The document discusses Nigeria's transition from military to democratic rule that began in 1999. It argues that the transition may not represent a true democratic dawn due to the military's legacy of control over politics and the economy. Under past military regimes like those of Babangida and Abacha, the military consolidated power by gaining control of businesses and the financial sector. Many see the current transition as allowing the military to maintain influence behind a civilian facade. The transition may fail to establish true democracy and represent only a repackaging of controlled military politics.

1. From Despotism to Neo-Militarism:
Transition without Transformation in Nigeria’s New Democratic Dawn
Introduction
Barring any unforeseen problem, Nigeria will emerge as a formal democracy by June
1, 1999, six months to the end of the current century. Great expectations of a ‘new’
dawn of democratic possibilities are being raised about the current transition; there is
a relentless international media focus on Nigeria - given its recent sordid past under
the brutal regime of General Sani Abacha and the desperation to rid the international
community of another albatross nation. But is democracy really dawning in Nigeria?
Or is the current transition just another false start? This article problematises the
whole transition programme and sees it as a legitimate target for contestation by the
social forces who, after all, will bear the costs of a transition. In doing this, it focuses
on the place of the military in the transition programme and argues that because of the
its legacy, the little space avaialble as a result of the transition may end up being a re-
packaged space for controlled clientelistic military politics with a civilian, formally
democractic garb. The rise and rise of a pro-military, status-quo political party is
already bearing testimony to the primacy of this hegemonic bloc that will be in
control of the state, in the name of democracy.
Some scholars of democratic transition in countries emerging from prolonged
authoritarian past have stressed the virtues of sequencing and correctly argued that
any opening for democracy can, at best, be a means to an end, an instrumental
response to a multi-faceted crisis. Unfortunately, this position often leaves the
impression that the process is irreversible once it begins and elections treated as
though democracy had dawned. Yet evidence abounds in political science literature of
the crucial need to think less teleologically about democratic transitions. While
democratic transitions may lead to democratic development, pacted transitions have
not necessarily led to consolidated democracies nor stem the tide of democratic
reversals. While it is arguable that there is some merit in occupying rather than
boycotting an emerging space, no matter how limited, one must caution against
misconstruing a re-packaged space for controlled clientelistic politics as a new space
for democratic settlement. Without seeking to dismiss optimistic views of Nigeria’s
on-going transition therefore, there is a need to interrogate such views critically if
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2. only to aid a realistic assessment of where Nigeria is headed in the aftermath of the
elections, what the role of the military will be and whether this dawn is indeed a new
one, or a false dawn.
Although entrenched military interest does not constitute the only or major
threat to the transition programme (I think poverty and economic inequality does!), it
goes a long way in explaining why many see the current transition as a civilian claok
for continued military rule, and this has serious bearing on the future consolidated
status of the current transition and the extent to which the process can be seen as
credible and authentic. By trying to unpack the convoluted background to the
military’s ‘foundational’ agenda, we would be able to determine whether this is an
institutional or a cabalistic agenda of a powerful minority. This distinction becomes
necessary in any attempt to build a healthy, civil-military relations agenda to assist
the process of consolidating the transition. It may also help us guide against the
overwhelming tendency to treat the military institution as monolithic or define the
military simply by the excesses of its aberrant officer corps. One, it is a misnomer to
assume that the project the ruling military elite adopts is necessarily the military class
project, agreed in advance by the officer corps, not to mention the rank and file.
Indeed, this may distort the social origins of such agenda since the way the military
elite corps sometimes interposes itself in Nigerian politics is an extension of an
oligarchic agenda not necessarily shared by all officers.
Background to Military Hegemony
Although the Nigerian military first became involved in politics in 1966, it was
generally believed it did so to establish national unity and eradicate corruption. Six
months after, it had become a beacon of national disintegration as it broke up into
ethnic and regional factions. There is a sense in which most observers of the military
in this phase of Nigeria’s treacherous political terrain believed that it was primarily a
fighting force, largely uninterested in the paraphernalia of office and accoutrements of
power. This soon changed after the civil war and the sudden oil wealth brought about
by the Arab oil shock of early 1970s. The origins of Nigeria’s ‘bureaucratic-
economic militariat’ could indeed be traced back to the central role played by the
military in the control and management of this new found oil wealth, especially
through its implementation of the Nigerian Enterprises Decrees of 1972 and 1977.
