Myanmar's Kachin state and the illicit economy fueled by natural resource conflicts

10/10/2017 Myanmar’s Kachin state at the heart of illicit economy
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Myanmar
Myanmar’s Kachin state at the heart of illicit economy
JUNE 23, 2014 by Ben Marino in Laiza, Myanmar
As the convoy of trucks laden with precious Burmese teak and sandalwood snakes its way into China from Myanmar, it comes
perilously close to a ravine in the Himalayan foothills of Yunnan province.
The caravan of timber being transported to China hails from Myanmar’s lawless northern state of Kachin. The resource-rich region
bordering China and India is at the centre of a multibillion-dollar illicit economy fuelled by mining, logging and drug trafficking,
according to observers and law enforcement officials.
The war-torn state is also at the heart of a power struggle between China’s encroaching economic interests in Myanmar and the
battle-hardened ethnic militias engaged in fragile peace talks with the quasi-civilian government in Naypyidaw.
As the Myanmar government and 17 armed ethnic groups engage in talks to draft an agreement for the first nationwide ceasefire in
more than 60 years, analysts say bringing stability to Kachin is a priority after more than half a century of fighting in the region’s
jungles.
The long-running conflict between the Kachin militias and Naypyidaw reignited after a 17-year ceasefire collapsed in 2012, followed
by a major Myanmar army offensive against the Kachin Independence Army, the military wing of the Kachin Independence
Organisation (KIO).
Today, the 8,000 Kachin militiamen remain dug into some of the same mountains where US and British forces fought the Japanese
in the second world war. Analysts say the conflict has descended into trench warfare, with foes often stationed on hilltops a few
hundred metres apart.

“The Myanmar government can’t even control its own territory, so it would be a fairy tale if they could quickly bring progress and
reform to our region,” says Lbang Toi Pyi Sa, a senior official with the KIO.
Mr Lbang Toi Pyi Sa, in charge of camps for the displaced near the rebel-held town of Laiza, paints a grim picture of the
humanitarian crisis that is unfolding. As many as 70,000 people have been forced out of their homes, and basic antimalarial
medicines are lacking.
While some humanitarian assistance is reaching KIO-held areas, local officials and foreign NGOs agree that more will be needed as
the summer advances.
Outside Mr Lbang Toi Pyi Sa’s office, the impoverished state’s reliance on Chinese money and aid is apparent. Shops and restaurants
accept renminbi, the Chinese currency, and are stocked almost solely with products from China. Chinese mobile phone networks offer
the only reliable way to communicate because the local ones remain jammed by the Myanmar army.
But KIO officials are sceptical of the recent surge in Chinese aid, saying it comes with strong “political strings” attached –
underscoring deep mistrust about Beijing’s motives in Myanmar.
As Mr Labang Toi Pyi Sa pores over a map of Kachin, pointing out where
Chinese interests mine some of the world’s few jadeite mountains, log
forests, plan to harness its hydroelectric projects, and pipe oil and gas
from the Bay of Bengal, he concedes that the KIO is “under a lot of
economic pressure from China”.
“We have no other option than to sell our resources to China,” he says.
Myanmar’s trade in jade alone, mined and taxed by the KIO in the
territories it controls, is estimated to have exceed $8bn in 2011, according
to Harvard’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation.
In Kachin there is a combination of
anarchy and a military government –
with a lot of anarchy at the grassroots
level
YUN SUN, STIMSON CENTER

While Chinese interests run deep in Kachin and were established when Myanmar was ruled by a brutal military junta, some of
Beijing’s plans have gone awry since Myanmar opened itself up to western investors in 2011. In Kachin, protests against a Chinese-
run hydroelectric project resulted in the suspension of the $3.6bn Myitsone dam.
As a result, some Kachin officials believe Beijing has been pressing Naypyidaw to protect its hydroelectric projects. They even suggest
the last military offensive against the KIA was at the behest of China.
“The last war was caused by China, because of the Chinese and Burmese governments’ joint efforts to build a hydroelectric plant,”
says Captain Zing Htung Gum Shawng of the KIA, highlighting common perceptions of Chinese investment in the region.
Nonetheless, analysts say, armed militias and their associates have partnered with Chinese companies and continue to benefit from
the lawlessness across large parts of Kachin.

Yun Sun of the Stimson Center, a US think-tank, says powerful groups have vested interests in preserving the sense of lawlessness
that pervades Kachin.
“In Kachin there is a combination of anarchy and a military government – with a lot of
anarchy at the grassroots level,” she says.
Foreign observers say unscrupulous business interests and criminal syndicates are
thriving.
Recently, the smuggling of methamphetamine and opium from Myanamar’s Shan state
into Kachin has been preoccupying local drug enforcement officials.
The chosen route by smugglers transporting methamphetamine – also known in its
pill-form as yaba – is across the Chinese border and then further afield to Thailand,
Cambodia, India and Bangladesh.
The drugs are mostly manufactured in “jungle labs” in Shan, often close to the Chinese
border where precursor chemicals such as ephedrine are readily available. The UN’s
Office on Drugs estimates that sales of yaba and methamphetamine generated $15bn in
2010 in east Asia alone.
Hpau Daw Gam Ba, a senior KIA official in charge of drug eradication, laments the
“weak” law enforcement on the Chinese side as he empties one of the latest seized
consignments of yaba and opium on to his desk.
“We even provide the Chinese police with the drug dealers’ locations and when they will
become active. We hope the Chinese government will take some real action in seizing
these drugs.”
Fall in Myanmar drug seizures
causes concern rather than relief
Drug seizures in Myanmar have
plunged as traffickers hide
refineries and laboratories in
lawless border areas, in an early
sign of what some fear will be an
international smuggling wave as
southeast Asia’s economies unify.
Official seizures of
methamphetamine pills and
heroin in the country also known
as Burma have plummeted more
than 80 per cent in 2014, as
authorities struggle to penetrate
areas of militia conflict cloaking
frontiers with China, Thailand
and Laos ...
Continue reading

Natural resources and armed conflict in Kachin state, Myanmar
Zau Lawt
Independent Research Fellow

Introduction
Myanmar is the second largest country on mainland Southeast Asia and rich in natural
resources in terms of gemstones, gas, copper, gold and other minerals. Majority of the
natural resources are existing in the ethnic states. The Kachin state with the area of
89,041 km2
,one of the resource richest states in Myanmar is located in the northern part
between two giant countries; China in the east, India in the west. Kachin Independent
Army (KIA) founded in 1961, controlled over the northern part of Shan State, some
area of China border in Kachin state and some part of Kachin state area which is rich
in terms of untapped water resources for hydropower, gold, platinum, copper, silver,
iron, the jadeite the most famous and the best quality gem stone in Myanmar and in the
world. Most of the natural resources were under KIA control before cease fire
agreement with central government in 1994. KIA survival is totally depends on natural
resources exploitation and tax from china border trade under its control. In June 9, 2011,
for the security of Chinese backed up Tarpein dam on Tarpein river in Daw Hpum Yang
township, Banmaw district, the fighting started between KIA and Central government
breaking 17 years of cease fire agreement.
The historical Burma/Myanmar-ethnic relationship and Myanmar Democracy transition
After the three Anglo-Burmese wars (1824–1826, 1852, and 1885) the Burman fell
down under British Empire. The Indian Civil Service, at ﬁrst composed of the British,
governed Burma. After 1937 the administrative separation of Burma from India and the
Burma Civil Service was established. The British did not trust the Burmans, who had
resisted their rule. Thus, minorities formed the majority of the troops: the Karen (27.8
percent), Chin (22.6 percent), and Kachin (22.9 percent), who were organized into
ethnic military units, such as the Karen Riﬂes in the British Army. Only about 12.3
percent of the Burma army was composed of Burmans at the start of World War II. The
Karen participating with the British exacerbated Burman antagonism against the Karen.
When the Japanese invaded Burma in 1942, many Burmans deserted and joined Aung
San in an anti-British Burma Independence Army and were deployed with the Japanese
invaders. The Karen and the Kachin sided with the Allies and sometimes acted as
guerrilla forces behind Japanese lines assisting the Allies (such as Wingate’s Raiders,

Merrill’s Marauders, Force 136, US Detachment 101, British lavies etc.). Until March
1945, the Burmans were officially in league with the Japanese.
After World War II, the British were going to give independence some of its colonial
countries. India was bound to become independent, and Burma would certainly follow.
But What kind of independence, and whether independent Burma would be divided
between Burma Proper and a separate minority area was unclear. Some parliament
members in England wanted to try Aung San as a traitor because he backed the Japanese
before and during most of the war, and others regarded him as a criminal because
Japanese troop killed thousands of British soldiers and civil servant. However he
negotiated independence for Burma. This resulted in the Aung San–Atlee Agreement
of January 27, 1947, calling for independence within one year. Through his leadership
of the second Panglong Conference (the first was in 1946), the agreement of February
12, 1947, which brought together minority groups and Burmans to get independent
together and he was able to convince the British that the minority areas should not be
separated from Burma Proper. The Karens (Karen rebellion that started in 1949) were
only observers at the conference. At 4:20 a.m., January 4, 1948 Burma got
independence from British but unfortunately Aung San was assassinated on July 19,
1947. Despite of Aung San’s assassination, the Pang Long agreement was still in the
well process and named the country as “The Union of Burma” composed of the
(essentially) Burman areas and a Shan, Kachin, Kaya, and later Karen State in
additionally later Chin Special Division (province). The president of the Union
ethnically rotated. The first was a Shan, the second a Burman, the third a Karen and the
fourth would have been a Kachin but that was never happened. After the 1960 elections,
passage of legislation making Buddhism to be the state religion, and the coup of 1962,
forced the ethnic (mostly Christian) to against the government. It was only after the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988 that a large number of
cease-fires were negotiated with most of the Armed Groups and peace treaties usually
verbal agreements under which the rebels held certain territories and were able to keep
their arms, supposedly until a constitutional process end. The SPDC announced the
implementation of the seven-step ‘road-map’ in August 2003. After the seven-road-
map the national convention was followed. Lieutenant-General Thein Sein was SPDC’s
Secretary One and National Convention Convening Commission Chairman. In May,
2008, the Myanmar constitution was completed. The constitution guarantees military

