Ancient Greece - The Second Military Revolution

ANCIENT GREECE
vii-The Second Military Revolution

PRINCIPAL TOPICS

I. Thrasybulos

II. Epaminondas

III. The Second Military Revolution, 362-336

Θρασύβουλος
Thrasybulos

Θρασύβουλος born c.440s

Thrasybulos died 388 BC

Thrasybulus receiving an olive crown for his successful campaign against the Thirty Tyrants. From Andrea Alciato's Emblemata, 1531

411-after an oligarchic coup in Athens, the pro-democracy sailors at Samos elected
him navarch, making him a primary leader of the successful democratic resistance

411-410-commanded along with Alcibiades and others at several Athenian victories

404-after Athens’ defeat he led the resistance to the Spartan-imposed oligarchic
government known as the Thirty Tyrants

he commanded a small force of democratic exiles which invaded Attica:

first they defeated the Spartan garrison

next, the forces of the oligarchy, killing the leading tyrant Critias, Plato’s uncle

403-he restored the democracy and made a conciliatory peace, no bloody reprisals

“Thrasybulus’ call for peace and union between the two camps was rejected by
the oligarchs, who expected Spartan aid. In Sparta, however, the murderous
arrogance of Lysander...was making many powerful men nervous, including the
kings Agis and Pausanius. Marching into Attica, Pausanius took the lead and
masterminded...the reconciliation of the various Athenian parties…. Under his
aegis the Athenians agreed on the first recorded amnesty in history. Under its
terms, only the Thirty and their chief officers could be brought to justice for
crimes committed before 403; all others were compelled to renounce the many
bitter grievances that had accumulated. In September Thrasybulus led his men
unopposed to the Acropolis, where they sacrificed to Athena in gratitude for the
salvation of the city and their own safe return. The work of reestablishing the
democracy then began.

Pomeroy et al., p.352

The Athenians came close to respecting the terms of the amnesty…. nonetheless,
the decades of war followed by months of terror under the Thirty had taken a
heavy toll, and there was no lack of people eager to assign blame for Athens’
problems. The colorful Socrates had annoyed jealous parents whose young sons
had lionized him….three Athenians...zeroed in on the eccentric old philosopher
who haunted the public spaces of Athens confuting the careless in argument.
Socrates (470-399) had been quick to identify the drawbacks of democracy, and
he had also been the teacher of (at least) two men who in different ways had
harmed Athens: Alcibiades and Critias. The amnesty prevented his accusers from
charging him with inciting his pupils with treason, so instead they brought...an
accusation [ 1] he did not believe in the gods of the state [2] he taught new gods;
and [3] he corrupted the young.

Pomeroy et al., pp.352-353

THE CRISIS OF THE POLIS AND THE
AGE OF SHIFTING HEGEMONIES
Pomeroy et al. chapter title

“Years of futile warfare, accompanied by economic difficulties and attendant civil strife, led
many people to question their relationship to the world around them. Already around the
middle of the fifth century Greek thinkers had begun to ask key questions about the human
community. What was the purpose of civic life? Why had people come together in communities
in the first place? Were the laws of the polis in accord with nature [κατα φυσις] or in conflict
[αντι] with it? Why were some people free and others slaves? How were Greeks different from
non-Greeks? Should Greeks war with other Greeks and enslave them when victorious?

To these questions others came to be added. Why should some have so much more than
others? Did the autonomous city-state provide the best way of life? Did the exclusion of women
from decision making go without saying? Was warfare worth the sacrifices it entailed? A
smaller group debated larger questions---the nature of justice, of piety, of courage, of love.

op. cit. p. 361

“ Spartans were noble in death but insufferable in victory….a graceless diplomacy
regularly led the Spartans to lose the peace after winning the war….

“Jubilant after bringing Athens to its knees in 404, Sparta housed significant
imperialist factions supporting the aggressive policies of Lysander and King
Agesilaus. In 395 Sparta’s alienated allies combined against it. The resulting
[Corinthian] war ended in 387 [with Spartan victory], but continued high-handed
behavior on Sparta’s part caused existing resentments to fester. In 377 Agesilaus’
provocative policies resulted both in the formation of a new Athenian naval
confederacy [the Second Athenian Confederacy] and in the alliance of Athens and
Thebes. By 371 Thebes was strong enough to defeat Sparta on the battlefield and the
years that followed saw Thebes cripple Sparta still further by the liberation of
Messenia. The Theban ascendancy died, however, when their charismatic leader
Epaminondas was killed in battle, and revolts during the 360s and 350s gradually
weakened the Athenian confederacy. The resulting vacuum would be filled by
Macedon under the resolute leadership of Philip.”

