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@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Ransomware:	History,	Analysis,	&	Mitigation
Andy	Thompson
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Whoami – Andy	Thompson	- @R41nM4k3r
• Customer	Success	Strategic	Advisor	– CyberArk	
Software
• B.S.	MIS	– University	of	Texas	at	Arlington	
• COMPTIA	A+	&	Sec+
• VMWare	VCA-DCV
• (ISC)2	SSCP	&	CISSP
• Married,	Father	of	2	girls.
• Member	of	Shadow	Systems	Hacker	Collective
• Member	of	Dallas	Hackers	Association
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Agenda
• Overview
• in	the	News
• Timeline
• Technical	Analysis
• Analysis	of	Client	Infection
• Command	&	Control	(C2)	Architecture	
Setup/Design
• Evolved	Ransomware
• Mitigation	techniques
• Final	thoughts
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Cyber	Extortion	Defined
• Cyber	extortion	is	an	online	crime	involving	an	attack	or	threat	
of	attack	against	a	person	or	enterprise,	coupled	with	a	
demand	to	stop	the	attack.	
• Cyber	extortions	have	taken	on	multiple	forms:
• Encrypting	Data	and	holding	it	hostage
• Threatening	exposure
• Denying	access	to	data	or	services
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Ransomware	Defined…
• Leveraging	software	to	inhibits	use	of	the	
system.
• Applies	extortion	on	the	assumption	that	
the	data	is	important	enough	to	the	user	
they	are	willing	to	pay	for	recovery.
• There	is	no	guarantee	of	actual	recovery,	
even	after	payment	is	made.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Ransomware:	a	one	BILLION	dollar	industry
• Harjavec Group	states	$209	
million	in	just	the	first	3	
months	of	2016
• the	total	cost	of	ransomware	
could	reach	$1	billion	this	
year.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Ransomware	Victims
• HIPPAA	now	considers	ransomware	a	
breach	as	the	organization	lost	control	of	its	
data.
• Only	a	quarter	of	American	homes	back	up	
their	data	on	a	regular	basis.
• Over	the	past	12	months	almost	half	of	all	
US	companies	have	been	affected	by	
ransomware.
Much	larger	ransoms	have	been	demanded	into	the	millions.	Some	
organizations	refuse	to	pay	and	suffer	the	consequences.	Others	do	not	
disclose	they	have	actually	paid	the	ransom.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
How	it	gets	in	– By	application:
31%
28%
24%
4%
1%
1%
9%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
EMAIL	LINK
EMAIL	ATTACHMENT
WEBSITE	OR	APPLICATION	OTHER	THAN	EMAIL	OR	
SOCIAL	MEDIA
SOCIAL	MEDIA
USB	STICK
BUSINESS	APPLICATION
DON'T	KNOW.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
How	it	gets	in	– By	Device:
49%
36%
7%
5%
4 %
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
DESKTOP	COMPUTER
LAPTOP
UNKNOWN	SOURCE
SERVER
SMARTPHONE	OR	TABLET
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Ransoms	Paid
• Hollywood	Presbyterian	Medical	
Center
• 40	BTC	(~$17,000	USD)	Ransom	paid.
• Horry	County	School	District,	South	
Carolina
• 20	BTC	(~$8,000	USD)
• University	of	Calgary
• $15,780
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
This	week	in	Ransomware
• Check	Point	Releases	Cerber
Decryptor
• August	16th
• Bad	Guys	defeated	decrytpor 1	day	later.	
• Shark	Ransomware	as	a	Service	
• Developers	keep	20%
• Emisoft Security	releases	decryptor
for	Philadelphia	Ransomware	variant
• September	10th
• Noobcrypt
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Law	Enforcement	– Latest	Target	of	Ransomware
• Melrose	PD
• Tewksbury	PD
• Swansea	PD
• Wiscasset	PD
• Boothbay	Harbor	PD
• Waldoboro	PD
• Midlothian	Ill	PD
• Lincoln	County	Sheriff's	Office
• Many	more
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Malvertising
• Up	325% from	2014-2015
• Recently	as	of	March	15th,	2016
• Companies	outsource	their	advertising	
through	advertising	networks	
• Tainted	ads	with	the	Angler	toolkit.
