1. Reforming Civil-Military Relations for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria:
Issues and Options for Consideration.
By
Dr J ‘Kayode Fayemi
Centre for Democracy and Development
Introduction
Let us begin from the hardly contestable premise that prolonged military rule has had an altogether
negative impact on the political development of Nigeria. Having been ruled by the military for much of
the last three and half decades, Nigerians are no longer debating whether the military should return to
the barracks. It is largely a question of when they should go, and how their exit can be made
permanent. Besides the agreement over the inappropriateness of the military rulers in government
however, no concrete ideas have emerged on what the role of the military should be in a democracy,
yet it is taken for granted that a stable civil-military relations is a pre-requisite for sustainable
democracy. This of course raises more questions that it answers, both in terms of sustainable
democracy and a professional organisation of men and materials in the armed forces. Since the
demilitarisation of politic and the subordination of the military to objective civilian control are not ends
in themselves, my task in this lead discussion paper is to find a deeper explanation to accompany any
reference to a stable and sustainable civil-military relations and posit some ideas on what the military
mission should be in a democracy.
The experience of Africa in less than a decade after the post-cold war “wind of change” in which West
Africa appeared to have disposed off the era of jackboots and bayonets and usher in democracy
certainly calls for a more comprehensive understanding of a stable civil military relations. In the past
five years, the region has regressed to one of “home-grown” democracies, quasi-dictatorships,
personalised autocracies, military-backed civilian rule and never ending transitions. It also seems
obvious from this recent experience that while demilitarisation of politics may widen the space within
which democratic reform takes place, it does not automatically translate into a complete overhaul of
politics from its military roots, especially in a body politic that has become so atomised and, in which
the symbols, values, and ethos of the military are replicated by large sections of the civil-society. For
the purpose of this workshop therefore, the pertinent questions that should be answered are: what are
the obstacles to achieving a stable, sustainable civil-military relations and what, if anything, can the
Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) do to address those obstacles?
Obstacles to a Stable Civil-Military Relations

2. The first obstacle to a stable civil-military relations has been one of perception and misperception
encouraged by the military’s legacy of colonialism. Given the role of the army as the defender of the
colonial authority, it was apparent that those arraigned against those in authority perceived the army as
a reactionary force created to intimidate and oppress the ordinary people. Since many of these
nationalist leaders became the leading figures in the post-colonial State, there was always a deep-seated
suspicion among them and the people they governed that the military was an institution to watch. The
involvement of the military in coup d’etat for much of the 60s and 70s decade only served to confirm
this view of the military as a conservative institution. Ironically, it was during this period that leading
Western thinkers saw the military as ‘modernisers’. The leading military sociologist, Morris Janowitz,
propounded the “political vacuum theory” arguing that the military was a catalyst for overall
development ‘because of certain inherent characteristics which make it imperative for them to
intervene in politics’. In the Eastern bloc, many tin-pot dictators received support from the Soviet
Union under the guise of being vanguards for revolutionary change. The fact that these optimistic, but
mistaken assumptions have followed closely on the heels of the ideological support and theoretical
backing military rule received during the Cold War exposes the soft underbelly of the current state of
civil-military relations literature. There was the ideological and intellectual argument that military rule
correlated to nationalism and therefore, modernity throughout the Cold War era. The Western world
also backed military rule as the best solution to economic liberalisation, since authoritarianism helped
ensure the strictures of structural adjustment programmes. This gave the military institution in several
African countries the political legitimacy they were deprived of by their own citizens even at a time
good governance became the condition for international aid assistance.
Whether one agrees with such characterisations of the post-colonial army or not, external support and
political developments in much of Africa enhanced the place of the military in civil society, essentially
because it controlled all the instruments of coercion. Legitimacy was therefore bought by that control,
but in the wider civil society, those who joined the armed forces were always seen as the rejected
stones. Given such a history, coupled with the actual retinue of repression and bad leadership, the
military has always been seen as an occupation force1 and it will take a paradigm shift to reassure the
populace that it is prepared to subordinate itself to objective civilian control without constituting itself
into a further threat to national security.
