SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 84
 
NERC CIP Compliance Workshop ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Presenters Gib Sorebo  – Chief Security Engineer, SAIC Mike Echols  – Critical Infrastructure Protection Manager, Salt River Project Jim Brenton  – Regional Security Coordinator, ERCOT Joshua Axelrod  – Director Of Professional Services, Alert Enterprise Lior Frenkel  – CEO, Waterfall Security Solutions Steven Applegate  – Cyber Security Threat and Vulnerability Program Manager, NERC
Agenda ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
DOE Modern Grid Strategy AMI = Advanced Metering Infrastructure DR = Demand Response ADO = Advanced Distribution Operations ATO = Advanced Transmission Operations AAM = Advanced Asset Management Source: Department of Energy
NERC CIP Overview
NERC CIP Compliance
Critical Assets
Control & Backup Control Centers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Transmission Substations ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Kv = kilovolt
Automatic Load Shedding ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Special Protection System (SPS) ,[object Object]
System Restoration ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Generation Resources ,[object Object]
Other Assets ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Critical Cyber Assets CCA = Critical Cyber Asset Cyber Asset Name Essential R3.1 R3.2 R3.3 Connectivity CCA Cyber.Asset.Name Yes Yes Yes No IP Yes Cyber.Asset.Name Yes Yes Yes No Disconnected No Cyber.Asset.Name Yes No No Yes Dial-up Yes Cyber.Asset.Name Yes No No No Serial No
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP Standards Version 4 Update
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Review:  CIP-002-3 CA Identification
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],New CIP-002-4 CA Identification Criteria
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP-002-4/R2: Critical  Cyber   Asset Identification
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP-002-4 - Attachment 1:  New Critical Asset Identification Criteria
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP-002-4 - Attachment 1:  New Critical Asset Identification Criteria
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP-002-4 - Attachment 1:  New Critical Asset Identification Criteria
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP-002-4 - Attachment 1:  New Critical Asset Identification Criteria
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP-002-4 - Attachment 1:  New Critical Asset Identification Criteria
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Projected CIP-002-4 Time Lines
What’s next for CIP Standards
CIP 003 Security Policy ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],NERC = North American Electric Reliability Corporation CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 003 Leadership CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 003 Exceptions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],NERC = North American Electric Reliability Corporation CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 003 Information Protection CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],What Where  Who What information is critical? Where is the critical information located? Who owns the critical information?
CIP 003 Change Control and Configuration Management CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection I&A = Identification and Authentication DES = Data Encryption Standard PKI = Public Key Infrastructure
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Make a checklist Do the same for databases, operating systems and network infrastructure devices. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIG) and Center for Internet Security (CIS) benchmarks provide a starting point. CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection I&A = Identification and Authentication DES = Data Encryption Standard PKI = Public Key Infrastructure CIP 003 Change Control and Configuration Management Access Audit Communication Protection I &A The meter restricts access based on token I&A The meter records when access is authorized The meter encrypts data commands issued on it The meter requires token-based authentication The meter only accepts inputs from collectors The meter records what functions that are initiated on it The meter uses DES encryption. The meter accepts tokens authorized by the PKI system
CIP 004 Awareness and Training ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
CIP 004 Access Control
CIP 005 Network Security Network Applications Databases Operating System Network Operating System Databases Applications Access Points Electronic Security Perimeters CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 005 Network Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 005 Network Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection CIP 005 Network Security Ports and Services System Security Password Security Community String Security Open firewall ports and protocols No default accounts At least six-character passwords No public strings Point-to-point rules (no any any) Strong passwords Complex passwords Rename community strings Deny by default No default community strings Password changes every 360 days
CIP 006 Physical Security
