Grassroots Constitucional Politics in Iceland

Grassroots available at:
Constitutional blokkerpaul.
Politics in Iceland wordpress.com

Grassroots Constitutional Politics in Iceland
Paul Blokker
January 2012

Iceland has recently embarked on an experimental form of constitution-making
from below. Iceland is in this a rare – in distinct ways probably unique - example
of a popular or citizen-driven constitutionalism. This participatory approach in
many ways challenges core assumptions of mainstream, modernist
understandings of constitutionalism, such as the idea of constitutionalism as a
social phenomenon and practice dominated by legal professionals or that of
constitutions as higher laws that are near to impossible to change. At the same
time, the Icelandic experience brings to the fore many questions that popular or
democratic constitutionalism raises as an alternative understanding and practice
of constitutionalism, not least related to the modes and effectiveness of
participation, the notion of representation in the constitution-making process,
the role of deliberation, as well as the actual, substantive results of participatory
constitution-making.

Recent debates among experts of constitutionalism have centered for a good part on the
tension between the constitution as a higher law, on the one hand, and democracy,
politics, and civic participation, on the other. While some argue that there is no tension
between constitutions and democracy, since the former provide the necessary
prerogatives for the latter1, many observers see a strong tension between the legalist idea
of higher laws (i.e., laws that are particularly difficult to revise), including the ideas of
entrenched rights and the guardianship of constitutions by means of judicial review, and
democratic politics inspired by the idea of popular sovereignty.2 The latter would include
the idea of the governed being able to give themselves their own laws. Those emphasizing
the civic-democratic dimensions of constitutions often take a very different view of the
role of the constitution in democratic societies than that of a legalistic perception of a
higher law.3 Rather than providing the fundamental parameters for democratic regimes,
constitutions are seen as vehicles of public participation and debate, as well as of social
integration. James Tully, for instance, endorses what he calls “democratic
constitutionalism”, a form of constitutionalism that endorses “the freedom of the
members of an open society to change the constitutional rules of mutual recognition and
association from time to time as their identities change”.4 An important component in
democratic constitutionalism is an emphasis on the possibility of the members of a

1
See, e.g., Dworkin 1995.
2
See, e.g., Bellamy 2007.
3
I have discussed this debate concisely in Blokker 2011.
4
Tully 2001: 5, 6.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990463


political community to themselves change their fundamental rules of association.5 As also
Allan Hutchinson and Joel I. Colón-Ríos have recently argued: “from a democratist
standpoint, the merit of a constitution is to be found not so much in its longevity and its
force towards stability, but in its capacity for both democratic participation and
constitutional transformation. It is not only whether people can take part in constitutional
decision-making, but how easily, how often, and how actively they can do so; there must
be adequate mechanisms and processes in place to maximize these opportunities”.6

Until recently, the importance of the idea of democratic constitutionalism could be
observed almost exclusively in democratizing countries in Latin America and Africa, in
which in the last two decades or so quite some constitution-making processes have
witnessed innovative forms of inclusive, participatory constitutional politics. These
societies often have had to deal with the legacies of authoritarian pasts and forms of deep
(ethnic) divisions. Since 2008, however, what is by many regarded as an advanced and
thoroughly consolidated democratic regime, if not one of the most wealthy countries in
the world, has embarked on what in some of its facets might be seen as the most radical
form of democratic constitutionalism “in action”. An enduring series of civic protests has
involved a strong critique of not only the political establishment’s handling of the
economic crisis and its run-up, and forced the government to resign in early 2009. Civic
resistance has also called for a revision of the ground rules of the Icelandic democratic
community.7 One of the more immediate results of the so-called pots and pans
revolution8 in Iceland has been an original attempt at rewriting the Icelandic constitution
by means of popular constitution-making.

Some facets of the current constitution-making process in Iceland can be understood as
unique, but at the same time, so I believe, the process highlights significant and more
general tensions intrinsic to modern constitutionalism. Such tensions can equally be
observed – even if in different ways - in other so-called advanced (as well as in some new)
democratic societies, and thus are of wider significance, beyond the in many ways peculiar
case of the current Icelandic “moral revolution”. Such constitutional frictions might be
understood as forms of what I call “constitutional anomie”, that is, a distance between

