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Linux Security Myth

                                Mackenzie Morgan

                                 Ohio LinuxFest 2010


                                11 September 2010




Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)        Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   1 / 35
Introduction


Outline



1     Introduction


2     Vocabulary


3     What can still hurt me?


4     What protection is there?




    Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)       Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   2 / 35
Introduction


Me




     Mackenzie Morgan
     Computer Science student
     Ubuntu Developer
     Kubuntu user
     http://ubuntulinuxtipstricks.blogspot.com ← find slides here




Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)       Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   3 / 35
Introduction


This Talk




     Linux Zealot: Try Linux! It doesn’t get viruses!
     Average Person: No viruses? I’m invincible!




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)       Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   4 / 35
Vocabulary


Outline



1     Introduction


2     Vocabulary


3     What can still hurt me?


4     What protection is there?




    Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   5 / 35
Vocabulary


Malware




Malware (or “badware”) is an umbrella term for viruses, trojans, worms,
rootkits, etc.




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth    11 September 2010   6 / 35
Vocabulary


Virus




Viruses infect individual files. They spread when people share those files.




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth     11 September 2010   7 / 35
Vocabulary


Social Engineering




Social Engineering is tricking people into doing something that is bad for
security.




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth     11 September 2010   8 / 35
Vocabulary


Trojan




Trojans are malware that get installed via social engineering. . . or, well,
lying.
“I’m a fun game and totally safe! but not really, I’m actually going to steal your
passwords. . . ”




  Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)       Linux Security Myth           11 September 2010   9 / 35
Vocabulary


Worm




A worm infects other systems, automatically, usually over a network.




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth    11 September 2010   10 / 35
Vocabulary


Botnet




A botnet is a group of systems infected by malware which operate as a
collective and are controlled by a erm. . . jagoff.




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   11 / 35
Vocabulary


Botnet




A botnet is a group of systems infected by malware which operate as a
collective and are controlled by a erm. . . jagoff.
Yes, I’m from Pittsburgh. How’d you guess?




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   11 / 35
Vocabulary


Rootkit




A rootkit keeps the activities of an unauthorised user hidden so that you
can’t tell your system has been owned.




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth    11 September 2010   12 / 35
Vocabulary


Keylogger




A keylogger tracks everything you type. Yes, including passwords.
It could be hardware (see ThinkGeek), but usually software. There are
legitimate(-ish) uses.




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   13 / 35
Vocabulary


Browser-based Attack


A browser-based attack is any attack that takes place inside the web
browser. They are usually not limited to a specific OS.
Examples:
     Cross-site Scripting (XSS) – using Javascript on one webpage to steal
     data from another
     Tracking cookies – harvests the information stored in your browser by
     other websites
     Cookie jacking – stealing credentials for other websites from your
     browser’s cookies
     Click jacking – hiding clickable objects on a webpage on top of other
     objects so that you’re not clicking what you think you’re clicking



 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth     11 September 2010   14 / 35
Vocabulary


Phishing




Phishing is social engineering aimed at making you believe you are
interacting with someone else whom you trust




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)     Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   15 / 35
What can still hurt me?


Outline



1     Introduction


2     Vocabulary


3     What can still hurt me?


4     What protection is there?




    Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   16 / 35
What can still hurt me?


What’s still a problem?




All of those




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   17 / 35
What can still hurt me?


But what about no viruses?




     Windows ones usually won’t run, even in Wine
     Several hundred for Linux
     Only ∼30 in the wild ever
     No known viruses exploiting current vulnerabilities




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   18 / 35
What can still hurt me?


Email Trojans




“Check out this cool new game! http://example.com/foo.desktop”




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   19 / 35
What can still hurt me?


Untrusted Software




.deb for “screensaver” on gnome-look.org




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   20 / 35
What can still hurt me?


Untrusted Software




.deb for “screensaver” on gnome-look.org
. . . and now you’re on a botnet
http://ubuntuforums.org/showthread.php?t=1349678




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   20 / 35
What can still hurt me?


Browser-based attacks




     Unless only for Internet Explorer
     Firefox? Opera? Chrome?




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   21 / 35
What can still hurt me?


Phishing




There’s no patch for gullibility




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   22 / 35
What can still hurt me?