[object Object],Create Baseline Configuration
CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection Vendor releases security patch or update SME determines patch or update applicability (within 30 days of availability) SME creates plan (within same 30 days) for future deployment SME downloads patch or update and deploys in test environment SME tests security controls and functionality according to test plan SME securely deploys and tests in production environment (or TFE)
CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection IDS = Intrusion Detection System ICS = Industrial Control System CIP 007 Systems Security
CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection Ports and Services System Security Password Security Community String Security Open firewall ports and protocols No default accounts At least 6 character passwords No public strings Point-to-point rules (no any any) Strong passwords Complex passwords Rename community strings Deny by default No default community strings Password changes every 360 days
CIP 008 Incident Response ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 008 Incident Response ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP 009 Recovery CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection CIP 009 Recovery
Challenges Created by New CIP Requirements ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
NERC is Complex. NERC CIP is more Complex.. To meet all requirements you need to interface with: Applications – SAP, Oracle, HR, and Business Applications GRC, IAM, Change Management, Asset Management Directories, Network Security and IT Systems Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) Control Systems: EMS, DMS, HMI/SCADA Facilities / Building Management Video surveillance and other imaging sensors Situational Awareness and Geo-Spatial Mapping Incident Management Applications
Streamline On-Boarding/Off-Boarding & Close Security Gaps Enterprise Compliance Eliminate Overlaps Workplace Efficiency Simplify & automate onboarding & offboarding Human resources SCADA/ Network Physical security Governance risk & compliance Identity management IT/ERP security Assets Contractors Background Checks Certification Internal Control Policies  Industry  Specific  Risk Library
A New Generation of Solutions Bridges the Gap, Removes the Silos
Active Policy Enforcement
Situational Awareness
Incident Response
NERC CIP Security and Compliance Posture
Compliance Solutions Tools: Features To Look For ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
CIP 003 – 009 Takeaways CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
Beyond NERC-CIP: Perimeter Protection Issues Internet Critical Network Business Network Critical Cyber Asset Command And Control
Network Threats ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Routine Threats Advanced Threats
Remote Control ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Routine Threats Advanced Threats
Advanced Perimeter Protection Unidirectional Communications Critical Network Business Network Critical Cyber Asset Enterprise Planning System One-Way Communications Hardware
Unidirectional Data Transfer ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Air Gap Unidirectional Data Transfer
Emulating Two Way Protocols One-Way Communications Hardware Emulation Agent Two-Way Protocol Two-Way Protocol Emulation Agent
Emulating Two-Way Protocols ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Unidirectional Gateways Software Agents
Under the Hood WF-Packet preparation and sending (Sequencing, Redundancy, Error correction) High capacity and optimized receiving mechanism. Scheduler 3 rd  Party API SDK Connectors Management Control and Conf. MMI Connectors SDK 3 rd  Party API Scheduler Management Control and Conf. MMI Unidirectional Fiber optics ETH ETH
Mature Product Lines ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Broad Range of Features
Application: Generation Photo courtesy of wikimedia.org Critical Network Critical Cyber Assets Business Network Enterprise Historian (Replica) Plant Historian ICCP (to SO)
Application: Generation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Historian Replication ICCP Communications
Application: Transmission Photo courtesy of: hydro station L'Ange-Gardien, QC Substation Network EMS Network Critical Cyber Assets DNP3 DNP3 EMS
Application: Transmission ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Historian Replication ICCP Communications
NERC-CIP: Specific Benefits ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Copyright © 2011 Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd ,[object Object],CIP-003: Security Management Controls CIP-005: Electronic Security Perimeters CIP-007: Security Systems Management
NERC-CIP: Systemic Benefits ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Copyright © 2011 Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Increased Security Reduced Program Documentation Reduced Audit and Assessment Costs
What CIP is Not ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What if I’m Not Required To Comply?
Am I at Risk? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Have a look for yourself
How far should I go?
How do I choose security controls? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Where can I go for help?
Culture of Compliance What Does It Look Like? How Do I Get There?

