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Engineering Topology Aware Adaptive 
Security: 
Preventing Requirements Violations at 
Runtime 
Christos Tsigkanos1, Liliana Pasquale2, Claudio Menghi1, 
Carlo Ghezzi1, Bashar Nuseibeh2,3 
1Politecnico di Milano 2Lero 3The Open University
Motivation 
Engineering adaptive security systems that continue to protect critical 
assets in the face of changes in their operational environment. 
Analysis 
Environment 
(Topology) 
Monitoring Planning 
System 
Security Controls 
Execution 
Security 
Requirements 
X
Topology 
Structure of space 
Location of 
objects and agents 
• Proximity 
• Reachability
Physical Topology 
Structure of space 
Location of 
objects and agents 
• Proximity 
• Reachability 
Containment 
into physical areas.
Physical Topology 
Structure of space 
Location of 
objects and agents 
• Proximity 
• Reachability 
Containment 
into physical areas.
Physical Topology 
Structure of space 
Location of 
objects and agents 
• Proximity 
• Reachability 
Containment 
into physical areas. 
Placement 
of physical objects and 
agents.
Physical Topology 
Structure of space 
Location of 
objects and agents 
• Proximity 
• Reachability 
Containment 
into physical areas. 
Placement 
of physical objects and 
agents.
Physical Topology 
Structure of space 
Location of 
objects and agents 
• Proximity 
• Reachability 
Containment 
into physical areas. 
Placement 
of physical objects and 
agents. 
Proximity 
Colocation in the same 
physical area.
Physical Topology 
Structure of space 
Location of 
objects and agents 
• Proximity 
• Reachability 
Containment 
into physical areas. 
Placement 
of physical objects and 
agents. 
Proximity 
Colocation in the same 
physical area. 
Reachability 
Accessibility of a 
physical agent/object 
to physical 
areas/objects.
Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns 
Security Concern Topological Concept 
Assets Agent, Object 
Threat Agent 
Attack Topology Structure and Relationships 
Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area 
Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities
Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns 
Security Concern Topological Concept 
Assets Agent, Object 
Threat Agent 
Attack Topology Structure and Relationships 
Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area 
Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities
Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns 
Security Concern Topological Concept 
Assets Agent, Object 
Threat Agent 
Attack Topology Structure and Relationships 
Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area 
Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities
Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns 
Security Concern Topological Concept 
Assets Agent, Object 
Threat Agent 
Attack Topology Structure and Relationships 
Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area 
Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities
Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns 
Security Concern Topological Concept 
Assets Agent, Object 
Threat Agent 
Attack Topology Structure and Relationships 
Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area 
Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities 
Forbid 
access to 
O6.
… But Topology Changes 
Topology changes determined by agents/assets 
movements may facilitate different attacks and 
render enabled security controls ineffective.
Topology Changes Examples (1/2) 
Topology change: 
Potential threat: 
Bob enters office O6 
Eve can access O6 and eavesdrop the 
safe’s key code
Topology Changes Examples (1/2) 
Topology change: 
Potential threat: 
Bob enters office O6 
Eve can access O6 and eavesdrop the 
safe’s key code
Topology Changes Examples (2/2) 
Topology change: 
Potential threat: 
A valuable server is placed in office O2 
Mallory can tamper with the server 
Server
Topology Changes Examples (2/2) 
Topology change: 
Potential threat: 
A valuable server is placed in office O2 
Mallory can tamper with the server 
Server
Topology Aware Adaptive Security 
How to engineer the activities of the MAPE loop 
to reconfigure security controls at runtime when 
topology changes
Engineering Topology Aware Adaptive Security
Modeling the Topology of the Environment 
Ambient Calculus 
… how we use it? 
For Example: A2[ Eve | Bob | O5 | O6[ Safe ] | O7 ] 
• Locations, Agents and Assets are specific kinds of Ambients 
• Agents can move spontaneously depending on their current 
location
Monitoring
Monitoring 
The topology model is updated after changes 
in the environment are detected. 