Pomeroy et al., pp.363-364

In the revived democracy established in 403 BC, Thrasybulus became a
major and prestigious leader.... Thrasybulus seems to have advocated a
more radically democratic policy than the populace was willing to accept
at the time; he called for reinstating pay for political service, and sought
to extend citizenship to all the metics and foreigners who had fought
alongside him against the Thirty. He was initially cautious about
offending Sparta, but, when Persian support became available at the
start of the Corinthian War, he became an advocate of aggressive action,
and about this time seems to have regained his preeminence in Athenian
politics. He initiated the rebuilding of the long walls, which had been
demolished at the end of the Peloponnesian War, and commanded the
Athenian contingents at Nemea and Coronea; these two defeats,
however, damaged his political stature, and he was replaced at the head
of the state by Conon, whose victory at Cnidus had ended Sparta's
dreams of naval empire.
Wikipedia

In 394 BC The Battle of the Nemea River was fought between Sparta and her allies
the Achaians, Eleians, Mantineians, and the Tegeates against a coalition of Boetians,
Euboeans, Athenians, Corinthians, and Argives. This was to be the last clear-cut
victory that Sparta enjoyed. It was also the largest hoplite battle the Greeks ever
fought.
The tactics were similar to all other
Greek hoplite battles, except that when
the armies were arrayed, with the
Spartans having the customary honor of
being on the right, the army drifted right
as it advanced. This was not good for the
Spartan allies, as it exposed the soldiers
to a flanking attack, but it gave the
Spartans the opportunity to use their
superior coordination and discipline to
roll up the flank of the Athenians, who
were stationed opposite. The result of the
battle was a victory for Sparta, even
Hercules slaying the Nemean lion.
though her allies on the left suffered Detail of a Roman mosaic from Llíria (Spain).
significant losses.
This willingness to accept losses on the left flank for flanking position on the right was
a dramatic change from typical conservative hoplite military tactics.

Throughout his career, Thrasybulus defended democracy at Athens against its
opponents. He was one of the few prominent citizens whom the Samians trusted
to defend their democracy, and whom the fleet selected to lead it through the
troubled time of conflict with the 400. Later, in his opposition to the Thirty
Tyrants, Thrasybulus risked his life when few others would, and his actions were
responsible for the quick restoration of democracy. In the words of Cornelius
Nepos,

This most noble action, then, is entirely Thrasybulus's; for when the Thirty Tyrants,
appointed by the Lacedaemonians, kept Athens oppressed in a state of slavery, and had
partly banished from their country, and partly put to death, a great number of the
citizens whom fortune had spared in the war, and had divided their confiscated property
among themselves, he was not only the first, but the only man at the commencement, to
declare war against them.

Modern historian John Fine points to the clemency shown by Thrasybulus and
other democrats in the wake of their victory over the Thirty as a key contribution
towards reestablishing stable government in Athens. While many city-states
throughout the Greek world broke down into vicious cycles of civil war and
reprisal, Athens remained united and democratic, without interruption, until
near the end of the third century, and democracy, albeit interrupted several
times by conquest or revolution, continued there until Roman times, several
centuries later.
Wikipedia

ΑΝΑΒΑΣΙΣ
ANABASIS

Increasingly, the Greeks’ service as mercenaries was eagerly
sought and just as willingly offered. During this period, for
example, one of the great epics of military history was enacted by
10,000 Greek mercenaries who were in the employ of a Persian
satrap, Cyrus. In a battle for control of the throne of Persia, Cyrus
was killed and his Asiatic troops panicked and fled. The 10,000
Greeks stood alone, undefeated, but over 1,500 miles from
friendly territory. Their march out (ἀνάβασις) under the
leadership of Xenophon [a noble student of Socrates] was a
remarkable feat, and served as a prologue to the later conquests of
Alexander.
Thomas E. Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p. 15

LIGHT INFANTRY
One Athenian general made a significant contribution to the art of war.
Iphicrates organized bodies of lightly armed infantry, calling them peltasts from
their pelta or small round shields. Actually they were a lighter version of the
hoplites---smaller shield, lighter spear, less armor, but greater freedom of
movement. Through drill, they perfected their discipline, preserving their
mobility and firepower with the javelin while maintaining cohesion and
defensive power, so that they no longer feared to encounter hoplites. This
development was only possible under a mercenary system with professional
soldiers. The old citizen soldier could fight in a phalanx, but the new peltast
required long hours of detailed training and competent leadership. In essence,
the peltast served as a tactical link between the hoplite and the irregular forces.