5
Another relevant project is that on constituent power of the Italian scholar Antonio Negri. With regard to
the possibility of a constituent power of progressive political forces, he notes: “the third point on the basis
of which an alternative left needs to organize its constituent capacity consists in the overcoming of political
representation as a profession… The expansion of the instruments of direct democracy is fundamental and
can only expand towards the inclusion of the themes of the security of the life in common and the functions
of protection and control of both privacy and social relations. It is clear that also the functions of the
judiciary are to be opened up to direct democracy, removing the illusion that a professional legal apparatus
could have guaranteed independence and farsightedness in the face of economic privilege and social
superiority’ (Hardt & Negri 2011; my translation).
6
Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos 2011: 18.
7
See for a recent description of the protests, Bater 2011.
8
See http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10735.



existing, institutionalized constitutional orders, on the one hand, and wider societal
perceptions, interpretations and tendencies, on the other.9 Constitutional anomie10 can be
seen as indicating forms of constitutional failure.11 One form of constitutional anomie that
manifests itself in the Icelandic case is that of the idea that the constitution is archaic and
obsolete, and does not provide the adequate means to regulate democratic society.12 A
second form is the idea that the current Constitution does not provide adequate moral
guidance to the Icelandic community and does not reflect its key values.13 Another
dimension of constitutional anomie relates to the idea of self-governance and legitimacy,
which in the Icelandic case boils down to the view that the current constitution is not of
the Icelanders’ own making. Yet another – related - dimension of constitutional anomie is
the idea that it should be the people itself that actively gives the political community its
fundamental rules, or at least should have democratic channels to be able to participate in
the formulation of fundamental rules; in this case, the Icelandic people deliberating and
formulating the ground rules of the Icelandic democratic community.14 These are some of
the tensional dimensions that play a role in the current civic constitution-making process
in Iceland, which, I believe, are of wider significance for other democratic societies in
which the role of constitutionalism is being debated.

Constitutional Politics in Iceland
The Icelandic Constitution15 has since its adoption in 1944 been understood as a transitory
document by many, even if this status has never translated into wholesale revision or
substitution of the document. A parliamentary committee set up for the purpose has
never been able to gather sufficiently widespread support for changing the 1944
9
For an early elaboration, see Blokker 2010.
10
See http://www.ecprnet.eu/MyECPR/proposals/reykjavik/uploads/papers/3802.pdf.
11
See http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i9351.pdf.
12
This is an aspect that is for instance also discussed in the case of the Netherlands, where some view the
language of the 1814 Constitution as out of touch with current times. Also the far-going changes in the
British constitutional system were to some extent inspired by the idea that the traditional system of
common law was out of touch with the challenges of modern times.
13
In a kind of negative comparison, it could be argued that moral guidance also plays an important role in
the current Hungarian “constitutional counter-revolution”. See for one recent statement, Scheppele 2011,
available at: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/hungarys-constitutional-revolution/.
14
There are other examples of “advanced” democracies where this dimension has recently come into play.
Some of the inspiration for the constitutional changes in the British case is to be found in the idea of
democratic participation, while also in the Netherlands some have argued along these lines: ”In een
volwaardige parlementaire democratie maakt het volk zelf zijn Grondwet.” [In a fully fledged parliamentary
democracy, the people makes its own Constitution] (see http://www.nieuwegrondwet.nl/). Also the (failed)
European attempt at constitution-making was evidently driven by an idea of public deliberation and civic
participation. One of the main protagonists of the constitutionalization of Europe, and proponent of the idea
of ‘constitutional patriotism’ in which civic participation plays a fundamental role, Juergen Habermas,
currently warns for the dangers of excluding the citizens from a European ‘post-democratic politics’
(Habermas 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/10/jurgen-habermas-
europe-post-democratic).
15
See http://www.government.is/constitution/.



Constitution.16 The perception of the constitution’s transitory nature results inter alia
from it having been de facto adopted in an emergency situation (the Second World War)
in which only the minimally necessary changes were made to transform Iceland from a
country dependent on the Danish monarchy into an independent republic. Another aspect
that fed into the idea of the constitution’s transitory nature is the fact that it is largely
based on the Danish constitution and thus does not reflect the autonomy of the Icelandic
political community. Things have changed radically with the 2008 economic crisis and its
devastating effects for the Icelandic economy. One admirable consequence of this crisis
has been the attempt at political-moral renewal through the reformulation of the
fundamental values of the Icelandic constitutional regime. The story of the Icelandic
constitutional “revolution from below” is clearly a unique but at the same time conflictive
process, which raises complex questions about constitutional change and innovation. A
good part of the thrust for political and constitutional renewal came from the Icelandic
population, that is, from individual dissenting citizens, intellectuals, and civic
organizations.17 One key early activist and initiator of the revolution was Hördur
Torfason,18 a musician, songwriter, and human rights activist. People of a variety of
backgrounds, representing various ideas and groups, such as for instance anarchists,
brought in different justifications to engage in the “pots and pans revolution”,19 which

