1. Justice as a Social Object
David Koepsell
TU Delft

2. Justice and Ethics
• Justice as a measure of the rightness of laws or legal
systems poses a problem: by what standard can we
measure? Can we find some objective standard? If not,
then how do we deal with events like Nuremberg?
Some Possibilities: (a) Nuremberg is just because the allies
won (b) unjust because it had no basis in law or custom, or (c)
just because of the existence of some objective measure of
the good. (a) and (b) are unsatisfying
Q: are there universal values by which justice can be
measured?

3. Implications
• If there are universal ethical values, what
would this imply?
– The good exists
– There is a universal measure of the good
– The good can be known by all
• Moreover…
– Ethical theory could describe the good and how to
know it

4. Testing the hypothesis
• Consider first three major existing schools of
ethical theory.
– Is there vagueness?
– Are there counterexamples?
– Are there unsatisfying cases?
• Is there overlap?

5. Virtue Ethics
• The good is defined as character traits
– There is vagueness: no bright lines between
virtues and vices. e.g. rashness-courage-
cowardice. Also, arbitrary choices in choosing
what counts as a virtue.
– Counterexamples: virtue theory gives no guidance
for action.
– Unsatisfying cases exist: virtuous warriors may be
vicious in other regards. How shall we weigh the
importance of conflicting virtues?

6. Deontological Theories
• The good is defined as some group of duties
– There is less vagueness, especially in Kantian theory.
The Categorical Imperative is just that: categorical,
without exception. In rights-based theory, defining
what counts as rights is potentially arbitrary.
– Counterexamples abound: exceptions to general rules
seem necessary = killing is justified in self-defense,
lying is justified to prevent murder, etc.
– Unsatisfying cases abound: rights seem worth
bargaining away for certain securities and duties may
conflict.

7. Consequentialism
• The good is defined as action that increases some
universally-agreed upon value, like happiness
– There is vagueness: choosing a value is arbitrary, and
defining it’s general character is impossible to judge.
e.g. what counts as happiness? Over what time-
frame?
– There are counterexamples: for any universally-
chosen value, there are some agents who do not
prefer it.
– There are unsatisfactory cases: slavery, wars, thefts,
etc., can be justified if the hedonic calculus works out

8. Is There Overlap?
• Ethical theories above offer some overlap, but
incomplete.
– Les Miserables, example:
– Jean Valjean exhibits some virtues, but violates
categorical duties. Happiness even harder to
calculate, but let’s assume the theft of bread
increases overall happiness.
– Indeed there is often some overlap, but not
always.

9. Implications for Ethical Theories
• Ethical theories are only models, and thus
failure to give a consistent, non-vague,
satisfactory solution to particular cases does
not imply that there is not THE GOOD
• Major ethical theories cannot all be
completely right
• No major ethical theory solves the problem of
the source of the good without assumptions

10. Could there still be THE GOOD
• Universal ethical values may exist.
– Overlap among ethical theories may indicate
some common truth
– The good may yet exist in some way that no
ethical theory has solved or could solve
– There are reasons to believe that certain values
are at least important, perhaps even universally,
based upon behaviors and institutions around the
world and over time

11. The Phenomenology of THE GOOD
• Hume, Reid, and others argue that moral
intuition points to the good in a way that
reason alone cannot
• Institutions regard the good as knowable and
expressible, for instance through the common
law
• The Nuremburg principles were expressed as
though they were universal, and applicable
post hoc. Where did they come from?

12. The Phenomenology of THE GOOD
• We can access through empirical means,
primarily through introspection of our
intentional states, our considerations of the
good a priori (if there is such a thing as the
good)
• We can also use cases to help develop a
picture of the good that suits our common
intuitions

13. The Phenomenology of THE GOOD
• There are many complex social objects that
are real, but extremely difficult to quantify
objectively.
– Consider a “reputation” or a “friendship”
– These objects exist, they are real, but describing
them is extraordinarily complex, and may depend
upon vague and subjective intentional states.
– There may be no general rule of how such objects
exist

14. Conclusions
• Existing ethical theories are imperfect models
of the good, and provide little compelling
evidence to accept their truth in light of
contradictions, vagueness, and unsatisfactory
cases
• Some overlap among them suggests that
there may be yet some “good” that each
manages to capture, however imperfectly

15. Conclusions
• If the good exists, and there are some
universal ethical values, this might explain our
moral intuitions, and the general feeling that
things like the Nuremburg principles are just
• The good may be a complex social object like
friendships or reputations: real, but incredibly
difficult to describe or develop rules for

16. Conclusions
• We should remain skeptical about the existence
of universal ethical values. Skepticism is
necessary for inquiry. It seems unlikely that any
one theory (at least among existing theories) can
account for the good, if it indeed exists.
• Nonetheless, there is reason to inquire, perhaps
along some as yet untaken course of inquiry, to
suit our tendencies to act as though there is a
good and that it is worth pursuing.