Yet, the patterns of accumulation, which prevailed, did not become immediately
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3. obvious because of the proxy nature of such control. Several of the retired military
officers swept out of power in the 1975 coup actually left with no remarkable
accummulated wealth, although corruption and cronyism had crept into the
vocabulary in the latter years of the Gowon administration. They were also not quick
to get involved in business in the manner their successors did after relinquishing
power in 1979.
Many of the military officers who ruled the country between 1975 and 1979
soon found themselves in business, politics and the diplomatic sector courtesy of the
companies whose controlling interests were procured by the local business class with
close links to the military. If one traces the personal, political and financial links of a
series of individuals associated with the military, prior to their exit from government
and, in the immediate aftermath to civilian politics in 1979, the emerging trend of a
convoluted network including the military, bureaucracy (the super-permsecs) and
multinational representatives becomes immediately apparent. At this stage though, it
would appear that the acquisition was largely in pursuit of a highly personal agenda,
not a conscious institutional programme of wielding political influence.
Barely two years after they left office, someone like the former Chief of Army
Staff under General Obasanjo, Lt.General (Rtd) Theophilus Danjuma had established
a shipping line and got enlisted on the Governing Boards of at least five multinational
corporations as Chairman. The then Deputy Head of State, Late Major General Shehu
Yar’adua had also gone into the shipping business with a good civilian friend of the
Military, Chief MKO Abiola, whose election victory was later to be annulled by the
military. The former Head of State, General Obasanjo immediately went into large
scale farming when he established Temperance Farms Limited (which later became
Obasanjo Farms Ltd). By the mid-80s, Generals Danjuma and Yar’adua had between
them direct involvement in no fewer than twenty local or foreign owned businesses in
the country in banking, oil, shipping sectors. The proclivity of the ex-military generals
to weild financial control was however not limited to their top-most brass. As Table 1
shows, others who retired before them and several who did so after them entered the
board game too. As one observer of the retired military phenomenon noted, “an
increasing number of retired senior military officers …combine
chairmanships/directorships of their own private businesses, with part-time
appointments to key governmental posts and parastatals relating to agriculture,
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4. commerce, and industry, in addition to interlocking directorships of many foreign
companies incorporated in Nigeria.” (Adekanye; 1993:30).
Yet in spite of the growing tendency towards personal accumulation among
officers that had become noticeable in the post 1979 transition phase, and which was
certainly continued under the Buhari-Idiagbon junta, a distinguishing feature of the
pre-Babangida military regimes was that they were less directly subservient to foreign
capital and more inclined to wielding indirect political influence, although quite a
number of them contested elections on the platform of all the 2nd republic political
parties. Even though there were officers committed to the market orthodoxy of
capitalist development among them, officers who advocated economic nationalism
and greater state control over the economy, either in the form of mixed economy or
state capitalism won the internal struggles.
Consolidating Military Hegemony
All this was to change with the arrival of General Babangida at the helm of affairs in
1985 and this became immediately obvious even from the title he gave himself. For
the first time, Nigerians became worried that their military ruler opted for an all
encompassing title of “President”, hitherto thought to be restricted to democratically
elected rulers, not the low profile “Head of State” that had become the norm. Indeed,
the situation began to resemble more closely the institutional and personalist agenda
of control pioneered in countries like Thailand and Chile. As the country became
sucked into the vortex of structural adjustment programme under General Babangida,
the elevation of finance over industrial capital became the most significant feature of
that era. Short term monetarist policies of exchange rate devaluation, removal of
subsidies, slate of state enterprises, freeing of prices and generalised deflationary
policies took precedence over structural reform of that damaged economy based on an
agreed national consensus. The deregulation of the financial market ensured that the
financial sector became the only growth sector with interests rates determined by
supply as agriculture and industry experienced severe distress.
