1.
RPKI Deployment Status
in Bangladesh
Md. Abdul Awal
Network Startup Resource Center
https://nsrc.org

2.
Why Should We Care About RPKI?
2
#bdNOG13

3.
Long ago, people were living in peace
• Network engineers were innocent and trustworthy
• Global routing table only had valid prefixes
• But the perfect world can’t exist:
– Someone made mistake in BGP announcements
– Someone hijacked other’s prefixes
– Global routing table becomes vulnerable of incorrect routes
• Internet operations get affected
• The core of Internet can’t be left vulnerable like that
#bdNOG13 3

4.
A route is not bad unless proved guilty
• How to prove it? – By validating
• How can we validate? – Cross-match with VRPs
• What makes the VRPs? – ROAs
• How to collect all the ROAs? – Resource PKI (RPKI)
• Who does what?
– Resource holders create ROA
– Network operators do ROV
#bdNOG13 4

5.
RPKI is about 2 things: ROA and ROV
Signing prefixes
a.k.a. creating ROAs
1
RIR CA
RIR Resource DB
Member Login
Authentication
2001:db8::/32
192.0.2.0/24
AS 65000
ROA
#bdNOG13 5

6.
RPKI is about 2 things: ROA and ROV
Validating ROAs
a.k.a doing ROV
2
RPKI Repository RPKI Validator BGP Router
RTR Protocol
rsync/RRDP
#bdNOG13 6

7.
What Makes a Route RPKI Invalid?
192.168.0.0/24 ...65500 192.168.0.0/24 ...65520
192.168.0.0/23 ...65520
Max Length
Invalid
Max Length+Origin
Invalid
Origin
Invalid
R1
192.168.2.0/23 ...65500
100.100.0.0/24 ...65500
Valid
Not Found
192.168.0.0/22
65500
/23
Prefix
ASN
Max Length
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/23
192.168.0.0/24
192.168.1.0/24
192.168.2.0/23
192.168.2.0/24
192.168.3.0/24
Prefixes covered
by the ROA
7
VRP

8.
RPKI deployment in Bangladesh
8
#bdNOG13

9.
RPKI ROA Adoption
Source: https://observatory.manrs.org/
#bdNOG13 9

10.
RPKI Validation
https://stats.labs.apnic.net/rpki/BD
#bdNOG13 10

11.
RPKI Validation
https://stats.labs.apnic.net/rpki/BD
#bdNOG13 11

12.
RPKI Invalids
Source: https://observatory.manrs.org/
Source: https://rpki.anuragbhatia.com/
#bdNOG13 12

13.
RPKI Invalid Types
#bdNOG13 13
Source: https://rpki.anuragbhatia.com/ (last updated on 8-Jun-2021)
15
101
Invalids per Address Family
IPv4 IPv6 0
20
40
60
80
100
120
IPv4 IPv6
#
of
Invalid
Routes
RPKI Invalid Types
Origin Invalid Max Length Invalid

14.
Top Contributors of RPKI Invalids
#bdNOG13 14
3
3
3
3
3
5
5
8
16
39
0 10 20 30 40
137823
137935
141439
131216
24342
63969
38071
136516
134204
58715
# of RPKI Invalid BGP Announcements
AS
Number
Source: https://rpki.anuragbhatia.com/ (last updated on 8-Jun-2021)
0
5
10
15
20
25
IPv4 IPv6
#
of
ASN
ASNs Announcing Invalid Routes
Origin Invalid Max Length Invalid

15.
What Goes Wrong?
15

16.
Routing Incidents
Source: https://observatory.manrs.org/
#bdNOG13 16

17.
Invalid Routes are Getting Rejected
• More and more operators are deploying RPKI and ROV
– BCC/NDC
– Telia
– NTT
– Cogent
– HE
– Cloudflare
– Netflix
– AMS-IX
– DE-CIX and many more
#bdNOG13 17

18.
Considerations about ROA and ROV
18
#bdNOG13

19.
Creating ROA
Not a good idea to create ROAs
up to /24 (v4) or /48 (v6). Better to
create ROAs for specific prefixes
that are announced in BGP
19
#bdNOG13
VS

20.
Creating ROA
VS
You may sign same prefix
with multiple ASNs but do
if you really really have to
20
#bdNOG13

21.
Doing ROV
Validation without
dropping RPKI
Invalids
Validation with
dropping RPKI
Invalids
21
#bdNOG13
VS

22.
Recommendations on RPKI Deployment
22
#bdNOG13

23.
General Recommendations
• Only create ROAs for prefixes that are announced in BGP
– Signing unannounced prefixes can lead to “validated hijack”
– Add to standard operating procedure: if it is originated, sign it!
• Check your ROAs and announcements from external sources
• Deploy at least two reliable Validator Caches
– Two different implementations, for software independence
• Needs to avoid default route on the border routers
#bdNOG13 23

24.
General Recommendations
• While validating:
– If Valid: ALLOW
– If Invalid: DROP
– If Not Found: ALLOW with lower preference
• For fully supported Route Origin Validation across the network
– EBGP speaking routers need talk with a validator
– IBGP speaking routers do not need to talk with a validator
• Train the engineers with toolsets and debugging techniques
#bdNOG13 24

25.
ROA for Small ISPs and Enterprises
• Have own Internet resources?
– Creating ROA is straightforward using RIR’s resource
management portal
• Got assignment for LIR?
– Have public ASN?
• Ask the LIR to create ROA with your ASN and verify
– Don’t have public ASN?
• Ask the LIR to create ROA for the assigned prefix and verify
#bdNOG13 25

26.
ROV for Small ISPs and Enterprises
• Have BGP with transits and peers?
– Receive full routes from neighbors?
• Implementing ROV using validator cache is straightforward
– Receive partial routes with default from neighbors?
• Ask transits to do ROV for you
• Implement ROV using validator cache to validate peer and IX routes
– Receive only the default route
• ROV wouldn’t fit, however, you may ask transits to do ROV on their network J
• Have static routing with transits?
– ROV wouldn’t fit, however, you may ask transits to do ROV on their network
#bdNOG13 26

27.
Thanks
awal@nsrc.org