For Example: if Eve moves to room O6 
A2[ Eve | Bob | O5 | O6[ Safe ] | O7 ] 
A2[ Bob | O5 | O6[ Eve | Safe ] | O7 ]
Threat Analysis
Threat Analysis 
Identify violations of security 
requirements that can take place in future 
evolutions of the topology model. 
1. Generation of future topological configurations 
2. Identification of security requirements violations
Generation of Future Topological Configurations
Generation of Future Topological Configurations
Generation of Future Topological Configurations
Threat Analysis 
Identify violations of security 
requirements that can take place in future 
evolutions of the topology model. 
1. Generation of future topological configurations 
2. Identification of security requirements violations
Specifying Requirements 
Computation Tree Logic 
• Branching time logic 
• Semantics in terms of states and paths 
For example: Never Bob with another agent in room O6
Identification of Requirements Violations 
Security Requirement:
Planning
Planning 
Select security controls that prevent 
security requirements violations 
Remove future paths of execution that should not be reached 
– Progressively pruning the LTS until violating states do not exists 
– Ensuring satisfaction of other requirements
Planning 
X X 
X
Planning 
Functional Requirement:
Planning 
X X
Planning 
Functional Requirement:
Execution
Execution 
Revoke from agents the permission to 
access to specific areas depending on the 
pruned LTS transitions 
In our example … 
Pruned LTS Transition: <Eve in O6> 
Security Control: Revoke from Eve access to O6
Evaluation 
Applicability 
Prototype Realisation 
– Analysis 
• Ambient Calculus model checking 
• Domain-specific heuristics 
– Planning 
• Security controls selection 
Expressiveness 
 Permission 
 Prohibition 
X Obligation 
X Dispensation
Conclusion & Future Work 
Conclusion 
A systematic approach to engineer adaptive security systems 
– Formal representation of the physical topology 
– Identification of security requirements violations by model checking 
– Selection of security controls that prevent violations of security 
requirements 
Future Work 
• Investigate applicability to Cyber-Physical Systems 
• Further evaluate the approach with practitioners
Questions?
Engineering Topology Aware Adaptive Security: Preventing Requirements Violations at Runtime

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Engineering Topology Aware Adaptive Security: Preventing Requirements Violations at Runtime

  • 1. Engineering Topology Aware Adaptive Security: Preventing Requirements Violations at Runtime Christos Tsigkanos1, Liliana Pasquale2, Claudio Menghi1, Carlo Ghezzi1, Bashar Nuseibeh2,3 1Politecnico di Milano 2Lero 3The Open University
  • 2. Motivation Engineering adaptive security systems that continue to protect critical assets in the face of changes in their operational environment. Analysis Environment (Topology) Monitoring Planning System Security Controls Execution Security Requirements X
  • 3. Topology Structure of space Location of objects and agents • Proximity • Reachability
  • 4. Physical Topology Structure of space Location of objects and agents • Proximity • Reachability Containment into physical areas.
  • 5. Physical Topology Structure of space Location of objects and agents • Proximity • Reachability Containment into physical areas.
  • 6. Physical Topology Structure of space Location of objects and agents • Proximity • Reachability Containment into physical areas. Placement of physical objects and agents.
  • 7. Physical Topology Structure of space Location of objects and agents • Proximity • Reachability Containment into physical areas. Placement of physical objects and agents.
  • 8. Physical Topology Structure of space Location of objects and agents • Proximity • Reachability Containment into physical areas. Placement of physical objects and agents. Proximity Colocation in the same physical area.
  • 9. Physical Topology Structure of space Location of objects and agents • Proximity • Reachability Containment into physical areas. Placement of physical objects and agents. Proximity Colocation in the same physical area. Reachability Accessibility of a physical agent/object to physical areas/objects.
  • 10. Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns Security Concern Topological Concept Assets Agent, Object Threat Agent Attack Topology Structure and Relationships Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities
  • 11. Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns Security Concern Topological Concept Assets Agent, Object Threat Agent Attack Topology Structure and Relationships Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities
  • 12. Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns Security Concern Topological Concept Assets Agent, Object Threat Agent Attack Topology Structure and Relationships Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities
  • 13. Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns Security Concern Topological Concept Assets Agent, Object Threat Agent Attack Topology Structure and Relationships Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities
  • 14. Topology Helps Identify Relevant Security Concerns Security Concern Topological Concept Assets Agent, Object Threat Agent Attack Topology Structure and Relationships Vulnerability Characteristic of an object or area Security Control Location of assets and vulnerabilities Forbid access to O6.