• Nytimes,	BBC,	MSN,	AOL,	Answers.com,	
ZeroHedge,	Infolinks,	my.xfinity,	nfl,	realtor.com,	
theweathernetwork,	thehill,	and	newsweekall
served	up	ransomware.
• Other	victims	include:
• Spotify,	TMZ,	Skype,	Ebay,	Drudge	Report,	and	
many	many many others.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
The	First	Ransomware:	The	AIDS	Virus
• Discovered	in	1989	
• Replaced	Autoexec.bat
• After	90	days,	Encrypted	
file	names	on	c:/
• Asked	to	‘renew	the	license’	
• $189	to	a	PO	box	in	
Panama
• Dr.	Joseph	Popp	was	arrested		
by	Scotland	Yard	later	that	
year	and	charged	with	
blackmail
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Reveton
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Internet	Era	Ransomware:	FBI	Lockscreen
• Circa	2011
• Reveton Trojan	Family
• Impersonates	national	law	
enforcement
• Locks	out	of	PC
• Easily	removed
• Boot	to	safemode
• Remove	registry	key
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Crypto-Currency
• Bitcoin
• Anonymous
• Secure
• Instant
• Not	regulated
• Perfect	for	EXTORTION!
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Cryptolocker
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
CryptoLocker
• Started	to	appear	around	
September	2013
• Delivered	mainly	though	the	
GamoverZeus (GoZ)	P2P	
Botnet
• Used	Domain	Generated	
Algorythms (DGA)
• Produce	thousands	of	domains
• Only	1	or	2	were	real
Example:	Faoefijawjfaslekf9ejaklja[.]ru
Bitcoin	Price
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
CryptoLocker…a	deeper	look.
• Infected	local	drives	AND	
network	storage
• AES-2048	Asymmetrical	
Encryption
• De-facto	name	for	every	
‘crypto’	infection	today
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
CryptoLocker continued…
• Mid	2014	GoZ is	shut	down.
• Down	goes	CryptoLocker
• Keys	recovered	from	c2c	allow	
for	decryption.
• New	variants	emerge	shortly	
thereafter
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Torrentlocker
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Torrentlocker
• Mainly	seen	in	Australia	&	
New	Zealand.
• Phishing	disguised	as	red-light	
tickets	and	Tax	notices.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Torrentlocker:	 A	common	naming	convention
• "(AUS|NSW)"-"(POST|GOV)"."(com|org|net|etc)
• Example:	enforcement-aus-gov.org
• Example:	nsw-post.com
• Easy	to	block	Top	Level	Domain	(TLD)
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Alpha/Teslacrypt
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Alpha/TeslaCrypt
• Initially
• attacked	gamers	
(game	related	file	extensions)
• DGA	based	domains	for	C2
• Example:	asdfwef23sdf.com
• Evolved
• Expanded	file	extensions
• Compromised	domains	for	c2
• Exploit	kits	and	now	Spam
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Alpha/TeslaCrypt
• V1.0	used	symmetric	AES	Keys
• TALOS	group	released	
TeslaDecrypt
• V2.0+	used	Asymmetric	Keys
• Still	in	the	wild
• V4.1	discovered	April	22,	2016
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Smell	ya Later	TeslaCrypt!
• May	18th
• Distributors	Switching	to	
CryptXXX &	other	variants
• Researcher	asked	in	chat	for	the	
master	decryption	key.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Cryptowall
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
CryptoWall
• Exploded	in	end	of	2014
• Compromised	Servers	&	
Exploit	Kits
• Used	anonymous	Tor	&	
I2P
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
2016The	Year	of	Ransomware
According	to	new	data	released	by	Enigma	
Software,	August	2016	was	the	worst	month	to	date	
for	ransomware	in	the	U.S.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
XXXcrypt
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
XXXCrypt
• Spreading	mostly	through	
Angler	Exploit	Kit
• Steals	Credentials
• V2.	Released	May	9th
• Ransom	message	is	now	
unique	to	each	victim
• Kaspersky	Labs	Already	
has	Functional	decrypter.	
