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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA,
represented by his guardian, CLOTILDES. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Officefor private respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 54492-R and 54493-
R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay allowing the probate of the winof Don
Jesus Alsua in Special Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the complaint in Civil Case3068 after declaring
the two deeds of sale executed by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The respondent court 1 denied the
probate of the will, declared null and void the two sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants,
petitioners herein, to pay damages to the plaintiffs, now the private respondents, the sum of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00), to render an accounting of the properties in their possession and to reimburse the latter
the net gain in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties from the date of the firing of the
complaint up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees and costs.
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated actions are the following.
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doñ;a Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together
with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian
Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de
Particion Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and
Doñ;a Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential features of which are stated in
private respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A)of all the properties of the Alsua spouses,
which inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them signed by the spouses and all the
above named heirs in the left margin of every page (parafo primers).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties described in the inventory
(Annex A) are conjugal properties with the exception of five parcels of land Identified
with the figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery stock which are
paraphernal properties of the late Doñ;a Tinay (segundo parafo).
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine children but five of
them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code (old) to avoid
Possible misunderstanding among their children concerning the inheritance they are
entitled to in the event of death of one of them they have decided to effectuate an
extrajudicial partition of all the properties described in Annex "A" thereto under the
following terms and conditions: (Parafo quinto):
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the
improvements thereon specifically described from pages 1-12 of said inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a
total land area of 5,720,364 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P69,740.00.
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the

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To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the
total land area of 5,630,715 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P58,830.00. têñ.£îhqwâ£
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and admit that the
totality of the properties allotted and adjudicated to the heirs as described in the
preceding paragraph, constitute one half of the properties described in Annex "A",
including any amount of cash deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties assigned to them as
their hereditary portion represent one-half not only of the conjugal properties but
includes the paraphernal properties — waivingnow and forever any complaint or claim
they have or they may have concerning the amount, value, extension and location of the
properties that are allotted to each and everyone. They also waiveany claim they have
or they may have over the remaining portion of the properties, which spouses reserved
for themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone of the heirs
acknowledge that the properties which are left in the possession of the surviving
spouse, including any amount in cash, are even less than the one- half that should
correspond in absolute ownership as his legitimate participation in the conjugal
properties. In consequence they waiveany claim that they have or may have over said
portion of said properties or any amount in cash during the lifetime of the surviving
spouse, including any right or claim they have or they may have over the paraphernal
properties of Doñ;a Tinay in the event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them, the survivingspouse
waives any claim he or she may have over the properties assigned or adjudicated to the
heirs under and by virtue of this deed. The properties which were reserved for them (the
spouses) should be considered as his or her legitimate participation in the conjugal
properties and the fair compensation of his or her usufruct on the properties that the
surviving spouse reserved for himself or herself which shag be distributed in equal
shares among the heirs upon his or her death unless said properties of some of them
have been disposed of during the lifetime of the survivingspouse.
(e) Any heir whomay dare question the validity and legitimacy of the provision
contained herein shall be under obligation to pay to the other heirs, in the concept of
damages and prejudice, the sum of P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees.
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties assigned or adjudicated
to each and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as his share or participation in the
estate or as his inheritance left by the deceased and each heir shall become the
absolute owner of the properties adjudicated to him under this deed.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doñ;a Florentina, also known as Doñ;a Tinay separately executed their
respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the provisions of which were in conformity and in
implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided
for the institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal
assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial
Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of
them, one-half thereof would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the
four children. The holographic will of Doñ;a Tinay written in Spanish reads, as translated: têñ.£îhqwâ£
TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to Don Jesus Alsua,
resident of and with postal address in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
Philippines, being in the full possession of my mental and physical faculties freely and
spontaneously execute this my last will and testament in my handwriting and signed by
me and expressed in the Spanish language which I speak, write and understand, this
5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which I
ordain and provide:
First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and
begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of whom are still living and they are Francisco
Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. The other five (5) died during
their minority, single and without children.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and during our
conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts and industry, we were able to acquire
conjugal properties consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao lands and urban lands
registered in the office of the Registry of Property of the Province of Albay and in the
City of Manila.
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the following- my spouse Don
Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and personal, and the other half, to my
children Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua,
married to Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje, in
equal parts. It is to be understood, however, that the other half that corresponds as
legitime to my above named children have already been given to them, pursuant to a
document dated November 25, 1949 and ratified on the same day, month and year
before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. 11; Series of
1949) enjoining each and everyone of them to respect and faithfully comply with each
and every clause contained in the said document.
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of this testament, the
same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the children
mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion that is, one-half (1 1/2) to my spouse;
and the other half to my children in equal parts.
Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua without having to post
any bond.
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my ownhandwriting this testament on this 5th
day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
Philippines. têñ.£îhqwâ£
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic will on the same day, Jan.
5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above will of his wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay filed before the Court of First Instance of Albay
their respective petitions for the probate of their respective holographic wins which were docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No. 485 (Doñ;a Florentina Ralla de
Alsua, Petitioner).
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils
amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged

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and provided that one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed
of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25,
1949, but that they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay) the other half or those
not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and
reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well as in all properties which might be
acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the survivingspouse, whatever
belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the four children. It was
also declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was
designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the properties reserved for
themselves.
The codicil executed by Doñ;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as translated: têñ.£îhqwâ£
CODICIL
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That my spouse and I
have agreed to divide the properties which wehave acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2 that
would correspond to me covers all the properties that I have partitioned among my
children in the Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 before Notary Public
Segundo G. Flores, Jr. (Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11; Series of 1949) (and)
even as the properties which by reason of this testament I leave to my husband as his
share and the other half that corresponds to my husband constitutes an the properties
that up to now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban lands situated in
Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of Albay and in the City of Manila, with the
exception of that portion that I bequeath to my husband as his inheritance and his
legitimate.
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don Jesus Alsua and my
children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I leave to
my aforecited children all the properties described in the above mentioned Document of
Partition dated November 25, 1949 which correspond to each one of them and in the
profits (fruits) expressed in the same, and in the event that the properties granted to one
or any of my children should exceed in quantity or value those corresponding to another
or others, I hereby declare that it is my will that the same be divided among my children
as their inheritance from the free portion of my property.