Ibid.

LIGHT INFANTRY

Agrianian Peltast by Johnny
Shumate
The Agrianians were
especially prized by
Alexander the Great. Peter
Green calls them his Gurkhas.

In the case of Sparta, the [Peloponnesian War], although
resulting in victory, brought about a peculiar predicament. A
people trained exclusively for war with their neighbors now
found themselves compelled to exercise their lead in
nonmilitary relations. The role was one for which the
Spartans’ peculiar institutions had not only left them
unprepared, but also positively unfitted. In a way, therefore,
her victory was Sparta’s undoing, although she dominated
events for another 30 years. The wars also had a direct and
personal impact on the Spartan warrior, the key to the state’s
success. The years of fighting reduced the body of superbly
trained hoplites from about 5,000 (in 479 BC) to about 2,000
(in 371 BC). By then, another city-state was contesting the
supremacy of Sparta.
Ibid.

Ἐπαµεινώνδας
Epaminondas

Ἐπαµεινώνδας Epaminondas, an
idealized figure in
the grounds of
Epaminondas Stowe House

Boeotia, “the dancing ground of war”

V.D. Hanson, The Soul of Battle, p. 30

The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in
371 was not merely that he put his best on the left to a depth of 50 shields to ensure
a slugfest with the Spartan elite right, but that by doing so he ensured to his own
allies---and Sparta’s confederates across the battlefield as well---that neither
weaker side would have to face their betters and play the role of sacrificial lambs.
The next winter Epaminondas invaded Laconia with a unified army and
encountered Peloponnesian states that appreciated his past magnanimity and were
now eager to join him. How odd that the basic idea that a leader should bear the
greatest risk in battle by putting his men on the left of the phalanx waited until the
twilight of the hoplite age.

Hanson, A War Like No Other, p.159

King Kleombrotus led a Spartan force
of 11,000 into Southern Boeotia to
fight a Theban force of 6,000
commanded by Epaminondas

the latter was “one of the very rarest
of generals, a great leader who was
also an innovator

“he realized that ‘the Spartans would
never change their traditional shock
tactics, the success of which depended
on an advance in perfect order, all
spears...striking the enemy’s front
simultaneously’--JFC Fuller

Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series,
accordingly, he devised a tactic that text, p. 15; map, after p. 19
would...throw them into disorder

Until now, tactical success had depended primarily on
preventing one opponent from overlapping another’s force, a
situation that would endanger the flanks and rear of a
phalanx. Normally, when two forces advanced toward
another in phalangial formation, there was a tendency for
each force to drift to its right.
Ibid.

Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, after p. 19

Until now, tactical success had depended primarily on preventing
one opponent from overlapping another’s force, a situation that
would endanger the flanks and rear of a phalanx. Normally, when
two forces advanced toward another in phalangial formation,
there was a tendency for each force to drift to its right.
Accordingly, most commanders put their best men on their right,
which later be came known as the position of honor. In many
cases, battles resulted in each force’s right defeating its opponent’s
left; victory or defeat then depended upon which force could
recover soon enough to bring its right around to the flank or the
rear of the opponent’s right. Naturally, the force that was better
trained and drilled and could accomplish this more rapidly than
the other. because in all of Greece no force was better drilled than
the Spartan army, it retained a distinct advantage in the
traditional battle.
Ibid.

At Leuctra, instead of drawing up his troops in parallel lines
opposite the Spartan forces, Epaminondas formed the Thebans
into an oblique order.
Ibid.