role in the Parliament and their domination in the Executive. In November 2010 the
nationwide election, neglecting 1990 political winner NLD, was started. Lieutenant-
General Thein Sein becomes the first Myanmar president after 25 year Military regime.
History of Establishing Kachin Independent Army and the relationship with Military
Government & Newly Democratic Government
Before 1961, there were Kachin Armies under Myanmar military. The Myanmar
military regime used them to fight against Karen, and other ethnic armed groups. Seeing
discrimination in the military and towards the ethnics, the Kachin army started to form
their own. Therefore on February 5, 1961 Kachin independent Army(KIA)/Kachin
Independent Organization(KIO) was establish by led Lahpai Naw Seng, Lahtaw Zau
Seng (General Officer Commander), Lahtaw Zau Tu and others from Kachin Army
under Myanmar military. It’s been 52 years long against the marginalization and
discrimination regime. Most of Kachin land full of natural resources; Hpa kant jadeite
mining area, Mali and Nmai river abundance of gold and water resources, Ledo or
steward road connect from china to India, are fully under KIA control before 1994
ceasefire agreement (previous failure ceasefire agreements in 1963 and 1980). After
1994 ceasefire agreement KIO shared their territories and natural resources extraction
with military regime and did participated the National Convention process (Kachin
people’s condemned for participation in the drafting 2008 constitution) and submitted
19 points from KIO that wasn’t recognized, until the central government rejected
Kachin State Progress Party led by Dr. Manam Tu Ja from KIO. KIO did celebrated
public forum and press release for why and how KIO took part in the process of
Myanmar democracy reforming process. KIO liaison offices in Myitkyina, Kachin
State, Mandalay and Yangon as well as Myanmar immigration offices in Laiza area
china cross border in KIA/KIO controlled area, sharing natural resources in Hpa Kant
where many military crony companies invested in exploring jade, gold, iron and other
natural resources. Before 17 years ceasefire agreement broke out on June 19, 2011, the
relationship between them were significantly good.

Natural Resources, domestic and Foreign Investments in Kachin State and Trading
Resources internationally and domestically
The Kachin second biggest states, full of legal and illegal investment from national and
international country (China), has abundant of renewable and non-renewable natural
resources. The Kachin state is rich in natural resources in terms of jadeite (which is first
found in 1788 and explored by native Kachin), gold, timber, teak, and iron, many kinds
of hard woods, water, and fertile land. Jadeite, widely exploring in Kachin state, is
renowned for the best quality in the world. A November 2007, Business week article
figured out the total value of jadeite exports to China was US$ 433.2 million for a year1
.
In fiscal year 2007-8, Human Rights Watch pointed out a reported figure of US$647
million and US$297 million in fiscal year 2006-7for the value of overall gem exports
from Burma.
Moreover, series of China investment of the hydro-powers in Kachin state which are 7
cascade dams investment on N Mai river and Mali river including Myitsone dam
(6000MW), Tarpein I,II dams on Tarpein river in Daw Hpum Yang township, Banmaw
district, Kachin, have been boomed up.
After ceasefire agreement, small individual companies, joint venture and crony
companies increase significantly in natural resource extraction industries. Today, over
300 small individual companies and 30 joint venture companies were working along
with the Myanmar Gems Enterprises (MGE) and United Myanmar Economic Holdings
Limited (UMEHL) by regime family, as well as some ethnic armed group Wa, SSA,
NSA and Chinese companies. The majority of ventures had direct relationship with the
junta. E.g. Htoo Company by business tycoon U Tay Za has very closed relationship
with General Than Shwe, runs several mining in Phakant Kachin state.
Concept of Environmental Security, Resource curse and armed conflict
After WW II in the decolonization period, many former colonial countries placed their
hope on natural resource exploitation for economic, political development and poverty
reduction. There are historically successfully using the natural endorsement to

countries development for example Canada, Norway in EU, Chile and Malaysia. Yet,
these are some examples of notwithstanding copping the resources for development:
resource dependence is generally categorized as poor economic growth and lower level
of living standard, higher level of inequalities and corruption as well as
authoritarianism. The resource dependent countries are among the most conflict-riding
countries and facing political and economic instabilities defined as resource curse such
as Zambia. While resource dependent countries striving to cope the civil war such as
African countries and some Asia countries like Myanmar, Cambodia, the resource less
countries are developing fast in advanced technology fields, industrialization such
Japan, South Korea.
Not all the resource dependent countries are facing the resource war and not all
resources linked with war. Undeniably, a history show that it is depends on the
country’s leader ruling mechanism to the institutions, resources. As an Angolan
journalist said, “It is fashionable to say that we are cursed by our mineral riches. That
is not true. We cursed by our leaders.” It is correct not to blame the resource richness
but to analyze the ruling structure. Myanmar the resource rich country, the military
ruling junta weak in institution, ruling mechanism, authoritarianism, high corruption,
and inequalities lead the country into intra and intrastate conflict.
The environmental security is not just the security for environmental atmospheres such
as the effects of growing number of population, weaknesses of governance systems and
climate change but also interlink with state security. The core threat to the environment
security is the modern industrialization dependent on international trade, technology,
fast urbanization, centralization, and bureaucratic governance over the resources.
Not only the resource scarcity causes conflicts but also the resource abundance (mostly
with respect to non-renewable resources) causes conflicts as well. In both perspectives,
societies confronted with specific environmental circumstances scarcity or abundance
has a higher risk of being affected by violent conflicts for example Great Lakes region
of Africa.

The process of natural resources and current armed conflict in Kachin state
Natural resources such as timber, water, fertile land, wildlife, minerals, metals, gem
stones, and hydrocarbons are potential sources of wealth and development. Yet, the
development process in Kachin state and the people living standard, health, education,
transportation, communications are still far behind of least resource places like
Mandalay, Yangon, Nay Pyi Daw. Even though centered government former military
regime has extracted, taxed, exported natural resources from Kachin, earned millions
of dollars from gem auction, the government failed to develop the Kachin state where
the prostitution, drug users among the teenagers after 1994 ceasefire agreement, drug
and human trafficking are dramatically increasing in Kachin state.
However, natural resources are the key to not only finance but also motivate the conflict
in some cases. It also shaped the power on commercialization of armed conflict and
territorial sovereignty around the valuable resources areas and trading networks. Such
kind of armed conﬂict in the post-Cold War period is behaved by a speciﬁc political
ecology closely connected with the geographical and political economy of natural
resources (Le Billon, P. 2001). Capturing the natural resources have been causing many
social unrest, armed clash according to the above mentions, here I will argue two thing
territorialization of sovereignty around the valuable resources area and trade network
that is relevant with the current conflict in Kachin state.
KIA has been primarily occupied most of the resource rich area in Kachin state with
well-armed equipment. After 1994 ceasefire agreement, the legal and illegal companies
from domestic and China started logging, exploring jadeite and gold and investing in
hydropowers in Kachin state. Chinese backed up 7 cascade dams in Mali river and Nmai
river, Myitsone dam 6000MW, the second biggest dam in Myanmar after Tasang dam
7100 MW on Salaween river near Thailand, is located in the centered of Kachin state.
The series of dams’ location are all along the way on the main transportation and
communication routes from KIA Central Head Quarter, Laiza to Battalion No. (1), No.
(6). The project is actually focusing on geopolitical interest rather than economic
interest for national development. As military regime used to practice building strong
military battalions for sake of dam security, for example the military in Law Pi Tha
hydropower dam in Kayan state, the government will build military battalions around
the dam areas in Kachin as well. Most of the electricity from Law Pi Tha goes to

Yangon, Nay Pi Daw, and other places where the native people has no electricity though
electricity transmission lines are crossing over their house roves. The same thing 90%
of electricity from the series of Myitsone dams will go to china, only 10% will be used
in the domestic. The government will harvest $ 500 million annually. Saffron revolution
in which many monks were beaten, tortured, killed, jailed, started with peacefully
procession of against rice price up and the rise of 50 kyat added up to public bus
transportation fee. If the Myitsone dam completed the rice field, agriculture from
downstream will be enormously affected that might lead the whole country uprising
like 88 incident. Ignoring these matters, the continuation of damming is the reason to
wipe out not only KIA but also the Kachin culture rooted up stream, the native there in
the uphill lands.
Therefore, KIA opposed the dam strongly by helping secretly the some political
activists for drawing China Power Investment Company into the law court for
committing land confiscation around the Myitsone dam area and eviction. And the other
the most important issue, China investment in gas and oil in Arakhan state and the dual
pipe lines for transporting the gas and oil from Arakhan, oil from Africa, Middle East
to Yunan province will pass through central Myanmar and one of the KIA Battalion
No. (3) situated in Kut Hkai, Shan state next to China Yunan province. To secure the
pipelines routs and chinese investments in Kachin state, the Myanmar government need
to wipe out KIA from Kachin state and to take hold territorialization of sovereignty
around the valuable resources area and trade network with china.
In order to start cleansing the route as a first step, they asking impossible demand from
KIA asking them to withdraw the KIA Pan Tsun post2
for the sake of security of one of
the Chinese backed up Tarpein Dams, which is situated near that post. In June 9, 2011
the fresh fighting between Myanmar newly democracy government and KIA started by
breaking 17 years ceasefire agreement and creating around 100,000 internal displace
persons (IDPs) and perpetrating atrocity against the Kachin ethnic. Newly Myanmar
democracy government has been in extensive use of artillery, including 105mm
howitzers, 120mm mortars and Russian-made Mi-35 helicopters, the Mi-24 Hind
helicopter gunship and Sweden 84mm Carl Gustaf rocket launchers. Using those
advanced weapons in the battlefield is just as the same operation to protect from foreign
2
KIA Pan Tsun Post near the Tarpein Dam is the strategic post for securing the communication way from head quarter to Battalion No. (3) in Shan State.

troop invasion into Myanmar. In addition, the goverment blocked the international
humanitarian aids to the IDPs and failed to talk genuine political negotiation is the worst
inhumane act as a democracy government. This conflict phenomenon is based on
foreign trade, land, and water conflict: “Water and Conﬂicts literature considers the
ability of shared water resources to generate violent conﬂict” (Scott W.D. Pearse-Smith
August, 2012).
Conclusion
This paper reviews the writer finding from the theory and the ground conflicts on the
natural resource and armed conflict in Kachin state. It describes the abundance of
natural resources; the nature of domestic and foreign investments, which is eventually
leading the ethnic armed, conflicted with central government.
Resources abundance in Kachin state, cause the natural resource conflict between the
ethnic armed groups, KIA, and Myanmar central government regardless of state
development and security. There are politically rooted issues beyond the resource
scarcity and abundance inflicted the natural resource and armed conflict.
The current interstate conflict is historical, political conflict rather than state security
and traditional security. It’s totally base on securing natural resources scarcity for the
military crony, elite, individual interests for exploiting and selling the resources for
revenues to expand militarization, authoritarianism and rather than state development.
Therefore, Myanmar government should consider solving this historical rooted ethnic
issue through multi-ethnic, political dialogue holding as a second Pang Long
conference in 21st
century.