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws inheritance the part of
the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in favor of my children in
the Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal
property of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those properties
which weshall acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survivemy spouse, I hereby declare that it is my will
that any and all kinds of property that pertain to me or would pertain to me, which have
not been disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among my
above-mentioned heirs after my death. Ligao, Albay, Philippines, August
14,1956. têñ.£îhqwâ£
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a separate but similar
codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above codicil of his wife. Also on the same day of
August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay both filed their respective supplemental petitions
for the probate of their respective codicils in the probate proceedings earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their
respective holographic wins and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to serve without bond in
an order issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959. Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of
Don Jesus, he took his oath of office and performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the presence of
his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining
properties with their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then instructed to
draft a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms
home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959
had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus'
holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his
properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and
that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted
his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and
whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and
Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to servewithout a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Doñ;a Tinay had been paid, all her heirs
including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for approval a deed of partition executed on December
19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and which essentially confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the holographic
will and codicil of Doñ;a Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved the partition of 1959 and on January 6,
1961 declared the termination of the proceedings on the estate of Doñ;a Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the will of November 14,
1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the Court of First Instance of
Albay and was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo
and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was
not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed
under duress or influence of fear or threats; or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the main beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the
testator was secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not executed according to the formal requirements
of the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949
agreed upon by him, his deceased spouse, Doñ;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and
Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened Don Jesus' own probated
holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively, essentially confirming and implementing the said
partition of 1949 which had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the partition of the
estate of Doñ;a Tinay in December, 1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated November 14, 1959, the Probate
Court appointed her Administratrix of the estate of her late father, Don Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the
Probate Court an inventory of the properties of the estate which, according to the oppositors therein (the
private respondents now) did not include some properties appearing in the agreement of November 25. 1949
or in the inventory attached thereto as Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion" of December 19, 1959 as
belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus. According to the oppositors, these properties consist of thirty-
three (33) premium agricultural lots with a total land area of 1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119
hectares and with a total assessed value of P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of P238,000.00 at
only P2,000.00 per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots Ideally located in the business section of
Legazpi City including the lot and the building presently occupied by the well-known "MayonHotel" with an
assessed value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market value at the time of P469,040.00. It
appearing from the new will that these properties were bequeathed to Pablo Alsua and Francisco Alsua-Betts,
specifically, 3 parcels of the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to Francisco, the oppositors also raised
in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the inventory of the estate of their late father. In answer,
Francisco claimed ownership over the same, alleging that she bought the properties from their father and
presenting the two Deeds of Sale now being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show the sale

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of the 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco by their father for the price of P70,000.00 and the other
dated November 26, 1962 evidencing the sale of the four urban lots for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud
in the sales, the oppositors filed Civil CaseNo. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two deeds of
sale, with damages, which upon agreement of the parties was then jointly heard and tried with Special
Proceedings No. 699 for probate of the Last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14,
1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First Instance of Albay promulgated a
decision on January 15, 1973, the dispositive portion of which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, inview of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES andALLOWS the Will
executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on November 14, 1959, which had been
marked as Exhibit A, consisting of nine (9) pages, and orders that the same be made
the basis for division and distribution of the estate of said testator;
2. In Civil Case3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint and holds that the sale
on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U)and the sale on November 26, 1962 (Exh. W), are lawful
and valid sales and accordingly conveyedtitle to the VENDEE thereof. The Plaintiffs in
Civil Case3068. are ordered jointly and severally to pay to the defendant, Francisco
Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos for attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) and to pay the costs.
On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the appealed decision in a
judgment rendered on April 4, 1977, the dispositive portion of which states, as translated, thus —têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEWOF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to set aside as it
hereby sets aside the decision appealed from in the following manner: (1) in Special
Proceedings 699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is hereby denied; (2) in Civil CaseNo.
3068, Exhs. U and W and the titles issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null
and void, ordering the appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to pay to the
plaintiffs in the concept of fixed damages, the sum of P5,000.00 and to render an
accounting of properties in their possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs the net gain,
in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties subject of litigation in Civil
Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of this complaint, up to the complete
restoration of the properties pertaining to (plaintiffs) pursuant to Article 2208 of the New
Civil Code, paragraph 11, ordering them in addition to pay to the plaintiffs and
oppositors the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs.
Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four assigned errors, to
wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the findings of the probate
court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that private respondents, oppositors to the probate
of the will, are in estoppel to question the competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.
II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that testator Don Jesus
Alsua cannot revoke his previous will.
III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures resulting in a gross misapprehension of facts.
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of August 26, 1961 (Exh.
U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold that the same is of no moment. The
controversy as to the competency or incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to execute his will cannot be
determined by acts of the herein private respondents as oppositors to the will in formally agreeing in writing
jointly with the petitioner Francisca Alsua de Betts that their father, Don Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the
court executor of the will of their mother in Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of Doñ;a Florentina
Ralla de Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court not to require Don Jesus Alsua to file any accounting
as executor in the proceedings, whichpetitioners claim and was upheld by the trial court as constituting
estoppel on the part of the private respondents from questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling laid down in the case of Testate
Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an eminent and recognized authority on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of
Appeals, and We quote:têñ.£îhqwâ£
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the
rile of estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over
and above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see that testamentary
dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to law.
The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's Will, 300 N.Y.S.,
502: têñ.£îhqwâ£
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the
existence of the right of any living person, but to determine
whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by
the pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites to
personal direction of the mode of devolution of his property on
death. There is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a
proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and
he may and frequently does receive no personal benefit from the
performance of the act.
One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it
is the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be
compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a
deceased person (Matter of Watson's Wilt 262 N.Y., 284, 294,
186, N.E., 787; Matter of Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325,
208, N.Y.S., 672; Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div., 733, 216
N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S., Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 Misc.
587, 593, 290, N.Y.S., 581). To that end, the court is, in effect, an
additional party to every litigation affecting the disposal of the
assets of the deceased. Matter of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164
Misc. 295, 298, N.Y.S., 219.'
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court erred in not allowing the probate
of the last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim that the disallowance was based on
speculations, surmises or conjectures, disregarding the facts as found by the trial court. The Civil Court is very
clear and explicit in providing the cases where a will may be disallowed under Article 839 which provides as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a wilt at the
time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

5
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should
be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the respondent court itself when it
accepted the findings of the trial court on the due execution of the questioned will and testament of Don
Jesus, declaring: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... and going back to the previous question, whether the questioned will and testament
of November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the
New Civil Code, this Tribunal from the very beginning accepts the findings of the inferior
court concerning the question, têñ.£îhqwâ£
On October 2, 1959, Doñ;a Florentina died at Ligao, Albay. About
2 weeks after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to
make a new will, thereby revoking and cancelling his previous
holographic will which he made on January 5, 1955 and also its
codicil dated August 14, 1956. In the presence of his bookkeeper
and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, he crossed out in ink each
and every page of said page he wrote on each page the word
"cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon (ExhV-5, V-6,
consecutively up to and including Exh. V-14). He then instructed
Ramirez to make a list of all s properties with their corresponding
descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer, Don Gregorio
Imperial, Sr. and the latter came accompanied by his son, Atty.
Jorge S, Imperial, who, incidentally, is now a judge of the Court of
First Instance of Naga City, Camarines Sur. Don Jesus informed
his lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and accordingly
gave more detailed instructions as to how he wanted to divide his
properties among his four children. He handed to them a list and
on the left he indicated the name of the child to whom the listed
properties shall pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the
instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his
major language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio
are always in Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959,
Atty. Jorge S. Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft
of the will and after reading it Don Jesus said that it was as
directed by him, and after making a few minor corrections, he
instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the winin final form. He
further told Atty, Jorge Imperial that the signing of the will should
be at his home in Ligao, in the morning of November 14, 1959,
and that the witnesses should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then
Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr. Jose Madarieta whois a friend of
the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya whois a sort of employee of Don
Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don Gregorio and
Atty. Jorge S. Imperial, riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi
residence of Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed the latter that Don
Jesus was requesting him to be one of the attesting witnesses to
his will. Mr. Balana, having a very high regard for Don Jesus,
considered it an honor to be so asked, and gladly went with the
Imperials. They arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao;
Albay, almost ten o'clock of that morning, and they were ushered
in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter requested them to be seated
at the usual receiving room on the ground floor while he
announced their arrival to Don Jesus who was on the second
floor. Soon Don Jesus came down, carrying with him the will to be
signed placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted Don Gregorio,
Mr. Balan, and Atty. Imperial and immediately joined them in
conversation. Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose
residence is just across the road from the house of Don Jesus.