More Related Content

What's hot

Microsoft .Net Capabilities - Rishabh Software
Microsoft .Net Capabilities - Rishabh SoftwareMicrosoft .Net Capabilities - Rishabh Software
Microsoft .Net Capabilities - Rishabh Software
Rishabh Software
 
RDrew ITIL Presentation
RDrew ITIL PresentationRDrew ITIL Presentation
RDrew ITIL Presentation
Ron Drew
 

What's hot (20)

Enterprise Architecture Governance
Enterprise Architecture GovernanceEnterprise Architecture Governance
Enterprise Architecture Governance
 
ITIL Service Strategy 2011
ITIL Service Strategy 2011ITIL Service Strategy 2011
ITIL Service Strategy 2011
 
itil process maturity assessment
itil process maturity assessmentitil process maturity assessment
itil process maturity assessment
 
Data center disaster recovery.ppt
Data center disaster recovery.ppt Data center disaster recovery.ppt
Data center disaster recovery.ppt
 
Best practices for building network operations center
Best practices for building  network operations centerBest practices for building  network operations center
Best practices for building network operations center
 
Deployment Strategies Powerpoint Presentation Slides
Deployment Strategies Powerpoint Presentation SlidesDeployment Strategies Powerpoint Presentation Slides
Deployment Strategies Powerpoint Presentation Slides
 
Frontit seminarium: "Om COBIT, PM3 eller ITIL är svaret..."- Malmö 22 oktober
Frontit seminarium: "Om COBIT, PM3 eller ITIL är svaret..."- Malmö 22 oktoberFrontit seminarium: "Om COBIT, PM3 eller ITIL är svaret..."- Malmö 22 oktober
Frontit seminarium: "Om COBIT, PM3 eller ITIL är svaret..."- Malmö 22 oktober
 
Complexity and Solution Architecture
Complexity and Solution ArchitectureComplexity and Solution Architecture
Complexity and Solution Architecture
 
ITSM Foundation Course Material
ITSM Foundation Course MaterialITSM Foundation Course Material
ITSM Foundation Course Material
 
ServiceNow Configuration Management Database
ServiceNow Configuration Management Database ServiceNow Configuration Management Database
ServiceNow Configuration Management Database
 
ServiceNow Vancover Release.pptx
ServiceNow Vancover Release.pptxServiceNow Vancover Release.pptx
ServiceNow Vancover Release.pptx
 
Solution Architecture And Solution Security
Solution Architecture And Solution SecuritySolution Architecture And Solution Security
Solution Architecture And Solution Security
 
ITSM (IT Service Management) & ITIL V3 Foundation
ITSM (IT Service Management) & ITIL V3 FoundationITSM (IT Service Management) & ITIL V3 Foundation
ITSM (IT Service Management) & ITIL V3 Foundation
 
Microsoft .Net Capabilities - Rishabh Software
Microsoft .Net Capabilities - Rishabh SoftwareMicrosoft .Net Capabilities - Rishabh Software
Microsoft .Net Capabilities - Rishabh Software
 
RDrew ITIL Presentation
RDrew ITIL PresentationRDrew ITIL Presentation
RDrew ITIL Presentation
 
ModSecurity and NGINX: Tuning the OWASP Core Rule Set - EMEA
ModSecurity and NGINX: Tuning the OWASP Core Rule Set - EMEAModSecurity and NGINX: Tuning the OWASP Core Rule Set - EMEA
ModSecurity and NGINX: Tuning the OWASP Core Rule Set - EMEA
 
Information technology Infrastructure library{itil}
Information technology Infrastructure library{itil}Information technology Infrastructure library{itil}
Information technology Infrastructure library{itil}
 
ITIL V3 Overview
ITIL V3 OverviewITIL V3 Overview
ITIL V3 Overview
 
Implementing Effective Enterprise Architecture
Implementing Effective Enterprise ArchitectureImplementing Effective Enterprise Architecture
Implementing Effective Enterprise Architecture
 
Enterprise Architecture: The role of the Design Authority
Enterprise Architecture:The role of the Design AuthorityEnterprise Architecture:The role of the Design Authority
Enterprise Architecture: The role of the Design Authority
 

Viewers also liked

Leveraging Technology to Enhance Security, Reliability & NERC-CIP Ver.5 Compl...
Leveraging Technology to Enhance Security, Reliability & NERC-CIP Ver.5 Compl...Leveraging Technology to Enhance Security, Reliability & NERC-CIP Ver.5 Compl...
Leveraging Technology to Enhance Security, Reliability & NERC-CIP Ver.5 Compl...
TheAnfieldGroup
 
FERC Filing Colton
FERC Filing ColtonFERC Filing Colton
FERC Filing Colton
Chad Colton
 