The second obstacle to a stable civil-military relations, in Nigeria, and in fact the rest of the sub-region
is the acute lack of knowledge of the military and security issues generally among the civilian political
elite. This is a problem that was in fact triggered off by the deep resentment exhibited against the
military by the civilian political elite. So bad has the problem become that the knowledge of the
military is at best of times, sketchy, and at the worst, virtually non-existent. The military in Nigeria has
always preyed on this lack of public knowledge, which has in turn precluded the development of a
1
For a good background on the nature of civil-military relations in Nigeria, see J ‘Bayo Adekanye,
Nigeria: In Search of a Stable Civil-Military Relations, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1981). See,
also his inaugural lecture, “Military Occupation and Social Stratification, (Ibadan: University of
Ibadan, 1992)

3. civilian, strategic understanding of the operational requirements of an accountable armed forces. In
effect, since the military has been responsible for both operational and policy control over defence and
political matters, there has been no alternative, countervailing system to scrutinise its decisions. This
lack of effective oversight is perhaps the single most important factor responsible for the demise of the
few civilian, democratic governments and the incipient return of military ‘democrats’ under various
guises in West Africa. The military profession, like any other, find it difficult to respect a boss who
lacks a basic understanding of the institution. This is partly at the root of the derogatory remark often
heard from soldiers, bloody civilians! in reference to the ignorance of the civil society about the nature
of the military.
In addition to the lack of effective oversight from the civilian political elite and the general populace
must be added the overarching absence of a clear and identifiable military mission tied closely to its
traditional duties and professional training. The threat of a military without a mission was more
evident in countries where the military is caught in the duality of responsibility for political and
defence matters such as in Nigeria. Ideally, military missions are determined largely by objective
security threats faced by any country subject to periodic review. Objectively, a country like Nigeria,
which does not face huge external threats, will be expected to redefine its role and mission to
accommodate the changing geopolitical realities. However, for a military that has always been in
search of a mission to justify its size and existence, the search for a mission has led the institution to
engage in unnecessary forays into areas with little or nothing to do with the protection of Nigeria’s
territorial integrity. Objective security threats have therefore assumed the perception and realities of the
ruling elite with little attention paid to explaining the nature of the state and the complexity of the
State-civil society relations. The effect of this has been a situation where the ‘ideas of the ruling class
have become the ruling ideas’. This has concentrated on how best to enhance regime security under
successive military regimes. To this end, military professionals are found running bureaucracies, anti-
robbery squads, designing constitutions, engaged in internal security, humanitarian and disaster
management as well as social welfare projects. This has serious implications in at least two broad areas
for sustainable civil-military relations.
First, because the military has now acquired extensive experience running all kinds of civilian based
projects with good opportunities for rent-seeking, the political experience and economic clout gained
from these involvement have eroded any notion of the military as an aberration in civilian
administration. In that period of time, the manner in which they have developed extensive links and
penetrated virtually every sector of the economy and industry remains one of the greatest threats to
civil-military relations in a post-military state. By the early 1990s when there was some available
documentary evidence, several retired and in a few cases serving military officers were already
involved in financial and industrial sectors as bank directors and company chairpersons. Although it
may be stretching credulity to contend that they comprehended their role in class terms, that of linking
finance capital to the ruling State apparatus, they were all aware that their success in the unknown
world of finance depended on official actions through the unbridled deregulation championed under the

4. military’s structural adjustment programme. Even officers who have not directly participated in this
‘casino economy’ are known to be beneficiaries of some companies that served primarily to
concentrate money in the hands of a financial oligarchy closely associated with the rulers. The same is
replicated between oil and trading interests and successive ruling military elite as witnessed in their ties
with such companies like Julius Berger, HFP Engineering, Public Works Nigeria, Julius Berger, Cappa
and D’Alberto, C & C Chagouri, and Costain, just to mention a few. Simultaneous with this has been
an increasing social stratification in which the military sits atop the pecking order in political and
financial terms while the rest of the old pre-military industrial class depend on them for survival or are
squeezed out of their commercial ventures. Given the consolidation of military hegemony by these
extensive interests in the arguably ‘legitimate world of finance, oil and industry’, even if the military
were to withdraw into its barracks, it may still exercise considerable “behind the scene” influence -
with its penetration of every sector of the domestic economy in a variety of ways and undermine the
new and consolidating democracy. This has been the experience of some democracies in Asia –
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia and some parts of Latin America where
old type military regimes have succeeded in building ‘foundational’ governments.2
The second problem this ‘mission-less’ threat poses is in relation to the military’s primary role of
defence of the nation’s territorial integrity. By overextending its responsibilities beyond defence duties
or redefining its defence duties to include other elements like nation-building and internal security, the
efficiency of the fighting force is inevitably undermined. There is no doubt that the professionalism of
our soldiers has had its own setbacks due to their involvement in politics. This political usurpation of
military talents has been shown to be bad in areas where the military is now needed to function like a
fighting force. Although the Nigerian military has a somewhat acquired a fine reputation in its
commitment to international peacekeeping duties, Nigerian soldiers have been found wanting on such
missions for reasons not unconnected to the disorientation that automatically flows from bad military
leadership. As a result, military counterparts from other countries often saw them as a bad influence on
their own soldiers if they are allowed to interact for an extensive duration.