References;
Arakan Oil Watch (March 2012).The case for revenue transparency in the oil and gas sector.
Burma’s Resource Curse. Available at:
http://www.burmapartnership.org/2012/03/burmas-resource-curse-the-case-for-
revenue-transparency-in-the-oil-and-gas-sector/
Balani, C. (2008). Environmental Security and Ethnic Conflict in Eastern Burma. [Article].
Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association, 1-28.
Billon, L. Ph. (2001). Chapter 1. The resource curse., Chapter 2. Strategic role of
resources in war. Fuelling war: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts. New
York . Oxford University Press Inc.
Dalby S. ( 2002). Chapter 3. Environment, Conflict, and Violence. Environmental Security
(pp.41-61). London. University of Minnesota Press.
Dokken, K. (2001). Environment, security and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: is
environmental security a useful concept? [Article]. Pacific Review, 14(4), 509.
Elliott, L. (2004). Chapter 9. Environmental Security. The Global Politics of the
Environment (2nd Eds., pp. 201-222). Washington Square, New York. New York
University Press.
EarthRights International ( September,2008). The increasing investment of Chinese
Multinational Corporations in Burma’s hydropower, oil and natural gas, and mining
sectors. China in Burma. Available at: http://www.earthrights.org/publication/china-
burma-increasing-investment-chinese-multinational-corporations-burmas-
hydropower-o
Imagining ‘Burma’: a historical overview/Marja-Leena Heikkila-Horn/Mahidol University
International College, Salaya Campus, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand// Asian Ethnicity
Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2009, 145–154
Le Billon, P. (2001). The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts.
Political Geography, 20(5), 561-584. doi: 10.1016/s0962-6298(01)00015-4
Le Billon, P. (2001). The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts.
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Peluso Lee. N. & Watts, M. ( 2001). ,Chapter 1. Violent Environment. Peluso Lee, N &
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Extraction, and Political Ecology of a Mythic Commodity. Watts. M, Violent
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Ross, M. L. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from
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Rieffel L. (2010). External Interests and Internal Challenges: Myanmar/Burma Washington,
DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press.
Steinberg, David I., (2010). Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Skidmore, M. & Wilson, T. (2007). Assessing political/military developments after the
departure of khin nyunt: The political situation in Myanmar. V. Bowman,
Myanmar: the state, community and the environment (pp.1-17). Australia: ANU E
Press and Asia Pacific Press.

10/10/2017 The Kachin dilemma
https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21571189-over-border-kachin-conflict-causes-headaches-china-kachin-dilemma 1/5
Myanmar and China
TheKachindilemma
Over the border, the Kachin conflict causes headaches for China
Print edition | Asia Feb 2nd 2013 | DIANTAN AND YINGJIANG
ZHANG SHENGQI is nervous of the police. In Yingjiang, a Chinese county bordering
on Myanmar (see map), he asks the driver of his car to stop so he can check whether
he is being followed. Mr Zhang, a Chinese Christian, smuggles food and clothing
over the border into Myanmar to help Kachin refugees, many of whom share his
beliefs. The Chinese authorities, torn between their support for the Myanmar
government and strong local ties with the Kachin, keep a wary watch.
The fighting in Kachin state has created a series of problems for China. It worries
that it might trigger a large-scale influx of refugees across the porous border into
Yunnan province, where Yingjiang is located. The Kachin Independence Army
(KIA), whose administrative centre in the town of Laiza lies just over the border,
may be about to fall to the Burmese government army, but few expect peace. Mr
Zhang and fellow activists from China are likely to remain busy in the dozens of
Si b ib t d

camps inside Myanmar that house tens of
thousands of refugees close to China’s border.
China
wants to
maintain
good
relations
with
Myanmar,
not least to
counter
Myanmar’s
recent warming of relations with America.
China has big interests in energy and resources in Myanmar. Its investments there
include at least $2 billion spent on oil and gas pipelines crossing Myanmar into
Yunnan that are due to be completed in May. China sees this project as one of huge
importance to its energy security, helping it avoid dependence on shipments
coming through the Strait of Malacca. But it also wants to keep on good terms with
the Kachin, who share ethnicity with minorities on the Chinese side of the border.
Most of the jade and wood that form the backbone of trade in the towns of
Yingjiang county come from Kachin state. In recent years China’s burgeoning
economic ties with Kachin have benefited some of the state’s inhabitants, but are
also seen by some as exploitative. China does not want to fuel such resentment by
siding too closely with the Burmese army in its fight against the KIA.
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Mr Zhang operates in the grey zone created by these conflicting pressures. The
authorities elsewhere in China are often quick to stop organised activities by
people like him: “house-church” Christians who shun state-backed religious
groups (Mr Zhang spent four months in jail in 2003 on charges of leaking state
secrets after writing a report on the persecution of house churches). After the
fighting broke out in Kachin in 2011 he moved from Beijing to Yunnan to set up an
NGO to help victims of the conflict. To mobilise support he opened an account on
China’s Twitter-like microblog service, Sina Weibo, under the name woai nanmin,
meaning “I love refugees”. He says he raised about 100,000 yuan ($16,000) in cash
donations within China last year. This month alone Chinese supporters have
provided another 50,000 yuan.

Given the reluctance of China to become directly involved in the humanitarian
crisis, and the Burmese government’s refusal of international aid in Kachin and
Shan states, the semi-covert work of NGOs such as Mr Zhang’s play a vital role. To
evade Chinese border guards he sneaks over at night, away from official crossing
points (the border in Yingjiang is marked by a river). Since late last year most non-
residents have been barred even from entering Nabang, the Chinese border town
opposite Laiza. Nabang has been hit by stray projectiles fired by the Burmese army.
Officials have tried to keep the refugee crisis from spilling into China. On the edge
of the border town of Diantan in Yingjiang’s neighbouring county of Tengchong, a
Burmese activist points to dilapidated wooden houses where refugees are renting
cheap accommodation. There are about 1,000 Burmese in these squalid shacks, he
estimates, part of the 4,000 or so refugees who crossed into Diantan last April. The
government briefly kept them in a vehicle-repair yard and provided them with food
and medical help (the Chinese characters for Jesus, scrawled on one wall, are a
reminder of their stay). But two or three weeks later most of them were escorted
back to Myanmar to be housed in refugee camps near the border (see picture). Some
camps are run by the government, some by the Kachin.
Like Myanmar, China bars access to Kachin refugees by international groups,
including the UNHCR. According to Human Rights Watch, a New York-based NGO,
there were between 7,000 and 10,000 Burmese refugees in Yunnan in June last
year. The Chinese authorities deny reports that they have sent Kachin refugees back
against their will.
Mr Zhang, the Chinese Christian, says the authorities probably know about his
activities but turn a blind eye. He points out, however, that officials could be doing

a lot more to help. The government has built four refugee camps around Nabang,
but they remain empty. A fellow Christian activist, Hua Huiqi, says he has been
visiting Myanmar to advise the Kachins on media relations. “I have been a rights
activist in China and now I’ve gone international,” he says proudly. China’s
tolerance for such activities is being tested.