VMware Product Applicability Guide for NERC CIP v5 Final Version 1.0
VMware Product Applicability Guide for NERC CIP v5 Final Version 1.0VMware Product Applicability Guide for NERC CIP v5 Final Version 1.0
VMware Product Applicability Guide for NERC CIP v5 Final Version 1.0
Anthony Dukes
 
RAC Troubleshooting and Diagnosability Sangam2016
RAC Troubleshooting and Diagnosability Sangam2016RAC Troubleshooting and Diagnosability Sangam2016
RAC Troubleshooting and Diagnosability Sangam2016
Sandesh Rao
 
QualysGuard InfoDay 2013 - QualysGuard RoadMap for H2-­2013/H1-­2014
QualysGuard InfoDay 2013 - QualysGuard RoadMap for H2-­2013/H1-­2014QualysGuard InfoDay 2013 - QualysGuard RoadMap for H2-­2013/H1-­2014
QualysGuard InfoDay 2013 - QualysGuard RoadMap for H2-­2013/H1-­2014
Risk Analysis Consultants, s.r.o.
 
QualysGuard InfoDay 2014 - QualysGuard Web Application Security a Web Applica...
QualysGuard InfoDay 2014 - QualysGuard Web Application Security a Web Applica...QualysGuard InfoDay 2014 - QualysGuard Web Application Security a Web Applica...
QualysGuard InfoDay 2014 - QualysGuard Web Application Security a Web Applica...
Risk Analysis Consultants, s.r.o.
 
ICS Cybersecurity: How to Protect the Proprietary Cyber Assets That Hackers C...
ICS Cybersecurity: How to Protect the Proprietary Cyber Assets That Hackers C...ICS Cybersecurity: How to Protect the Proprietary Cyber Assets That Hackers C...
ICS Cybersecurity: How to Protect the Proprietary Cyber Assets That Hackers C...
EnergySec
 

Viewers also liked (20)

Leveraging Technology to Enhance Security, Reliability & NERC-CIP Ver.5 Compl...
Leveraging Technology to Enhance Security, Reliability & NERC-CIP Ver.5 Compl...Leveraging Technology to Enhance Security, Reliability & NERC-CIP Ver.5 Compl...
Leveraging Technology to Enhance Security, Reliability & NERC-CIP Ver.5 Compl...
 
Stop Chasing the Version: Compliance with CIPv5 through CIPv99
Stop Chasing the Version: Compliance with CIPv5 through CIPv99 Stop Chasing the Version: Compliance with CIPv5 through CIPv99
Stop Chasing the Version: Compliance with CIPv5 through CIPv99
 
2015 Long-Term Reliability Assessment by NERC
2015 Long-Term Reliability Assessment by NERC2015 Long-Term Reliability Assessment by NERC
2015 Long-Term Reliability Assessment by NERC
 
FERC Filing Colton
FERC Filing ColtonFERC Filing Colton
FERC Filing Colton
 
FERC 101, continued - Robert Deibel - USDA Forest Service and Matt Rice, Amer...
FERC 101, continued - Robert Deibel - USDA Forest Service and Matt Rice, Amer...FERC 101, continued - Robert Deibel - USDA Forest Service and Matt Rice, Amer...
FERC 101, continued - Robert Deibel - USDA Forest Service and Matt Rice, Amer...
 
VMware Product Applicability Guide for NERC CIP v5 Final Version 1.0
VMware Product Applicability Guide for NERC CIP v5 Final Version 1.0VMware Product Applicability Guide for NERC CIP v5 Final Version 1.0
VMware Product Applicability Guide for NERC CIP v5 Final Version 1.0
 
MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE
MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSEMASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE
MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE
 
OpenStack at Cisco, June 2015
OpenStack at Cisco, June 2015OpenStack at Cisco, June 2015
OpenStack at Cisco, June 2015
 
RAC Troubleshooting and Diagnosability Sangam2016
RAC Troubleshooting and Diagnosability Sangam2016RAC Troubleshooting and Diagnosability Sangam2016
RAC Troubleshooting and Diagnosability Sangam2016
 
