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Identity & Security In AllJoyn 14.06
Tim Kellogg
Saturday, July 19 2014
https://github.com/tkellogg/alljoyn-examples
https://github.com/tkellogg/alljoyn-
core/tree/master/alljoyn_core/src
Embedded Security
Mitsubishi EMI Incident (2003)
• Brakes disabled when given 1000-10000x legal
levels of EMI radiation
• Car thinks brakes are locked, so it releases
• All within limits required by law
Slammer Worm (2003)
• Nuclear plant safety monitoring disabled for 5
hours
• “The business value of access to the data
within the control center worth the risk of
open connections between the control center
and the corporate network”
• Unpatched MSSQL Server
Hello, my name is Bruce Schneier and I
think routers are super duper easy to
hack, mostly because you nerds never
patch the software
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/the
_internet_of_thin.html
University of Washington Study (2010)
“We demonstrate that an attacker who is able to
infiltrate virtually any Electronic Control Unit
(ECU) can leverage this ability to completely
circumvent a broad array of safety-critical
systems”
http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-
oakland2010.pdf
Hey, check it out! I
made my own
encryption algorithm
Embedded Needs “Rails”
• Software Updates
• Security & Identity
• Communication
• Media Streaming
• User Interfaces
Distributed Bus
Distributed Bus
Security
Auth Listeners
• ALLJOYN_RSA_KEYX – X.509 certificates
• ALLJOYN_SRP_KEYX – Show Random PIN
• ALLJOYN_SRP_LOGON – preset U/P table
• ALLJOYN_ECDHE_NULL
• ALLJOYN_ECDHE_PSK
• ALLJOYN_ECDHE_ECDSA – DSA
ALLJOYN_RSA_KEYX
• RSA = Asymmetric key encryption
• X.509 certificates
– Trusted Certificate Authority
SRP_KEYX & SRP_LOGON
• Threshold Cryptography
• No trust required to establish a secure
connection
• LOGON = Username & Password
• KEYX = A PIN is displayed
ALLJOYN_SRP_KEYX
ECDHE
• Elliptic Curve (EC) Cryptography
• DHE = Diffie-Hellman key Exchange
– Symmetric key encryption
ALLJOYN_ECDHE_NULL
• Elliptic Curve Encryption
• No verification of identity
ALLJOYN_ECDHE_PSK
• PSK = Pre-Shared Key
• Service already has the client’s public key
• A password may also be used
ALLJOYN_ECDHE_ECDSA
• ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm
• Certificate shows identity
Questions?
@kellogh
Practical Internet of Things

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Security & Identity in AllJoyn 14.06

Editor's Notes

  1. * David-Besse nuclear power plant Safety monitoring disabled for 5 hours FirstEnergy – received unsecured monitoring information
  2. Make care ignore driver input Completely erase all evidence of tampering Unidentified make and model from 2009
  3. Open source Lots of Partners Share methods, algorithms, and testing The irony: Maybe OSS projects are more successful because we’re asked to do them a favor http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2011/11/16/do-me-a-favor-so-youll-like-me-the-reverse-psychology-of-likeability/
  4. Cluster tree mesh network
  5. Go over code https://github.com/tkellogg/alljoyn-examples/blob/master/secure/service/src/org/alljoyn/bus/samples/secureservice/
  6. Shared Remote Password
  7. Authenticates
  8. A common (public) secret is combined with private secrets
  9. Like OpenSSH