16
One serious attempt of creating a new draft has been made, but the constitution was never implemented.
The fact that the Icelandic Constitution has never been widely revised probably has also to do with the
difficulty of doing so. As Article 79 states: “Proposals to amend or supplement this Constitution may be
introduced at regular as well as extraordinary sessions of Althingi [Icelandic Parliament, pb]. If the proposal
is adopted, Althingi shall immediately be dissolved and a general election held. If Althingi then passes the
resolution unchanged, it shall be confirmed by the President of the Republic and come into force as
constitutional law”.
17
The grassroots movement was perhaps not in all facets a spontaneous popular reaction to the crisis. It
would in this be worthy to study the variegated composition of the popular protests. As one member of the
Constitutional Council, whom I interviewed in August 2011, argued, an important role was played by more
‘elitist’ persons, including academics and writers, who clearly had more familiarity with acting in the public
sphere.
18
Se, e.g., http://grapevine.is/Features/ReadArticle/You-Cannot-Put--Rules-On-Love.
19
A particularly significant and alarming episode regards an early eruption of protest in December 2008,
when some 30 dissenting citizens set out to use their constitutional right to publicly assist at a parliamentary
session in the House of Parliament, with the intent to publicly read a critical declaration, but were stopped
by a policeman and guards. Nine persons were arrested and face heavy charges (from 1 to 16 years of
imprisonment), not least on the basis of being charged with violation of section 100 of the penal code which
stipulates that anyone found guilty of “attacking the sovereignty of Parliament” will be sentenced to a
minimum of 1 year imprisonment. In February 2011, the Reykjavik District’s Court ruled that four dissenters
were found guilty of minor charges, and five not guilty (see:
http://www.grapevine.is/News/ReadArticle/Reykjavik-Nine-Convictions-For-Some-Acquittal-For-Others).
The law case against the “Reykjavik 9” has led to widespread public criticism (see: http://www.rvk9.org/in-
english/), expressions of solidarity (see: http://www.rvk9.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Support-the-
Reykjavik-Nine.pdf), and a recent documentary highlighting the absurdity of the charges (see:
http://send.perspiredbyiceland.com/en).


consisted in enduring protests and extensive resistance to the political establishment as
well as critique of the status quo.

An early manifestation of civic action was the organization of a National Assembly20 or
national “brainstorming session” by the so-called Anthill movement, a collective of
grassroots movements, in November 2009. The aim of this event was to discuss the future
and main defining values of Iceland (the slogan of the event read: “National Convention -
a date with the future"). Organizers included Gudjón Mar Gudjónsson, a young
entrepreneur with extensive ICT skills, and creator of the Ministry of Ideas, a civic
movement promoting participatory democracy. Of the participants of the National
Assembly, 1,200 were randomly selected from the Icelandic census, and 300 were
deliberately selected from among political institutions and relevant associations. The
highly innovative format – small, modified group discussions identifying main themes and
core values, which were then voted on in the plenary - led to the identification of a
number of themes and values that were to designate an Iceland of the future. The nine
themes that were identified as particularly significant for Iceland were: Education,
Economy, Equal Rights, Family, Environment, Public Administration, Welfare,
Sustainability, and Opportunities. The four core values that were identified were:
Integrity, Equal Rights, Justice, and Respect. While these outcomes might seem abstract
and general, and contain a highly universalistic flavour (and thus not necessarily
identifying purely Icelandic ideals), the importance of the event lay probably much more
in the deliberative and civic-participatory nature of the session. In other words, one of the
underlying themes was clearly the need for a politics from below - in contrast to elite and
institutionalized politics - as an answer to the various political failures and forms of
negligence that were at the basis of the economic crisis of 2008. In this, the event became
an important inspiration for those who favoured the idea of constitution-making as a way
to address the crisis and to provide Iceland with a new and citizen-driven and locally
engendered set of fundamental rules and values.