Little wonder then that the economic reform programme started by the
military regime in 1986 (under General Babangida) finally collapsed under the weight
of the 1993 annulled election and the massive capital flight that followed. By 1993,
Nigeria, according to the World Bank was among the 20 poorest countries in the
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5. world. The situation has since worsened under the present regime. GNP grew only 2.8
percent in 1994, inflation ran at over 60 percent, exponential unemployment growth
rate and the Nigerian naira virtually collapsed. As one study notes, of that period,
"virtually all pretense of professional economic management … abandoned, and the
government cynically allowed the economy to become completely predatory in
nature." As a result, the country stopped servicing interest payments on much of its
$28 billion foreign debt, and it is more than $7 billion in arrears on its debt to the
Paris Club of Western creditors. Its thinly spread saving grace in the international
finance market, has resulted from its continued servicing of Brady bonds and
promissory notes. Yet, in spite of this dismal record, a high number of retired military
officers or fronts of serving officers were heavily involved in the finance/banking
sectors. Not only do many of them lack any knowledge of the industry, they
possessed little aptitude to apply themselves to the huge responsibilities their
involvement demanded of them. Although it may be stretching credulity to assume
that all the officers involved were aware of there role in class terms of linking finance
capital to state apparatus, they knew their financial success depended on official
actions linked to the promotion of structural adjustment programmes and were in no
doubt that this ensured the military hegemony already established in several spheres.
Not even the mini-boom engendered by the Persian Gulf Oil crisis in 1990/91
brought any respite to the generality of the population. Instead, the extra fund was
regarded as discretionary income which went on a massive spending binge that
diverted revenues into corruption funded patronage, sharply expanded extra-
budgetary expenditure and bloated an already inflation ridden economy. Indeed,
according to Dr Pius Okigbo’s official inquiry into the finances of the Central Bank of
Nigeria, "between September 1988 and 30 June 1994, US$12.2 billion of the
$12.4billion (in the dedicated and special accounts) was liquidated in less than six
years... spent on what could neither be adjudged genuine high priority nor truly
regenerative investment; neither the President nor the Central Bank Governor
accounted to anyone for these massive extra-budgetary expenditures...that these
disbursements were clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reeling
with a crushing external debt overhang."
It soon became obvious that the restructuring of the economy along monetarist
lines could be said to have represented an ambitious attempt by the ‘techno-military’
authoritarian state under General Babangida to generate a new hegemonic bloc and
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6. this was carried out on two levels. First, as a result of the government’s privatisation
agenda, several of the state-owned industrial and commercial ventures were sold
directly to ex-military generals or to conglomerates linked to them. In addition the
new merchant banks that emerged to take advantage of the financial sector boom
featured several retired military officers on their boards. In fact, it was common
knowledge in the late 1980s and eraly 1990s that no matter how solid one’s capital
base was your likelihood of gaining a bank licence was dependent on having at least
one ex-military personnel listed on your board. Table 1 shows this phenomenon very
clearly. Second, General Babangida went beyond the personalist mode of influence
seeking by ensuring that the stratification of the military from the rest of society did
not just exist at the level of retired officers, but also at an institutional level. Hence,
by adopting a practise common in Latin American military, he announced the
formation of an Army Bank (which never took off!), an industrial armament city –
(which also did not see the light of day) and the Nigerian Army Welfare Insurance
Scheme (NAWIS). To ensure that every military officer bought into this agenda, the
government spent N550 million ($60 million in 1992) to purchase cars for all serving
military officers of and above the rank of captains. This was later extended to the non-
commissioned officers in the form of motorcycles and the rank and file got bicycles.
At this stage, a paradigmatic shift had already occurred in the mindset of the
military cabal intent on remaining in power. Unlike before when it was an anathema
for serving officers to flaunt their involvement in the economic sector and to stake a
claim to permanent political control, many became closely identified with oil,
financial, and shipping interests whilst also justifying why they ought to be
legitimately seen as political players. They declared in several public fora that they
were best placed to take Nigeria into political and economic heights because of their
military training and the advantage of liberal university education. Indeed, many
began to threaten Nigerians that even if they were removed from direct political role,
they would return by hook or crook. Indeed, the idea of a military party took root and
some of the officers and civilian intellectuals involved in that project on behalf of
General Babangida were assigned the task of studying the Nasserist/Baathist models
in Egypt, Syria and Iraq as well as the Latin American foundational regime type.
Although it was General Babangida who put in motion the idea of constructing an
undisguised military party, it was General Abacha, his military successor who dusted
up the blueprint and tried to implement it through the artificial creation of political
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7. parties. Through these parties, General Abacha got himself “unanimously” elected
and his anointment as the president was already seen as a foregone conclusion when
he suddenly died.