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10/10/2017 Conflict and Powerful Companies Stoke Land Disputes in Kachin State | Myanmar Business Today
https://www.mmbiztoday.com/articles/conflict-and-powerful-companies-stoke-land-disputes-kachin-state 2/12
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| Vol 4 Issue 9
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TRF/Thin Lei Win
Enlarge image Kachin farmers in the village of Naung Chain in Myitkyina, Kachin State, are in a legal tussle with village authorities over land they
consider theirs, but which officials say is designated as grazing ground.
La Laung Daung Nan vividly remembers the last day of April 2015. Alone in front of the two-acre plot of land her family had been allocated in a United Nations-led
project, she waited for fellow villagers to turn up.
They had been sent by officials and were coming to take down the barbed wire that protected her rubber saplings from the trampling of cows and buffalos.
“When they came, I pleaded with them not to do it, that we are from the same village,” she recalled, sitting on the bamboo floor of her stilt home with three other
aggrieved farmers.
Her words fell on deaf ears. The next day, roaming animals seeking pasture left few traces of the 11-month-old saplings.
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Daung Nan, her husband and 16 others in Naung Chain, a dusty village a 40-minute motorbike ride away from the state capital Myitkyina, are in a legal tussle with
village authorities over land they consider theirs, but which officials say is part of 1,600 acres designated as grazing ground.
The villagers say they were not consulted about plans to turn their land into grazing grounds and believe it was a ploy by officials who planned to profit from
renting out 300 acres to a Chinese company for a banana plantation.
Their battle is an illustration of land rights disputes engulfing Kachin state and the whole country, a largely agrarian nation emerging from decades of military rule
where rights are fragile and victims of injustice have little recourse.
Sa Yaw Haung Khaung, the village administrator, defended the land seizure in an interview with Myanmar Now, an independent news service supported by the
Thomson Reuters Foundation, saying officials acted according to the law.
He played down the impact on villagers, saying the Chinese concession covered only 70 acres for growing watermelons. It would have generated income for the
whole village but was abandoned following protests, he added.
Rampant land seizures
Campaign group “Land In Our Hands” said in a 2015 report Kachin, Myanmar’s northernmost state bordering China, has the second largest number of land
confiscations after Shan state.
“Land confiscations in Kachin have been so rampant there is little vacant land left,” Bawk Ja Lum Nyoi, a fiery political activist known for taking on powerful
interests, said.
“Villagers are too scared to speak up. There are more landless people now and many are struggling to survive.”
Land disputes have been fuelled by the outgoing semi-civilian government of President Thein Sein’s liberalisation policies that have driven up land prices and attract
foreign and domestic investment, analysts said.
Fighting between ethnic insurgents and the army, which flared up again in 2011 after a ceasefire fractured over long-held grievances, has weakened communities’
rights and driven more than 100,000 civilians from their homes.
Many worry whether they will still be able to access their farmland when peace returns and accuse the army of seizing swathes of land.
Meanwhile, junta-era issues such as a heavy military presence across the state, oppression of ethnic minorities and the unchecked exploitation of natural resources
persist.
If land disputes remain unresolved they will be detrimental to the peace process and overall stability of Kachin, activists said.

“Many farmers do not dare to demand the return of land confiscated by the military,” said Lahpai Zaw Tawng from Kachin State Farmers Network, who has been
helping the Naung Chain villagers.
Many are hoping the new government and parliament led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) will keep its election promises, including fair resolution of
disputes, establishing land tenure security and support for the landless.
Land key to peace and democracy
Changes in land ownership and use are among key issues in Myanmar’s political and economic transition, with deep resentment and protests over acquisitions for
infrastructure, development or large-scale agricultural projects.
Up to 70 percent of Myanmar’s labour force is estimated to work in agriculture. The sector accounts for 44 percent of economic output, according to consulting firm
McKinsey & Co.
All land is owned by the government but farmers are given land use or tillage rights, making land use a particularly sensitive issue for small-scale farmers who make
up the majority of the country’s population of 51 million.
Yet these rights are neither respected on the ground in practice, nor provide protection against land grabbing, activists said.
The “Land In Our Hands” report found 42.9 percent of respondents said they possessed legal documents issued by the government when their land was
confiscated.
The issue is even more sensitive in ethnic areas. Ethnic minorities make up an estimated 30 to 40 percent of Myanmar’s population, and ethnic states occupy some
57 percent of the total land area.
“Important questions around access to and control of land are at the heart of the civil war, and unless they are addressed well, real peace is likely to remain out of
reach,” the Netherlands-based Transnational Institute said in a report.
Bawk Ja, chair of the National Democratic Force (NDF) in Kachin, who took a powerful company to court over a land grabbing case and has been jailed for her
political activities, agreed.
“Without resolving the land issue, there’s no way you can achieve real peace,” she said.
Ruled by guns
Activists like Bawk Ja and Zaw Tawng are educating villagers about their rights so they are better able to stand up for themselves. It is a long process.
Arr Ti, 65, and Yaing Myaw, 45, from Shwe Aite village, remember shaking with fear during a meeting a few years ago with a senior military official.
“He put his pistol down on the table first before telling us we have to move. Then he asked, ‘Anyone want to say anything?’. I was so scared,” Yaing Myaw said.

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But they’ve become emboldened. With help from Bawk Ja, they sent letters to central authorities about their cases, and defiantly returned to their homes and
farms.
“I’m not giving in. It’s my land,” said Arr Ti, who was asked in 2006 to leave her orchard, which she has owned since 1982.
The army told her it was confiscated to build a telecommunications tower, but nothing has been built so far.
Land grabs have become so politically contentious that Myanmar’s military-backed parliament set up the Farmland Investigation Commission in 2012.
In just two years the commission received more than 30,000 cases. But it has heard only two-thirds of cases and found in fewer than 1,000 that compensation was
justified, according to Namati, a charity working on land rights.
Daung Nan and her husband, La Ban Khan Phan, have began to prepare their land in Naung Chain village again, while keeping up the fight to save it from
becoming a grazing ground. (Thomson Reuters Foundation)
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10/10/2017 In Myanmar's Kachin, families uprooted by war pin hopes on new government - Business Insider
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-in-myanmars-kachin-families-uprooted-by-war-pin-hopes-on-new-government-2016-1 1/6
In Myanmar's Kachin, families uprooted by
war pin hopes on new government
REUTERS
JAN. 15, 2016, 11:17 AM
By Thin Lei Win
MYITKYINA, Myanmar (Thomson Reuters Foundation) - For more than six months in
2011, Ywe Ja refused to leave her village in Myanmar's Kachin State despite heavy fighting.
It was where she was born, and she had built a life there as a teacher with a farmer
husband and a young child.
Fighting between the ethnic insurgent group the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and
the Myanmar army in the country's north erupted that year after the breakdown of a 17-
year ceasefire.
"Then the authorities started seeing Kachins as part of the KIA," Ywe Ja said. "Business
and social rivals could accuse you of having links with the KIA and the army would arrest
you without any investigations."
Worried that her husband would fall prey to these suspicions and heavily pregnant with
her second child, she finally left Tar Law Gyi, a village about two hours' drive from
Myitkyina, the Kachin state capital, in March 2012.

Two weeks after arriving at the St. Paul Jan Mai Hkawng camp, she gave birth.
"I never thought I'd end up staying here so long," she said, sitting in the thatched-walled
meeting room of the camp that she now helps to manage with the support of local group
Karuna Myanmar Social Services, run by the Catholic Church.
Fighting has died down in her village, but her family has not returned, fearing the
continued presence of the army and land mines in the area.
Now, for the first time since leaving her home, Ywe Ja says she has hope, which rests with
Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, the party that won the November
election in a landslide.
"I woke up really early to vote. I'm very happy that the NLD won. I think they will
prioritize the peace process," she told Myanmar Now, an independent news service
supported by the Thomson Reuters Foundation.
UPROOTED
Fighting has displaced around 100,000 people in Kachin and northern Shan States since
June 2011 after a ceasefire fractured over long-held grievances.
Life in camps for people uprooted by fighting is becoming increasingly difficult.
"There are no jobs nearby...Foreign aid has been reducing and because everything is up in
the air," said Phyu Ei Aung of the Metta Foundation that has been providing aid since
2011.
Violence against women is rife, in the majority of cases husbands taking out their
frustration on their wives, she added.
It is little wonder then that many have been galvanized by the election results, where the
NLD's strong showing in ethnic states surprised observers. In Kachin, the party won 22 of

30 parliamentary seats and more than half of the state legislature, giving it a strong
mandate to govern at both local and national levels.
"All the displaced are looking forward to the new government to create (a country) where
everyone is able to live happily and peacefully regardless of their race and religion," said Ja
Khun Ya, a 40-year-old from the same village as Ywe Ja.
LIVES INTERRUPTED
Since fighting resumed, the internally displaced people (IDPs) have been languishing in
small, hastily-built shelters that flood in monsoon and become unbearably hot in the
summer, facing dwindling aid support.
The United Nations' World Food Program, which provides food assistance to IDPs in
Kachin, told Myanmar Now it is facing a $51 million shortfall in funds.
The IDPs say they are willing to work, but jobs are few and far between. They say most end
up working in construction sites for a daily wage of around $2.30 for women and $4.70 for
men.
"The employers sometimes pay us less. They would say, 'You are receiving support from
aid agencies so 2,000 kyats ($1.50) is enough.' We don't have a choice," Ja Khun Ya said.
In the bigger Zi Un camp, where 710 people are supported mainly by the Kachin Baptist
Convention, dozens of women make money sewing traditional Kachin headgear, which
allows them to stay close to their children. It is a time-consuming task, taking 40 to 50
minutes to earn 100 Kyats ($0.08) for each colorful headpiece.
LINGERING SCARS
Suu Kyi said in an Independence Day speech this month that the peace process would be
the first priority of her new government, which is due to take power in March.

As hundreds of representatives of guerrilla groups, the military and members of
parliament gathered in the capital Naypyidaw this week for the second stage of talks aimed
at ending decades-long ethnic conflicts, she said more of Myanmar's rebel groups should
be brought into peace talks.
The outgoing semi-civilian government of President Thein Sein signed what it called a
nationwide ceasefire agreement in October, but seven of 15 rebel groups invited to
participate declined to sign, including some of the most powerful.
Aid workers in Kachin State warned against setting expectations too high.
"I don't think we will see any drastic changes for a year or two. Even if the IDPs can go
back to their villages because the political situation is now good, we would still need to
assist them so they can go back to making a living like they did before the fighting," said
Metta's Phyu Ei Aung.
Lu San, a 39-year-old mother of four who used to run a small store, said she went through
the lengthy bureaucratic process to gain approvals to briefly go back to her village across
the river from Myitkyina a few months after fleeing. They had left the shop and hundreds
of baskets of paddy behind.
"There was nothing left. All the valuable stuff had been looted. I heard later the army took
them," she said, her voice rising at the memory.
Born in 1942, Hkun Baw La recalls fighting in Kachin in the 1960s. Yet ordinary citizens
forged lasting friendships and in his village, home to Shan, Kachin and Bamar, and a
Christian church and a Buddhist monastery stood side-by-side before the fighting flared
up again.
Now Kachin militias roam many villages, including his own, and the Shan and Bamar had
received weapons from the army to protect themselves against the KIA.
(Editing by Paul Vrieze and Ros Russell; Please credit the Thomson Reuters Foundation,
the charitable arm of Thomson Reuters, that covers humanitarian news, women's rights,

trafficking, corruption and climate change. Visit news.trust.org)