It should be mentioned that the transitory nature of the Icelandic constitution provided,
however, not only fertile ground for a grassroots revolution, but it also reignited a political
project for constitutional revision, as some distinct political forces had been endorsing a
project of constitutional change for some time. In particular, the new prime minister,
Johanna Sigurdardottir (Social Democratic Alliance), who heads the centre-left
government that came to power in April 2009 - after the collapse in January 2009 of the
prior, conservative government (headed by the Independent Party) - had been pressing
for constitutional reform for years. The new government’s agenda included the idea of
establishing a special Constitutional Council which was to revise the Icelandic Constitution.

20
See http://www.thjodfundur2009.is/english/.


A bill to this extent was submitted to parliament, and adopted in June 2010 after
extensive debate.21

The Act on the Constitutional Assembly (ACA)22 that was adopted in June 2010 not only
stipulated the election and mandate of a Constitutional Council but also proposed a
Constitutional Gathering on constitutional matters, a one-day civic-participatory event to
be held before the elections of the Constitutional Council, and to be prepared by a
constitutional committee of seven members.23 The Act stated that the ‘National Gathering
shall endeavour to call for the principal viewpoints and points of emphasis of the public
concerning the organization of the country’s government and its constitution; the
committee shall process the information collected at the National Gathering and deliver
to the Constitutional Assembly when it convenes’ (Interim Provision/Act 2010). The
National Gathering was thus to gather information among citizens regarding the main
themes and core values for a new constitution. In this, the National Gathering was clearly
strongly inspired by the November 2009 Assembly, which also came through in the
cooperation in the Gathering’s organization by members of Anthill. The originality and
unprecedented nature of the whole process lies clearly in the explicit emphasis on
citizens’ driven constitutional reform, a form of ‘crowd-sourcing’ in the form of a civic
brain-storming session, and the explicit exclusion of members of political parties to
participate in either the National Gathering or to stand for elections for the Constitutional
Council. The citizen-driven constitutional revision process is unique in any established
democratic society (other recent innovative, civic examples of constitution-making regard
Latin American as well as African countries, but not North-American or European ones).24
The constitutional dimension that is clearly played on is the idea of self-governance and a
perception of constitutionalism which understands civic participation as a necessity in
order for a constitution to become a vibrant reflection of a political community’s political
imaginary and self-understanding.

21
Main arguments against the undertaking of revising the constitution were its inappropriateness in times of
crisis and an insistence on the parliament’s prerogatives in constitutional politics, see Thorarensen 2011.
22
See http://thjodfundur2010.is/other_files/2010/doc/Act-on-a-Constitutional-Assembly.pdf.
23
The chair of the constitutional committee recently gave an informative talk on the constitution-making
experience, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AiO9oNbpN14&feature=relmfu.
24
Switzerland is a partial exception in that 50,000 citizens can initiate a revision of the constitution (IDEA
2006). Even if the ‘fear of the masses’ with regard to constitution-making processes is now much less
outspoken than in the immediate post-WWII years (IDEA 2006), and public participation of some form is
now widely endorsed, in particular in the case of democratizing and post-conflict societies, in most cases
civic participation takes the form of consultation (the Kenian National Constitutional Conference is one
example of an inclusive, but not citizen-driven assembly). The Icelandic case has the potential to be unique
(depending in a way on what happens with the Draft Constitution produced by the Constitutional Council) in
that the Constituent Assembly is made up of the “people” rather than politicians and/or experts.


The Constitutional Gathering25 was held on 6 November 2010, organized amongst others
by Agora,26 a non-profit organization headed by the aforementioned Gudjón Mar
Gudjónsson. 950 randomly selected Icelanders participated in the event, and discussed
fundamental values and distinct constitutional categories in 128 roundtables. The main
themes that resulted from the roundtables were based on “word clouds” which
themselves reflected those themes mentioned most frequently by individual participants.
The outcome was the identification of eight main themes for a new Icelandic constitution
(country and nation; morality; human rights; justice, well-being and equality; the nature of
Iceland, conservation and utilization; democracy; division of power, responsibility and
transparency, and peace and international cooperation). These themes were then to be
one of the bases of the deliberations of the Constitutional Council. This Council was
elected on 27 November, when 37 percent of the Icelandic electorate selected up to 25
candidates among 522 self-enlisted candidates by means of a proportional STV system.
The elections had been advertised by the National Electoral Commission twenty-four days
earlier, while mostly modest campaigns had been held by the candidates (their campaign
money could not exceed 12.500 Euro). The novelty of these elections clearly lay in the
explicit exclusion of politicians from candidature and the idea of establishing a purely
citizen-based constituent assembly. Article 6 of the ACA on eligibility read “[p]ersons who
qualify to stand for elections to the Althing may stand for election to the Constitutional
Assembly. However, the President of the Republic of Iceland, members of parliament,
their alternates, cabinet ministers and members of the Constitutional Commission and the
Organising Committee are not eligible to stand for the election”. One senses a flavour
here of “anti-political politics” as it emerged for instance in the 1970s and 80s in East-
Central Europe. An important aspect of such a view of politics is the idea of the self-
empowerment and responsibility of citizens.27 There were, however, major problems with
the elections, in that the turn-out was particularly low (normal national elections see turn-
outs of around 85%) and, at least according to some skeptical observers (probably
exaggerating somewhat), procedures had been far from flawless. The latter led to
complaints to an ad hoc, executive committee of the Supreme Court, which suggested to
annul the elections on 25 January 2011. In this very insecure situation for the
Constitutional Council, the parliament decided after heated debate to install a
Constitutional Council by means of parliamentary appointment. The ACA was in this
repealed.

