are building the ultimate platform for web security
    Rapidly prototype attacks
    Nobody should have to use commercial tools
         Because Vega is free



                                 www.subgraph.com
Introducing Vega Platform


                ‣ Open-source web application
                  vulnerability assessment platform
                ‣ Easy to use Graphical Interface
                ‣ Works on Windows, Mac, Linux
                ‣ Automated scanner, attacking proxy
                  finds vulnerabilities
                ‣ Based on Eclipse RCP
                ‣ Extensible: Javascript – language
                  every web developer knows
                ‣ Shipped first release July 1
                ‣ EPL 1.0
         www.subgraph.com
Vega is Built On:

Eclipse RCP / Equinox OSGi
Apache HC
JSoup
Mozilla Rhino
Eliteness




                 www.subgraph.com
Automated Scanner
 Recursive crawl over target scope
 404 detection
 Probes path nodes to determine if files, directories
 Builds tree-like internal representation of target
  application
     Vega runs injection modules on nodes, abstracted in API
 Response processing modules run on all responses
 Modules written in Javascript
 New for 1.0
   Expanded scope, more than one base URI
   Support for authentication: HTTP, form-based, NTLM
   Much better scanner modules
   Very annoying crawler bugs fixed 
                          www.subgraph.com
Vega Automated Scanner




       www.subgraph.com
Start new scan and choose
 some of these modules:




                        www.subgraph.com
Which are each one of these..




         www.subgraph.com
Modules produce
 vulnerability
   reports:




                  www.subgraph.com
..which are based on these:




  Vega is very extensible.

         www.subgraph.com
Request /
response pair




                www.subgraph.com
Can be reviewed / replayed, module
         highlights finding




              www.subgraph.com
Vega Proxy
 Intercepting proxy
 SSL MITM, including CA signing cert
     http://vega/ca.crt through the proxy
 Edit requests, responses
 Request replay
 Response processing modules run on all responses
 Modules written in Javascript
 New for 1.0
   Proxy scanning
   Fuzzes pages in target scope when enabled
   Finds lots of vulnerabilities 




                          www.subgraph.com
Browser proxy
configuration:




                 www.subgraph.com
General proxy use. Green “play” button
     enables proxy, red stops it.




             www.subgraph.com
Configuring a Breakpoint




      www.subgraph.com
Intercepted Request




    www.subgraph.com
SSL MITM: Magic proxy URI




      www.subgraph.com
Proxy Scanning
Gathers parameters and path information
 observing client-server interaction
Sees things the crawler can’t see
   RPC endpoints
   Links in flash,   Java, other active content
Very effective at finding vulnerabilities
To try it, configure the proxy, create a
 proxy target scope, enable proxy scanning

                        www.subgraph.com
Configure a target scope




              www.subgraph.com
Enable Proxy Scanning




Alert Notification Icon, aka SQL Injection Blinker




                           www.subgraph.com
Proxy Scanner Alerts




    www.subgraph.com
Demo




   (1.0!)




www.subgraph.com
Extending Vega
Modules written in Javascript
In the Vega/scripts/ subdirectory tree
   Well on OS X they’re in some weird place

Two kinds of modules:
    Injection, AKA “Basic”
      Send fuzzing requests, do stuff with the responses
    Response processing
      Pattern matching, regex, checking response
       properties
                      www.subgraph.com
Extending Vega
Rich API
   Check documentation   at
    https://support.subgraph.com
DOM Analysis with Jquery
   E.g. file
           upload, password input submitted
    over HTTP..
Alerts based on XML templates
   In the XML/ subdirectory

Freemarker Macro / CSS components
                   www.subgraph.com
Where are we at?
 Feature complete for 1.0
 Testing and fixing bugs
 Additional module refinement and testing
 Vega 1.0 release in November? Or early December
 Visit my github (or github.com/brl) if you want what you
  see here
      Download link on our website is the beta..

 Can provide builds for OS X, Windows users
      Just ask me – email, irc (#subgraph / freenode), twitter, whatever




                              www.subgraph.com
What’s coming?
 Even more improvements in detections
 Fuzzer / brute forcer
 Better reporting
 Better encoding, decoding, representation and
  manipulation of structured data
 Headless scanner
 HAR export
 Scriptable proxy
 We’re open to ideas and feedback!

                          www.subgraph.com
Thank you!




 Web                                         Try Vega / get the source
       http://www.subgraph.com                   http://github.com/dma/Vega (newer,
                                                   less stable)
 Twitter
                                                  http://github.com/subgraph/Vega
    Us: @subgraph                                 (more stable)
    Me: @attractr
                                              E-mail us
 IRC                                               info@subgraph.com
       irc.freenode.org, #subgraph




                                      www.subgraph.com

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Subgraph vega countermeasure2012