10/10/2017 Kachin State - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kachin_State 1/10
Kachin Stateကချင် ပြည် နယ်
Wunpawng Mungdan
State
Flag
Kachin State
Kachin State (Kachin: Jingphaw Mungdaw; Burmese: ကချင်ပြည် နယ် ) is the
northernmost state of Myanmar. It is bordered by China to the north and
east; Shan State to the south; and Sagaing Region and India to the west. It
lies between north latitude 23° 27' and 28° 25' longitude 96° 0' and 98°
44'. The area of Kachin State is 89,041 km2 (34,379 sq mi). The capital of
the state is Myitkyina. Other important towns include Bhamo, Mohnyin and
Putao.
Kachin State has Myanmar's highest mountain, Hkakabo Razi (5,889 metres
(19,321 ft)), forming the southern tip of the Himalayas, and a large inland
lake, Indawgyi Lake.
Contents
1 History
1.1 2011 outbreak of civil war
2 Government
2.1 Executive
2.2 Legislature
2.3 Judiciary
3 Demographics
3.1 Religion
Coordinates: 26°0′N 97°30′E

Location of Kachin State in Myanmar
Coordinates: 26°0′N 97°30′E
Country Myanmar
Region Northern
Capital Myitkyina
Government
• Chief
Minister
Khat Aung
(NLD)
• Cabinet Kachin State
Government
• Legislature Kachin State
Hluttaw
3.2 Language
4 Economy
5 Transportation
6 Education
7 Health care
8 See also
9 References
10 External links
History
Traditional Kachin society was based on shifting hill agriculture. According
to "The Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social
Structure", written by E. R. Leach, Kachin was not a lingusitic category.
Political authority was based on chieftains who depended on support from
immediate kinsmen. Considerable attention has been given by
anthropologists of the Kachin custom of maternal cousin marriage, wherein
it is permissible for a man to marry his mother's brother's daughter, but not
with the father's sister's daughter. In pre-colonial times, the Kachin were
animist.
The Burmese government under Aung San reached the Panglong
Agreement with the Shan, Kachin, and Chin peoples on 12 February 1947.
The agreement accepted "Full autonomy in internal administration for the
Frontier Areas" in principle and envisioned the creation of a Kachin State by
the Constituent Assembly. Kachin State was formed in 1948 out of the

Area
• Total 89,041.8 km2
(34,379.2 sq mi)
Area rank 3rd
Population (2014)[1]
• Total 1,689,441
• Rank 10th
• Density 19/km2
(49/sq mi)
Demographics
• Ethnicities Kachin (includ.
Zaiwa), Lisu,
Han-Chinese,
Shan, Naga,
Bamar, Nu
• Religions Theravada
Buddhism
64.0%
Christianity
33.8%
Islam 1.6%
Hinduism
Animism 0.2%
Time zone MST
(UTC+06:30)
British Burma civil districts of Bhamo and Myitkyina, together with the larger
northern district of Puta-o. The vast mountainous hinterlands are
predominantly Kachin, whereas the more densely populated railway corridor
and southern valleys are mostly Shan and Bamar. The northern frontier was
not demarcated and until the 1960s Chinese governments had claimed the
northern half of Kachin State as Chinese territory since the 18th century.
Before the British rule, roughly 75% of all Kachin jadeite ended up in China,
where it was prized much more highly than the local Chinese nephrite.
Kachin troops formerly formed a significant part of the Burmese army. With
the unilateral abrogation of the Union of Burma constitution by the Ne Win
regime in 1962, Kachin forces withdrew and formed the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA) under the Kachin Independence Organization
(KIO). Aside from the major towns and railway corridor, Kachin State has
been virtually independent from the mid-1960s through 1994, with an
economy based on smuggling, jade trade with China and narcotics. After a
Myanmar army offensive in 1994 seized the jade mines from the KIO, a
peace treaty was signed, permitting continued KIO effective control of most
of the State, under aegis of the Myanmar military. This ceasefire
immediately resulted in the creation of numerous splinter factions from the
KIO and KIA of groups opposed to the SPDC's sham peace accord, and the
political landscape remains highly unstable.
2011 outbreak of civil war
Renewed fighting between the Kachin Independence Army and the Burmese army began on June 9, 2011 at
Ta-pein hydropower plant and continued throughout 2012. Initial reports suggested that from June to
September 2011 a total of 5,580 Internally Displaced Persons from 1,397 households arrived at 38 IDP camps
under Myanmar Government control.[2] In August, 2012 thousands of Kachin refugees were forced by the
Chinese Government back into Myanmar despite the continued fighting there; NGOs like Human Rights Watch

Historical population
Year Pop. ±%
1973 737,939 —
called to cease such action and pointed the illegality of doing so under international law.[3] As of October 9,
2012, over 100,000 IDPs are taking shelter in various camps across Kachin State. The majority of IDPs (est.
70,000) are currently sheltering in KIA controlled territory.[4] Fatality estimates were difficult to estimate but
most reports suggested that between government troops, Kachin Independence Army rebels, and civilians
upwards of 1,000 people had died in the conflict.
Even though many Kachins were already displaced internally, only around 150,000 people are reported as
IDPs. The Kachins are currently the major target for the Burmese government, yet only few Kachins have
resettled in the United States or in Australia, as compared to other Myanmar ethnics (such as the Karens and
Chins).
Government
Executive
Legislature
Judiciary
Demographics
The majority of the state's inhabitants are ethnic Kachin. The Kachin
group has six tribes or subdivisions: Jinghpaw, Lisu, Rawang, Lachid,
Zaiwa and Lhaovo. The word "Jinghpo Wunpong," which means "Strong
and United Human Beings", also represents the six Kachin tribes. The
region is also home to a number of Shan and a small number of Tibetans.

1983 904,794 +22.6%
2014 1,689,441 +86.7%
Source: 2014 Myanmar Census[1]
Religion
Christianity is the main religion for Kachin people in Kachin State.
Language
The Jingpho language was the traditional language of the area, and is the state's
lingua franca. The Bamar people (Burmese) were a minority in Kachin State before
the independence of Burma from the British, but after 1948, groups of Bamar
(Burmese) came to Kachin State to settle down so that offices could be run with
the Burmese language, which has caused language shift and commenced the
decline of the Kachin language.Many later Kachin generations did not have a
chance to speak or learn their language properly at school.
Some Kachin tribes speak and write their own language: the Zaiwa, the Rawang,
and the Lisu, who speak both the Lisu language and the Lipo language.
Economy
The economy of Kachin State is predominantly agricultural. The main products
include rice, teak, sugar cane, opium. Mineral products include gold and jade.
Hpakan is a well known place for its jade mines.[6] Over 600 tons of jade stones, which were unearthed from
Lone-Khin area in Hpakan aka Pha-Khant Township in Kachine State, had been displayed in Myanmar
Naypyidaw to be sold in November 2011. Most of the jade stones extracted in Myanmar, 25,795 tons in 2009–
10 and 32,921 tons in 2008–09, are from Kachin State. The largest jade stone in the world, 3000 tons, 21
metres long, 4.8 metres wide and 10.5 metres high was found in Hpakan in 2000.[7] The Myanmar
government pays little attention to the deterioration of environment in Kachin because of jade mining. There
has been erosion, flooding and mudslides. Several houses are destroyed every year.[8]
Religion in Kachin (2015)[5]
Buddhism (20%)
Christianity (75%)
Islam (1.6%)
Hinduism (0.4%)
Animist (0.2%)

Kachin has deep economic ties with China, which acts as the regions biggest trading partner and chief investor
in development project. One controversial construction project of a huge 1,055 megawatt hydroelectric power
plant dam, the Myitsone Dam, is ongoing.[9][9] It is funded by China Power Investment Cooperation. When
completed, the dam will measure 152 metres high and the electricity produced will be sold to China. This
project displaced about 15,000 people and is one of 7 projects planned for the Irrawady River.[10]
Bhamo is one of the border trading points between China and Myanmar.[11]
Transportation
Kachin State is served by the following airports:
Bhamo Airport
Myitkyina Airport
Putao Airport
There is a railroad between Myitkyina and Mandalay (through Sagaing). The train will takes 21–30 hours from
Mandalay to Myitkyina.[12]
Education
The Education system in Myanmar does not emphasis learning but rather memorization facts. in 1990's the
Education minister asked all the states and division Education Chiefs to pass all the students who failed the
mathematics examination with a score of at least 30 points though the normal passing score was actually 40.
Educational opportunities in Myanmar are extremely limited outside the main cities of Yangon and Mandalay.