  • 15. … But Topology Changes Topology changes determined by agents/assets movements may facilitate different attacks and render enabled security controls ineffective.
  • 16. Topology Changes Examples (1/2) Topology change: Potential threat: Bob enters office O6 Eve can access O6 and eavesdrop the safe’s key code
  • 17. Topology Changes Examples (1/2) Topology change: Potential threat: Bob enters office O6 Eve can access O6 and eavesdrop the safe’s key code
  • 18. Topology Changes Examples (2/2) Topology change: Potential threat: A valuable server is placed in office O2 Mallory can tamper with the server Server
  • 19. Topology Changes Examples (2/2) Topology change: Potential threat: A valuable server is placed in office O2 Mallory can tamper with the server Server
  • 20. Topology Aware Adaptive Security How to engineer the activities of the MAPE loop to reconfigure security controls at runtime when topology changes
  • 21. Engineering Topology Aware Adaptive Security
  • 22. Modeling the Topology of the Environment Ambient Calculus … how we use it? For Example: A2[ Eve | Bob | O5 | O6[ Safe ] | O7 ] • Locations, Agents and Assets are specific kinds of Ambients • Agents can move spontaneously depending on their current location
  • 24. Monitoring The topology model is updated after changes in the environment are detected. For Example: if Eve moves to room O6 A2[ Eve | Bob | O5 | O6[ Safe ] | O7 ] A2[ Bob | O5 | O6[ Eve | Safe ] | O7 ]
  • 26. Threat Analysis Identify violations of security requirements that can take place in future evolutions of the topology model. 1. Generation of future topological configurations 2. Identification of security requirements violations
  • 27. Generation of Future Topological Configurations
  • 28. Generation of Future Topological Configurations
  • 29. Generation of Future Topological Configurations
  • 30. Threat Analysis Identify violations of security requirements that can take place in future evolutions of the topology model. 1. Generation of future topological configurations 2. Identification of security requirements violations
  • 31. Specifying Requirements Computation Tree Logic • Branching time logic • Semantics in terms of states and paths For example: Never Bob with another agent in room O6
  • 32. Identification of Requirements Violations Security Requirement:
  • 34. Planning Select security controls that prevent security requirements violations Remove future paths of execution that should not be reached – Progressively pruning the LTS until violating states do not exists – Ensuring satisfaction of other requirements
  • 40. Execution Revoke from agents the permission to access to specific areas depending on the pruned LTS transitions In our example … Pruned LTS Transition: <Eve in O6> Security Control: Revoke from Eve access to O6
  • 41. Evaluation Applicability Prototype Realisation – Analysis • Ambient Calculus model checking • Domain-specific heuristics – Planning • Security controls selection Expressiveness  Permission  Prohibition X Obligation X Dispensation
  • 42. Conclusion & Future Work Conclusion A systematic approach to engineer adaptive security systems – Formal representation of the physical topology – Identification of security requirements violations by model checking – Selection of security controls that prevent violations of security requirements Future Work • Investigate applicability to Cyber-Physical Systems • Further evaluate the approach with practitioners

Editor's Notes

  1. This work was done in collaboration with researchers from Politecnico di Milano: … and with Bashar Nuseibeh from Lero and the Open University
  2. The main challenge our work tries to address is to engineer adaptive security systems that continue to protect critical assets in the face of changes in their operational environment. They do so by performing the activities of the MAPE adaptation loop. In particular, adaptive security systems monitor and analyse their operational environment in order to detect possible future violations of security requirements and identify and deploy security controls aimed to prevent the potential violations identified during the analysis. incorporating an explicit representation of the environment’s topology enables reasoning about both structural and semantic awareness of important contextual characteristics that can affect security Concerns and therefore engineering more effective adaptive security systems.