At Leuctra, instead of drawing up his troops in parallel lines
opposite the Spartan forces, Epaminondas formed the Thebans
into an oblique order. The idea was to concentrate heavily on the
left and push this flank ahead so as to defeat the enemy’s
formidable right, while at the same time the reduced-strength
Theban center and right advanced more slowly and in echelon.
The threat of the Theban center and right served to prevent the
Spartans from reinforcing their own right. Simply stated, the
object was to meet shock with supershock. Epaminondas put his
best troops on the left, not the right, and arranged them in a
formation at least 50 ranks deep. He took the risk that his
weakened center and right would be able to pin...the Spartan
forces to their front, until the massed formation on the left could
be driven home. This novel formation, however, had a weakness
on the flanks.... To protect [there], Epaminondas stationed an
elite group of Theban warriors (The Sacred Band) on the left
flank, while on the right flank, ahead of his withdrawn center, he
placed the Theban cavalry.
Ibid.

The battle plan worked to perfection. Epaminondas led the attack
on the left, which crushed the opposing Spartan right. He then
wheeled against the flank of the remaining Spartan troops at the
moment his center and right threatened to engage them in front.
The result was an overwhelming Theban victory.
Ibid.

Epaminondas’ ability to seize the initiative and, at a critical point,
to bring to bear on the battlefield a striking force superior to the
defender’s was the crucial factor in his success. That he was able
to do this in spite of total numerical inferiority is a tribute to his
reasoning and tactical acumen….The oblique order of
Epaminondas fixed the entire enemy line in position and enabled
him to drive home his main thrust before the weakness in his own
center and right had been detected by the Spartans. No finer
illustration of the principles of Mass and Economy of Force* is to
be found in ancient military history.
op. cit., p. 16
*These two principles of war are defined as follows:

Mass: Concentrate superior combat power at the critical time
and place.

Economy of Force: Emphasize the principle effort and restrict
the strength of secondary efforts

The final card of
Epaminondas was now
on the table; in the past
Helot insurrections had
failed not out of a
shortage of manpower…
369 but simply because
there was no initial
window of protection
for the revolutions to
consolidate their
toehold. Now his
Thebans would provide
that critical breathing
space...

370

op. cit., p. 98

Throughout Greece there is evidence that homosexual relationships were a
contributing factor to unit morale. In Sparta, for example, the separation of the
sexes at an early age, together with attitudes peculiar to other Greeks on the role of
women, resulted in overtly homosexual relationships centering on life in the
barracks. No doubt such strong ties extended to the battlefield and must help
explain Spartan heroism, most notably in defeats from Thermopylai (480) to
Leuktra (371), where men chose annihilation rather than the shame of flight. Yet the
most extreme example was not among the Dorians but rather in Thebes. There the
Sacred Band, composed of 150 homosexual couples (something unknown even at
Sparta), for some fifty years fought heroically in the city’s most desperate battles
and were wiped out to a man at Chaironeia (338); Philip was struck by the
appearance of the huddled masses of their paired corpses. (Plut. Pel. 18-19; Mor.
761 a-d; Xen. Symp. 8.32)

Hanson, Western Way of War, pp.124-125

Mantinea is, in fact, full of ghosts. The voices of Greece’s greatest statesmen,
generals, and writers once echoed off these hills before their speakers fell in the
alluvial mud of the battlefield. Well off to the distance there is the small hillock of
Skopê (“Lookout Hill), where the greatest military man Greece ever produced, the
liberator Epaminondas died in 362---his retainers pulling out a spear from his guts
as he gazed down at his retreating Theban army, which had broken on the news that
its beloved general had been carried off and was bleeding to death on the hill above
them.

Hanson, A War Like No Other, pp.154-155

THE SECOND
MILITARY
REVOLUTION

THE SECOND Niketerion (victory
medallion) bearing the

MILITARY
effigy of king Philip II of
Macedon, 3rd century AD,
probably minted during
the reign of Emperor

REVOLUTION
Alexander Severus.

this “friend of horses” was born son of
King Amintas iii and Queen Euridice i

368-365--a hostage in Thebes, at the
home of Epaminondas, became the
eromenos of Pelopidas

359-the deaths of his elder brothers,
King Alexander ii and Perdiccas iii,
allowed him to take the throne

appointed regent for his infant nephew
Amyntas iv, he brushed him aside and
Φίλιππος Β' ὁ Μακεδών began his reign
Philip II of Macedōn
382-359-336

The royal army of Macedon was Philip’s, not [his son] Alexander [the
Great]’s. It had been formed and led for more than twenty years by
Philip, while Alexander was at its head for little more than half that
period. It was King Philip who crafted a grand new army; Philip who
supplied it, led it, and organized it differently from anything in past
Greek practice---in order to kill other Greeks. As it turned out, Alexander
found his inheritance even more useful for killing Persians.