Under General Abacha, Nigeria became almost a carbon copy of Thailand
under Field Marshal Sarit, who at the time he came into power in the late 1950s, sat
on the Board of at least two Thai banks, and several of his subordinates were
members of at least three more, not to mention others with their civilian fronts in
place. When he came into power in November, 1993, General Abacha had
considerable interests in the air, oil and construction industries and he never
relinquished his interests in those companies. Several others like his Communication
Minister, Major General Adisa owned Board of Afonja Community Bank. Indeed, it
was a badly kept secret that General Abacha ran the Nigerian economy during his five
year at the helm as a personal fiefdom. It was no surprise therefore when the scale of
his theft became public after his demise. Although General Abacha failed to achieve
the ultimate goal of creating a military party to direct the affairs of the nation, many
of the people who assisted in that project can now be found in Nigeria’s two alliances
of convenience – the PDP – Peoples Democratic Party and the All Peoples
Party/Alliance for Democracy axis and it is for this reason that many now interpret the
current transition programme as a civilian cloak for continued military rule. The
ghost of President Shagari’s maxim in the 1980s that the military has become a
political party is now haunting the current process. Indeed, the central question on the
lips of every politician and civil society activist is: Is the military accepting the loss of
explicit political control in exchange for impunity for human rights abuses of the last
fifteen years and a guarantee of secrecy regarding their personal and institutional
finances and backroom influence.
What is to be done?
Given the grip of the military as described in the preceding paragraphs, there
are two ways of approaching the problems of military control and domination of the
body politic. The first is more cautious and incremental and there are merits in the
arguments of its proponents who have posed the question thus: “how, given the
existing forms of domination, of military occupation and social stratification, can the
military be ignored, if conflict is to be averted and democracy consolidated in a
fractious setting such as Nigeria’s?” The second approach is to tackle the issue more
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8. comprehensively: what transformations and institutional mechanisms in class
structure, power sharing and ethnic relations will be required to assure conditions of
lasting peace in Nigeria? An innovative use of both approaches would certainly work
better than an isolated use of either. Of equal importance is what becomes of the
state-building project itself in an atmosphere where the growing orthodoxy is that
what is the retrenchment of the state and its replacement with the market. Clearly,
this orthodoxy is gaining influence in the current transition with the pressure to
privatise remaining state institutions in a setting where the only people who have the
resources are those lose to the military, and perhaps backed by foreign resources.
While it is arguable that retired military officers have the right as citizens to
contribute their experience and expertise to the vital sectors of the economy given the
fact of their premature retirement from the services, it is difficult to ignore the link
between those clamouring for state privatisation with the current financial
involvement of the military with the explicit agenda to collapse the military and
capitalist classes in society under military hegemony. The seeming hijack and
subsequent control of the leading political party in the current transition programme –
Peoples Democratic Party, certainly raises the spectre of unrestrained domination in
this direction.
There is now no doubt that the military will exercise considerable “behind the
scene” influence even if the military were to withdraw into their barracks come June
1999, given the consolidation of military hegemony by this extensive interests in the
arguably ‘legitimate world of finance, oil and industry’. But this threat comes more
from retired military officers and the challenge for the new government will come in
the form of its capacity to minimise their links with serving officers who may
eventually form the fulcrum of future attempts to subvert the democratic opening.
With their penetration of every sector of the domestic economy in a variety of ways,
the new military class in politics will not hesitate to confront any threat, real or
percieved by using those they have mentored in the military and their chance of
undermining the new and consolidating democracy remain very real. This has been
the experience of some democracies – Turkey, Chile, Argentina, Pakistan, Philippines
and Indonesia readily come to mind as places where old type military regimes have
succeeded in building ‘foundational’ governments.1
1
See Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, (Baltimore:
John Hopkins University Press, 1996)
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9. In the context of creating a stable civil-military relations, the overriding fact
that the military in Nigeria has now become entrenched in all aspects of civic and
economic life makes their eventual removal an area that will demand considerable
skills in reassuring them and assuaging their fears about a post-military dispensation,
finding an appropriate role and mission for those left behind in the institution who
will want to maintain their professional autonomy, developing a civilian, democratic
defence policy expertise and creating the necessary opportunities for networking and
dialogue between military representatives and civil society workers. To achieve the
above, we consider below how other consolidating democracies have handled civil-
military relations after prolonged military rule primarily to refocus the military
mission and subordinate a powerful military institution under civilian control.