Clearly, the set of intricate events has weakened the social legitimacy of the Constitutional
Council, starting with the low turn-out and ending with the Council’s political appointment
rather than its popular election. Nevertheless, the Council started its work in April 2011 on
the basis of a wide range of materials, including the conclusions of the National Gathering,

25
See http://stjornlagarad.is/english/.
26
See http://agora.is/
27
See e.g. Falk 2011.


a detailed report by the seven-member Constitutional Committee which had also been set
up in the ACA, and an extensive electronic database provided by the latter. One could
argue that part of the civic-participatory potential was in part recuperated (and it should
not be forgotten that the members of the Council were indeed ordinary citizens or at least
non-politicians or constitutional lawyers) by means of an exceptionally open and
transparent mode of working. The Council had an active website28 as well as Facebook
page,29 which could be used by citizens to provide comments and suggestions, while draft
proposals were posted on line. Citizens could thus closely follow the evolution of the
debate on the constitution. What is more, active usage was being made of the afore-
mentioned Facebook, as well as of Twitter, Youtube,30 and Flickr. The whole process has
clearly been very innovative and open, even if the argument that this was an example of
“crowd-sourcing”, made by many a foreign journalist,31 appears to be not accurate as the
taking up of citizens’ comments in the final draft seems to have been ultimately fairly
limited and the wider role of the public was mostly consultative rather than truly
participative.

Moving from the process of constitution-making to the substance of the actual draft,32 it
seems fair to say that although there are a number of civic-democratic channels that have
been included in the constitution, the overall nature of the text – including the civic-
participatory dimension - does not differ drastically from many other constitutions in
Europe.33 The most conspicuous aspects regard the articles 32-36, which deal with the
preservation of Icelandic cultural heritage and treat the natural resources as common
property. It is interesting to observe, in this respect, that the radically participative and
grassroots form of constitution-making has in this case not led to the adoption of a
radically participatory form of democracy in constitutional terms. The most radical
proposals in civic-participatory terms can be found in the articles 65 and 66. Article 65
gives the possibility to organize a petition by at least 10 % of the electorate to call for a
referendum on legislation passed by the parliament.34 Article 66 gives the possibility for 2
% of the electorate to submit an item on the parliamentary agenda, while 10% of the

28
See http://stjornlagarad.is/english/.
29
See https://www.facebook.com/Stjornlagarad.
30
See http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=stjornlagarad&oq=stjornlagarad&aq=f&aqi=&aql=
&gs_sm=s&gs_upl=0l0l0l11162923l0l0l0l0l0l0l0l0ll0l0.
31
See, e.g., The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/09/iceland-crowdsourcing-
constitution-facebook.
32
Available at: http://stjornarskrarfelagid.is/english/constitutional-bill/.
33
The Constitutional Council took into account many European constitutions in its deliberations.
34
By way of comparison, article 75 of the Italian constitution allows for citizen-initiated referenda: “A
general referendum may be held to repeal, in whole or in part, a law or a measure having the force of law,
when so requested by five hundred thousand voters or five Regional Councils” (available at:
http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf).


electorate may submit a legislative bill to the parliament.35 Article 113 dealing with
constitutional revision introduces an obligatory referendum regarding constitutional
amendments. While the civic-participatory thrust of these articles seems clear, at the
same time, the draft constitution introduces a novel legalistic element: an institution
resembling a constitutional court (the Lögrétta) with ex ante powers. This institution can
be asked for an opinion on the constitutionality of legislative bills by the parliament or
parliamentary committees. This could be seen – at least in theoretical terms - as in partial
tension with the parliamentary democratic form mentioned in article 1 and the civic-
participatory dimension of the articles 65 and 66.