RannohDecrypter.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Compromised	
Site
Redirect
Exploit	Kit
XXXCrypt
Infection
Spam
Macros
Locky
Infection
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Petya – The	MBR	Encryptor
• Rewrites	systems	MBR	and	forces	BSOD.
• Fake	“check	disk”	runs	and	encrypts	Master	
File	Table.	
• Masquerades	as	a	job	application
• Links	to	a	shared	dropbox folder	containing	
self	extracting	archive	containing	applicant	
resume	and	fake	photo
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
PowerWare – Using	your	own	tools	against	you.	
• Disguised	in	spam	as	an	“invoice”
• Leverages	MS	Word	and	Native	
PowerShell.	
• Does	not	pull	down	any	additional	
binaries,	and	leverages	PowerShell	
(already	on	the	system	and	approved	to	
be	there)	to	do	the	dirty	work.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Jigsaw	– I	want	to	play	a	game.
• Ransom	payment	of	$150
• Serious	about	its	threats
• Every	hour	it	deletes	100	files	
permanently.
• Every	reboot	it	deletes	1000	files.	
• Decrypter available	now.
This image cannot currently be displayed.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
SAMSAM &	MAKTUB
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
The	Dr will	See	you	now…after	paying	the	ransom
• Exploits	known	
vulnerabilities	in	unpatched	
servers.	
• Specifically	JBOSS.
• 3.2	Million	Servers	
vulnerable.
• Once	in,	laterally	moves	to	
cause	the	most	amount	of	
destruction
Samas/Samsam/MSIL.B/C
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Attack	Anatomy
Installation
Phone	
Home
Key	
Exchange
Encrypt Extortion
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Typical	Ransomware	Request
• Exploit	kit	fires	starting	Process
• Geolocation	call
• C2	Exchange
18:24:25 wefasdif.facetrap.io
18:24:26 m.wordpress.com
18:24:38 ip-addr.es
18:24:45 travelsecretstoday.com
18:24:45 banzaiitreesofdallas.net
18:24:45 mrchinscyberfriends.org
18:27:04 api.uark.edu
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Chain	of	Events	- a.k.a Path	of	Pain
• Any	Attack	Vectors	
initiates	chain
• Phishing
• Compromised	Server
• Malvertising
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
The	RAW	IP	Address
• Used	for	Geolocation
• Exclude	code	execution	or	perform	
different	operation	based	on	global	
position
• China,	Russia,	Iran,	typically	ignored
• Attempt	to	display	message	in	native	language
• Unique	Identifier
• Added	hash	with	other	system	info.
• (<Request	ID>|campaign|<MD5>|<OS	Info>|IP	address)
• Can	restrict	one	infection	per	IP	address
• Identify	possible	analysis	attempts
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Ransomware	Evolved
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Linux.Encoder Ransomware
• Targets	Linux	powered	web	servers	by	encrypting		
MySQL,	Apache,	and	home/root	
folders	associated	with	the	target
• Asks	for	1	bitcoin	to	decrypt	
crucial	files.
• 3	versions	currently.	All	have	been	
already	decrypted
• Written	by	this	guy.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
OSX	KeRanger
• Discovered	March	4,	2016
• Downloaded	6000	times	before	it	was	shut	down.	
• Variant	of	Linux.encoder &	“Educational”	Hidden	Tear	Ransomware
• Recompiled		into	the	Open	Source	Bit	torrent	client	Transmission.
• Published	on	their	site	with	updated	MD5	Hash.
• Turkish	Developer	Key	was	used	to	bypass	Apple’s	Gatekeeper	Security	Feature
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
IOS	“Ransomware”
• May	2014	Australian	iPhone	users	
were	victims	of	Ransomware	attack.		