Options and Issues for the new government
To address the threat concretely, the new government will have to seriously
address the question of the military mission in a democratic and accountable manner.
A ‘mission-less’ military poses a serious threat in relation to the military’s primary
role of defence of the nation’s territorial integrity. By overextending its
responsibilities beyond defence duties or redefining its defence duties to include other
elements like nation-building and internal security, the efficiency of the fighting force
has been severely undermined under military rule. There is no doubt that the
professionalism of Nigerian soldiers has had its setbacks due to their involvement in
politics. This political usurpation of military talents has been shown to be bad in
areas where the military is now needed to function like a fighting force such as their
multi-purpose, peace operations. Although the Nigerian military has a somewhat fine
reputation in its commitment to and participation in international peacekeeping duties,
Nigerian soldiers have also been found wanting on such missions largely because of
the disorientation that automatically flows from bad military leadership and its
depressing lack of professionalism.
The first thing to say is that no two countries have handled civil-military
relations in a post-military state in the same manner. The unifying theme in all of the
responses is the determination to assert civiliian supremacy and oversight and the
subordination of the military to objective civilian control. The outcomes to this
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10. singular objective have however varied. From countries like Haiti, Panama and Costa
Rica where standing armies were completely eliminated in search of a stable and
sustainable democracy to those countries with a mixture of measures leading to
surreptitious military influence, like in Indonesia, Phillipines, Thailand, Pakistan,
South Korea and Bangladesh. In another category, we have in Latin America, and in
some respects in the Russian republic consolidating democracies where the military is
still actively involved in politics to another where armed forces have moved from a
completely political orientation into a stable, conventional roles. The military in
Poland and to a large extent among the liberation armies turned conventional
militaries in Southern Africa would qualify for such categorisation. In all of these
cases, there are still problems with creating a solid civil-military relations where roles
are clearly defined and missions fully worked out, but the fact that the mission has
been refocussed, especially in countries like South Africa and Poland gives real cause
to hope that military obstacles to sustainable civil-military relations are not
insurmountable. The consolidating democracy in South Korea seemed to have
succeeded where others have failed by security reconciliation via punishment of past
human rights abuse when two former heads of state were sent to life jail for their role
in the massacre of student demonstrators in the early 1980s.
Yet, the experience of countries where the military has become so entrenched
also gives much cause for worry about how successful the agenda for a sustainable
relations with the military can be in Nigeria, especially when one confronts the
inevitable issue of amnesty or punishment for human rights and political abuse
committed by successive military authorities. To take the example of Argentina and
Chile, which appears to be the most favoured model for the Nigerian ruling elite if
one goes by their attempt to replicate the Chilean model in terms of the economy and
politics, one can only be cautiously optimistic. After seven years of democratic
restoration, General Pinochet made every effort to punish human rights abuses of his
seventeen years rule as Chilean Head of State. Through his preserved core of hard
right supporters, some of who describe him as the greatest ‘visionary’ Chile has ever
known, the elected Chilean government was not able to exorcise the terrible ghosts of
those repressive years. In the end, it took an international action to bring General
Pinochet to account, an action that is described as a threat to democracy in some
circles, and an opportunity to consolidate Chilean democracy on the other hand.
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11. The Chilean scenario definitely leaves a sour taste in the mouth of many about the
future of any consolidating democracy in Nigeria, especially given the almost
pervasive evidence that every effort is being made to militarise society in order for
military Generals to transform themselves into ‘elected’ civilian rulers.
Although the place of the military was handled differently in the consolidating
democracies discussed above, what was common to all the cases is the fact that they
tended towards finding a professional role for the military and defining a clear role
and mission for the military. In ensuring civilian supremacy and a democratic pattern
of civil-military relations, the civilian leadership in a post military state must define
the role the Nigerian military must play in a clear and precise manner. As much as
possible, this must be restricted to its traditional external combat role as a means of
strengthening civil-military relations. If it must get involved in any internal security
operations like Operation Sweep etc then a proper criteria would need to be developed
for evaluating the involvement of armed forces in non-combat operations. Without
being prescriptive about this, any attempt to redefine the role and mission for the
Nigerian military, given the declining external security threats faced by the country
must consider security in a holistic manner, and pay particular attention to the
protection of offshore interests and promotion of a professional peace-keeping
command given Nigeria’s good record in international peacekeeping operations.