  • 1. Using and Extending Vega David Mirza, Subgraph Montreal www.subgraph.com
  • 2. Introduction Who We Are  Open-source security startup  Based in Montreal  Experienced founders: • Secure Networks Inc. • SecurityFocus (Symantec) • Core Security Technologies • Netifera • REcon www.subgraph.com
  • 3. Open Source and Security  Kerckhoffs’ principle  Auguste Kerckhoffs: 19th Century Dutch linguist and cryptographer  Made an important realization: “ “  “The security of any cryptographic The security of any cryptographic system does system doessecrecy, it in itsbe able to fall not rest in its not rest must secrecy, it mustthe enemy’s hands without inconvenience. into be able to fall into the enemy’s hands without inconvenience”  The adversary knows the system (Claude The adversary knows the system Shannon) (Claude Shannon) ” ”  As opposed to “security through obscurity” www.subgraph.com
  • 4. Open Source and Security  Kerckhoffs’ Principle  Well understood in the world of cryptography  New ciphers not trusted  Because cryptography is a “black box”  Once in a while, less now, companies try to market proprietary ciphers  There’s a term for this: “snake oil”  Kerckhoffs’ principle can be understood as “open source is good security” www.subgraph.com
  • 5. Commercial Web Security Software  Advantages  Ease of installation, upgrade, use  User experience  Quality assurance, bug fixes  Documentation and help  Development driven by demand and need  Disadvantages  Expensive  Sometimes bizarre licensing restrictions  EOL, acquisitions, other events  Proprietary / closed source www.subgraph.com
  • 6. Open Source Web Security Tools  Let’s just talk about disadvantages..  No integration / sharing between tools  Poor or non-existent UI, documentation / help  Painful, broken installations  Code is of inconsistent quality  Developer / contributor unreliability  Developer interest driven by interest, skill level, whim  Forks  Abandonment   Developer finished college, got a job  Successfully reproduced www.subgraph.com
  • 7. i hurt  myself today www.subgraph.com
  • 8. Our Vision  One web, one web security tool  Open source  Consistent, well-designed UI  Functions really well as an automated scanner  Shouldn’t need to be a penetration tester  Advanced features for those who are  User extensibility  Community  Plus all that boring stuff  Documentation, help, business friendly features  We are building the ultimate platform for web security  Rapidly prototype attacks  Nobody should have to use commercial tools  Because Vega is free www.subgraph.com
  • 9. Introducing Vega Platform ‣ Open-source web application vulnerability assessment platform ‣ Easy to use Graphical Interface ‣ Works on Windows, Mac, Linux ‣ Automated scanner, attacking proxy finds vulnerabilities ‣ Based on Eclipse RCP ‣ Extensible: Javascript – language every web developer knows ‣ Shipped first release July 1 ‣ EPL 1.0 www.subgraph.com
  • 10. Vega is Built On: Eclipse RCP / Equinox OSGi Apache HC JSoup Mozilla Rhino Eliteness www.subgraph.com
  • 11. Automated Scanner  Recursive crawl over target scope  404 detection  Probes path nodes to determine if files, directories  Builds tree-like internal representation of target application  Vega runs injection modules on nodes, abstracted in API  Response processing modules run on all responses  Modules written in Javascript  New for 1.0  Expanded scope, more than one base URI  Support for authentication: HTTP, form-based, NTLM  Much better scanner modules  Very annoying crawler bugs fixed  www.subgraph.com
  • 12. Vega Automated Scanner www.subgraph.com
  • 13. Start new scan and choose some of these modules: www.subgraph.com
  • 14. Which are each one of these.. www.subgraph.com
  • 15. Modules produce vulnerability reports: www.subgraph.com
  • 16. ..which are based on these: Vega is very extensible. www.subgraph.com
  • 17. Request / response pair www.subgraph.com
  • 18. Can be reviewed / replayed, module highlights finding www.subgraph.com
  • 19. Vega Proxy  Intercepting proxy  SSL MITM, including CA signing cert  http://vega/ca.crt through the proxy  Edit requests, responses  Request replay  Response processing modules run on all responses  Modules written in Javascript  New for 1.0  Proxy scanning  Fuzzes pages in target scope when enabled  Finds lots of vulnerabilities  www.subgraph.com
  • 20. Browser proxy configuration: www.subgraph.com
  • 21. General proxy use. Green “play” button enables proxy, red stops it. www.subgraph.com
  • 22. Configuring a Breakpoint www.subgraph.com
  • 23. Intercepted Request www.subgraph.com
  • 24. SSL MITM: Magic proxy URI www.subgraph.com
  • 25. Proxy Scanning Gathers parameters and path information observing client-server interaction Sees things the crawler can’t see  RPC endpoints  Links in flash, Java, other active content Very effective at finding vulnerabilities To try it, configure the proxy, create a proxy target scope, enable proxy scanning www.subgraph.com
  • 26. Configure a target scope www.subgraph.com
  • 27. Enable Proxy Scanning Alert Notification Icon, aka SQL Injection Blinker www.subgraph.com
  • 28. Proxy Scanner Alerts www.subgraph.com
  • 29. Demo (1.0!) www.subgraph.com
  • 30. Extending Vega Modules written in Javascript In the Vega/scripts/ subdirectory tree  Well on OS X they’re in some weird place Two kinds of modules:  Injection, AKA “Basic”  Send fuzzing requests, do stuff with the responses  Response processing  Pattern matching, regex, checking response properties www.subgraph.com
  • 31. Extending Vega Rich API  Check documentation at https://support.subgraph.com DOM Analysis with Jquery  E.g. file upload, password input submitted over HTTP.. Alerts based on XML templates  In the XML/ subdirectory Freemarker Macro / CSS components www.subgraph.com
  • 32. Where are we at?  Feature complete for 1.0  Testing and fixing bugs  Additional module refinement and testing  Vega 1.0 release in November? Or early December  Visit my github (or github.com/brl) if you want what you see here  Download link on our website is the beta..  Can provide builds for OS X, Windows users  Just ask me – email, irc (#subgraph / freenode), twitter, whatever www.subgraph.com
  • 33. What’s coming?  Even more improvements in detections  Fuzzer / brute forcer  Better reporting  Better encoding, decoding, representation and manipulation of structured data  Headless scanner  HAR export  Scriptable proxy  We’re open to ideas and feedback! www.subgraph.com
  • 34. Thank you!  Web  Try Vega / get the source  http://www.subgraph.com  http://github.com/dma/Vega (newer, less stable)  Twitter  http://github.com/subgraph/Vega  Us: @subgraph (more stable)  Me: @attractr  E-mail us  IRC  info@subgraph.com  irc.freenode.org, #subgraph www.subgraph.com