  3. In a general sense, topology refers to the study of shapes and spaces, including properties such as connectedness and boundary Make it clear that topology represents the structure of the space plus some additional properties. Remember to mention that space can be both physical and digital
  4. For this paper we focused on physical topologies. Here it is an example of a floor plan of a university building, where we have areas, rooms, agents and objects. A representation of the topology identifies the structure of space and the location of objects and agents in that space. A physical topology represents the location of physical agents (e.g., humans, robots) and objects in a physical environment (e.g., a building) and their structural relationships (e.g., agents-objects proximity). Figure ?? shows a representation of the physical topology of a corporate building that is composed of rooms R1, R2 and R3. This topology also represents physical objects, such as lab equipment (e.g., microscope M) and a desktop (D) that are located in rooms R2 and R3, respectively, and human agents such as a visitor (V) and an employee (E). In this example, a containment relationship exists if an area contains objects/agents (e.g., room R1 contains agents V and E, or the building belongs to a specific department). A proximity relationship identifies the distance between two agents/objects or whether these are simply co-located in the same area. In this example, a visitor is co-located with an employee. A reachability relationship expresses if an agent can access another area or reach an object from a specific location. For example, room R2 can be accessed by the employee and the visitor who are in room R1, or M can be reached by those agents who are in room R2. For a physical topology, accessibility always requires agents-objects proximity.
  5. Here there is an example of physical topology and explain exactly each element! In a general sense, topology refers to the study of shapes and spaces, including properties such as connectedness and boundary. A representation of the topology identifies the structure of space and the location of objects and agents in that space. A physical topology represents the location of physical agents (e.g., humans, robots) and objects in a physical environment (e.g., a building) and their structural relationships (e.g., agents-objects proximity). Figure ?? shows a representation of the physical topology of a corporate building that is composed of rooms R1, R2 and R3. This topology also represents physical objects, such as lab equipment (e.g., microscope M) and a desktop (D) that are located in rooms R2 and R3, respectively, and human agents such as a visitor (V) and an employee (E). In this example, a containment relationship exists if an area contains objects/agents (e.g., room R1 contains agents V and E, or the building belongs to a specific department). A proximity relationship identifies the distance between two agents/objects or whether these are simply co-located in the same area. In this example, a visitor is co-located with an employee. A reachability relationship expresses if an agent can access another area or reach an object from a specific location. For example, room R2 can be accessed by the employee and the visitor who are in room R1, or M can be reached by those agents who are in room R2. For a physical topology, accessibility always requires agents-objects proximity.
  6. Here there is an example of physical topology and explain exactly each element! In a general sense, topology refers to the study of shapes and spaces, including properties such as connectedness and boundary. A representation of the topology identifies the structure of space and the location of objects and agents in that space. A physical topology represents the location of physical agents (e.g., humans, robots) and objects in a physical environment (e.g., a building) and their structural relationships (e.g., agents-objects proximity). Figure ?? shows a representation of the physical topology of a corporate building that is composed of rooms R1, R2 and R3. This topology also represents physical objects, such as lab equipment (e.g., microscope M) and a desktop (D) that are located in rooms R2 and R3, respectively, and human agents such as a visitor (V) and an employee (E). In this example, a containment relationship exists if an area contains objects/agents (e.g., room R1 contains agents V and E, or the building belongs to a specific department). A proximity relationship identifies the distance between two agents/objects or whether these are simply co-located in the same area. In this example, a visitor is co-located with an employee. A reachability relationship expresses if an agent can access another area or reach an object from a specific location. For example, room R2 can be accessed by the employee and the visitor who are in room R1, or M can be reached by those agents who are in room R2. For a physical topology, accessibility always requires agents-objects proximity.