A regional security mission within a global context will earn the country a lot
of support and goodwill if handled professionally. This will certainly call for a
review of threat perception perspectives and a redefinition of the defence policy
process. If the feeling is however overwhelming that the predominant threat to the
state is mainly internal, not inter-state nor regional insecurity, then the civilian
authority must weigh carefully the involvement of the military in such ventures
against the proper funding of law enforcement agencies or the creation of an internal
security mechanism that takes attention away from the Nigerian armed forces. The
idea of using the army to quell dissension in the Niger-Delta or anywhere for that
matter must be scrupulously avoided by a civilian government, especially when all
conflict management options have not been explored.
The second issue for consideration is therefore the separation of operational
and policy control over broad defence matters such as size, shape, organisation,
equipment, weapon acquisition and pay/conditions in the services on the one hand,
and administrative control over the services on the other. The professional military
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12. loves a civilian head who understands their predicament and they value unrestricted
access to the President as well as autonomy over their internal organisation and
operations. The point has been made earlier about how the lack of any expertise on
the part of elected civilian authorities has not allowed room for effective oversight of
the various arms of the armed forces. Any redirection of the defence policy process
will inevitably require a different kind of expertise, which must be a mixture of
civilians and military professionals. To sustain this, there is a need for a significant
thawing process through changes in relationships between the military and civilian
political elite, and a significant increase in contacts between Nigerian opinion
moulders and the outside world. The process of agreeing an appropriate role for the
military can only be successfully achieved in a climate of sustained dialogue. At the
moment, the level of contact is non-existent, or just on a social and unstructured
manner. Yet, in introducing civilian expertise however, care must be taken not to
substitute military incompetence in a political setting as damaged as Nigeria’s with
civilian inexperience. A possibility is to create a Strategic Cell that may serve as a
buffer between a civilian presidency and the military professionals. The immediate
challenge is for the civilian, democratic leadership to make the right choice of military
chiefs to lead the military restructuring/re-professionalisation project.
The question of recruiting into the armed forces is also an issue that has to be
resolved as part of the overall resolution to the nationality question. There is a strong
perception, rightly or wrongly, that the there is a dominant recruitment of
‘Northerners’ into the Nigerian military. Only recently, the Christian Association of
Nigeria (CAN), raised this as a fundamental problem. While this is a political
problem that cannot be resolved on a rational basis, central to the issue of military
recruitment pattern in terms of military professionalism are three central questions:
Should our armed forces in a democratic dispensation be an equals opportunities
institution? Should it be a combat effective, battle ready force recruited from the
most able in the most rigorous and competitive manner? Should the manner of
recruitment matter – if the training is standardised and geared towards bringing out
the best in every recruit?2 Although the above are the rational questions to which
answers must be found, they do not necessarily constitute the most important issue
when the whole issue of structure and process are the ones generating much attention.
2
See Kayode Fayemi, “The Politics of Military Recruitment: What is to be done?”, Tempo Magazine,
28 August 1997, pp.4-5 for an extensive analysis of the Nigerian Armed Forces’ recruitment.
12

13. These are political issues that can only be resolved through a process of confidence
building and conflict resolution mechanisms.
It is why the central issue to be resolved is the need to negotiate a process of
reconciliation (Argentina/Chile) or restitution (South Korea) between the military and
the civil society that takes into account what is in the long term best interests of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in consolidating democracy. In Nigeria
where the military has had a long and chequered history of political intervention and
built up immense economic clout, assuaging the fears of the military in a
consolidating democracy by a declaration of amnesty for past misdeeds poses a
serious challenge to the strengthening of a stable civil-military relations. Already,
several people in Nigeria are yearning for the day when the military would be brought
to account for past actions and any attempt to stop that process happening will be
opposed by those important opinion leaders. Yet, the question must be asked, as
others must have asked themselves in Chile, Argentina and Philippines: While
restitution may be a necessary, even cathartic exercise, in terms of a sustainable, civil-
military relations, is it the nest way to promote a stable, civil-military relations or is
there a way to achieve a balance between restitution and reconciliation. This is one of
the areas where the right balance must be reached between the search for immediate
justice and the need for long term stability. Clearly, any new government that refuses
to acknowledge the scale of abuse and injustice in Nigeria over the last decade would
be confronted with the pressure from the civil society. Equally, any attempt to rush
into issues bordering on the role of the military in the last decade would raise serious
concerns in military circles.