Hanson, Carnage and Culture; Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, p. 74

THE MACEDONIAN MILITARY
MACHINE

phalanx-mercenary, not free farmer hoplitai; hand-picked “tallest & strongest”

the spear-lengthened from 8 to 16-18 feet, a sarissa, a true pike; little or no body armor.
“They could always rely on making their first strike before the enemy got to grips…”-Green

the first four or five rows, not three were thrusting--40% more spearheads in the killing
zone--”a storm of spears”-Polybius

Companion Cavalry (hetairoi)-elite body of aristocratic horsemen, heavily armored
on strong mounts. “...adept at spiking their opponents through the face”-Green

“shield bearers” (hypaspists)-another infantry with more armor and shorter
spears. Green uses the British term, “Guards regiment”

professional corps of light infantry, slingers, archers and javelineers [peltasts] rounded
out the composite army group, supplying preliminary bombardment and reserve support
Op. cit., pp. 74-75

Philip brought to Western warfare an enhanced notion of decisive war.
True, the Macedonian’s face-to-face, stand-up fighting was reminiscent
of the shock assaults of the Greek phalanxes of the past. The running
collisions of massed infantry, the spear tip to the face of the enemy, were
still the preferred creed of any Macedonian phalangite. But no longer
were Macedonians killing merely over territorial borders. Battle was
designed predominantly as an instrument of ambitious state policy.
Philip’s destructive mechanism for conquest and annexation was a
radical source of social unrest and cultural upheaval, not a conservative
Greek institution to preserve the existing agrarian community….the
centerpiece of a new total war of brutal annihilation which the world had
not yet seen.

0p.cit., p. 77

Philip and his son
knew only two
ways to acquire
gold: to dig it out
of the ground or to
steal it from
someone weaker
than themselves--
Green

φιλιππου

Philip’s men, too, were a completely different breed from the Greek
hoplites of the city-state. In his lost comedy Philip, the playwright
Mnesimachus (ca. 350 BC.) makes his characteristic Macedonian
phalangites brag:

Do you know against what type of men you’ll have to fight?
We who dine on sharpened swords,
and drink down blazing torches as our wine.
Then for dessert they bring us broken Cretan darts
and splintered pike shafts. Our pillows are shields
and breastplates…
(Mnesimachus frg. 7 [cf. Athenaeus 10.421b]

0p.cit., p. 77

Warriors who wore cords around their waists until they had killed a man
in battle, who could not even sit at meat with their fellows until they had
speared a wild boar single-handed, who drank from cattle horns like
Vikings---such men were not the stuff of which a cultural renaissance is
made.

Most Macedonian nobles preferred the more manly pleasures of
hunting, carousing, and casual fornication. Sodomy---with young boys
or, at a pinch, with each other---they also much enjoyed; but they had no
intention of letting it be contaminated with decadent Platonic notions of
spiritual uplift. The simultaneous presence in Alexander’s headquarters
of tough Macedonian officers and Greek civilian intellectuals was to
produce untold tension and hostility….

Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, p. 11

Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p.22

DIRECTION

the Phalanx was made up of 6
the Taxis was made up of 6
Taxeis, infantry battalions, 1,536
Syntagmai, 256 soldiers each
soldiers each

Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p.23

358-Arymbas, the new king of Molossia (a tribe in
Epirus) sealed an alliance with Philip, also new to the
throne of Macedonia, with his sister Myrtale

she was Philip’s fourth wife, mother to his first son
Alexander

356-Philip’s race horse won at Olympia, so she took
that name

the night before she became pregnant with Alexander
she dreamed a thunderbolt entered her (Zeus) and a
great fire was kindled--Plutarch
Olympias
Ὀλυμπιάς
ca. 375–316 BC
her fierce personality, claim of descent from Achilles,
mysticism, devotion to Dionysus’ snake-worshiping
cult all would influence her son, Alexander

358-Arymbas, the new king of Molossia (a tribe in
Epirus) sealed an alliance with Philip, also new to the
throne of Macedonia, with his sister Myrtale

she was Philip’s fourth wife, mother to his first son
Alexander

356-Philip’s race horse won at Olympia, so she took
that name

the night before she became pregnant with Alexander
she dreamed a thunderbolt entered her (Zeus) and a
great fire was kindled--Plutarch
Olympias
Ὀλυμπιάς
ca. 375–316 BC
her fierce personality, claim of descent from Achilles,
mysticism, devotion to Dionysus’ snake-worshiping
cult all would influence her son, Alexander

Zeus seduces Olympias. Fresco by Giulio Romano between 1526 and 1534, in Palazzo del Te, Mantua, Italy.