• Actually	victims	iCloud	accounts	were	
phished.
• Devices	were	put	in	Lost	(LOCKED)	mode	
w/	ransom	message.
• Failure	to	pay	resulted	in	wiped	device.
• Russian	Officials	Arrested	2	People	a	
month	later.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
SIPLockr – 1st Android	Encrypting	Ransomware
• Detected	June	1st,	2014
• Lots	of	Android	Screen	Lockers,	but	
this	was	the	first	file	encrypter.	
• Encrypts	*.jpg,	*.jpeg,	&	*.png
to	*.enc
• Communicates	to	C2	via	Tor	network
• Decrypter is	currently	available.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Adult	Player	– Extortion	at	its	Finest
• Masquerades	as	a	Porn	Movie	player.
• Takes	photos	using	the	front	facing	camera	
while	in	use.
• Initiate	Lock	screen	with	photos	and	ransom	
message.
• If	ransom	is	not	paid,	send	message	and	photos	
to	all	contacts	on	phone.
• Easy	to	fix
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Internet	of	Things
• Institute	for	Critical	Infrastructure	
Technology	– “IoT presents	an	
Infinite	attack	surface”.
• What’s	next?
• Pacemakers/Insulin	pumps
• Automobiles
• Your	house
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
THE	FUTURE	IS	NOW!
• Pen	Test	Partners	at	DEF	CON	
24	successfully	compromised	a	
connected	thermostat
• Locked	out	of	device	until	
ransom	paid
• Can	also	turn	up/turn	down	
temperature	as	part	of	the	
extortion	process
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Mitigation	Techniques
• Backup	often	
• Keep	disconnected	when	not	in	use
• Review	and	restrict	access	to	shared	
resources
• Disconnect	from	Network	Shares	when	not	
in	use.
• Train	end-users	about	social	engineering	
techniques.
• Phishing
• PHISHING
• PHISHING!
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
More	Mitigation	Techniques
• Antivirus
• Actually	keep	it	updated.
• Patch	the	OS	and	software.
• Can’t	exploit	vulnerabilities	
that	have	been	patched.
• Prevent	Malvertising/injection
• Adblock/ublock Orgin/AdFender
• Noscript
• Sandboxie
• End	of	Life	– It’s	called	that	for	a	
reason
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Even	More	Mitigation	Techniques
• Only	install	software	from	trusted	
sources
• Follow	the	pack
• Apple	store	is	safe
• Bad	code	still	falls	through
• Android	marketplace	still	iffy
• You	have	to	trust	the	developer
• Avoid	Open	Source	Software
• Validate	Hashes	from	external	
sites
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Will	this	guy	ever	stop?
• Intrusion	Prevention	Systems
• Actually	implement	block	mode.
• Web	Content	Providers	host	their	
own	ad	content
• Probably	unrealistic,	but	it’s	a	real	
possibility	for	small/medium	
businesses.
• Macros.
• Do	I	really	have	to	say	it?
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Advanced	Mitigation	Techniques
• Prevent	Lateral	Movement	in	your	environment.
• No	password	reuse.
• Frequent	Password	Rotation.
• Enable	Least	Privilege
• Not	everyone	needs	administrative	rights.
• Even	better,	implement	Application	Control
• Restrict	the	binaries	from	ever	executing
• AC	can	prevent	ransomware	entirely
• Isolate	your	Critical	Resources
Ransomware	no	longer	wants	to	infect	a	single	machine.	Isolate	the	infection.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Reasons	why	you	SHOULD	pay.
• You	get	your	files	back.
• FBI	previously	stated,	“easiest	path	
is	to	pay”.
• It’s	in	their	best	interest	to	
deliver.
• It	might	be	cheaper.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Reasons	why	you	Shouldn't	pay.
• US-CERT	&	FBI	clearly	say	no.