QualysGuard InfoDay 2013 - QualysGuard RoadMap for H2-­2013/H1-­2014
QualysGuard InfoDay 2013 - QualysGuard RoadMap for H2-­2013/H1-­2014QualysGuard InfoDay 2013 - QualysGuard RoadMap for H2-­2013/H1-­2014
QualysGuard InfoDay 2013 - QualysGuard RoadMap for H2-­2013/H1-­2014
 
Webinar: Vulnerability Management leicht gemacht – mit Splunk und Qualys
Webinar: Vulnerability Management leicht gemacht – mit  Splunk und QualysWebinar: Vulnerability Management leicht gemacht – mit  Splunk und Qualys
Webinar: Vulnerability Management leicht gemacht – mit Splunk und Qualys
 
Breaking In and Breaking Records – A Look Back at 2016 Cybercrimes
Breaking In and Breaking Records – A Look Back at 2016 CybercrimesBreaking In and Breaking Records – A Look Back at 2016 Cybercrimes
Breaking In and Breaking Records – A Look Back at 2016 Cybercrimes
 
FERC Order 1000: Understanding Transmission Planning in a New Paradigm
FERC Order 1000: Understanding Transmission Planning in a New ParadigmFERC Order 1000: Understanding Transmission Planning in a New Paradigm
FERC Order 1000: Understanding Transmission Planning in a New Paradigm
 
QualysGuard InfoDay 2014 - QualysGuard Web Application Security a Web Applica...
QualysGuard InfoDay 2014 - QualysGuard Web Application Security a Web Applica...QualysGuard InfoDay 2014 - QualysGuard Web Application Security a Web Applica...
QualysGuard InfoDay 2014 - QualysGuard Web Application Security a Web Applica...
 
ICS Cybersecurity: How to Protect the Proprietary Cyber Assets That Hackers C...
ICS Cybersecurity: How to Protect the Proprietary Cyber Assets That Hackers C...ICS Cybersecurity: How to Protect the Proprietary Cyber Assets That Hackers C...
ICS Cybersecurity: How to Protect the Proprietary Cyber Assets That Hackers C...
 
Tripwire IP360 Vulnerability Management Scanning Best Practices
Tripwire IP360 Vulnerability Management Scanning Best PracticesTripwire IP360 Vulnerability Management Scanning Best Practices
Tripwire IP360 Vulnerability Management Scanning Best Practices
 
Lessons Learned For NERC CIPv5 Compliance & Configuration Change Management
Lessons Learned For NERC CIPv5 Compliance & Configuration Change ManagementLessons Learned For NERC CIPv5 Compliance & Configuration Change Management
Lessons Learned For NERC CIPv5 Compliance & Configuration Change Management
 
Industrial Control System Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Fir...
Industrial Control System Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Fir...Industrial Control System Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Fir...
Industrial Control System Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Fir...
 
Risk Assessments
Risk AssessmentsRisk Assessments
Risk Assessments
 
Pros and Cons of Moving to Cloud and Managed Services
Pros and Cons of Moving to Cloud and Managed ServicesPros and Cons of Moving to Cloud and Managed Services
Pros and Cons of Moving to Cloud and Managed Services
 

Similar to NERC CIP Compliance 101 Workshop - Smart Grid Security East 2011

2015 04 16_WECC Open Mic Webinar Slide Deck
2015 04 16_WECC Open Mic Webinar Slide Deck2015 04 16_WECC Open Mic Webinar Slide Deck
2015 04 16_WECC Open Mic Webinar Slide Deck
Bryan Carr
 
10 - CIP-002-5.1 Medley - Carr
10 - CIP-002-5.1 Medley - Carr10 - CIP-002-5.1 Medley - Carr
10 - CIP-002-5.1 Medley - Carr
Bryan Carr
 
CE Power NERC Compliance
CE Power NERC ComplianceCE Power NERC Compliance
CE Power NERC Compliance
Brian V. Wilson
 
Wind Exchange 2015 Report
Wind Exchange 2015 ReportWind Exchange 2015 Report
Wind Exchange 2015 Report
Joshua Chokera
 
Other FacilityICCP MasterHistorianDatabaseSCADA.docx
Other FacilityICCP MasterHistorianDatabaseSCADA.docxOther FacilityICCP MasterHistorianDatabaseSCADA.docx
Other FacilityICCP MasterHistorianDatabaseSCADA.docx
gerardkortney
 