In the context of sustaining a stable civil-military relations, the over-riding fact that the military in
Nigeria has now become entrenched in all aspects of civic and economic life makes its eventual
removal an area that will demand considerable skill in reassuring it and assuaging its fears about a post-
military dispensation, finding an appropriate role and mission for those left behind in the institution
who will want to maintain their professional autonomy; developing a civilian, democratic defence
policy expertise and creating the necessary opportunities for networking and dialogue between military
representatives and civil society workers. To achieve the above, we consider below how other
consolidating democracies have handled civil-military relations after prolonged military rule primarily
to refocus the military mission and subordinate a powerful military institution under civilian control.
2
See Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, (Baltimore:
John Hopkins University Press, 1996)

5. Comparing Experiences
The first thing to say is that no two countries have handled civil-military relations in a post-military
state in the same manner. The unifying theme in all of the responses is the determination to assert
civilian supremacy and oversight and the subordination of the military to objective civilian control.
The outcomes to this singular objective have however varied. From countries like Haiti, Panama and
Costa Rica where standing armies were completely eliminated in search of a stable and sustainable
democracy to those countries with a mixture of measures leading to surreptitious military influence,
like in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, South Korea and Bangladesh. In another
category, we have in Latin America, and in some respects in the Russian Republic, consolidating
democracies where the military is still actively involved in politics to others where the armed forces
have moved from a completely political orientation into conventional, professionally stable roles. The
military in Poland and to a large extent the liberation armies turned conventional militaries in the
Southern African region would qualify for such categorisation. In all of these cases, there are still
problems with creating a solid civil-military relations where roles are clearly defined and missions fully
worked out, but the fact that the mission has been refocused, especially in countries like South Africa
and Poland gives real cause to hope that military obstacles to sustainable civil-military relations are not
insurmountable. The consolidating democracy in South Korea seemed to have succeeded where others
have failed by reconciling punishment of past human rights abuse to stability when two former heads
of state were sent to life jail for their role in the massacre of student demonstrators in the early 1980s.
This certainly sets a precedent, which must be examined carefully in terms of its potential for long term
stability.
Yet, the experience of countries where the military has become so entrenched also gives much cause
for worry about how successful the agenda for a sustainable relations with the military can be in
Nigeria, especially when one confronts the inevitable issue of amnesty or punishment for human rights
and political abuse committed by successive military authorities. Even in Latin America where the
military never really saw themselves as an alternative to civilian, democratic rule, these problems were
still largely unresolved given the clout of the military. To take the example of Argentina and Chile,
which appears to be the most favoured model for the Nigerian ruling elite if one goes by its attempt to
replicate the Chilean model in terms of the economy and politics, one can only be cautiously
optimistic. After seven years of democratic restoration, General Pinochet’s continued control of the
military has blocked every effort to punish the human rights abuses of his seventeen years rule as
Chilean Head of State. Through his preserved core of hard right supporters, some of who describe him
as the greatest ‘visionary’ Chile has ever known, the elected Chilean government has not been able to
exorcise the terrible ghosts of those repressive years. This represents a benchmark of failure for some
that fought for democratic reform while others argue that there is some wisdom in exercising patience
till General Pinochet leaves the scene. For all practical purposes, he remains the undemocratic spirit
guiding Chilean democracy, but the question still remains to be answered: Who guards this Guardian?