Another core issue that has to be addressed by any consolidating democracy,
especially following Nigeria’s recent experience is the necessity for civilian political
leaders to eschew the temptation of using the military to settle scores amongst
themselves, if sustainable civil-military relations is to have any future. Part of the
damage that was done to the leaders of the June 12 election was the impression
created by some of them that they were trying to use the military to restore the
mandate. Even if one doubts the veracity of such claims, the current regime has won
some sympathy with the claims that they were invited to take over by the presumed
winner of the June 12. The deft assemblage of several supporters of the June 12
election into the regime’s maiden cabinet further reinforced such claims. Although
we may not know the precise details of what really transpired between Chief Abiola’s
13

14. camp and General Abacha and his men, suffice it to say that there was some
understanding between them which the military decided to take advantage of.
Besides, it is common knowledge that civilian political leaders have in the past either
participated actively or encouraged the military to stage coups against their
opponents. This not only undermines the fragile political system, but also destroys
military professionalism. In essence, the clarity and quality of the post-military
leadership will necessarily determine how these complex issues are resolved in a
sustained framework.
Conclusion
It seems obvious from the available evidence that while demilitarisation of politics
may widen the space within which democratic reform takes place, it will not
automatically translate into a complete overhaul of politics from its military roots,
especially in a body politic that has become so atomised and, in which the symbols,
values, and ethos of the military are replicated by large sections of the civil-society.
Even so, it would be wrong to reinforce the impression that everything is
given and pre-determined and that there is nothing that we can do about demilitarising
the state and ridding it of its military excesses. If we try to understand the civil-
military relations dilemma in terms of the complexity of the state-civil-society
relations in Nigeria whilst explaining how the nature of state power relates to the key
forces of production in the economy and society within a political synthesis, then we
will be in a position to address the crisis of governance that is likely to confront the
new and fragile democracy about to be installed in Nigeria.
TABLE 1.
Lt General TY Danjuma Elf-Aquitane
Universal Trust Bank
First Universal Lt-General M.I.Wushishi
Continental Reinsurance Churchgate Group
Guinness Nigeria Ltd Chartered Bank
14

15. Continental Reinsurance
Inter-Continental Assurance
Urban Shelter Bldg.Society
Union Trust Bldg.Society
Prime Merchant Bank
CentrePoint Merchant Bank
Lt-General Gibson Jalo
Societe Bancaire Nigeria
WorldGate Building Society
Silvertrust Insurance Brokers
Imperial Finance and Securities
First Interstate Merchant Bank (Ex-Director)
Alpha Merchant Bank (Ex-Director)
Colonel Sani Bello
Broad Bank
Continental Merchant Bank
Globe Reinsurance
Law, Union & Rock Insurance
Inland Bank
Nicon Insurance
Dominion Trust
General Yakubu Gowon
National Oil Corporation
Capt.Isaiah Gowon
Greenfield Mortgage
UBA
15

16. Major General Abdullahi Shelleng
Solid Mortgage Ltd
Fortune Mortgage
Multi-Trust Bancshares
MBCOM Securities
Major General Ejiga
Manufacturers Merchant Bank (Chair)
Major General Ahmadu Rimi
Royal Merchant Bank
Alhaji Mohammed Gambo
Highland Bank
Major General D.M.Jemibewon
Ivory Merchant Bank
Asset & Liability Ins.Corp
Mr Etim Inyang
Crown Merchant Bank
AVM U Muazu
Broad Bank
Major General Goerge Innih
Broad Bank
Bridgestone Finance Corp.
Air Commodore Dan Suleiman
North-South Bank
Maj.General Musa Yar’adua
Habib Bank
Africa Ocean Lines
Lt Colonel Hussein Abdullahi
HillCrest Merchant Bank
16

17. Commodore Salaudeen Akano
Liberty Assurance
First Union Mortgage
Brig.BAM Adekunle
Manhattan & Extraco Finance Co.