Similar to NERC CIP Compliance 101 Workshop - Smart Grid Security East 2011 (20)

Alan Bull CTOTF NERC Presentation
Alan Bull CTOTF NERC PresentationAlan Bull CTOTF NERC Presentation
Alan Bull CTOTF NERC Presentation
 
White paper scada (2)
White paper scada (2)White paper scada (2)
White paper scada (2)
 
2015 04 16_WECC Open Mic Webinar Slide Deck
2015 04 16_WECC Open Mic Webinar Slide Deck2015 04 16_WECC Open Mic Webinar Slide Deck
2015 04 16_WECC Open Mic Webinar Slide Deck
 
10 - CIP-002-5.1 Medley - Carr
10 - CIP-002-5.1 Medley - Carr10 - CIP-002-5.1 Medley - Carr
10 - CIP-002-5.1 Medley - Carr
 
CE Power NERC Compliance
CE Power NERC ComplianceCE Power NERC Compliance
CE Power NERC Compliance
 
Rapid7 NERC-CIP Compliance Guide
Rapid7 NERC-CIP Compliance GuideRapid7 NERC-CIP Compliance Guide
Rapid7 NERC-CIP Compliance Guide
 
Importance of the NERC PRC-005 Standard - Challenges and Audit Tips
Importance of the NERC PRC-005 Standard - Challenges and Audit TipsImportance of the NERC PRC-005 Standard - Challenges and Audit Tips
Importance of the NERC PRC-005 Standard - Challenges and Audit Tips
 
8.1.1_PAR 2030.7_Bower_EPRI/SNL Microgrid Symposium
8.1.1_PAR 2030.7_Bower_EPRI/SNL Microgrid Symposium8.1.1_PAR 2030.7_Bower_EPRI/SNL Microgrid Symposium
8.1.1_PAR 2030.7_Bower_EPRI/SNL Microgrid Symposium
 
SARMA TALLARICO6-11
SARMA TALLARICO6-11SARMA TALLARICO6-11
SARMA TALLARICO6-11
 
Nerc Version 3 vs Version5 changes
Nerc Version 3 vs Version5  changesNerc Version 3 vs Version5  changes
Nerc Version 3 vs Version5 changes
 
Integrated Compliance
Integrated ComplianceIntegrated Compliance
Integrated Compliance
 
Wind Exchange 2015 Report
Wind Exchange 2015 ReportWind Exchange 2015 Report
Wind Exchange 2015 Report
 
Rm15 14 lppc comments 4-19-16(1)
Rm15 14 lppc comments 4-19-16(1)Rm15 14 lppc comments 4-19-16(1)
Rm15 14 lppc comments 4-19-16(1)
 
Explore the Implicit Requirements of the NERC CIP RSAWs
Explore the Implicit Requirements of the NERC CIP RSAWsExplore the Implicit Requirements of the NERC CIP RSAWs
Explore the Implicit Requirements of the NERC CIP RSAWs
 
CRITERIA FOR OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION LINE AMPACITY RATINGS
CRITERIA FOR OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION LINE AMPACITY RATINGSCRITERIA FOR OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION LINE AMPACITY RATINGS
CRITERIA FOR OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION LINE AMPACITY RATINGS
 
Standards based security for energy utilities
Standards based security for energy utilitiesStandards based security for energy utilities
Standards based security for energy utilities
 
Wind turbine condition monitoring sqi rev
Wind turbine condition monitoring sqi revWind turbine condition monitoring sqi rev
Wind turbine condition monitoring sqi rev
 
Real time monitoring proposal 2011
Real time monitoring proposal 2011Real time monitoring proposal 2011
Real time monitoring proposal 2011
 
NERC v6.0 for ESM Solution Guide
NERC v6.0 for ESM Solution GuideNERC v6.0 for ESM Solution Guide
NERC v6.0 for ESM Solution Guide
 
Other FacilityICCP MasterHistorianDatabaseSCADA.docx
Other FacilityICCP MasterHistorianDatabaseSCADA.docxOther FacilityICCP MasterHistorianDatabaseSCADA.docx
Other FacilityICCP MasterHistorianDatabaseSCADA.docx
 

