Iran and the Bomb Iran is very close to the point of achieving “breakout”: enriching uranium to weapons-grade purity, and demonstrating the capability to detonate a nuclear warhead. In each of the elements of a nuclear weapon – fissile material, warhead, and delivery system – Iran has made substantial progress in the last decade. That progress has accelerated since the first UN sanctions were imposed in 2007. Today, we have reached the critical point at which Iran’s next decision will be the decision to “break out”: begin enriching uranium to the highest, weapons-grade purity. By some calculations, Iran has enough uranium already enriched to a lower level for at least one bomb, and possibly two. Iran is almost ready, as well, to start up her 40-megawatt plutonium reactor at Arak, which would be a source of 1-2 bombs’ worth of plutonium per year. She is pursuing both the uranium and plutonium paths to a nuclear weapon. Iran performed warhead-related experiments as far back as 2002-2003. She has also improved her missile capability, and today can reach Southeastern Europe and Israel with nuclear-capable missiles. There are strong indications that Iran is developing ICBMs; U.S. intelligence believes Iran will be able to test an ICBM by 2015. Beyond that, Iran is constructing a missile silo complex in the northwestern tip of Venezuela, from which her currently available, nuclear-capable missiles could reach Florida and part of Georgia. Meanwhile, the likelihood that Iran will continue to engage in deception, in order to play for time, has only grown with the inauguration of Hassan Rouhani as the new president. Rouhani has boasted of the successful deceptions he perpetrated on the IAEA and European nations in the mid-2000s, when he was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator. Assuming there will be no military attack by the United States, what events might require Israel to mount a preemptive attack? Three to consider are an impending warhead test in Iran, the impending start-up of the plutonium reactor at Arak, and the impending operational deployment of the Russian S-300PMU2 air defense system, which would significantly change the anti-air threat posed by Iran. The geopolitical consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran cannot be overstated. Other nations in the region (like Saudi Arabia, and possibly Egypt and Turkey) will want to acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence. Nuclear material and the requisite weapons technology are now widely available. But a nuclear Iran would also be able to wage proxy wars – e.g., through Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations supported by Tehran – with even more immunity than Iran has today. Moreover, disarray in the NATO approach to missile defense, caused in large part by the Obama administration’s cancellation of missile-defense plans, will be exacerbated by the growing Iranian threat.

1. Iran and
the Bomb
J.E. Dyer
For Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors
18 November 2013

2. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Warhead device
Delivery system

3. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Enough HEU (U-235) for a warhead test
PressTV image
IAEA report: Figures as of 5 November 2013
Natanz
10,357kg LEU (3.5%)
Natanz + Fordo
196kg “MEU” (19.75%)
Natanz + Fordo + ?
?? Kg HEU (93.5%)

4. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
“2 weeks from decision to break-out”
Reuters image
IAEA report: Figures as of 5 November 2013
Natanz + Fordo
196kg “MEU” (19.75%)
Natanz + Fordo + ?
?? Kg HEU (93.5%)

5. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
“2 weeks from decision to break-out”
Reuters image
Newer centrifuges = dramatic acceleration
IAEA report: near-suspension of installations
14 November 2013

6. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Mainstream media conclusion:
Iranians making “concessions” to further negotiations
Worst case:
The “move after next” will be the breakout decision
Test the new centrifuges
Proceed to high enrichment

7. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Plutonium-239 from IR-40 heavy-water reactor
“Fat man” type bomb
1-2 bombs’ worth of P-239 per year

8. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Warhead device
Parchin *
Lavizan-Shian *
Najafabad?
Suspected detonator testing
sites
U.S., Western intelligence
Credible Iranian sources
 * Sites razed, “sanitized”

9. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Warhead device
IAEA concerns: “Possible military dimensions”
18 November 2011
Nuclear explosive device:
Procurement
Timeframe:
2002-2003
Design
Component testing – Detonator
development/testing

10. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Warhead device
The North Korea connection
18 November 2011
2010 – NK uranium bomb warhead tests?
2011 – Reports of NK nuclear scientists in Iran 2002-07
2013 – Head of Iranian nuke program in NK for third
warhead test (RAND: probable uranium bomb test)

11. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Delivery system
IAEA: “Possible military dimensions”
18 November 2011
Nuclear payload for Shahab missile:
Engineering studies
Timeframe:
2002-2003
Prototype components manufactured
 Fuzing/arming/firing system

12. Three components of a
nuclear weapon:
Delivery system
UK Intel: Iran tested nuke-capable MRBMs
29 June 2011
Secret testing:
Solid-fuel Sejjil: 800km
Timeframe:
2010-2011
Shahab, Sejjil tests to 2,000km
 US surv. present but no US reporting
CRS Report dated 6 December 2012

13. Threat radius: 2,000km

14. Threat radius: 2,000km
Silo site:
Paraguana Peninsula
Reported December 2010

15. Tabriz
Semnan?
Khorramabad
Underground missile silo sites

16. Semnan Rocket Complex
Expanded in 2009-10
with North Korean
assistance
Shahrud
New ICBM testing site
Reported August 2013
Extending range of Iranian missiles

17. Additional considerations
Iranian deception
Delayed IAEA recognition
Trigger points for Israeli strike
Regional reaction

18. Deception: Hassan Rouhani
2003 agreement with EU-3
Violated immediately and
continuously
Rouhani boasted of it
“We did not stop [the enrichment as agreed
with the EU-3], we completed the program!”

19. How far behind was IAEA?
Graphic: Institute for Science and International Security (Nov 2009)

20. How far behind was IAEA?
Rouhani totals 2005
(Installed)
AugDec 05
Operational centrifuges

21. Semnan Rocket Complex
Shahrud
. Qom
(Fordo)
Najafabad?
Tunnels, underground facilities

22. Trigger points for Israeli strike
Impending warhead test
Arak reactor start-up
Similar to Osirak 1981
Installation of S-300 air defense
system

23. S-300 changes the game
IRIAF air base
SA-5
Hawk
HQ-2

24. Regional reaction
The nuclear picture

25. Regional reaction
The nuclear discussion
?
?
?
? ?
Missile defense

26. Regional reaction
The nuclear discussion
Missile defense

27. Regional reaction
The nuclear discussion
Would have
deployed in 2013
Missile defense
Meaning/purpose of NATO

28. Regional reaction
The nuclear discussion
Missile defense
Meaning/purpose of NATO
Mobile interceptors in design – 2017?
Deployments to Romania, Bulgaria?
US Army cancels MEADS-Patriot follow-on
Turkey ambivalent – turns to China for air
defense system?

29. Regional reaction
Proxy wars
Iran offered “missile
umbrella” in 2011
“Extended deterrence”
During the Cold War, worked
better against United States
than against Soviet Union

30. The game will change
We can pay now…
… or we can pay later.

31. Iran and
the Bomb
J.E. Dyer
For Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors
18 November 2013

32. End of presentation
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33. S-300 changes the game

34. Iran Air Bases and Fixed-Site SAM Coverage
Tabriz
Mehrabad
Tehran
Hamadan
Arak
Natanz
Esfahan
Dezful
IRIAF air base
SA-5
Hawk
HQ-2
Bushehr
CIA map/Author graphic depictions

35. Iran Air Bases and Fixed-Site SAM Coverage
IRIAF air base
SA-5
Hawk
HQ-2
CIA map/Author graphic depictions