Mr. Madarieta was already informed by Don Jesus himself about
the fact of signing the will that morning, and so, on being advised
by Mr. Gayathat the Imperials had already arrived, Madarieta
proceeded to the residence of Don Jesus, without much delay.
With the coming of Madarieta and the coming back of Gaya, there
were now six people gathered in the living room, namely: Don
Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr.
Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the
witnesses who testified for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus
was in bright and lively conversation which ran from problems of
farming and the merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock,
Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about time to do what they
were there for, and this was followed by a more or less statement
from Jesus, whosaid: têñ.£îhqwâ£
'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a
ustedes que esten presentes para ser
testigos de rni ultimo voluntad y testamento
que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr.
Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones
cuyo documento tengo aqui conmigo y
encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta
satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
instrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo
cuatro (4) hijos todos egos.' (pp. 43-44,
t.s.n., hearing of December 7, 1967, Sarte.
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table
on another part of the same sala for convenience in signing
because there were chairs all around this table. The will which
consisted of nine pages, with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid
on the round table and the signing began, with Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial assisting each person signing by indicating the proper
place where the signature shall be written. Don Jesus, as testator,
signed first. After signing the original and the two other sets, the
three sets were then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed as
attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed
next as another attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta
finished signing all the three sets, the same were passed to Mr.
Jose Gayawho also signed as the third attesting witness. On
each of the three sets, Don Jesus signed ten times, — one on the
margin of each of the nine pages, and at the end of the instrument
proper. Each of the three attesting witnesses (Balana, Madarieta
and Gaya) signed eleven times on each set, — one on the margin

6
of each of the nine pages, one at the end of the instrument proper
and one below the attestation clause. The original will was
marked as Exh. A (or set A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K)
and the triplicate of Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and
Mr. Gayawere Identified by Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty.
(now Judge) imperial. It was also clearly established that when
Don Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr.
Gayawere present and witnessed said signing, and that when
each of these three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and the
two other attesting witnesses were present and Witnessing said
Signing. The signing by the testator and the attesting witnesses
having been completed, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial as Notary Public
with commission for the entire province of Albay, notarized the wilt
and sealed it with his notarial seat whichseal he brought along
that morning. After all the three sets were notarized, they were all
given back to Don Jesus who placed them inside the same folder.
At that moment, it was already about 12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus
invited all of them to lunch, which invitation was gladly accepted
by all of then-L (pp. 474-480, Joint Record on Appeal in CA-G.R.
No. 54492-R)
which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to conclude that the
same had not complied with the requirements of Arts. 804- 806 of the New Civil Code.
... (CA Decision, pp. 13-16, as translated).
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings of the lower court declaring the
contested will as having been executed with all the formal requirements of a valid will, are supported by the
evidence. This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter, review or revise the same. Hence,
there is no further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the lower court and the respondent appellate
court have declared that these are the facts and such facts are fully borne and supported by the records. We
find no error in the conclusion arrived at that the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. We
rule that the questioned last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal requirements
of the law.
Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain details which were a little bit
difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life." First was the fact that the spouses Don
Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay together with their four children Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had
executed the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A)which divided the conjugal properties of
the spouses between the spouses themselves and the children under the terms and conditions and
dispositions herein before stated and to implement its provisions, Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay subsequently
executed separately their respective holographic wigs both dated January 5, 1955 and codicils dated August
14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as reproduced herein earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils
having been probated thereafter and upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay, Don Jesus was appointed executor of
the will and in due time the partition of the properties or estate of Doñ;a Tinay was approved by the probate
court on July 6, 1960.
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 was an enforceable contract
which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the survivingspouse, barring him from violating said partition
agreement, barring him from revoking his holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14,
1956, and further barring him from executing his new will and testament of November 14, 1959, now the
subject of the probate proceedings elevated to this Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the Extrajudicial Partition of November
25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056 in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code whichare
applicable hereto. These Articles provide as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
forced heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the commerce of
man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritances,
except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of an estate, in
accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject- matter of
contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of the law may be deduced that
the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only to one who has made a prior will
or testament. In other words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope as to include in
the exception any person whether he has made a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old and new Civil Code, a person who
executes a will is permitted at the same time or a little thereafter or even before as long as he mentions this
fact in the will, to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The
court further added that jurisprudence is to the effect that the partition presupposes the execution of the will
that it ratifies or effectuates, citing the case of Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court
held the opinion that the extrajudicial partition of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the holographic will
executed by Don Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the codicil of August 14, 1956.
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra, the Supreme
Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior will before the testator can partition his properties among
his heirs, and We quote the pertinent portions of the decision: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the partition made by
Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants and appellants
herein, was valid and enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
forced heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid down the
following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a
person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein
said article is found, without the authority of a testament containing an expression of his
last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be
tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the
chapter referring to testaments, and especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely
different from the legal consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their
lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole or a part of their property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to
the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect to
future inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of
the estate in accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise
leads to the conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a
testamentary or legal succession and should be made in conformity with the

7
fundamental rules thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because
neither of the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that they
simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the owner, which,
otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in order to carry into
effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.
Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its division; and the
provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator to dispose of his property by acts inter
vivos or by last will, must be understood in accordance with this distinction. The Idea is
to divide the estate among the heirs designated by the testator. This designation
constitutes the disposition of the properties to take effect after his death, and said act
must necessarily appear in the testament because it is the expression of the testator's
last will and must be surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second
part, to wit, the division in conformity with that disposition, and the testator may make
this division in the same will or in another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words,
the law, in article 1056 as well as in article 1057, which we shall hereafter examine,
makes allusion to the forms or manner of making the partition and not to the effects
thereof, which means that, for purposes of partition the formal solemnities which must
accompany every testament or last will are not necessary. Neither is it necessary to
observe the special for. realities required in case of donations, because it is not a matter
of disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing those which already have been
legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative
commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition
his property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And
it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law,
therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it
necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who
disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In
employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who
freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect after
his death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the extrajudicial partition of November
25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code was expressly prohibited as against public policy had been validly
ratified by the holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956.