Recently uploaded

Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Joaquim Jorge
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
 
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
 
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
 
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your BusinessAdvantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
 
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfThe Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
 

NERC CIP Compliance 101 Workshop - Smart Grid Security East 2011

  • 1.  
  • 2.
  • 3. Presenters Gib Sorebo – Chief Security Engineer, SAIC Mike Echols – Critical Infrastructure Protection Manager, Salt River Project Jim Brenton – Regional Security Coordinator, ERCOT Joshua Axelrod – Director Of Professional Services, Alert Enterprise Lior Frenkel – CEO, Waterfall Security Solutions Steven Applegate – Cyber Security Threat and Vulnerability Program Manager, NERC
  • 4.
  • 5. DOE Modern Grid Strategy AMI = Advanced Metering Infrastructure DR = Demand Response ADO = Advanced Distribution Operations ATO = Advanced Transmission Operations AAM = Advanced Asset Management Source: Department of Energy
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16. Critical Cyber Assets CCA = Critical Cyber Asset Cyber Asset Name Essential R3.1 R3.2 R3.3 Connectivity CCA Cyber.Asset.Name Yes Yes Yes No IP Yes Cyber.Asset.Name Yes Yes Yes No Disconnected No Cyber.Asset.Name Yes No No Yes Dial-up Yes Cyber.Asset.Name Yes No No No Serial No
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.
  • 21.
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 27. What’s next for CIP Standards
  • 28.
  • 29. CIP 003 Leadership CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 30.
  • 31.
  • 32. CIP 003 Change Control and Configuration Management CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection I&A = Identification and Authentication DES = Data Encryption Standard PKI = Public Key Infrastructure
  • 33.
  • 34.
  • 35. CIP 004 Access Control
  • 36. CIP 005 Network Security Network Applications Databases Operating System Network Operating System Databases Applications Access Points Electronic Security Perimeters CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 37. CIP 005 Network Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 38. CIP 005 Network Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 39. CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection CIP 005 Network Security Ports and Services System Security Password Security Community String Security Open firewall ports and protocols No default accounts At least six-character passwords No public strings Point-to-point rules (no any any) Strong passwords Complex passwords Rename community strings Deny by default No default community strings Password changes every 360 days
  • 40. CIP 006 Physical Security
  • 41.
  • 42. CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 43. CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection Vendor releases security patch or update SME determines patch or update applicability (within 30 days of availability) SME creates plan (within same 30 days) for future deployment SME downloads patch or update and deploys in test environment SME tests security controls and functionality according to test plan SME securely deploys and tests in production environment (or TFE)
  • 44. CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection IDS = Intrusion Detection System ICS = Industrial Control System CIP 007 Systems Security
  • 45. CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 46. CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 47. CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 48. CIP 007 Systems Security CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection Ports and Services System Security Password Security Community String Security Open firewall ports and protocols No default accounts At least 6 character passwords No public strings Point-to-point rules (no any any) Strong passwords Complex passwords Rename community strings Deny by default No default community strings Password changes every 360 days
  • 49.
  • 50.
  • 51. CIP 009 Recovery CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 52. CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection CIP 009 Recovery
  • 53.
  • 54. NERC is Complex. NERC CIP is more Complex.. To meet all requirements you need to interface with: Applications – SAP, Oracle, HR, and Business Applications GRC, IAM, Change Management, Asset Management Directories, Network Security and IT Systems Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) Control Systems: EMS, DMS, HMI/SCADA Facilities / Building Management Video surveillance and other imaging sensors Situational Awareness and Geo-Spatial Mapping Incident Management Applications
  • 55. Streamline On-Boarding/Off-Boarding & Close Security Gaps Enterprise Compliance Eliminate Overlaps Workplace Efficiency Simplify & automate onboarding & offboarding Human resources SCADA/ Network Physical security Governance risk & compliance Identity management IT/ERP security Assets Contractors Background Checks Certification Internal Control Policies Industry Specific Risk Library
  • 56. A New Generation of Solutions Bridges the Gap, Removes the Silos
  • 60. NERC CIP Security and Compliance Posture
  • 61.
  • 62. CIP 003 – 009 Takeaways CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • 63. Beyond NERC-CIP: Perimeter Protection Issues Internet Critical Network Business Network Critical Cyber Asset Command And Control
  • 64.
  • 65.
  • 66. Advanced Perimeter Protection Unidirectional Communications Critical Network Business Network Critical Cyber Asset Enterprise Planning System One-Way Communications Hardware
  • 67.
  • 68. Emulating Two Way Protocols One-Way Communications Hardware Emulation Agent Two-Way Protocol Two-Way Protocol Emulation Agent
  • 69.
  • 70. Under the Hood WF-Packet preparation and sending (Sequencing, Redundancy, Error correction) High capacity and optimized receiving mechanism. Scheduler 3 rd Party API SDK Connectors Management Control and Conf. MMI Connectors SDK 3 rd Party API Scheduler Management Control and Conf. MMI Unidirectional Fiber optics ETH ETH
  • 71.
  • 72. Application: Generation Photo courtesy of wikimedia.org Critical Network Critical Cyber Assets Business Network Enterprise Historian (Replica) Plant Historian ICCP (to SO)
  • 73.
  • 74. Application: Transmission Photo courtesy of: hydro station L'Ange-Gardien, QC Substation Network EMS Network Critical Cyber Assets DNP3 DNP3 EMS
  • 75.
  • 76.
  • 77.
  • 78.
  • 79. What if I’m Not Required To Comply?
  • 80.
  • 81. How far should I go?
  • 82.
  • 83. Where can I go for help?
  • 84. Culture of Compliance What Does It Look Like? How Do I Get There?

