10. I.1: The Soul and its Capacities To Speak of Single Soul is already to assume an important answer Aquinas is committed to the idea that there is one soul. “If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three different reasons.” [q. 76, a.3]. “We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.” [q. 76, a. 3]
11. I.1.A: Why is a single soul controversial? Why? Nichomachean Ethics I.13 -- “Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of 'taking account' of one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of 'accounting for a mathematical property. That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have a rational principle, that which has a rational principle (as well as that which has not) will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father. ”
12. I.1.B: Aquinas must deal with Aristotle’s phenomena He does by identifying the distinct powers of the soul as distinct capacities or abilities of the same soul. Implications for the intellective soul It is a capacity (we will actually see that it is a grouping of capacities) of the soul, just as the ability to grow is a capacity of the same soul, and the sensitive appetite is a capacity of the same soul. [All of this and related questions is covered S.T., I. q. 75-78, and esp. q. 77 which considers the nature of a capacity]
13. I.2: The Intellectual Capacity(s?) In S.T., I, q. 79, we learn that the intellect, as a capacity, actually encompasses many activities Ex: apprehending, remembering, combining, dividing, judging, etc. Do these activities reflect several distinct capacities or one capacity that can engage in several activities? Answer [S.T., I, q. 79, a. 7] – the capacities of intellect are two!
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16. I.3.B: Phantasms Knowledge Imagination For more on imagination, see: S.T., I, q. 89, a. 5; q. 84, a. 7 and De Anima 2.13-113 Phantasm Defined by Aquinas as: “the likeness of a particular thing.” See: S.T., I, q. 84, a. 7, ad. 2
17. I.3.C: A Realist Assumption Treeness In potentia (id quod) Treeness In potentia (id quod) “The human intellect, which is connected to a body, has as its proper object a quiddity or nature existing in corporal matter.” (S.T., I, q. 84, a. 7)
18. I.3.D:The Agent Intellect Agent Intellect (agens intellectum) S.T., I, q. 79, a. 3; q. 85, a. 1 Treeness In potentia Treeness In Actu Intellig-ible species Actually know-able Represents through formal likeness Not Pictorial likeness S. T., I, q. 85, a. 2 Phantasm Potential intelligible
19. I.3.E: Questions/Further Resources about the Agent Intellect ?’s Stump, E. “Aquinas on the mechanisms of cognition: sense and phantasia.” In Medieval analyses in language and cognition: acts of the symposium, the Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy, January 10-13, 1996, edited by StenEbbesen and Russell L. Friedman, 377-396. Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999. Sheldon M. Cohen. “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms.” The Philosophical Review 91, no. 2 (April 1, 1982): 193-209.
20. I.4: The Second Capacity: The Impression of the Intelligible World “The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands.” [S.T., I, q. 85, a. 2, sed contra]
21. I.4.A: The Intellect and the Cause and Effect Model Remember the Analogy Treeness In Actu Seal: Wax:: Sensitive Species: Sense organ:: Intelligible Species: ? ?
22. I.4.B: The Passive Intellect The Potential Intellect Treeness In Actu Knowledge! In actu, Actually knowing The Potential Intellect “is what it is by becoming all things.“ Aristotle, De Anima III, 5 “But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually.” [S.T., I, q. 79, a. 2]
23. I.4.C: The id quod vs. the id quo Treeness In potentia (id quod) Treeness In Actu ? ? (Id quo) See S.T., q. 85, a. 2
24. I.4.D: Don’t mix up the agent intellect and the potential intellect in act! The Potential Intellect Being Substance Plant Tree Oak Tree “Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly.” S.T., q. 85, a. 3
40. I.5.b: Discursive Reasoning “It is clear, then, that reasoning is related to intellection as moving is related to resting, or acquiring to having—one of these is complete, the other incomplete. And because motion always advances from something immovable and stops at some resting point, so it is that human reasoning, in the course of investigation and discovery, advances from certain things that are grasped directly by intellect; these are first principles. Then in the course of judgment, it returns by analysis to those first principles, and relatives to these it examines its discoveries.” [S. T., I, q. 79, a. 8; see also q. 85, a. 5]
41. I.5.b.i: Running through the mind The Potential Intellect [1] S is P Q is R It’s complicated . . . But we will return . . .
42. I.5.c: Theoretical and Practical Reasoning Thought for thought’s sake Vs. Thought that results in action [S. T., I, q. 79, a. 11] “The speculative intellect by extension [?by accident of relation?] becomes practical. But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers.”
43. Section II:The Procedure of the Practical and Speculative Intellect Discursive Reasoning, The Treatise on God, and The Treatise on Law
44. II.1.A: Distinct Starting Points “Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended by men. For that which first falls under apprehension is being, the understanding of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that ‘the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,’ which is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaphysics IV” [S.T. Ia-Iiae, q. 94, a. 2]
45. II.2.B: Distinct Starting Points “Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension absolutely, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action (since every agent acts for an end, which has the nature of good). Consequently the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the nature of good, viz., that ‘good is that which all things seek after’. Hence this is the first precept of law, that ‘good is that which all things seek after’. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this; so that all the things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good belong to the precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done or avoided.” [S.T. Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 2]
47. II.5: From simple apprehension, to principles to conclusions Being Good Every effect has a cause The Good should be sought S is P S is P S is P Creatures are effects (and are not self-caused) Ice cream/Virtue is good A first cause (God) of creatures must exist Eat ice cream/Do this virtuous thing In the above image, we can imagine the formation of principles from an initial “simple apprehension” and the subsequent deduction of conclusions from those principles
48. II.6: Natural Law and Human Law Categorical Laws Vs. Contingent Laws Human Laws are attempt to instantiate and enforce universal natural laws in a particular time and place. Natural Law: Though shall not Kill [See all of S.T., Ia-IIae, q. 94] Human Law: In America, drive on the right so of the road (so that you don’t kill people with your car). But in England, drive on the left side of the road. [See all of S.T., Ia-IIae, q. 94] [S.T., Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 4] “But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.”
49. II.7:Preambulaefidei 1) Through his effects in nature God by approached in two ways: 2) Through grace “Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason.” [S.T., I, q. 1, a. 8, ad. 2] S.T., I, qq. 2 and 3 – Aquinas proceeds from God’s natural effects to his existence and his simplicity Therefore, because natural reason can prove these conclusions, they are preambles of faith – not articles of faith proper.
52. III.2: Is theology a Science? “Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.” [S.T., I, q. 1, a. 2]
53. III.3: Is theology proper speculative or practical? [S.T., I, q. 1, a. 4] “Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. . .” [S.T., I, q. 1, a. 4] “. . . Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss.”
54. The End Find this power point at: http://jeffreycwitt.com/posts Or directly at: http://www.jeffreycwitt.com/posts/postentry.php?flag=10
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