Such a holding of the appellate court that a person who executes a will is permitted to partition his properties
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even before executing his will as long as he
mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted under the ruling of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the
commentary of Manresa as quoted above. We rule, therefore, that the respondent court erred in denying
probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to
the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not
revoke his participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or
dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is voidand inoperative as a
partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only be
given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949, contained specific
designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that there was substantial compliance with the rules
on donations inter vivos under the old Civil Code (Article 633). Onthe other hand, there could have been no
valid donation to the children of the other half reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay
which, as stated in the deed, was to be divided equally among the children for the simple reason that the
property or properties were not specifically described in the public instrument, an essential requirement under
Article 633 which provides as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be made by public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described and in the
amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public writing; but it
shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice thereof shall
be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses which may be disposed of in
such manner that either of the spouses would like in regards to his or her share in such portion,
unencumbered by the provision enjoining the last survivingspouse to give equally to the children what
belongs or-would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay, in the
Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of only one-half of their combined properties which must
be charged against their legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half remained
entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with regards to their respective shares.
Upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion was distributed in accordance
with her holographic will dated January 25, 1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed
here that the distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic winand codicil, independently of the
holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on the same date. This is fundamental because
otherwise, to consider both wills and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on
joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly because upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay, only her estate was being settled,
and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Doñ;a Tinay and We find no
indication whatsoever that Doñ;a Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as
heirs to her free portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her holographic will, mention of her children as
heirs was made in the fourth clause but it only provided that, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Cuatro. Que si yoadquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de otorgado este mi
testamento seran las mismas repartados entre mi esposo o hijos arriba mencionada en
el parrafo tercero su la misma proporcion o sea: la mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra
mitad (1/2) para mis hijos en partes iguales.
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that "Should I acquire new properties
after the execution of this testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named
children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion, that is, one- half (1/2) to my spouse;
and the other half to my children in equal parts." From the above-quoted provision, the children would only
inherit together with Don Jesus whatever new properties Doñ;a Tinay would acquire after the execution of her
will.
Likewise, the codicil of Doñ;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to her share in the free portion of the
conjugal assets, and We quote that part of the codicil: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia que se sacara de ni
cuenta de libre disposicion todos aquellos bienes de los que no he dispuesto aun en
favor de mis hijos en la escritura de reparticion precitada y que excedieran de la mitad
de gananciales que le corresponds tal como arriba declare, incluyendo todos aquenos
bienes que se adquiriesen por nosotros despues de otorgado por mi este testamento.
Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yosobreviviera a mi esposo declaro que es mi
voluntad que todas las propiedades de todo genero que me pertenecen y me pudieran

8
pertenecer, no dispuestas aun en la reparticion, se dividan por igual entre mis
herederos mencionados despues de mi muerte.
Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his inheritance the part of
the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in favor of my children in
the Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal
property of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those properties
which weshall acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survivemy spouse, I hereby declare that it is my will
that any and all kinds of property that pertains to me or would pertain to me, which have
not been disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among my
above-mentioned heirs after my death.
The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining estate of Doñ;a Tinay in the event
that she should be the survivingspouse. To stress the point, Doñ;a Tinay did not oblige her husband to give
equally to the children, upon his death, all such properties she was bequeathing him.
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed on November 14, 1959 in view of
Our holding that Doñ;a Tinay's wig and codicil did not stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow the properties
equally to the children, it follows that all the properties of Doñ;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under her
holographic winand codicil became part of Don Jesus' estate unburdened by any condition obligation or
proviso.
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 and had in
fact conformed to said Partition by making a holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as
those of Doñ;a Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We rule, however, that Don Jesus was not forever
bound thereby for his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his discretion.
Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A winmay be revoked by the testator at any time before his death.
Any waiveror restriction of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute
freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such
previous will had as in the case at baralready been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the
first place, probate only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein.
And secondly, the rights to the succession are transmitted only from the moment of the death of the decedent
(Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his property before his
death to whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not
herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate is being contested.
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir instituted to the remaining estate of
Doñ;a Tinay in her holographic will and codicil resulting in all such properties becoming the properties of Don
Jesus alone, and after clearly pointing out that Don Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous holographic will and
codicil, by making another winexpressly cancelling and revoking the former, the next issue for the Court's
resolution is the validity of the provisions of the contested will. Though the law and jurisprudence are clear that
only questions about the extrinsic validity of the will may be entertained by the probate court, the Court had,
on more than one occasion, passed upon the intrinsic validity of a will even before it had been authenticated.
Thus We declared inNuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed to
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the wilt Normally this
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. ...
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation winbe protracted and for ought that appears in the record, in the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will probability exists that the case win come
up once again before us on the issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the wilt Result:
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a behalf that wemight as well meet head-on the time of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. ...
The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 contained an express revocation
of his holographic wigof January 5, 1955 and the codicil of August 14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of
his properties donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of
his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a statement
bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo
and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as executrix without bond.
Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the properties distributed to the children under
the Deed of 1949 and those distributed under the contested will of Don Jesus does not show that the former
had in fact been included in the latter. This being so, it must be presumed that the intention of Don Jesus in
his last win was not to revoke the donations already made in the Deed of 1949 but only to redistribute his
remaining estate, or that portion of the conjugal assets totally left to his free disposal and that which he
received as his inheritance from Doñ;a Tinay. The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact,
not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in the
contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be diamond of by him to
whomsoever he may choose.
If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as in fact he was, We cannot
and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus in doing so. We have clearly laid
down this rule in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its own Idea of a just
distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of disposition so clearly
expressed by the testatrix in the latter will. ...
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will in order to effect
what the court believes to be an equitable division of the estate of a deceased person.
The only functions of the courts in these cases is to carry out the intention of the
deceased as manifested in the wig. Once that intention has been determined through a
careful reading of the will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been
violated, it is beyond the place of judicial cognizance to inquire into the fairness or
unfairness of any devise or bequeast. The court should not sit in judgment upon the
motives and sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as already stated, nothing in the
law restrained her from disposing of her property in any manner she desired, and
secondly, because there are no adequate means of ascertaining the inward process of
her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude toward those who expected
her bounty. ...
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which allegedly benefited and favored the
petitioner to the prejudice of the other heirs who would have been entitled to an equal share under the
extrajudicial partition of 1949, faced two alternatives-one, to consider Don Jesus as a man of culture and
honor and would not snow himself to violate the previous agreement, and the other as one whose mental
faculties or his possession of the same had been diminished considering that when the will was executed, he
was already 84 years of age and in view of his weakness and advanced age, the actual administration of his
properties had been left to his assistant Madarieta who, for his part received instructions from Francisco and
her husband, Joseph Betts. According to the court, the better explanation is the latter, which is not legally
tenable. Under Article 799 of the New Civil Codewhich provides as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

9
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act,
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win. Mere weakness of mind or partial
imbecility from disease of body or from age-does not render a person incapable of making a will. têñ.£îhqwâ£
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably
carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or Idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or
partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and
how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing
mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily
require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14
Phil. 163).
The Civil Codeitself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will, it is essential that the testator be of
sound mind at the time of its execution, and under Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of sound
mind in the absence of proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the acceptance by the respondent court of the
findings of fact of the trial court on the due execution of the last win and testament of Don Jesus has
foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the will was not executed in accordance with the requirements
of the law. But more than that, gleaned from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described
behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a mentally incapacitated person nor one suffering from "senile dementia"
as claimed by private respondents. From these accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who
gave detailed instructions to his lawyeras to how he wanted to divide his properties among his children by
means of a list of his properties should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his
lawyerw-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will at his house in Ligao, "Don
Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the conversation which ran from problems of farming and
the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses was
made after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or gathering, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten presentes para ser
testigos de mi ultima voluntad y testamento que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr.
Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyodocuments tengo aqui con migo y
encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.
Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun implications thereof.
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other details which, in the words of the
decision "are a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of fife" such as the fact that
Don Jesus had sought the probate of his will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956 during his
lifetime but insofar as the will of November 14, 1959 is concerned, he had no intention of seeking the probate
thereof during his lifetime, the alleged redundant and unnecessary proceedings undertaken by Don Jesus in
the properties under question to petitioner Franciso Alsua-Betts when the same properties had already been
bequeathed to her in the will of November 14, 1959 and that "nothing, absolutely nothing, could be made the
basis for finding that Don Jesus Alsua had regarded his other children with less favor, and that he was more
sympathetic to Francisca so as to or forget the former depriving them of benefits already given to them and
rewarding the latter with disproportionate advantages or benefits, to such an extreme as to violate his previous
disposition consecrated in the previous extrajudicial partition, Exh. 8."
We agree with the petitioner that these details whichrespondent court found difficult to reconcile with the
ordinary course of things and of life are mere conjectures, surmises or speculations which, however, do not
warrant or justify disallowance of the probate of the winof Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not cause
his will to be probated during his lifetime while his previous holographic win and codicil were duly probated
when he was still alive is a mere speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the
testator. The law does not require that a will be probated during the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so
there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable consequence therefrom. The parties cannot correctly guess or
surmise the motives of the testator and neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is no
valid and legal ground to reject allowance or disallowance of the wig. The same thing can be said as to
whatever reason Don Jesus had for selling the properties to his daughter Francisca when he had already
assigned the same properties to her in his will. While We can speculate that Don Jesus desired to have
possession of the properties transferred to Francisca after the sale instead of waiting for his death may be a
reasonable explanation or speculation for the act of the testator and yet there is no certainty that such was
actually the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents may offer or as difficult to accept which
respondent court believes. A conjecture is always a conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for annulment of the two Deeds of Sale
executed by and between Don Jesus and petitioner Francisco is their validity or nullity. Private respondents
mainly contend that the sales were fictitious or simulated, there having been no actual consideration paid.
They further insist that the issue raised is a question of fact and, therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari
proceeding before the Supreme Court. On the other hand, petitioners herein maintain that it was error for the
respondent court to set aside on appeal the factual findings of the trial court that the two sales were valid.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive; and this same
principle applies even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of
evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact. But what should not be ignored by lawyers and
litigants alike is the more basic principle that the "findings of fact" described as "final" or "conclusive" are those
borne out by the record or those which are based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by
the Supreme Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals. These are exceptions to the general rule, where We have reviewed and revised the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that findings of fact by the Court of Appeals cannot
be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin vs.
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257);
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna vs. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buycovs. People, 51 O.G. 2927);
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April 30, 1957); and
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139,
April 23, 1958; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289).
In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's conclusion as to the nullity of the
contested sales was not supported by the evidence on record and adduced during the trial.
Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit U, a deed of sale over
agricultural lands executed on August 26, 1961 by Don Jesus in favor of Francisca for the consideration of
Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00), which document bears the signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as a
forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an instrumental witness, again not assailed as a forgery nor
alleged as done thru fraud, force or threat. (2) Exhibit "W", a deed of sale over urban lots executed on
November 16, 1962 for the consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), which document also
bears the signature of Don Jesus, also admittedly not a forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a document dated August 26,
1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo Alsua as witness, acknowledging receipt of a Bank of Philippine

10
Island Check No. 0252 in the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of
agricultural land to Francisco under the same date; again, Pablo did not deny the genuineness of his
signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. D-6979 dated November 26, 1962, in the
amount of P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca, payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X-1", a second
Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D-6980) also dated November 26, 1962 in the amount of ?47,355.29,
drawn by Francisco and payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-5 ", endorsements on the back of the
last two checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures thereon were not assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in the
annulment case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue Receipt (No. 2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a
notation acknowledging the receipt of BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from Don Jesus
Alsua in payment of Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We are convinced and
satisfied from this array of documentary evidence that in fact, Don Jesus sold the subject properties to his
daughter, Francisca for the total consideration of P150,000.00.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for being without cause or
consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground upon which the respondent court upheld said claim on the
basis that there was no need for funds in Don Jesus' old age aside from the speculation that there was
nothing in the evidence that showed what motivated Don Jesus to change his mind as to favor Francesca and
discriminate against the other children. The two contracts of same executed by Don Jesus in favor of
Francesca are evidenced by Exhibits "U" and "W", the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any
time during this long drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing. That the consideration stated in the contracts
were paid is also sufficiently proved as the receipts thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the
private respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny the payment of the consideration
And even of he now allege that in fact no transfer of money was involved, We find his allegation belied by
Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which show that the checks of Francisco made payable to Don Jesus. were in fact
given to Don Jesus as he endorsed them on the back thereof, and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the
annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus actually used Exhibit "XI " to complete payment on the estate
and inheritance tax on the estate of his wife to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the inadequacy of the given price.
Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not,
that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated
price as so inadequate to shock the court's conscience, considering that the price paid was much higher than
the assessed value of the subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by a father to her
daughter in which case filial love must be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEWOF THE FOREGOING, thedecision appealed from is hereby set aside. The decision
of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special Proceedings No. 699 and Civil CaseNo. 3068 is hereby
reinstated, with costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45645 June 28, 1983
FRANCISCO A. TONGOY, for himself and as Judicial Administrator of the Estate of the Late Luis D.
Tongoyand Ma. Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy, petitioners,
vs.
THEHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MERCEDES T. SONORA, JUAN T. SONORA, JESUS T.
SONORA, TRINIDAD T. SONORA, RICARDO P. TONGOY, CRESENCIANO P. TONGOY, AMADO P.
TONGOY, and NORBERTO P. TONGOY, respondents.
Tañada, Sanchez, Tanada & Tanada Law Officefor petitioners.
Reyes & Pablo Law Officefor respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 45336-R,
entitled "Mercedes T. Sonora, et al. versus Francisco A. Tongoy, et al.", promulgated on December 3, 1975.
The antecedent facts which are not controverted are quoted in the questioned decision, as follows:
The case is basically an action for reconveyance respecting two (2) parcels of land in
Bacolod City. The first is Lot No. 1397 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod, otherwise
known as Hacienda Pulo, containing an area of 727,650 square meters and originally
registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 2947 in the names of Francisco
Tongoy, Jose Tongoy, Ana Tongoy, Teresa Tongoy and Jovita Tongoy in pro-indiviso
equal shares. Said co-owners were all children of the late Juan Aniceto Tongoy. The
second is Lot No. 1395 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod, briefly referred to as
Cuaycong property, containing an area of 163,754 square meters, and formerly covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 2674 in the name of Basilisa Cuaycong.