Rootkits




If any of the previous work, the attacker might install one




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                  Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   23 / 35
What protection is there?


Outline



1     Introduction


2     Vocabulary


3     What can still hurt me?


4     What protection is there?




    Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   24 / 35
What protection is there?


Trusted software sources




     Stick to your distro’s repos
     Otherwise, source directly from upstream
     Avoid non-software in .deb or .rpm format
     Heed warnings about failed signature checks
     Arch Linux does not sign packages




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   25 / 35
What protection is there?


Launchers




You get a .desktop from web/email. . .
Do you know what it’ll run?




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   26 / 35
What protection is there?


Launchers




You get a .desktop from web/email. . .
Do you know what it’ll run?
Could be anything




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   26 / 35
What protection is there?


Launchers in KDE




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   27 / 35
What protection is there?


Launchers in GNOME

Fedora’s & openSUSE’s GNOME:




Ubuntu’s GNOME:




Ubuntu has a policy against “ignore this security warning” buttons


 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   28 / 35
What protection is there?


Browser - Javascript




Use NoScript
Users might not be equipped to know what to allow, but it blocks
cross-site scripting & click-jacking




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   29 / 35
What protection is there?


Browser - Encryption




Don’t send passwords unencrypted!
Lock icon:
Means connection is encrypted and probably no man-in-the-middle
NOT necessarily a sign that all is good!




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   30 / 35
What protection is there?


Browser - Phishing

But how do you know it’s the site it claims to be?
Look at everything before the third slash—that’s the domain




Check out this green thing

 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   31 / 35
What protection is there?


Minimal privileges




Don’t login graphically as root!
Why?
Malware gets full access




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   32 / 35
What protection is there?


Don’t need it? Don’t use it!




Don’t login remotely with command line or push files to it?
Uninstall your SSH and S/FTP servers




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   33 / 35
What protection is there?


Detecting problems



Find rootkits:
     rkhunter
     chkrootkit
Warn of changes:
     tripwire
Warn of attacks:
     snort
These are advanced tools




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   34 / 35
What protection is there?


Questions?




Slides will be posted:
http://ubuntulinuxtipstricks.blogspot.com




 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010)                    Linux Security Myth   11 September 2010   35 / 35

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Linux Security Myth: What Can Still Hurt Me