It is especially a problem in Kachin State where over 60 years of fighting between the government and
insurgents has displaced thousands of people. The following is a summary of the education system in the
state.[13]
AY 2002-2003 Primary Middle High
Schools 1183 86 41
Teachers 3700 1500 600
Students 168,000 80,000 24,100
Health care
The general state of health care in Myanmar is poor. The military government spends anywhere from 0.5% to
3% of the country's GDP on health care, consistently ranking among the lowest in the world.[14][15] Although
health care is nominally free, in reality, patients have to pay for medicine and treatment, even in public clinics
and hospitals. Public hospitals lack many of the basic facilities and equipment. In general, the health care
infrastructure outside of Yangon and Mandalay is extremely poor but is especially worse in remote areas like
Kachin State. The following is a summary of the public health care system in the state.[16]
2002–2003 # Hospitals # Beds
Specialist hospitals 2 125
General hospitals with specialist services 2 500
General hospitals 17 553
Health clinics 22 352
Total 43 1530

See also
Kachin Hills
Kachin State Cultural Museum
Kumon Bum Mountains
Myitsone Dam
References
1. Census Report (https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B067GBtstE5TeUlIVjRjSjVzWlk/view). The 2014 Myanmar
Population and Housing Census. 2. Naypyitaw: Ministry of Immigration and Population. May 2015. p. 17.
2. "UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Kachin fighting hits IDP health" (http://www.irinn
ews.org/Report/96785/MYANMAR-Kachin-fighting-hits-IDP-health), Irin, Myitkyina, 15 November 2012.
3. China 'forcing Kachin refugees back to Burma (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19365075), BBC,
24 August 2012.
4. IDPs (http://www.mrtv3.net.mm/newpaper/411newsn.pdf) (PDF), MRTV3, p. 8 Col 4.
5. Department of Population Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population MYANMAR (July 2016). The2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census Census Report Volume 2-C (https://drive.google.com/ope
n?id=0B067GBtstE5TSl9FNElRRGtvMUk). Department of Population Ministry of Labour, Immigration and
Population MYANMAR. pp. 12–15.
6. "Heaven and Hell: Burma's jade mines, Part 1" (http://www.ruby-sapphire.com/heaven-hell-jade-burma.h
tm). Ruby-sapphire. 2010-05-18. Retrieved 2012-05-23.
7. Burma jade production up (https://web.archive.org/web/20110519122746/http://www.baganland.net/201
0/10/myanmar-jade-production-up.html), Baganland, October 2010, archived from the original (http://ww
w.baganland.net/2010/10/myanmar-jade-production-up.html) on 2011-05-19
8. "Archived copy" (https://web.archive.org/web/20111228054713/http://www.shaneabrahams.com/2009/1
0/environmental-damage-causing-health-problems-in-kachin-state/). Shane Abrahams. October 2009.
Archived from the original (http://www.shaneabrahams.com/2009/10/environmental-damage-causing-hea
lth-problems-in-kachin-state/) on 2011-12-28. Retrieved 2011-03-10.
9. "Develop Kachin hydropower plant" (https://archive.is/20120803004128/http://www.earthtimes.org/articl
es/news/336357,develop-kachin-hydropower-plant.html), Earth times, archived from the original (http://w
ww.earthtimes.org/articles/news/336357,develop-kachin-hydropower-plant.html) on 2012-08-03

External links
The Kachin Post (https://web.archive.org/web/20080124125905/http://kachinpost.com/)
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kachin_State&oldid=804382173"
10. "KIO warns China: Myitsone Dam could spark ‘civil war’" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120324075712/
http://www.burmariversnetwork.org/news/11-news/559-kio-warns-china-myitsone-dam-could-spark-civil-
war.html). Burma Rivers Network. 2011-05-20. Archived from the original (http://www.burmariversnetwor
k.org/news/11-news/559-kio-warns-china-myitsone-dam-could-spark-civil-war.html) on 2012-03-24.
Retrieved 2012-05-23.
11. Aye Lei Tun. "Myanmar Times & Business Reviews" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120215122027/htt
p://www.mmtimes.com/no380/b005.htm). The Myanmar Times. Archived from the original (http://www.
mmtimes.com/no380/b005.htm) on 2012-02-15. Retrieved 2012-05-23.
12. "Kachin state, northern Myanmar, Burma, travel info & maps" (http://www.asterism.info/states/14/).
Asterism.info. Retrieved 2012-05-23.
13. "Education statistics by level and by State and Division" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080524012235/h
ttp://www.etrademyanmar.com/STATS/s1701.htm). Myanmar Central Statistical Organization. Archived
from the original (http://www.etrademyanmar.com/STATS/s1701.htm) on 2008-05-24. Retrieved
2009-04-09.
14. "PPI: Almost Half of All World Health Spending is in the United States" (https://web.archive.org/web/2008
0205231908/http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=108&subsecID=900003&contentID=25416
7). 2007-01-17. Archived from the original (http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=108&subsec
ID=900003&contentID=254167) on 2008-02-05.
15. Anwar, Yasmin (2007-06-28). "Burma junta faulted for rampant diseases" (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0120702123259/http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2007/06/28_Burma.shtml). UC Berkeley
News. Archived from the original (http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2007/06/28_Burma.sht
ml) on 2012-07-02.
16. "Hospitals and Dispensaries by State and Division" (https://web.archive.org/web/20110430032618/http://
www.etrademyanmar.com/STATS/s0413.htm). Myanmar Central Statistical Organization. Archived from
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10/10/2017 Kachin State facts, information, pictures | Encyclopedia.com articles about Kachin State
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Kachin
Encyclopedia of World Cultures
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Kachin
ETHNONYMS: Dashan, Jinghpaw, Khang, Singhpo, Theinbaw
Orientation
Identi cation. "Kachin" comes from the Jinghpaw word "GaKhyen," meaning "Red Earth," a region in the valley of the two branches of the upper Irrawaddy with the
greatest concentration of powerful traditional chiefs. It refers to a congeries of Tibeto-Burman-speaking peoples who come under the Jinghpaw political system and
associated religious ideology. The main people of this group are the Jinghpaw; their language is the lingua franca and the ritual language of the group. In Jinghpaw, they
are called "Jinghpaw Wunpaung Amyu Ni" (Jinghpaw and related peoples). The Singhpo are their kin in the Hukawng Valley and in northeasternmost India, closely
associated with the Ahom rulers of that part of Assam from the thirteenth century. "Theinbaw" is the Burmese form. "Khang" is the Shan word for Kachin, whom the
Chinese used to call "Dashan." Other than Jinghpaw (Chinese spelling, Jingpo), the Kachin are comprised of Maru (own name, "Lawngwaw"), Atsi (Szi, Zaiwa—the
majority Kachin population in Yunnan), Lashi, and speakers of the Rawang language of the Nung group, Achang (Burmese term, "Maingtha," meaning "people of the
{Shan} state of Möng Hsa"), and some in-resident communities of Lisu speakers (Yawyin, in Burmese). Lashi and Atsi-Maru (and smaller groups akin to Maru) are called
"Maru Dangbau" (the Maru branch) in Jinghpaw.
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Location. Kachin are located primarily in the Kachin State of Myanmar (Burma) and parts of the northern Shan State, southwestern Yunnan in China, and
northeasternmost India (Assam and Arunachal Pradesh), between 23° and 28° N and 96° and 99° E. The Maru Dangbau are found mainly along the Myanmar-China
border in this range. It is a region of north-south ranges, dissected by narrow valleys. In the valleys there are also Shan (Dai, in Yunnan) and Burmans, and those Kachin

who are more heavily in uenced by Shan culture. In the far north there are peaks as high as 5,000 meters but the Kachin settlements and swiddens normally range
between 1,200 and 1,900 meters or so, while the two main towns in Myanmar's Kachin State (Myitkyina and Bhamo, originally a Burman and a Shan town respectively)
are about 330 meters in elevation. Snow is always found on the highest northern peaks, and the upper elevations are subject to coldseason frosts. There are more than
50 days of frost a year at higher elevations. Rainfall occurs mainly in the monsoon season (between June and October) and is between 190 and 254 centimeters on
average. Temperatures are substantially lower on the high eastern slopes over the China border and in the northern Shan State. The forest cover is mixed
evergreen/deciduous broadleaf monsoon forest, with subtropical forest at lower elevations, including teak (Tectona grandis ).
Demography. There are no reliable census reports from recent decades from Myanmar. Projections from the estimates of the 1950s (then about half a million in all)
suggest a total Kachin population of perhaps a million or more, of which Yunnan contains over 100,000 and India but a few thousand. Average population density is
uneven. Because of the relatively poor growing conditions of the eastern zone and the adjacent northern Shan State, there was a greater tendency for Kachins to
incorporate valley areas originally belonging to the Shan, as well as to practice swiddening on grassland rather than on forested slopes. In the intermediate zone along
the north-south part of the Myanmar-China border, however, the relative density was especially high, owing to pro table concentration along the Chinese caravan trade
routes there; the associated high incidence of raiding caused some villages to practice high-slope terracing of wet-rice elds rather than rely exclusively on swiddening.
These historical conditions restricted access to enough forested upland to permit rotation cycles that were long enough for fallow elds to revert to natural cover. Even
in the more fertile zone of the west, conditions of warfare and trade sometimes led to high density and resulted in grassland rather than forest swiddening, with
associated tendencies toward erosion. Overall, many villages had twenty houses or fewer, with more than ve persons each, on average.
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Linguistic Af liations. All the Kachin languages are of the Tibeto-Burman Family. Jinghpaw and its dialects (chie y Sinli, in the south, which is the Standard Jinghpaw of
the schools based in the towns of Bhamo and Myitkyina; Mungun in Assam; Gauri {Hkauri} in the east; and Hkaku in the north and west {known as the Red-Earth
country}) are an autonomous branch of the family, while the languages of the Maru Dangbau are in the Burmese-Lolo Branch, akin to Burmese. Nung is less certainly
placed in Tibeto-Burman, while Lisu is a Loloish language in the Lolo-Burmese Branch.
History and Cultural Relations
There are Chinese mentions of Kachin in Yunnan going back to the fourteenth or fteenth century, and there are obscure references to what must be Singhpo clients in
the chronicles of the Ahom Kingdom in Assam, dating as early as the thirteenth century. There are similar mentions in the chronicles of some Khamti Shan principalities
from the Upper Chindwin, while Leach argues that the prototypical Kachin chie y (Gumchying Gumtsa) domains of the Red-Earth country may have arisen in the