Colonel Adejoro
Teta Investments
Brig.Alabi Isama
Golden Insurance
Lt.General Domkat Bali
Oriental Merchant Bank
Perpetual Assurance
Air Vice Marshal Ibrahim Alfa
Highland Bank
Maj.Gen.Seidu Balogun
Omicron Fin.& Securities
Maj.A.B.Ayi Bassey
Mercantile Bank
Brig.David Bamgboye
Harmony Mortgage
IncaTrust Bldg.Society
Air Cdre.Bernard Banfa
Liberty Assurance
AVM A.O.Bello
Globe Reinsurance
Colonel Odunsi Davies
Cashpoint Savings & Loans
17

18. Comm.MA Davies
Apple Finance & Securities
Air Cdre Kola Falope
Classic Home S & L Ltd
Brig. Harrison Eghagha
Dayne Finance & Investments
Maj.Gen David Ejoor
Public Finance Group
Alpha Insurance
Lt.Col.A.O.Eze
Target International Finance
Vice Admiral VA Kaja
Trendex Mortgage Bank
Colonel MB Kaliel
Nigerian Reinsurance Co.
Rear Admiral Ndubuisi Kanu
Dependable Finance
(Late) Gen. Hassan Katsina
Prime Merchant Bank
Brig.George Kurubo
Africa Prudential
Brig Abba Kyari
Creative Finance
Standard Insurance
Maj.Gen Zamani Lekwot
Prudent Merchant Bank
Maj Gen.Ekundayo Opaleye
Devcom Merchant Bank
18

19. Maj-Gen Mamman Kotangora
Cardinal Mortgage Bank
Maj-Gen Bagudu Mamman
Global Devt.Mortgage Inc.
Maj-Gen.M.Magoro
Inter-Continental Assurance
AVM Mouktar Mohammed
Group Merchant Bank
Metropolitan Gen.Finance
Maj-Gen.Abdullahi Mohammed
Trade Bank
Maj.Gen CB Ndiomu
BridgeStone Finance
Lt.Col David Nehikhare
Great Merchant Bank
Lt Col Paul Ogbebor
Great Merchant Bank
Brig.O.Odunaiya
Devserv Finance House
Col.Odusanwo
Crossland Savings & Loans Ltd
Lt.Col.Bola Ogunsanwo
Startrite S & L Ltd
PolCom MA Oluokun
Peak Merchant Bank
AVM Anthony Okpere
Corporate Alliance & Gen.Insurance
19

20. Fenceworks Nominees
Maj-Gen Olufemi Olutoye
ZincPace Fin & Securities
Air Cdre.Emeka Omeruah
Nigeria Merchant Bank
Maj-Gen SK Omojokun
Raona Securities & Finance
Lt-Col Omowa
Space Ventures
AVM AGM Osho
Benchmarks Investment
Norman Investment
Duncan Mortgage Ltd
Col.MO.Oshisanya
Acclaim Home S & L
Lt.Col.Tunde Oyedele
Nationwide Merchant Bank
Nationwide Securities
AVM Ishaya Shekari
Guardian Trust S & L
Maj-Gen DKS Shosilva
African Alliance Insurance
Commodore OO.Sosan
Legends Securities
Maj-Gen.Paul Tarfa
Universal Trust Bank
First Universal Insurance Brokers
20

21. Comm.Ebitu Ukiwe
Societe Bancaire Nigeria
AVM Yisa Doko
Intercity Bank plc
Lt.-Col.P.Z.Wyom
Rims Merchant Bank
Maj-Gen AK Adisa
Afonja Community Bank
Maj-Gen Adeyinka Adebayo
Amicable Merchant Bank
Brig-Gen David Mark
Huge interests in Telecommunications
PW Construction Company
Gen I.B.Babangida
Heritage Holdings
Maj-Gen Mobolaji Johnson
Julius Berger Construction Company
Ex-Military men contesting for political office
Presidency
General Olusegun Obasanjo
Senate
Major Gen- Mamman Magoro – Kebbi State
Maj-Gen Joseph Garba – Plateau State
Maj-Gen Ike Nwachukwu – Abia State
Brig-Gen John Shagaya – Plateau State
Air Commodore Jonah Jang - Kaduna
Brig-Gen David Mark – Benue State
Brig-Gen Tunde Ogbeha – Kogi State
Alhaji Nuhu Aliyu – Kaduna State
(Deputy Inspector-General of Police
21

22. Alhaji M.B.Wali – Kano State
(Deputy Inspector-General of Police)
Maj-Gen David Jemibewon - Kogi
Gubernatorial Contestants
Rear Admiral M. Lawal – Kwara State
Colonel MB Kaliel – Kebbi State
Colonel Baba Nyam – Kaduna State
22