6. Although he steps down this year as Commander-in-Chief, a position he retained in 1990 when he gave
way to the democrats, the octogenarian’s influence still runs deep within the civilian, political structure
not just because he remains a Senator for Life, but also as a result of the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ he
established over the years. For example, there are still 10 non-elected seats to be distributed at his
whim to subordinate Generals in the Chilean Senate. In addition, any attempt to revisit past human
rights misdeeds since he left office always earned the Pinochet retort ‘I will instruct the army to take
over if you try that’. The Chilean scenario definitely leaves a sour taste in the mouths of many about
the future of any consolidating democracy in Nigeria, especially given the pervasive evidence that
every effort is being made to militarise the Nigerian society in order for military Generals to transform
themselves into ‘elected’ civilian rulers.
In spite of the above picture, this is not a discussion that should be hinged strictly on structural
determinism which will only succeed in reinforcing the impression that all that is happening seems pre-
determined and given. Neither can the issues examined be captured simply through a theorisation of
historical experiences which is unchanging, non-dialectical and premised upon the separation of the
“domestic” and the “international”, the “economic” and the “political”. The approach therefore is to
capture the civil-military relations dilemma in terms of the complexity of the State-civil-society
relations in Nigeria whilst explaining how the nature of state power relates to the key forces of
production in the economy and society within a political synthesis. If this forms the central premise of
analysis, we can learn lessons from other lands without being completely shrouded in their own
experience.
Options and Issues for Consideration
Although the place of the military in a democracy was handled differently in the consolidating
democracies discussed above, what was common to all the cases is the fact that they tended towards
finding a professional role and defining a clear role and mission for which the military can take
ownership. In ensuring civilian supremacy and a democratic pattern of civil-military relations, the
civilian leadership in a post-military state must help the military with the definition of the role it must
play in a clear and precise manner. As much as possible, this must be restricted to its traditional
external combat role as a means of strengthening civil-military relations. If it must get involved in any
internal security operations like the Ogoni Internal Security operations and Operation Sweep etc, then a
proper criteria would need to be developed for evaluating the involvement of armed forces in non-
combat operations.
Without being prescriptive about this, any attempt to redefine the role and mission of the Nigerian
military, given the declining external security threats faced by the country must consider security in a
holistic manner, and pay particular attention to the protection of offshore interests and the promotion of
a professional peace-keeping command given Nigeria’s good record in international peace-keeping

7. operations. This is a regional security mission within a global context that will earn the country a lot of
support if handled professionally. This will certainly call for a review of threat perception perspectives
and a redefinition of the defence policy process. If the feeling is however overwhelming that the
predominant threat to the state is mainly internal, not inter-state nor regional insecurity, then the
civilian authority must weigh carefully the involvement of the military in such ventures against the
proper funding of law enforcement agencies or the creation of an internal security mechanism that
takes attention away from the Nigerian armed forces. Translated into concrete policy and in the light of
our recognition of internal dimensions of threat, it is safe to argue in favour of an objective threat
assessment that concentrates on a containable West-Central Africa security agenda. Hence, whilst the
recognition of the place of internal threats may question the necessity of a standing army, our overall
perspective on the nature of threats faced is an argument in favour of the retention of a standing army
whose role is clear and measurable.
The second issue for consideration is therefore the separation of operational and policy control over
broad defence matters such as size, shape, organisation, equipment, weapon acquisition and
pay/conditions in the services on the one hand, and administrative control over the services on the
other. The point has been made earlier about how the lack of any expertise on the part of elected
civilian authorities has not allowed room for effective oversight of the various arms of the armed
forces. Any redirection of the defence policy process will inevitably require a different kind of
expertise, which must be a mixture of civilians and military professionals. To sustain this, there is a
need for a significant thawing process through changes in relationships between the military and
civilian political elite, and a significant increase in contacts between Nigerian opinion moulders and the
outside world. The process of agreeing on an appropriate role for the military can only be successfully
achieved in a climate of sustained dialogue. At the moment, the level of contact is non-existent, or just
on a social basis and in an unstructured manner. In introducing civilian expertise however, care must
be taken not to substitute military incompetence in a political setting as damaged as Nigeria’s with
civilian inexperience. That would be a recipe for organisational failure. A possibility is to create a
Strategic Cell that may serve as a buffer between a civilian presidency and the military professionals.