Editor's Notes

  1. Reliability Coordinator. Balancing Authority. Interchange Authority. Transmission Service Provider. Transmission Owner. Transmission Operator. Generator Owner. Generator Operator. Load Serving Entity. NERC. Regional Entity.
  2. You can drill down into the detail and identify which NERC CIP compliance requirement is being violated. You can remediate or mitigate risk right from the same screen
  3. Via the SCADA interface the application detects unauthorized disabling of 2-levels of protection by disabling protective relays at a generation facility. The application delivers a geo-spatial view delivering situational awareness. In this slide we can view that an alert has been received and the user can confirm and initiate the remedial action scripts workflow.
  4. The application is pre-integrated with video surveillance and door locks from the building control system which can be tagged in the display and clicked on to access live video to confirm the incident. If needed the remote responder can initiate a lock down of the premises or the particular access point while automatically dispatching first responders.
  5. Compliance Is Painful - not necessarily. There is help available. Much of it is common sense. Paradigm shift and this becomes ingrained in the culture of your organization. Congress-Initiated Problem – two issues with this acronym: 1) congress initiated an order, but it was a response to a horrible blackout and subsequent studies done evidencing lack of participation in volunteer compliance. 2) not a problem, but one viable solution or remedy Can I punt? (No, this is everyone’s issue. If you have CCAs it is obvious. If not, think about doomsday scenarios… scary stats about BES outage scenarios. Cash Is Preferred – The preferred reaction to CIP within NERC is compliance, and hence, a more reliable BES. Not fines for noncompliance. NERC’S Brainchild – the process of creating and maintaining standards is currently an ANSI-certified process, where industry
  6. Reduced risk of noncompliance isn’t the goal… Reduced risk is the goal.
  7. Credible Threats to the Smart Grid. Elaborate on each. Talk about definition of risk and what you can do with it.
  8. Get real security and compliance is easy to attain Give scenarios where “ compliant ” is far from sufficient Talk about NERC sufficiency reviews Show CIA-NR model (possibly to organize threats?) Bad guys don’ t care if you ’ re compliant Standards are a moving target
  9. This is an area where people tend to get “feature fever.” Jumping into controls can waste money, derail your security projects, create an unstainable environment and even degrade your security posture.
  10. Mention the non-compliance parts of NERC (like my team) Warn of consultants who are not properly vetted
  11. Permeates organization from the top down Pragmatic: performance reviews, bonuses, quantify, ratings Benefits: Financial Benefits (litigation, retrofit, etc.) Can hit any “moving target” like CIP, NIST… Better to bake in vs. retrofit