The draft constitution has been consigned to the Icelandic Parliament in July 2011 and is
now pending. The Constitutional Council responsible for the draft has emphasized that it
has been adopted in full consensus36 within the council and has called for a referendum
on the draft. In October, the prime-minister has indeed suggested a public consultation37
on the draft constitution, to be held together with the Presidential elections scheduled for
June 2012. On 16 January, also the chairman of the parliamentary constitutional and
supervisory committee,38 which has been examining the draft since the autumn of 2011,
has argued that it is not unlikely that the text will be put to a national referendum. The
Icelandic parliament will not debate and vote on the draft before the autumn of 2012. Be
that as it may, the formal adoption procedure would be the one outlined in article 79 of
the current constitution.

What is clear is that – even in the worst-case-scenario in which the draft constitution is
ultimately dismissed by the Icelandic Parliament39 - the constitution-making process has

35
By way of comparison, article 71 in the Italian constitution allows for popular bills: “The people may
initiate legislation by proposing a bill drawn up in sections and signed by at least fifty-thousand voters”.
36
The consensual basis of the draft might enhance its legitimacy, but might also indicate a reason for the
lack of a radical democratic dimension of the draft. In other words, a more general problem of deliberation
might have come into play, that is, a “taming” scenario in which radical dissenting views ultimately succumb
to the more conservative views of a majority.
37
See http://www.rvk9.org/2011/02/16/what-does-the-ruling-entail/http:/www.icenews.is/index.php
/2011/10/05/icelandic-pm-wants-public-vote-on-new-constitution/.
38
See http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2012/01/16/29504/
39
Much depends on the favourable attitude of the governing parties, aided by support of members of the
opposition. Also the way in which the draft will ultimately be dealt with is obviously of great importance,
that is, the adoption of a largely unrevised text, or, alternatively, the more or less extensive revision of the
draft according to expert opinions and parliamentary considerations. A complete rejection of the
constitutional draft seems not likely, in that a revision of the constitution was a campaign promise of in
particular the Social-Democrats. As one of the members of the Constitutional Council put it in an interview
with me at the end of August 2011, as long as the current government remains in power, some impact of
the constitutional project seems likely. This member of the Council also pointed, however, to important
problems with regard to the legitimacy of the Council (badly harmed by the allegedly flawed elections), and,
one might add, the potential frictions resulting from what some see as a lack of cooperation between the
Council and the parliament.


been innovative and in many ways unprecedented, and will undoubtedly have important
repercussions for Icelandic democracy. One example of this is the formation of a new
political party,40 which includes members of the Civic Movement, and endorses a new
constitution reflecting the draft. But the experiment clearly also entails wider lessons
regarding the role of constitutions, and of citizen participation, in contemporary
democracies. The whole process of Icelandic grassroots constitution-making has been
original in its civic-participatory nature and in its explicit rejection of formal political
interference. While not living up to more radical expectations of civic involvement, the
process did raise the interest and participation of the wider citizenry (e.g., written
comments submitted through the new media totaled 3600, while suggestions added up to
approximately 370). And despite the lack of a radical-democratic dimension in the new
draft, the text is clearly an improvement, not least with regard to civic-participatory
channels. The draft addresses a number the issues I have indicated with the notion of
constitutional anomie: a more up-to-date, clearly and accessible written text; the attempt
to reconstitute a dimension of moral guidance to the constitution; the attempt to enhance
a substantive participatory dimension in constitutional terms; and finally, in terms of the
draft’s making, the reflection of autonomy and self-governance through an Icelandic,
citizen-driven constituent convention.

References
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Blokker, P. (2011), ‘Modern Constitutionalism and the Challenges of Complex Pluralism’, in: G.
Delanty and S. Turner (eds), The Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and
Political Theory, Routledge.

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Falk, B. (2011), ‘Between past and future. Central European dissent in historical perspective’,
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40
See http://grapevine.is/Home/ReadArticle/Broad-Alliance-To-Form.


Habermas, J. (2011), ‘Europe's post-democratic era. The monopolisation of the EU by political
elites risks reducing a sense of civic solidarity that's crucial to the European project’, The
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IDEA (2006), Participation in Constitution Making, available at:
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