Of the original registered co-owners of Hacienda Pulo, three died without issue, namely:
Jose Tongoy, who died a widower on March 11, 1961; Ama Tongoy, who also died
single on February 6, 1957, and Teresa Tongoy who also died single on November 3,
1949. The other two registered co-owners, namely, Francisco Tongoy and Jovita
Tongoy, were survived by children. Francisco Tongoy, whodied on September 15,
1926, had six children; Patricio D. Tongoy and Luis D. Tongoy by the first marriage;
Amado P. Tongoy, Ricardo P. Tongoy; Cresenciano P. Tongoy and Norberto P. Tongoy
by his second wife Antonina Pabello whom he subsequently married sometime after the
birth of their children. For her part, Jovita Tongoy (Jovita Tongoy de Sonora), who died
on May 14, 1915, had four children: Mercedes T. Sonora, Juan T. Sonora, Jesus T.
Sonora and Trinidad T. Sonora.
By the time this case was commenced, the late Francisco Tongoy's aforesaid two
children by his first marriage, Patricio D. Tongoy and Luis D. Tongoy, have themselves
died. It is claimed that Patricio D. Tongoy left three acknowledged natural children
named Fernando, Estrella and Salvacion, all surnamed Tongoy. On the other hand,
there is no question that Luis D. Tongoy left behind a son, Francisco A. Tongoy, and a
surviving spouse, Ma. Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy.
The following antecedents are also undisputed, though by no means equally submitted
as the complete facts, nor seen in Identical lights: On April 17, 1918, Hacienda Pulo
was mortgaged by its registered co-owners to the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
Bacolod Branch, as security for a loan of P11,000.00 payable in ten (10) years at 8%
interest per annum. The mortgagors however were unable to keep up with the yearly
amortizations, as a result of which the PNB instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings
over Hacienda Pulo on June 18, 1931. To avoid foreclosure, one of the co-owners and
mortgagors, Jose Tongoy, proposed to the PNB an amortization plan that would enable
them to liquidate their account. But, on December 23, 1932, the PNB Branch Manager
in Bacolod advised Jose Tongoy by letter that the latter's proposal was rejected and that
the foreclosure suit had to continue. As a matter of fact, the suit was pursued to finality
up to the Supreme Court whichaffirmed on July 31, 1935 the decision of the CFI giving

11
the PNB the right to foreclose the mortgage on Hacienda Pulo. In the meantime,
Patricio D. Tongoy and Luis Tongoy executed on April 29, 1933 a Declaration of
Inheritance wherein they declared themselves as the only heirs of the late Francisco
Tongoy and thereby entitled to the latter's share in Hacienda Pulo. On March 13, 1934,
Ana Tongoy, Teresa Tongoy, Mercedes Sonora, Trinidad Sonora, Juan Sonora and
Patricio Tongoy executed an "Escritura de Venta" (Exh. 2 or Exh. W), which by its terms
transferred for consideration their rights and interests over Hacienda Pulo in favor of
Luis D. Tongoy. Thereafter, on October 23, 1935 and November 5, 1935, respectively,
Jesus Sonora and Jose Tongoy followed suit by each executing a similar "Escritura de
Venta" (Exhs. 3 or DD and 5 or AA)pertaining to their corresponding rights and
interests over Hacienda Pulo in favor also of Luis D. Tongoy. In the case of Jose
Tongoy, the execution of the "Escritura de Venta" (Exh. 5 or AA)was preceded by the
execution on October 14, 1935 of an Assignment of Rights (Exh. 4 or Z) in favor of Luis
D. Tongoy by the Pacific Commercial Company as judgment lien-holder (subordinate to
the PNB mortgage) of Jose Tongoy's share in Hacienda Pulo. On the basis of the
foregoing documents, Hacienda Pulo was placed on November 8, 1935 in the name of
Luis D. Tongoy, married to Maria Rosario Araneta, under Transfer Certificate of "Title
No. 20154 (Exh. 20). In the following year, the title of the adjacent Cuaycong property
also came under the name of Luis D. Tongoy, married to Maria Rosario Araneta, per
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21522, by virtue of an "Escritura de Venta" (Exh. 6)
executed in his favor by the owner Basilisa Cuaycong on June 22, 1936 purportedly for
P4,000.00. On June 26, 1936, Luis D. Tongoy executed a real estate mortgage over the
Cuaycong property in favor of the PNB, Bacolod Branch, as security for loan of
P4,500.00. Three days thereafter, on June 29, 1936, he also executed a real estate
mortgage over Hacienda Pulo in favor of the same bank to secure an indebtedness of
P21,000.00, payable for a period of fifteen (15) years at 8% per annum. After two
decades, on April 17, 1956, Luis D. Tongoy paid off all his obligations with the PNB,
amounting to a balance of P34,410.00, including the mortgage obligations on the
Cuaycong property and Hacienda Pulo. However, it was only on April 22, 1958 that a
release of real estate mortgage was executed by the bank in favor of Luis D. Tongoy.
On February 5, 1966, Luis D. Tongoy died at the Lourdes Hospital in Manila, leaving as
heirs his wife Maria Rosario Araneta and his son Francisco A. Tongoy. Just before his
death, however, Luis D. Tongoy received a letter from Jesus T. Sonora, dated January
26, 1966, demanding the return of the shares in the properties to the co-owners.
Not long after the death of Luis D. Tongoy, the case now before Us was instituted in the
court below on complaint filed on June 2, 1966 by Mercedes T. Sonora, Juan T. Sonora
** , Jesus T. Sonora, Trinidad T. Sonora, Ricardo P. Tongoy and Cresenciano P.
Tongoy. Named principally as defendants were Francisco A. Tongoy, for himself and as
judicial administrator of the estate of the late Luis D. Tongoy, and Maria Rosario
Araneta Vda. de Tongoy. Also impleaded as defendants, because of their unwillingness
to join as plaintiffs were Amado P. Tongoy, Norberto P. Tongoy ** and Fernando P.
Tongoy. Alleging in sum that plaintiffs and/or their predecessors transferred their
interests on the two lots in question to Luis D. Tongoy by means of simulated sales,
pursuant to a trust arrangement whereby the latter would return such interests after the
mortgage obligations thereon had been settled, the complaint prayed that 'judgment be
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants-
(a) Declaring that the HACIENDA PULO, Lot1397-B-3 now
covered by T.C.T. No. 29152, Bacolod City, and the former
Cuaycong property, Lot 1395 now covered by T.C.T. No. T-824
(RT-4049) (21522), Bacolod City, as trust estate belonging to the
plaintiffs and the defendants in the proportion set forth in Par. 26
of this complaint;
(b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel
T.C.T. No. 29152 and T.C.T. No. T-824 (RT-4049) (21522),
Bacolod City, and to issue new ones in the names of the plaintiffs
and defendants in the proportions set forth in Par. 26 thereof,
based on the original area of HACIENDAPULO;
(c) Ordering the defendants Francisco A. Tongoy and Ma.
Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy to render an accounting to the
plaintiffs of the income of the above two properties from the year
1958 to the present and to deliver to each plaintiff his
corresponding share with legal interest thereon from 1958 and
until the same shall have been fully paid;
(d) Ordering the defendants Francisco Tongoy and Ma. Rosario
Araneta Vda. de Tongoy to pay to the plaintiffs as and for
attorney's fees an amount equivalent to twenty-four per cent
(24% )of the rightful shares of the plaintiffs over the original
HACIENDA PULO andthe Cuaycong property, including the
income thereof from 1958 to the present; and
(e) Ordering the defendants Francisco A. Tongoy and Ma.
