This is one of the only motions Judge James D. O'Neill III granted for me thus far in my case.

1. THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
BELKNAP COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
State of New Hampshire
v.
Richard E. Bergeron III
Case No. 211-2019-CR-163
MOTIO TO SCHEDULE TRIAL
NOW COMES the defendant, Richard E. Bergeron III, and respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court respect and guarantee his Speedy Trial Rights and schedule a trial in this matter as
soon as the court calendar allows. As grounds for this request, the defendant submits the following:
FACTS
1. Belmont Police arrested the defendant, Richard E. Bergeron III, on February 28,
2019 at his home at 107 Cotton Hill Road in Belmont, New Hampshire.
2. Bergeron is currently on bail and subject to bail conditions as long as this case
persists without adjudication.
3. Bergeron is not willing to discuss any plea agreements with the current prosecutor,
who has proven to be dishonest and highly unethical in her approach to this case.
4. Bergeron has repeatedly asked that the biased, wholly unqualified judge in this case
be recused and/or disqualified.
5. Judge O’Neill will be forced to retire by statute by April 1, 2022.

2. 2
6. Judge O’Neill was recently asked by the defendant to disqualify himself, or in the
alternative he could set a date for trial prior to his retirement date.
7. Judge O’Neill neglected to schedule a trial date and denied the motion without any
adequate explanation as to why it was not a valid request.
8. Deputy Grafton County Attorney Tara Heater has made no efforts to move this case
to trial, and Judge O’Neill and/or his superiors in Belknap County Superior Court have
yet to calendar this case despite the Superior Court being required to keep a “Speedy
Trial Calendar” as outlined in the Superior Court Speedy Trial Policy.
9. The court has neglected to reschedule this case after it’s been set for trial multiple
times only to be cancelled each time.
10. Bergeron is expecting the first distribution of funds of his father’s estate in the next
few weeks.
11. Bergeron will be inheriting his father’s Belmont property and will become a full
taxpaying resident of this community.
12. Bergeron runs a business and is a published author, and many projects and business
moves have had to be put on hold due to this case still hanging over his head.
13. Bergeron’s right to a speedy trial is actively being violated, and that will egregiously
compound the civil lawsuit state interests will face if Bergeron is acquitted at trial.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
14. The right to a speedy trial is relative, State v. Varagianis, 128 N.H. 226, 228, 512
A.2d 1117, 1119 (1986), and must be considered with regard to the practical
administration of justice, Fletcher, 135 N.H. at 608, 607 A.2d at 960 (quotations

3. 3
omitted). The delays in this case due to an overcrowded docket and scheduling
difficulties are indeed still held against the State by law, and the fact that these are not
deliberate delays are irrelevant. See State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 54-55, 498 A.2d
731, 735 (1985). State v. Maynard, 137 N.H. 537, 539 (N.H. 1993)
15. “…even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged
by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and
often hostility.” See United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S., at 120; Smith v. Hooey,
393 U.S. 374, 377-378 (1969). In Klopfer v. orth Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221-
222 (1967), the Supreme Court indicated that a defendant awaiting trial on bond
might be subjected to public scorn, deprived of employment, and chilled in the
exercise of his right to speak for, associate with, and participate in unpopular
political causes..”
16. The decision reached in State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829 provides the remedy for
denial of speedy trial rights: “Considering all the facts and circumstances, we hold
that the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the New Hampshire Constitution,
part I, Article 14 was denied, and his convictions are therefore vacated and the
charges against him are dismissed.” Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
17. Judge O’Neill also expressly stated at the first sanctions hearing that the Covid
situation was a “significant problem that the STATE is facing.” (emphasis added)
The recording is available at:
https://www.spreaker.com/user/10702518/judgestateproblem-1. Bergeron is not
personally facing any issues related to Covid-19. He can show up at any trial date that
the court decides upon and observe all required safety protocols, but the court refuses

4. 4
to schedule a trial in a timely fashion. That should not be the defendant’s burden to
bear.
18. The only caselaw cited by Judge O’Neill that supports Covid not being a state
problem is one that suggests “When the reason for the delay is the vicissitudes of
scheduling, the delay does not weigh heavily against the state.” This argument rings
hollow considering the use of the qualifier “heavily.” As Bergeron’s pleadings
expressly asserted, established caselaw does still consider the state at fault for
clogged dockets.
19. Judge O’Neill refuses to recognize the legal background and statutes that prove the
State’s case against Bergeron should be dismissed forthwith. This is proof positive he
is unfit to serve as an arbiter of these proceedings.
20. “A deliberate attempt to delay by either party is weighed heavily against that
party. Humphrey v. Cunningham, 133 N.H. 727, 735 (1990). A more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances rest with the State rather than with the defendant. Humphrey,
133 N.H. at 735.” (emphasis added)
21. Indeed there is a, “societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists
separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.” Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972), id at 519. Specifically, the right to a speedy trial serves
a societal interest in the fair and efficient operation of the criminal justice system.

5. 5
22. Speedy trial also exists to, “limit the possibility that memories will fade, witnesses
disappear, and needless delay impair an accused's ability to defend himself.”
See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
23. “Because the Court broadly assays the factors going into constitutional
judgments under the speedy trial provision, it is appropriate to emphasize that one
of the major purposes of the provision is to guard against inordinate delay between
public charge (February, 2019 in the instant case) and trial (date still not
determined in the instant case), which, wholly aside from possible prejudice to a
defense on the merits, may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty,
whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his
financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and
create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
24. The Sixth Amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.
25. We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the
rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. 386 U.S., at 223.

6. 6
26. As a circuit judge, Justice Blackmun wrote: The government and, for that
matter, the trial court are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of
criminal cases. The burden for trial promptness is not solely upon the defense. The
right to `a speedy . . . trial' is constitutionally guaranteed and, as such, is not to be
honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable. Hodges v. United
States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (CA8 1969).
27. The First Circuit also ruled that a delay of nine months is overly long, absent a
good reason, in a case that depended on eyewitness testimony. United
States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275, 1277 (1970). Courts typically apply a four-part test
first enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972), for determining
whether a defendant's speedy trial right under part I, article 14 of the State
Constitution has been violated. State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319, 540 A.2d 1212,
1213 (1988). These factors are: (1) the length of the pretrial delay; (2) the reasons
for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the
prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. Bernaby, 139 N.H. at 422, 653 A.2d
at 1126.
28. In just a little over two months it will be two full years since Bergeron filed his
one and only waiver of his speedy trial rights, and there is still no date for trial pinned
down. There is no possible excuse or explanation that can remedy this reality beyond
scheduling this trial forthwith or dismissing the indictments. If the state chooses to
fail to heed this request, one of the state’s overburdened prosecutors will face a
comprehensive secondary effort to have the case dismissed due to continuing and
egregious violations of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

7. 7
CONCLUSION
29. For all the foregoing reasons, Bergeron should have his case put on the next trial
calendar and should no longer be subject to incessant unexplained delays. In the
alternative the case should be dismissed for due process concerns, speedy trial rights
violations and failure to prosecute.
.
WHEREFORE, the defendant, Richard E. Bergeron III, pro-se, requests that this Court:
A) Grant this Motion and schedule a trial forthwith; and/or,
B) Schedule a hearing on this Motion; and
C) Dismiss this case due to Speedy Trial violations if a prompt date for trial cannot be
arranged.
D) Grant such other and further relief as the Court should deem just and fair.
Dated this 16th day of November, 2021.
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________
Richard E. Bergeron III
Pro-Se
107 Cotton Hill Road
Belmont, New Hampshire 03220