  7. Here there is an example of physical topology and explain exactly each element! In a general sense, topology refers to the study of shapes and spaces, including properties such as connectedness and boundary. A representation of the topology identifies the structure of space and the location of objects and agents in that space. A physical topology represents the location of physical agents (e.g., humans, robots) and objects in a physical environment (e.g., a building) and their structural relationships (e.g., agents-objects proximity). Figure ?? shows a representation of the physical topology of a corporate building that is composed of rooms R1, R2 and R3. This topology also represents physical objects, such as lab equipment (e.g., microscope M) and a desktop (D) that are located in rooms R2 and R3, respectively, and human agents such as a visitor (V) and an employee (E). In this example, a containment relationship exists if an area contains objects/agents (e.g., room R1 contains agents V and E, or the building belongs to a specific department). A proximity relationship identifies the distance between two agents/objects or whether these are simply co-located in the same area. In this example, a visitor is co-located with an employee. A reachability relationship expresses if an agent can access another area or reach an object from a specific location. For example, room R2 can be accessed by the employee and the visitor who are in room R1, or M can be reached by those agents who are in room R2. For a physical topology, accessibility always requires agents-objects proximity.
  8. Here there is an example of physical topology and explain exactly each element! In a general sense, topology refers to the study of shapes and spaces, including properties such as connectedness and boundary. A representation of the topology identifies the structure of space and the location of objects and agents in that space. A physical topology represents the location of physical agents (e.g., humans, robots) and objects in a physical environment (e.g., a building) and their structural relationships (e.g., agents-objects proximity). Figure ?? shows a representation of the physical topology of a corporate building that is composed of rooms R1, R2 and R3. This topology also represents physical objects, such as lab equipment (e.g., microscope M) and a desktop (D) that are located in rooms R2 and R3, respectively, and human agents such as a visitor (V) and an employee (E). In this example, a containment relationship exists if an area contains objects/agents (e.g., room R1 contains agents V and E, or the building belongs to a specific department). A proximity relationship identifies the distance between two agents/objects or whether these are simply co-located in the same area. In this example, a visitor is co-located with an employee. A reachability relationship expresses if an agent can access another area or reach an object from a specific location. For example, room R2 can be accessed by the employee and the visitor who are in room R1, or M can be reached by those agents who are in room R2. For a physical topology, accessibility always requires agents-objects proximity.
  9. Here there is an example of physical topology and explain exactly each element! In a general sense, topology refers to the study of shapes and spaces, including properties such as connectedness and boundary. A representation of the topology identifies the structure of space and the location of objects and agents in that space. A physical topology represents the location of physical agents (e.g., humans, robots) and objects in a physical environment (e.g., a building) and their structural relationships (e.g., agents-objects proximity). Figure ?? shows a representation of the physical topology of a corporate building that is composed of rooms R1, R2 and R3. This topology also represents physical objects, such as lab equipment (e.g., microscope M) and a desktop (D) that are located in rooms R2 and R3, respectively, and human agents such as a visitor (V) and an employee (E). In this example, a containment relationship exists if an area contains objects/agents (e.g., room R1 contains agents V and E, or the building belongs to a specific department). A proximity relationship identifies the distance between two agents/objects or whether these are simply co-located in the same area. In this example, a visitor is co-located with an employee. A reachability relationship expresses if an agent can access another area or reach an object from a specific location. For example, room R2 can be accessed by the employee and the visitor who are in room R1, or M can be reached by those agents who are in room R2. For a physical topology, accessibility always requires agents-objects proximity.
  10. Threats can arise from malicious agents. Attacks are actions performed by an agent to harm an asset that exploit topology structure and relationships. Security controls: depend on the location of assets and vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities: capabilities offered by a physical/digital object that can be exploited by a malicious agent to harm an asset. Taking into account the topology of an operational environment can radically change the way we identify security concerns for engineering secure systems. Some security concerns, such as vulnerabilities, threats and attacks, can also depend on the locations of human and software agents, who can harm valuable assets placed in their vicinity. Threats can arise from malicious agents while attack vectors represent the possible sequences of actions that can be performed by an agent to harm an asset depending on the topology structure and relationships. Vulnerabilities can be considered as capabilities offered by a physical or digital object, which can be exploited to harm an asset. The current topology state can give an indication of when a vulnerability can be exploited, for example, if an is agent is co-located with the same vulnerable object and has the capability to exploit it.