Rosario Vda. de Tongoy to pay the costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs also pray for such other and further remedies just and equitable in the
premises.
Defendants Francisco A. Tongoy and Ma. Rosario Vda. de Tongoy filed separate
answers, denying in effect plaintiffs' causes of action, and maintaining, among others,
that the sale to Luis D. Tongoy of the two lots in question was genuine and for a
valuable consideration, and that no trust agreement of whatever nature existed between
him and the plaintiffs. As affirmative defenses, defendants also raised laches,
prescription, estoppel, and the statute of frauds against plaintiffs. Answering defendants
counter claimed for damages against plaintiffs for allegedly bringing an unfounded and
malicious complaint.
For their part, defendants Norberto Tongoy and Amado Tongoy filed an answer under
oath, admitting every allegation of the complaint. On the other hand, defendant
Fernando Tongoy originally joined Francisco A. Tongoy in the latter's answer, but after
the case was submitted and was pending decision, the former filed a verified answer
also admitting every allegation of the complaint.
Meanwhile, before the case went to trial, a motion to intervene as defendants was filed
by and was granted to Salvacion Tongoy and Estrella Tongoy, alleging they were
sisters of the full blood of Fernando Tongoy. Said intervenors filed an answer similarly
admitting every allegation of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on October 15, 1968
finding the existence of an implied trust in favor of plaintiffs, but at the same time
holding their action for reconveyance barred by prescription, except in the case of
Amado P. Tongoy, Ricardo P. Tongoy, Cresenciano P. Tongoy, and Norberto P.
Tongoy, who were adjudged entitled to reconveyance of their corresponding shares in
the property left by their father Francisco Tongoy having been excluded therefrom in the
partition had during their minority, and not having otherwise signed any deed of transfer
over such shares. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEWOF ALL THE FOREGOING considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint, with respect to Mercedes, Juan, Jesus and Trinidad, all

12
surnamed Sonora. The defendants Francisco Tongoy and Rosario Araneta Vda. de
Tongoy are hereby ordered to reconvey the proportionate shares of Ricardo P.,
Cresenciano P., Amado P., and Norberto P., all surnamed Tongoy in Hda. Pulo and the
Cuaycong property. Without damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion of plaintiffs, the foregoing dispositive portion of the decision was
subsequently clarified by the trial court through its order of January 9, 1969 in the
following tenor:
Considering the motion for clarification of decision dated
November 7, 1968 and the opposition thereto, and with the view
to avoid further controversy with respect to the share of each heir,
the dispositive portion of the decision is hereby clarified in the
sense that, the proportionate legal share of Amado P. Tongoy,
Ricardo P. Tongoy, Cresenciano P. Tongoy and the heirs of
Norberto P. Tongoy, in Hda. Pulo and Cuaycong property consist
of 4/5 of the whole trust estate, leaving 1/5 of the same to the
heirs of Luis D. Tongoy.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 157-166, Vol. I, rec.).
Both parties appealed the decision of the lower court to respondent appellate court. Plaintiffs-appellants
Mercedes T. Sonora, Jesus T. Sonora, Trinidad T. Sonora and the heirs of Juan T. Sonora questioned the
lower court's decision dismissing their complaint on ground of prescription, and assailed it insofar as it held
that the agreement created among the Tongoy-Sonora family in 1931 was an implied, and not an express,
trust; that their action had prescribed; that the defendants-appellants were not ordered to render an
accounting of the fruits and income of the properties in trust; and that defendants were not ordered to pay the
attorney's fees of plaintiffs- appellants. For their part, defendants-appellants Francisco A. Tongoy and Ma.
Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy not only refuted the errors assigned by plaintiffs-appellants, but also assailed
the findings that there was preponderance of evidence in support of the existence of an implied trust; that
Ricardo P. Tongoy, Amado P. Tongoy and Norberto P. Tongoy are the legitimate half-brothers of the late Luis
D. Tongoy; that their shares in Hacienda Pulo and Cuaycong property should be reconveyed to them by
defendants-appellants; and that an execution was ordered pending appeal.
On December 3, 1975, respondent court rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which is
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the judgment and Orders
appealed from by ordering Maria Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy and Francisco A.
Tongoy. —
1) To reconvey to Mercedes T. Sonora, Juan T. Sonora (as substituted and represented
by his heirs), Jesus T. Sonora and Trinidad T. Sonora each a 7/60th portion of both
Hacienda Pulo and the Cuaycong property, based on their original shares;
2) To reconvey to Ricardo P. Tongoy, Cresenciano P. Tongoy, Amado P. Tongoy and
Norberto P. Tongoy as substituted and represented by his heirs each a 14/135th portion
of both Hacienda Pulo and the Cuaycong property, also based on their original shares;
provided that the 12 hectares already reconveyed to them by virtue of the Order for
execution pending appeal of the judgment shall be duly deducted;
3) To render an accounting to the parties named in pars. 1 and 2 above with respect to
the income of Hacienda Pulo and the Cuaycong property from May 5, 1958 up to the
time the reconveyances as herein directed are made; and to deliver or pay to each of
said parties their proportionate shares of the income, if any, with legal interest thereon
from the date of filing of the complaint in this case, January 26, 1966, until the same is
paid;
4) To pay unto the parties mentioned in par. 1 above attorney's fees in the sum of P
20,000.00; and
5) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED (pp. 207-208, Vol. 1, rec.).
Petitioners Francisco A. Tongoy and Ma. Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy (defendants-appellants) have
come before Us on petition for review on certiorari with the following assignments of errors (pp. 23-24, Brief
for Petitioners):
I. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was a trust constituted on Hacienda Pulo.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the purchase price for the Cuaycong property was paid by Jose
Tongoy and that said property was also covered by a trust in favor of respondents.
III. Conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents have adequately proven an implied trust in their
favor, the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the rights of respondents have prescribed, or are barred by
laches.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the respondents Tongoy are the legitimated children of
Francisco Tongoy.
V. Granting arguendo that respondents Tongoy are the legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy, the Court of
Appeals erred in not finding that their action against petitioners has prescribed.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in ordering petitioners to pay attorney's fees of P 20,000.00.
VII. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that execution pending appeal in favor of respondents Tongoys
was justified.
I
It appears to US that the first and second errors assigned by petitioners are questions of fact which are
beyond OUR power to review.
Thus, as found by the respondent Court of Appeals:
xxx xxx xxx
We shall consider first the appeal interposed by plaintiffs-appellants. The basic issues
underlying the disputed errors raised suggest themselves as follows: 1) whether or not
the conveyance respecting the questioned lots made in favor of Luis D. Tongoy in 1934
and 1935 were conceived pursuant to a trust agreement among the parties; 2) if so,
whether the trust created was an express or implied trust; and 3) if the trust was not an
express trust, whether the action to enforce it has prescribed.