• It	might	be	cheaper,	but	it’s	really	
not.
• Disclosure	is	not	cheap.
• There’s	a	target	on	your	back.
• Copycat	attacks	are	real.	
• No	guarantee	you	get	your	files	
back.
• The	Criminals	win.
“The	FBI	does	not	condone	
payment	of	ransom,	as	payment	
of	extortion	monies	may	
encourage	continued	criminal	
activity	...	or	be	used	to	facilitate	
serious	crimes.”
- Chris	Stangl,	a	section	chief	in	the	FBI's	cyber	
division
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Help!	I’ve	been	ransomwared!
What	do	you	recommend?
• Contact	your	friendly	neighborhood	hacker.	
• Research	the	variant.
• Take	the	machine offline.
• Change	ALL	the	passwords!
• Wait…wait	as	long	as	you	have	to.
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
Last	slide…I	swear
“An	ounce	of	prevention	is	worth	a	
pound	of	cure.”
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
@NTXISSA			#NTXISSACSC3
References
• http://thehackernews.com/2016/03/what-is-malvertising.html
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIDS_(Trojan_horse)
• http://www.coindesk.com/fbi-malware-victims-should-pay-bitcoin-ransoms/
• https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/10/12/destructive-malware-cryptolocker-on-the-loose/
• https://blog.kaspersky.com/ransomware_targets_ios_osx/4903/
• https://threatpost.com/alleged-oleg-pliss-iphone-hackers-arrested-in-russia/106570/
• http://thehackernews.com/2016/01/linux-ransomware-decryption.html
• http://www.securityweek.com/os-x-ransomware-keranger-based-linuxencoder
• http://www.virusradar.com/en/Android_Simplocker.A/description
• http://thehackernews.com/2013/07/Android-Ransomware-malware-mohit-kumar-hacker.html
• http://www.doynews.com/tags/adult-player-android
• http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/adult-player-android-porn-app-blackmailing-users-secret-photos-demands-
ransom-1518808
• https://labs.bitdefender.com/2016/03/keranger-is-actually-a-rewrite-of-linux-encoder/
• https://blog.avast.com/2015/02/10/mobile-crypto-ransomware-simplocker-now-on-steroids/
• https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/29/reveton-ransomware-exposed-explained-and-
eliminated/
• http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/03/big-name-sites-hit-by-rash-of-malicious-ads-spreading-crypto-
ransomware/
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malvertising
• http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/latest-security-news/half-of-american-ransomware-victims-
have-paid-the-ransom-reveals-study/
• http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-me-ln-hollywood-hospital-bitcoin-20160217-
story.html
• http://go.cyphort.com/rs/181-NTN-682/images/Malvertising-Report-15-RP.pdf
• https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/04/06/tewksbury-police-pay-bitcoin-ransom-
hackers/PkcE1GBTOfU52p31F9FM5L/story.html
• https://securityledger.com/2015/10/fbis-advice-on-cryptolocker-just-pay-the-ransom/
• http://www.pcworld.com/article/3046626/security/petya-ransomware-overwrites-mbrs-locking-users-
out-of-their-computers.html
• http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/teslacrypt-4-0-released-with-bug-fixes-and-stops-
adding-extensions/
• http://www.newsweek.com/how-counter-ransomware-attack-442779
• https://www.kent.edu/is/secureit/april-2015-victims-ransomware
• http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/03/samsam-ransomware.html?m=1
• https://threatpost.com/new-server-side-ransomware-hitting-hospitals/117059/
• http://thehackernews.com/2015/01/police-ransomware-suicide.html
• https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A
• https://threatpost.com/locky-variant-changes-c2-communication-found-in-nuclear-ek/117196/
• https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ransomware
• http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0X502K
• http://www.csoonline.com/article/3101863/security/report-only-3-percent-of-u-s-companies-pay-
attackers-after-ransomware-infections.html
• https://www.herjavecgroup.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report
• http://virusguides.com/free-decrypter-philadelphia-ransomware-available/

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