Philip brought many Athenians to his
capital to add luster to his court

343/2-he secured Aristotle as a tutor for
Alexander and his companions

this formative relationship deeply
inspired Alexander. Intellectually curious,
he would bring Greek scholars on his
campaigns

he would send back specimens of flora
and fauna to his tutor from as far away as
India

323-this link continued until their deaths
in the same year

when viewing a
core area early 4th c. map always
added by 359 begin with the
added by 336 key, scale &
added after 336 orientation
Corinthian League 337

other Greek states
Persian empire

when viewing a
Philip was the beneficiary of almost core area early 4th c. map always
two centuries of patient state building added by 359 begin with the
added by 336 key, scale &
added after 336 orientation
Corinthian League 337
fifth century collaboration with Persia other Greek states

shielded Macedon from its neighbors Persian empire

grain and timber financed Hellenizing

359-Philip ii faced a severe crisis,
threats from Greeks and non-Greeks

but his new army and shrewd
leadership led to expansion, first
northward, over “barbarians”

then southward, into Thessaly,
famous for its horses (and cavalry)

A WARY EYE TO THE
NORTH
Two Athenian politicians, rivals, both famous for their oratory, cast
nervous glances toward the new Macedonian army. Philip first expanded
his state to the east, conquering Chalcidice and Thrace; then southward
towards the Greek heartland.

Isocrates tried to distract him, urged Philip to “free the Greeks” of Asia
Minor, most of whom were once again vassals of a renewed Persian
Empire. Demosthenes was the more implacable enemy. He warned his
fellow Athenians in a famous series of attacks, the Philippics. They have
added a word to our vocabulary for a hard-hitting political tirade.

Demosthenes
Practising Oratory
by Jean-Jules-Antoine Lecomte du Nouy
(1842–1923).

Demosthenes used to talk
with pebbles in his mouth and
recited verses while running.
T strengthen his voice, he
o
spoke on the seashore over
the roar of the waves.

A modern collage representing
Demosthenes’ Third Philippic
the chairs are on the Πνύξ
the acropolis and Mount Υµηττός
form the backdrop

A View of the Speaker’s Platform (βεµα)
on the Πνύξ

“I am told that in those days [431-404] the Spartans and all our other enemies
would invade us for four or five months---during, that is, the actual summer---
and would damage Attica with infantry and citizen troops, and then return home
again. And so old fashioned were the men of that day---nay rather, such true
citizens…but their warfare was of a legitimate and open kind. But now, as I am
sure you see, most of our losses are the result of treachery, and no issue is
decided by open conflict or battle; while you are told that it is not because he
leads a column of heavy infantry that Philip can march wherever he chooses, but
because he has attached to himself a force of light infantry, cavalry, archers,
mercenaries, and similar troops. And whenever, with such advantages, he falls
upon a State which is disordered within, and in their distrust of one another no
one goes out in defense of its territory, he brings up his engines and besieges
them. I pass over the fact that summer and winter are alike to him---that there is
no close season during which he suspends operations.

Demosthenes, Third Philippic, quoted in Kagan, ed., Problems in Ancient History, p. 429

It is probably true that Philip excited rivalries between the Greek states,
having as a goal the exploitation of opportunities for Macedonian
penetration of the south. It is also probably true that… Demosthenes, having
earlier decided that Philip was a grave threat… trifled with the facts while
marshaling Athenian resistance to Macedonia, and gave less than due
credence to Philip’s several conciliatory overtures to Athens. At any
rate,...relations between Athens and Macedonia grew increasingly strained,
as Philip consolidated his position in Thrace and Thessaly, and, on one
occasion, penetrated as far southward as Thermopylae. This strained
relationship reached the point of open break in 340 B.C., when Philip
unsuccessfully laid siege to...Byzantium, and coincidentally seized most of
the Athenian grain fleet. In response, Athens declared war.