  11. Threats can arise from malicious agents. Attacks are actions performed by an agent to harm an asset that exploit topology structure and relationships. Security controls: depend on the location of assets and vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities: capabilities offered by a physical/digital object that can be exploited by a malicious agent to harm an asset. Taking into account the topology of an operational environment can radically change the way we identify security concerns for engineering secure systems. Some security concerns, such as vulnerabilities, threats and attacks, can also depend on the locations of human and software agents, who can harm valuable assets placed in their vicinity. Threats can arise from malicious agents while attack vectors represent the possible sequences of actions that can be performed by an agent to harm an asset depending on the topology structure and relationships. Vulnerabilities can be considered as capabilities offered by a physical or digital object, which can be exploited to harm an asset. The current topology state can give an indication of when a vulnerability can be exploited, for example, if an is agent is co-located with the same vulnerable object and has the capability to exploit it.
  12. Threats can arise from malicious agents. Attacks are actions performed by an agent to harm an asset that exploit topology structure and relationships. Security controls: depend on the location of assets and vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities: capabilities offered by a physical/digital object that can be exploited by a malicious agent to harm an asset. Taking into account the topology of an operational environment can radically change the way we identify security concerns for engineering secure systems. Some security concerns, such as vulnerabilities, threats and attacks, can also depend on the locations of human and software agents, who can harm valuable assets placed in their vicinity. Threats can arise from malicious agents while attack vectors represent the possible sequences of actions that can be performed by an agent to harm an asset depending on the topology structure and relationships. Vulnerabilities can be considered as capabilities offered by a physical or digital object, which can be exploited to harm an asset. The current topology state can give an indication of when a vulnerability can be exploited, for example, if an is agent is co-located with the same vulnerable object and has the capability to exploit it.
  13. Threats can arise from malicious agents. Attacks are actions performed by an agent to harm an asset that exploit topology structure and relationships. Security controls: depend on the location of assets and vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities: capabilities offered by a physical/digital object that can be exploited by a malicious agent to harm an asset. Taking into account the topology of an operational environment can radically change the way we identify security concerns for engineering secure systems. Some security concerns, such as vulnerabilities, threats and attacks, can also depend on the locations of human and software agents, who can harm valuable assets placed in their vicinity. Threats can arise from malicious agents while attack vectors represent the possible sequences of actions that can be performed by an agent to harm an asset depending on the topology structure and relationships. Vulnerabilities can be considered as capabilities offered by a physical or digital object, which can be exploited to harm an asset. The current topology state can give an indication of when a vulnerability can be exploited, for example, if an is agent is co-located with the same vulnerable object and has the capability to exploit it.
  14. Threats can arise from malicious agents. Attacks are actions performed by an agent to harm an asset that exploit topology structure and relationships. Security controls: depend on the location of assets and vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities: capabilities offered by a physical/digital object that can be exploited by a malicious agent to harm an asset. Taking into account the topology of an operational environment can radically change the way we identify security concerns for engineering secure systems. Some security concerns, such as vulnerabilities, threats and attacks, can also depend on the locations of human and software agents, who can harm valuable assets placed in their vicinity. Threats can arise from malicious agents while attack vectors represent the possible sequences of actions that can be performed by an agent to harm an asset depending on the topology structure and relationships. Vulnerabilities can be considered as capabilities offered by a physical or digital object, which can be exploited to harm an asset. The current topology state can give an indication of when a vulnerability can be exploited, for example, if an is agent is co-located with the same vulnerable object and has the capability to exploit it.
  15. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  16. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations). Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  17. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  18. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  19. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  20. Labelled Transition System [9] (LTS) is a modelling formalism used to describe systems and their evolution in terms of states and transitions.
  21. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  22. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  23. It is a branching time logic characterised by state and path formulae. State formulae are specified over a set of atomic propositions While path formulae must be satisfied by at least one path or on all paths
  24. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  25. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  26. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.
  27. The Ambient Calculus is a process algebra having a special focus on mobility [6]. An ambient is an abstract entity that can model different elements both in a physical space (e.g., agents and locations) and in a digital space (e.g., programming scopes and variables) [17]. Ambients reside in a hierarchy of locations and form a tree structure that can be dynamically re-configured when they exercise a set of capabilities (actions), such as in , out , and open . In this work, a fragment of the Ambient Calculus is considered where the communication primitives and the open capability are neglected.