context of Khamti conquest of the area and displacement of Tibetan traders from the region of Putao (Hkamti Long). However, the rst historical light on them comes
from the end of the eighteenth and the start of the nineteenth century. Their spread was connected with the spread of the Shan (and Ahom) Tai-speaking peoples of the
region's valleys, with whom Kachin have had a symbiotic relation. There are more Shan borrowings than any other in the Jinghpaw lexicon, and Shan-Buddhist ideas (and
terms) are found in the ideological rhetoric associated with the Gumlao version of their political system ("Gumlao" means "rebellious aristocrats"; see below). Most of
the ethnography comes from the work of American Protestant and European Catholic missionaries, who started work in the Bhamo area in the late nineteenth century,
and later extended to the Kachin areas in the Shan States and northward to and beyond Myitkyina, which the railway reached in 1899. The rest of what we know, aside
from professional ethnography, comes from the records and diaries of British colonial of cers and associated traders. There are Chinese sources for the Yunnan Kachin,
only now becoming available outside China, and these show a long-standing place for Jinghpaw in the Tusi system of imperially appointed political-cum-customs agents
in this borderland of Southeast Asia, the Kachin chiefs being subordinate to local Shan princes in this context. There was an expansion of Kachin settlement toward the
east and south from late in the eighteenth century, in which the Kachin followed the growth of the Chinese overland caravan trade, especially with the rise and spread of
commercial opium growing. This led to a owering of the Gumlao political system, owing to the injection into Kachin politics of new sources of wealth from involvement
in the trade and from the levying of tribute on the caravans. It also led to more confrontation of Kachin with Shan, and to instances of Kachin taking over minor Shan
valley principalities. There is also indication that a much earlier period saw a similar development of centers of political power in the Red-Earth country, when the chiefs
there were able to collect tribute from the annual in ux of itinerant Tibetan pack traders going to Burma and even Siam and wintering in Kachin territory, where they
gathered forest products for sale farther on. In the Third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885, while the British were taking Mandalay, the Kachin were also trying to take
advantage of the collapse of royal Burma, and it was thought that, had the British failed to reach Mandalay when they did, the Kachin (and Shan?) might have reached it
rst. During the British Imperium in Burma and India most of Kachinland was under the Frontier Administration, but the Triangle, north from Myitkyina, between the
two branches of the Irrawaddy, was largely unadministered until just before the Japanese invasion of 1942. The Kachin State has been a constitutent of the Union of
Burma (now Myanmar) since that country regained independence in 1948, and the President-elect on the eve of the socialist military coup of 1962 was a Kachin chief,
the Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng. Since the coup, however, the Kachin have been a major element in the multiethnic insurgency against the Myanmar government
throughout the mountains of the Myanmar-China-Thailand border region, which has led to the extension of Kachin communities into northern Thailand. In 1953 a
Jingpo Autonomous Region was established in southwestern Yunnan in China; the Peoples' Republic of China has proved a magnet and refuge for some of the insurgent
leaders from Myanmar. Kachins have served prominently in Burma's armed forces (as also in British times), and some hundreds served, some in Europe, during the First
World War.
Settlements
Traditional Kachin villages usually had far fewer than 100 households; the larger villages existed for defense, but the requirements of swidden agriculture led to
segmentation of villages. In the old days many were stockaded. Houses were built on piles. There were three sorts of houses. In regions with strong hereditary chiefs
ruling multivillage tracts, the chief's house was sometimes up to 30 meters long (10 meters wide), occupied as a single dwelling by the extended household of the chief.
These were generally on steep mountain terraces. This form of dwelling served to symbolize the ownership of the tract by the lineage of the chief. Since livestock were

considered individual household property rather than lineage property, they were not kept under the "longhouse." In some pioneer Gumlao settlements there were real
longhouses, composite structures with separately owned individual household apartments along a corridor. Again, livestock were kept separately. These longhouses
symbolized the cooperative nature of the Gumlao political order.
The rest of the Kachin lived and continue to live in individual household dwellings. Water supply was a critical factor in village size and placement, but villages that were
high up for defense purposes were often distant from their water supply. Most villages were entered through a sacred grove marked by posts serving to elicit prosperity
from the gods, and by shrines to the spirit of the earth, where community sacri ces were held.
The other kind of building that exists today is the household granary. The house posts and beams are made of wood, oors and walls of woven split bamboo, roof
thatched with grass. Domestic tasks like weaving and rice pounding are done under the overhanging front gable of the house, under which the larger animals are also
kept. Inside, the house is partitioned lengthwise. The left (up-slope) side consists of sleeping apartments; the right side is left open for cooking, storage, and
entertainment. At the end of the apartments is a space for the household spirit and ancestral spirits not yet sent to the land of the dead. In front of the house are altars to
spirits and large X-shaped posts to which cattle are bound during sacri ces aggrandizing the household. The main external decoration is the pair of hornlike ornaments
over the front roof peak on important aristocratic houses. Inside chiefs' houses there are various symbolically carved boards and posts signifying the ritual claim to
spiritual sources of general prosperity in the sky world and the nether world, and a head of a buffalo sacri ced at the construction.
Economy
Subsistence and Commercial Activities. Traditionally, all Kachins were farmers and there was no full-time occupational specialization. Save where Kachin settlements
have encroached on Shan valley principalities, there is swidden farming. The main staple crop is rice, and the burnt-over swidden is cultivated with a short, heavy-
handled hoe and planted with a planting stick, the crop being reaped with a knife or sickle. Swiddens, especially in the colder, less well rain-fed eastern zone, are also
planted with maize, sesame, buckwheat, millet, tobacco, and various species of pumpkin. Vegetables and fruits are planted in house-yard gardens. People also raise some
cotton and opium poppy. As one goes east into the Dehong of Yunnan, cultivation is a mixture of upland wet-rice terraces, monsoon swiddening, and grassland
swiddening. Rice farming starts in February or March, and the cut slopes are burnt over and planted before the onset of the monsoon in June; harvesting is in October.
Grain, which is threshed by being trampled by buffalo, is stored by December. Kachins do not generally use a swidden for more than three years at a time. Fallowing
ideally takes at least twelve years, but eld rotation does not usually require moving the settlement; villages often last half a century or more.
Fishing with traps and poison is common, but economically insigni cant. Hunting with traps, snares, deadfalls, pellet bows, and guns is especially common in the
agriculturally slack cold season between December and February. Cattle, buffalo, pigs, dogs, and fowl are bred for sacri ce but generally not for eating. Pigs are fed
cooked mash in the evening but scavenge during the day. Some dogs are used in hunting, and some horses are kept.

Boiled rice with a vegetable stew and sometimes meat or sh are eaten three times a day. There is an aversion to eating cats, dogs, horses, monkeys, sheep, and goats.
Tobacco and betel are commonly chewed. Opium smoking has been wide-spread in the last century or so. Rice beer is prepared, the malted mash also being taken during
heavy work and on journeys, while the liquor is also distilled. These drinks are essential to hospitality and to ritual sacri ce.
Industrial Arts. Most metalware is obtained from Shan and Chinese, but in some northern regions there are lineages of blacksmiths who smelt ore. No pottery making is
reported, though earthenware pots are common. Bamboo, cane, and grass are used to weave mats, baskets, and house walls. Woodworking and carving are not
elaborate. Women weave on the belt loom, producing elaborate, largely oral-geometric designs, with some embroidery.
Trade. Trade is mainly with Shan and Chinese (and Burmese) for salt, metalware, and the prestigious heirloom wares exhibited by aristocratic lineages. Kachins attend
the markets held every ve days in Shan towns, where they sell small amounts of garden and forest produce. The extent of Kachin involvement in opium growing and
trading is in dispute, but the poppy was commonly cultivated in the area, though perhaps mainly by non-Jinghpaw. Trade with the Chinese caravans that came through
the region carrying, among other things, opium, was a major source of wealth for the settlements of the intermediate zone; chiefs extracted considerable revenue from
traders in their domains.
Division of Labor. Men clear and burn the swiddens, hunt, go on raids, and assume most political and religious roles. Women have full responsibility for weeding,
harvesting, transporting, and threshing; both men and women cook and brew from the crops, marketing any surplus. Women fetch water and rewood; they prepare raw
cotton for weaving their own clothing and make their husbands' (largely Shan-style) clothes from commercial cloth.
Land Tenure. Forest lands in a tract are village property and there is no private property in swidden land. Chiefs or the joint rulers of a Gumlao community have the sole
right to allow people to live in a village and the sole right to dispose of land to those wishing to use it, but may not refuse any resident household use of swidden lands.
Deciding when and where to shift swidden sites and assigning swidden plots are the prerogative of the chief and the elders. Irrigated lands can be inherited and sold to a
fellow villager, but never to an outsider; this right follows the rule that a cultivator may not be dispossessed from a plot while it is in use.
Kinship
Kin Groups and Descent. Descent is agnatic and there are eponymous clans with xed correspondences between clan names in the different languages. The ve
aristocratie clans are descended from the sons of Wahkyet-wa, youngest brother among the ancestors of the Shan, Chinese, and other peoples. These brothers were
descendants of Ningawn-wa, eldest brother of the Madai nat, chief of the sky spirits. The aristocratie clans are, in order of precedence, Marip, Lahtaw, Lahpai, N'Hkum,
and Maran. The clans are divided into major lineages and these into lesser segments and local lineage groups, and it is especially to the last that exogamy strictly applies,
although all the clans are exogamous in theory. In some regions a form of marriage called hkau wang magam is practiced, which prohibits marrying into a lineage from
which a wife has been taken until the fourth generation, and requires a marriage with a mother's brother's daughter's daughter's daughter (MBDDD). In such cases the
MBDDD may turn out to be in one's own lineage, and the requirement must still be met. Some traditional lineage genealogies recited by bards are very long, though the
number of generations back to the common ancestor seems to be a xed number (i.e., genealogical telescoping). Clans are sometimes spoken of as if they were tribes