Griess, ed., pp.25-26

“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation
of an earlier Persian army”--Griess
having exhausted
diplomacy, Philip
invaded in the
summer of 338 BC

having exhausted
diplomacy, Philip
invaded in the
summer of 338 BC

Next, he advanced to
Elatea and captured it

having exhausted
diplomacy, Philip
invaded in the
summer of 338 BC


Diversionary attack
he sends part of his
forces back around
Mt. Parnassos

having exhausted
diplomacy, Philip
invaded in the
summer of 338 BC


Diversionary attack
he sends part of his
forces back around
Mt. Parnassos

His main force now
attacks the Thebans
and Athenians at
Chaeronea (Χαιρώνεια)

Since the well-chosen position of the allies prevented Philip
from using his favorite strategy he had to provoke a gap in their
position. This he accomplished by withdrawing his right. As the
Athenians advanced, the gap opened and 18-year-old
Alexander, riding at the head of the Companions, began his
charge to glory.

...that fatal gap at last opened between the Greek centre and
the Theban brigades on their right. Superior discipline,
ironically, had sealed the fate of the Sacred Band. They held
their formation; the troops at the centre did not. Into the gap
thus opened, at the head of Macedonia’s finest cavalry division,
thundered the young crown prince...while a second mounted
brigade attacked the Sacred Band from the flank. Very soon the
Thebans were completely surrounded.

Green, pp. 75-76

[The Sacred Band were]
wiped out to a man at
Chaironeia (338); Philip
was struck by the
appearance of the huddled
masses of their paired
corpses.

Hanson, vide supra

The Thebans...drew the conclusion [at Coronea] that they [like the Spartans] must
drill also. When, at Leuctra, they came to confront the Spartans again, their drilled
phalanx overmassed the Spartan’s right and won the day.

It was thus that the principles of drill and manoeuvre infiltrated the Greek world
at large. But there was another infiltrator: hierarchy….

Once the practice of drill and manoeuvre took root outside the egalitarian army
of Sparta, officer rank acquired a different status….The mercenary had been a
familiar figure in the Greek military world from early times and in Alexander’s day
was...a mainstay of both his own and of the Persian army. By definition the
mercenary was a man under authority….In the mercenary, a master of drill and
manoeuvre (Alexander always rated them highest among his opponents), and at
the same time an instrument of purely military hierarchy, we encounter the
separation of citizenship from warriordom in its most extreme form.

John Keegan, The Mask of Command, pp. 124-125

With the emergence of the mercenary, and his near-relation the full-time
professional soldier, ancient armies completed the transformation both of their
nature and of their relationship with the state. They also, as it happened,
rehearsed and anticipated identical transformations to those that the armies of
Western Europe would undergo when they emerged from warriordom at the end
of the Middle Ages, passing for the second time through the heroic stage, which
resurrected itself after imperial rule by the Romans. And Europe’s early modern
armies were to display exactly that mixture of soldier-types so characteristic of
those of the Mediterranean world before Roman power beat all into the same
shape on its legionary anvil. Mercenaries and professionals, officered by warrior
aristocrats, formed the backbone of French and Habsburg armies from the
sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Town militias, equivalents of the city-state
armies of Greece, succeeded in surviving for much of the same period.

op. cit., pp. 125-126

It was not until the 1790s that these mutiform bodies were to encounter, in the
conscript levies of the Revolution, a military model which first challenged and
then overcame their dominance. Wellington was to prove himself one of the very
few ancien régime officers with the talent to meet Revolutionary armies on their
own terms and defeat them in battle.

op. cit., p. 126

It was not until the 1790s that these mutiform bodies were to encounter, in the
conscript levies of the Revolution, a military model which first challenged and
then overcame their dominance. Wellington was to prove himself one of the very
few ancien régime officers with the talent to meet Revolutionary armies on their
own terms and defeat them in battle.

op. cit., p. 126

But, that’s a story that’s already been told...

Ancient Greece - The Second Military Revolution

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Similar to Ancient Greece - The Second Military Revolution

Similar to Ancient Greece - The Second Military Revolution (20)

More from Jim Powers

More from Jim Powers (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Ancient Greece - The Second Military Revolution