The first two issues indicated above will be considered together as a matter of logical
necessity, being so closely interlocked. To begin with, the trial court found and ruled that
the transfers made in favor of Luis D. Tongoy were clothed with an implied trust, arriving
at this conclusion as follows:
The Court finds that there is preponderance of evidence in
support of the existence of constructive, implied or tacit trust. The
hacienda could have been leased to third persons and the rentals
would have been sufficient to liquidate the outstanding obligation
in favor of the Philippine National Bank. But the co-owners agreed
to give the administration of the property to Atty. Luis D. Tongoy,

13
so that the latter can continue giving support to the Tongoy-
Sonora family and at the same time, pay the amortization in favor
of the Philippine National Bank, in the same manner that Jose
Tongoy did. And of course, if the administration is successful, Luis
D. Tongoy would benefit with the profits of the hacienda.
Simulated deeds of conveyance in favor of Luis D. Tongoy were
executed to facilitate and expedite the transaction with the
Philippine National Bank. Luis D. Tongoy supported the Tongoy-
Sonora family, defrayed the expenses of Dr. Jesus Sonora and
Atty. Ricardo P. Tongoy, in their studies. Luis Tongoy even gave
Sonoras their shares in the "beneficacion" although the
"beneficacion" were included in the deeds of sale. The amount of
consideration of the one-fifth (15) share of Jose Tongoy is one
hundred (P 100,00) pesos only. Likewise the consideration of the
sale of the interests of the Pacific Commercial Company is only
P100.00 despite the fact that Jose Tongoy paid in full his
indebtedness in favor of said company. The letter of Luis D.
Tongoy dated November 5, 1935 (Exhibit 'BB-1') is very
significant, the tenor of which is quoted hereunder:
Dear Brother Jose:
Herewith is the deed which the bank sent for us to sign. The bank
made me pay the Pacific the sum of P100.00 so as not to sell
anymore the land in public auction. This deed is for the purpose of
dispensing with the transfer of title to the land in the name of the
bank, this way wewill avoid many expenses.
Yours,
Luis D. Tongoy
Jose Tongoy signed the deed because he incurred the obligation with the Pacific and
paid it. In releasing the second mortgage, Luis Tongoy paid only P100.00 and the deed
was in favor of Luis Tongoy. This was done in order "to avoid many expenses " of both
Jose and Luis as obviously referred to in the word "WE".
Those two transactions with nominal considerations are irrefutable and palpable
evidence of the existence of constructive or implied trust.
Another significant factor in support of the existence of constructive trust is the fact that
in 1933-34, when proposals for amicable settlement with the Philippine National Bank
were being formulated and considered, Luis D. Tongoy was yet a neophite (sic) in the
practice of law, and he was still a bachelor. It was proven that it was Jose Tongoy, the
administrator of Hda. Pulo, who provided for his expenses when he studied law, when
he married Maria Araneta, the latter's property were leased and the rentals were not
sufficient to coverall the considerations stated in the deeds of sale executed by the co-
owners of Hda. Pulo, no matter how inadequate were the amounts so stated. These
circumstances fortified the assertion of Judge Arboleda that Luis D. Tongoy at that time
was in no condition to pay the purchase price of the property sold,
But the Court considers the evidence of execution of express trust agreement
insufficient. Express trust agreement was never mentioned in the plaintiffs' pleadings
nor its existence asserted during the pre-trial hearings. It was only during the trial on the
merits when Atty. Eduardo P. Arboleda went on to testify that he prepared the deed of
trust agreement.
Indeed the most formidable weapon the plaintiff could have used in destroying the
"impregnable walls of the defense castle consisting of public documents" is testimony of
Atty. Eduardo P. Arboleda. He is most qualified and in a knowable position to testify as
to the truth of the existence of the trust agreement, because he was not only the partner
of the late Luis D. Tongoy in their practice of law especially during the time he prepared
and/or notarized the deeds of sale but he was also his colleague in the City Council. But
however forceful would be the impact of his testimony, it did not go beyond the
establishment of constructive or implied trust agreement. In the first place, if it is true
that written trust agreement was prepared by him and signed by Luis D. Tongoy for the
security of the vendor, why is it that only two copies of the agreement were prepared,
one copy furnished Jose Tongoy and the other kept by Luis Tongoy, instead of making
five copies and furnished copy to each co-owner, or at least one copy would have been
kept by him? Why is it that when Atty. Arboleda invited Mrs. Maria Rosario Araneta Vda.
de Tongoy and her son to see him in his house, Atty. Arboleda did not reveal or mention
the fact of the existence of a written trust agreement signed by the late Luis D. Tongoy?
The revelation of the existence of a written trust agreement would have been a vital and
controlling factor in the amicable settlement of the case, which Atty. Arboleda would
have played an effective role as an unbiased mediator. Why did not Atty. Arboleda state
the precise context of the written agreement; its form and the language it was written,
knowing as he should, the rigid requirements of proving the contents of a lost document.
It is strange that when Mrs. Maria Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy and her son were in
the house of Atty. Arboleda, in compliance with his invitation for the supposed friendly
settlement of the case, Atty. Arboleda did not even submit proposals for equitable
arbitration of the case. On the other hand, according to Mrs. Tongoy, Mrs. Arboleda
intimated her desire to have Atty. Arboleda be taken in. The Court refuses to believe
that Judge Arboleda was aware of the alleged intimations of Mrs. Arboleda, otherwise
he would not have tolerated or permitted her to indulge in such an embarrassing and
uncalled for intrusion. The plaintiffs evidently took such ungainly insinuations with levity
so much so that they did not think it necessary to bring Mrs. Arboleda to Court to refute
this fact.
The parties, on either side of this appeal take issue with the conclusion that there was
an implied trust, one side maintaining that no trust existed at all, the other that the trust
was an express trust.
To begin with, We do not think the trial court erred in its ultimate conclusion that the
transfers of the two lots in question made in favor of the late Luis D. Tongoy by his co-
owners in 1933 and 1934 created an implied trust in favor of the latter. While, on one
hand, the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants to prove an express trust
agreement accompanying the aforesaid transfers of the lots are incompetent, if not
inadequate, the record bears sufficiently clear and convincing evidence that the
transfers were only simulated to enable Luis D. Tongoy to saveHacienda Pulo from
foreclosure for the benefit of the co-owners, including himself. Referring in more detail
to the evidence on the supposed express trust, it is true that plaintiffs- appellants Jesus
T. Sonora, Ricardo P. Tongoy, Mercedes T. Sonora and Trinidad T. Sonora have
testified with some vividness on the holding of a family conference in December 1931
among the co-owners of Hacienda Pulo to decide on steps to be taken vis-a-vis the
impending foreclosure of the hacienda by the PNB upon the unpaid mortgage obligation
thereon. Accordingly, the co-owners had agreed to entrust the administration and
management of Hacienda Pulo to Luis D. Tongoy who had newly emerged as the
lawyerin the family. Thereafter, on the representation of Luis D. Tongoy that the bank
wanted to deal with only one person it being inconvenient at time to transact with many
persons, specially when some had to be out of town the co-owners agreed to make
simulated transfers of their participation in Hacienda Pulo to him. As the evidence
stands, even if the same were competent, it does not appear that there was an express

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