  • 1. Linux Security Myth Mackenzie Morgan Ohio LinuxFest 2010 11 September 2010 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 1 / 35
  • 2. Introduction Outline 1 Introduction 2 Vocabulary 3 What can still hurt me? 4 What protection is there? Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 2 / 35
  • 3. Introduction Me Mackenzie Morgan Computer Science student Ubuntu Developer Kubuntu user http://ubuntulinuxtipstricks.blogspot.com ← find slides here Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 3 / 35
  • 4. Introduction This Talk Linux Zealot: Try Linux! It doesn’t get viruses! Average Person: No viruses? I’m invincible! Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 4 / 35
  • 5. Vocabulary Outline 1 Introduction 2 Vocabulary 3 What can still hurt me? 4 What protection is there? Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 5 / 35
  • 6. Vocabulary Malware Malware (or “badware”) is an umbrella term for viruses, trojans, worms, rootkits, etc. Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 6 / 35
  • 7. Vocabulary Virus Viruses infect individual files. They spread when people share those files. Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 7 / 35
  • 8. Vocabulary Social Engineering Social Engineering is tricking people into doing something that is bad for security. Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 8 / 35
  • 9. Vocabulary Trojan Trojans are malware that get installed via social engineering. . . or, well, lying. “I’m a fun game and totally safe! but not really, I’m actually going to steal your passwords. . . ” Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 9 / 35
  • 10. Vocabulary Worm A worm infects other systems, automatically, usually over a network. Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 10 / 35
  • 11. Vocabulary Botnet A botnet is a group of systems infected by malware which operate as a collective and are controlled by a erm. . . jagoff. Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 11 / 35
  • 12. Vocabulary Botnet A botnet is a group of systems infected by malware which operate as a collective and are controlled by a erm. . . jagoff. Yes, I’m from Pittsburgh. How’d you guess? Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 11 / 35
  • 13. Vocabulary Rootkit A rootkit keeps the activities of an unauthorised user hidden so that you can’t tell your system has been owned. Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 12 / 35
  • 14. Vocabulary Keylogger A keylogger tracks everything you type. Yes, including passwords. It could be hardware (see ThinkGeek), but usually software. There are legitimate(-ish) uses. Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 13 / 35
  • 15. Vocabulary Browser-based Attack A browser-based attack is any attack that takes place inside the web browser. They are usually not limited to a specific OS. Examples: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) – using Javascript on one webpage to steal data from another Tracking cookies – harvests the information stored in your browser by other websites Cookie jacking – stealing credentials for other websites from your browser’s cookies Click jacking – hiding clickable objects on a webpage on top of other objects so that you’re not clicking what you think you’re clicking Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 14 / 35
  • 16. Vocabulary Phishing Phishing is social engineering aimed at making you believe you are interacting with someone else whom you trust Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 15 / 35
  • 17. What can still hurt me? Outline 1 Introduction 2 Vocabulary 3 What can still hurt me? 4 What protection is there? Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 16 / 35
  • 18. What can still hurt me? What’s still a problem? All of those Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 17 / 35
  • 19. What can still hurt me? But what about no viruses? Windows ones usually won’t run, even in Wine Several hundred for Linux Only ∼30 in the wild ever No known viruses exploiting current vulnerabilities Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 18 / 35
  • 20. What can still hurt me? Email Trojans “Check out this cool new game! http://example.com/foo.desktop” Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 19 / 35
  • 21. What can still hurt me? Untrusted Software .deb for “screensaver” on gnome-look.org Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 20 / 35
  • 22. What can still hurt me? Untrusted Software .deb for “screensaver” on gnome-look.org . . . and now you’re on a botnet http://ubuntuforums.org/showthread.php?t=1349678 Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 20 / 35
  • 23. What can still hurt me? Browser-based attacks Unless only for Internet Explorer Firefox? Opera? Chrome? Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 21 / 35
  • 24. What can still hurt me? Phishing There’s no patch for gullibility Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 22 / 35
  • 25. What can still hurt me? Rootkits If any of the previous work, the attacker might install one Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 23 / 35
  • 26. What protection is there? Outline 1 Introduction 2 Vocabulary 3 What can still hurt me? 4 What protection is there? Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 24 / 35
  • 27. What protection is there? Trusted software sources Stick to your distro’s repos Otherwise, source directly from upstream Avoid non-software in .deb or .rpm format Heed warnings about failed signature checks Arch Linux does not sign packages Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 25 / 35
  • 28. What protection is there? Launchers You get a .desktop from web/email. . . Do you know what it’ll run? Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 26 / 35
  • 29. What protection is there? Launchers You get a .desktop from web/email. . . Do you know what it’ll run? Could be anything Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 26 / 35
  • 30. What protection is there? Launchers in KDE Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 27 / 35
  • 31. What protection is there? Launchers in GNOME Fedora’s & openSUSE’s GNOME: Ubuntu’s GNOME: Ubuntu has a policy against “ignore this security warning” buttons Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 28 / 35
  • 32. What protection is there? Browser - Javascript Use NoScript Users might not be equipped to know what to allow, but it blocks cross-site scripting & click-jacking Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 29 / 35
  • 33. What protection is there? Browser - Encryption Don’t send passwords unencrypted! Lock icon: Means connection is encrypted and probably no man-in-the-middle NOT necessarily a sign that all is good! Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 30 / 35
  • 34. What protection is there? Browser - Phishing But how do you know it’s the site it claims to be? Look at everything before the third slash—that’s the domain Check out this green thing Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 31 / 35
  • 35. What protection is there? Minimal privileges Don’t login graphically as root! Why? Malware gets full access Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 32 / 35
  • 36. What protection is there? Don’t need it? Don’t use it! Don’t login remotely with command line or push files to it? Uninstall your SSH and S/FTP servers Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 33 / 35
  • 37. What protection is there? Detecting problems Find rootkits: rkhunter chkrootkit Warn of changes: tripwire Warn of attacks: snort These are advanced tools Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 34 / 35
  • 38. What protection is there? Questions? Slides will be posted: http://ubuntulinuxtipstricks.blogspot.com Mackenzie Morgan (OLF 2010) Linux Security Myth 11 September 2010 35 / 35