because major chie y domains have a majority of their residents in the chief's clan, which owns the village tract. In Jinghpaw proper, the wife acquires no membership in
her husband's clan and lineage, but in Gauri she acquires it to some extent, and this difference corresponds to differences in the ease of divorce and in the recovery of
marriage payments in such cases; in Jinghpaw proper, recovery is made from the wife's family, while in Gauri it is made mainly from her seducer, if any.
Kinship Terminology. Kinship terminology is bifurcate-merging, with Omaha-type cousin terminology. The members of the lineage from which wives are taken and
given, respectively, are referred to (by male speakers) with af nal terms (save that in the second descending generation the members of one's wife-taking groups are
called by grandchild terms and the members of the second ascending generation of the wife-giving group are given grandparent terms). On the other hand, the wife
takers of one's wife takers are all "grandchildren" and the men of one's wife givers' wife givers are all "grandfathers," regardless of generation. Furthermore, a male Ego
calls the men in his own generation, whether wife giver or wife taker, by the same "brother-in-law" term (hkau ); he calls the women in nonascending generations and
men of descending generations of his wife-giving group "wife's younger sibling" (nam ); and he calls the members of the three central generations of his wife takers,
exclusive of the men of his own generation, by the term hkri, meaning "sister's children." Women of ascending generations of one's own lineage are "aunts by
consanguinity" (moi ) and the men of corresponding generations of wife takers are "uncle-by-marriage" (gu ); women of the three central generations of wife givers' wife
givers are ni, etymologically an "aunt" term, which has primary reference to the wives of classi catory mother's brothers (tsa, rst ascending male wife giver). There are
terms for actual husband and wife, and real/classi catory siblings are distinguished by age relative to the speaker.
Marriage and Family
Marriage. Traditionally premarital sex was allowed; adolescents used to gather in the front apartment of a house evenings for singing, recitations of love poetry, and
lovemaking. These relations need not, and some of them could not, lead to marriage. Fines are levied in favor of a girl's family for fathering a bastard. Parents try to
arrange marriages to ally with other lineages, but negotiations are turned over to go-betweens. Bride-price is paid by the groom's father and the latter's lineage mates
and may involve lengthy negotiations with payments extending over many years; there may also be a year or two of bride-service. The bride's family provides her with a
dowry and helps defray the wedding costs. Polygyny, not common, is allowed, and often arises from the obligation to take on the widow of a real or classi catory brother.
Some chiefs have several wives, some of them Shan or Burmese, and these cases arise from the need for marriages of state. Exogamy is more theoretical than strict, and
it is quite possible to marry even a somewhat distant consanguine (lawulahta ). This follows from the two principles of asymmetrical marriage alliance and lineage
segmentation. The rst has a single rule: one may not take wives from the same lineages to which one gives wives; the reversal of an alliance is a major offense against
the whole social order. Since wife givers (mayu in Jinghpaw) outrank their wife takers (dama in Jinghpaw) ritually and in rights and duties to one another, wife givers can
extort a great deal from their wife takers, from which derives the auxiliary principle of diversi cation of alliances. Far from its being a rule that one should normally marry
a woman from a wife-giver lineage, it is often thought strategic to negotiate a new alliance. This possibility reinforces the tendency for lineages to segment (or ssion)
when they become too large and have to compete for limited social and economic resources. It follows that one's distant lineage mates may well have separated
themselves and have their own marriage networks, in which case each has effectively become a distinct unit of marriage alliance, and hence can intermarry. In Kachin

ideology, however, exogamy and marriage-alliance relations are xed once and for all among the ve aristocratic clans, with the result that this ideological model of the
system has the ve clans marrying in a circle (e.g., Lahtaw, Marip, Maran, N'Hkum, Lahpai, Lahtaw, each being wife giver to the next). This is consistent with the rules.
Wife giver-wife taker relations, and the restrictions against reversing them, are not transitive. They extend only to certain of the wife givers of one's own immediate wife
giver (and of the wife taker of one's own immediate wife taker) because a woman's lineage brothers hold a sort of lien on the children, so that her husband's lineage must
pay off that lien (to the natal lineage of her actual mother) along with paying the marriage price to her lineage. In principle the rank distinction between aristocrats and
commoners (du ni and darat ni respectively) is rigid, but for the same reasons that clan exogamy is only a ction, so is this. The politics of marriage alliance combined with
the tendency for local lineage segments to constitute separate entities occasionally allows a rising commoner lineage of wealth and power to get a major wife from a
lineage in an aristocratic clan that may have fallen on hard times, if the alliance is suitable to the two parties and the prices paid are appropriately in ated. There are,
however, some clans that gure as unequivocal commoners (not merely darat ni but darat daroi, "utter commoners"); an example is the clan Labya, properly called Labya
mi-wa, indicating that it is of Chinese origin and has been included fairly recently in the Kachin system.
Domestic Unit. Ideally, residence is virilocal, but uxorilocal marriage is not notably uncommon. This is especially true in the case of a noninheriting son, whose claims on
the assistance of his real or classi catory mother's brother, whose daughter is a preferential wife, may be greater than those on his own father.
Inheritance. Usually the youngest son (uma ) inherits his father's house and of ce, if any, while much of the movable property may go, in the father's lifetime, as dowry to
his daughters and as marriage settlements on the older sons. The youngest son in return is expected to support the parents in their old age and arrange their funerals. A
childless man's estate reverts to his brothers or lineage mates and their heirs. The principle of ultimogeniture is modi ed by the fact that an eldest son is thought to
succeed in some measure to the powers of the "mother's brother" or wife-giver line and in any case is next in line after the youngest in succession, so that the position of
an eldest son of a youngest-son line is especially important. This may be an idea associated with the Gumlao political order, but compare the mythical genealogy of the
chie y clans.
Sociopolitical Organization
Social Organization. See under "Settlements" and "Marriage and Family"
Political Organization. There are several versions of the system. Gumchying Gumtsa chiefs are the ritual models of chiefdom and the base for this kind of organization is
the Red-Earth country. Their authority derives from their monopoly of priests and bardic reciters of genealogical myths, through which ritual specialists they control
access to the spirits who make human occupancy of the land possible. They claim the right to various services and dues from their subjects, notably a hind quarter of all
animals (wild and domestic) that are killed in the tract, and so are called "thigh-eating chiefs." Gumlao communities reject on principle the hereditary privileges of chiefs.
In particular, they believe that all aristocrats of the community are equal, that is, all householders who can get someone to sponsor the essential Merit Feasts and
sacri ces. It is a mistake to call this a "democratic" system, since its principle is wider access by aristocrats to chie ike privileges (though they reject the thigh-eating
dues) ; a Gumlao man is called magam, which signi es an aristocrat though not a chief (duwa ) by strict succession. Gumlao is based on the idea that a noninheriting son
who can nd wealth and a place to set himself up may try to get an important Gumchying Gumtsa chief to sponsor him in a feat that will raise him to standing as a full
chief; but rst he must temporarily renounce all claims to standing (gumyu, which literally means "to step down from privilege") while he awaits the sponsoring rites.

When local and historical circumstances conspire to make wealth more generally accessible, there are aristocrats who will not bother with sponsorship at all, since
sponsorship becomes expensive and has to be postponed proportionally to the demand for it. They simply assume the ritual attributes, although not the thigh-eating
privileges, of chiefdom. This seems to be the root of the Gumlao movement. Not surprisingly, as conditions ease there will be gumlao magam who again seek sponsorship
as full chiefs, at which point Gumlao tracts turn again into Gumchying Gumtsa domains. The oscillation is fueled by a perennial ideological debate about the allowable
sources of ritual privilege, as well as by the combined effects of the principle of lineage segmentation and the tendencies toward disaffection brought about through
primogeniture. When a Kachin chief in close contact with Shan becomes more like a Shan prince (sawbwa, or tsao-fa ), often because he has taken over lowland Shan
territories or because he desires political recognition on the part of other sawbwas, he will try to assert even greater power over his "subjects" and may even abandon
Kachin priestly services and the closely connected reliance on upland farming. Such a chief is called "Gumsa duwa," a Gumsa chief. In tending toward becoming Shan and
asserting a sharp distinction between "rulers" and "subjects" incompatible with the claims and intricacies of the Kachin marriage-alliance system (a Shan prince, of
course, simply takes and gives wives as tribute) , and in giving up the ritual basis of his authority, he will tend to lose the allegiance of the Kachin manpower on which his
real power depends. The alternative is the compromise status of Gumrawng Gumsa (pretentious chiefs), who claim exclusive right over a village and maintain enough
upland swiddens to satisfy the Kachin priests who must serve them, but remain unconnected with the hierarchy of Kachin authority deriving from the rules of strict
succession and sponsorship, have no authority outside the village, and are not recognized outside the village as thigh-eating chiefs. Traditional Kachin chiefs, not being
absolute rulers, rarely acted apart from the wishes of the council of household elders. In Yunnan, where Kachin chiefs have long had a place within the Tusi system in the
context of Shan principalities, it is not unknown for agents (suwen, probably a Chinese title) to usurp much of the power of the chiefs, even though these administrative
agents may be commoners.
Con ict. Suppressed upon the extension of British rule, Kachin warfare was mainly guerilla action, raiding, and ambush, with sporadic instances of cannibalism and
headhunting reported.
Religion and Expressive Culture
Christian missionaries have already been mentioned. At present most, if not all, Kachin communities are Christian, and the social rift between Catholic and Protestant
communities sometimes is quite deep. Recent years have also seen some Government-sponsored Buddhist-missionary activity among Kachins in Myanmar.
Religious Beliefs. One class in Kachin religion includes the major deities, named and common to all Kachin, remote ancestors of commoner and aristocrat alike. These
Sky Nat (mu nat —the word "nat" means a spirit Lord) are ultimately children of the androgynous Creator (Woishun-Chyanun), whose "reincarnation" is Shadip, the chief
of the earth nats (ga nat ), the highest class of spirit. The youngest sky nat (senior by ultimogeniture) is the Madai Nat, who can be approached only by chiefs, whose
ultimate ancestor was his eldest brother and dama, Ningawn-wa, who forged the earth. A direct daughter of Madai Nat was the wife of the rst Kachin aristocrat. Below
all these in rank are the masha nat, the ancestor nats of lineages; that of the uma, or youngestson line of thigh-eating chiefs, has special importance. There is also a vague
sort of "High God," Karai Kasang, who has no myths (except that he seems to have something to do with the fate of the souls of the dead) and who Leach thinks is a
projection of the Christian God of the missionaries; this spirit's name makes no sense in the Kachin language. Below all these are minor spirits such as household

Myanmar's Kachin state and the illicit economy fueled by natural resource conflicts

Myanmar's Kachin state and the illicit economy fueled by natural resource conflicts

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