The question of recruiting into the armed forces is also an issue that has to be resolved as part of the
overall resolution to the nationality question. There is a strong perception, rightly or wrongly, that
there is a dominant recruitment of ‘Northerners’ into the Nigerian military. Only recently, the
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), raised this as a fundamental problem. While this is a political
problem that cannot be resolved on a rational basis, central to the issue of military recruitment patterns
in terms of military professionalism are three central questions: Should our armed forces in a
democratic dispensation be an equals opportunities institution? Should it be a combat effective, battle
ready force recruited from the most able in the most rigorous and competitive manner? Should the
manner of recruitment matter – if the training is standardised and geared towards bringing out the best

8. in every recruit?3 Although the above are the rational questions to which answers must be found, they
do not necessarily constitute the most important issue when the question of structure and process are
the ones generating much attention. These are political issues that can only be resolved through a
process of confidence building and conflict resolution mechanisms.
This is why the central issue to be resolved is the need to negotiate a process of reconciliation
(Argentina/Chile) or restitution (South Korea) between the military and the civil society that takes
account of what is in the long term best interests of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
consolidating democracies as a best practise guide to civil-military relations. In a country like Nigeria,
where the military has had a long and chequered history of political intervention and built up immense
economic clout, assuaging the fears of the military in a consolidating democracy by a declaration of
amnesty for past misdeeds poses a serious challenge to the strengthening of a stable civil-military
relations. Already, several opposition leaders in Nigeria are yearning for the day when the military
would be brought to account for past actions and any attempt to stop that process happening will be
opposed by those important opinion leaders. Yet, the question must be asked, as others must have
asked themselves in Chile, Argentina and Philippines: While restitution may be a necessary, even
cathartic exercise, in terms of a sustainable, civil-military relations, might it not exacerbate tensions
rather than attenuate them? This is one of the areas where the right balance must be struck between the
search for immediate justice and the need for long term stability. The jury is still out on that debate and
a lot will depend on how the current crisis is eventually resolved.
Another core issue that has to be addressed by any consolidating democracy, especially following
Nigeria’s recent experience, is the necessity for civilian political leaders to eschew the temptation of
using the military to settle scores amongst themselves, if sustainable civil-military relations is to have
any future. Part of the damage that was done to the leaders of the June 12 election was the impression
created by some of them that they were trying to use the military to restore the mandate. Even if one
doubts the veracity of such claims, the current regime has won some sympathy with the claims that
they were invited to take over by the presumed winner of the June 12. The deft assemblage of several
supporters of the June 12 election into the regime’s maiden cabinet further reinforced such claims.
Although we may not know the precise details of what really transpired between Chief Abiola’s camp
and General Abacha and his men, suffice it to say that there was some understanding between them
which the military decided to take advantage of. Besides, it is common knowledge that civilian
political leaders have in the past either participated actively or encouraged the military to stage coups
against their opponents. This not only undermines the fragile political system, but also destroys
military professionalism. In essence, the clarity and quality of the post-military leadership will
necessarily determine how these complex issues are resolved in a sustained framework.
3
See Kayode Fayemi, “The Politics of Military Recruitment: What is to be done?” Tempo Magazine,
28 August 1997, pp.4-5 for an extensive analysis of the Nigerian Armed Forces’ recruitment.

9. But before then, it is my view that the CDD can set the ball rolling in several ways by beginning to
nurture and arrange the kind of debates that should take place between the security community and the
democratic community.
Role of the Centre for Democracy and Development
1. Given the recognition of the paucity of knowledge on military matters among the civilian political
elite, the Centre can design a research and training agenda whose main goal is a thorough
understanding of the sociological imperatives driving praetorian armies, especially as these relate
to West Africa, but drawing lessons from other places. This information can be disseminated in
the form of seminars, workshops and round-tables where representatives of the military and the
civil society are always present;
2. Provide assistance to fledgling democracies in the region in the articulation of a clearly defined
role for the military in a democracy;
3. The Centre should as a matter of priority co-ordinate the development of sustained interaction
between the military and the civil society on a functional basis which should help in building
bridges across divides;
4. Provision of assistance in building capacity and training civilians with a view to developing a large
pool of national security knowledge in the mass media, think-tanks, universities and other civil-
society sectors; and
5. Advocating the maintenance of military autonomy in professional defence matters and effective
oversight of defence matters by the elected civilian authority.
In all, the Centre is in a unique position to play an influential role in the development of an institutional
framework for the understanding of the military, the articulation of a new mission and in the promotion
of a sustained dialogue process between the military and the civil society.