State and civil resistance

State and Civil Resistance

State and Civil Resistance:
A Narrative from Bhutan1

Abstract
The violation of human rights under the aegis of the State has of late become
pervasive on the land; the mass organized resistance like the Long March toward
democracy is fast germinating in the soil. The Amnesty international, Red Cross
Society and Indian print media have also been drawing attention of the world
community towards this resilient Monarchy in the eastern Himalayas. The State is
the vanguard of such a monotonous conception of the nation. It has combined
with utter callousness and contempt shown to the collective memory of the
people. The collective memory is through relevant, and therefore must be kept
alive. It is time to have an alternative reconstruction of the dynamic history of
political unrest, resistance and rebellion of the masses in the country. Moreover,
the event of Long March of the Bhutanese refugees and contemporary stalemate
in the political resolution of the problem are warranted to be narrated.

Key words:

human right, civil resistance, nationalist ideology, national integration, democracy
movement, Nepali, Red Cross Society, state terrorism, Amnesty International, collective
memory, Long March

Introduction
Bhutan is one country in south Asia, which is still falling off the map. Both official as
well as academic literatures fail to cover this country. Peruse an official report, a monograph or
a book on the South Asia! Nothing substantial in terms of the quantitative information and data
pertaining to this country would be traceable at all. Notwithstanding the negligence, the recent
spurt of internal political dynamism in the Shangri-la does quality to be treated as interesting.
The violation of human rights under the aegis of the State has of late become pervasive on the
land; the mass organized resistance like the Long March toward democracy is fast germinating
in the soil. The Amnesty international, Red Cross Society and Indian print media have also been
drawing attention of the world community towards this resilient Monarchy in the eastern
Himalayas.
What attracted, and yet attracts the adventurists, tourist and scientists to this country has been
the dragon motifs, lofty Himalayan mountain ranges and richly diversified reservoir of flora and
fauna. What distinguishes Bhutan as a unique nation today however is the forceful articulation
of a monolithic conception of nation in public parlance. Such a conception is inspired by the
status- quo-ist nationalist ideology. The ideology is explicitly expressed and the associated
worldview communicated to the masses by members of the ruling oligarchy in all public
1

It was originally published in the Journal of Assam University, vol.5, no.1, 2000, with an extended title.

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addresses across the nation. The State is the vanguard of such a monotonous conception of the
nation. This has remained as yet uncovered by the media. The royal proclamations of late have
even required the crazy distortion of the narratives of the social and political history on the one
hand and the forceful promulgation of the so-called official one history on the other. These
have combined with utter callousness and contempt shown to the collective memory of the
people. The collective memory is through relevant, and therefore must be kept alive. It is time
to have an alternative reconstruction of the dynamic history of political unrest, resistance and
rebellion of the masses in the country.
The themes are elaborated, and ensuing claims defended in the present chapter. The mode of
presentation of argument is description; an attempt has been made to develop a descriptive
framework. It is divided into six brief sections. The first section deals with the monolith of
State-ist conception of the nation in the backdrop of hierarchical social set up in the country.
The second section describes the genesis of civil servitude of the masses orchestrated by the
twin medieval institutions of Driglam Namjha and Tsa-Wa-Sum. The third part attempts to
capture the origin of social resistance by narrating the short history of Nepali settlement in the
country. The facets of political unrest of the masses are elaborated in the forth section. The fifth
section evaluates the dynamics and configuration of the State terror. The event of long march of
Bhutanese refugees, and the contemporary stalemate in political resolution of the problem are
reported in the last part of the critical profile.

1.

Stateist Ideology – a Monolith

Bhutan is a very small nation in the eastern Himalaya. It is a landlocked culture pitched
between two giant civilizations of India and China. It is a sovereign hereditary monarchy in the
south Asia. It is a Buddhist agrarian society. It is a mid-way house between the feudal and
capitalist economy. The capitalist institutions and organizations in the sectors of economic
activities have of been encouraged to develop though without allowing for adoption of the
democratic framework of decision making and governance.
The State, polity and society claimed to be integrated in a symbiotic relation in the nation. The
State, since its inception in 1907 in the so-claimed secular and modern form, is actually
pervasive in the life of the nation. The State-ist conception of nation is the core of nationalist
ideology in Bhutan. The national agenda are to attain the Gross National Happiness (GNH),
establish the paternal regulated society and strengthen the drupka version of political
governance in the nation. These agenda help in establishing hegemonic control of civil society
rather than attaining the material prosperity and economic development in a nation which is one
of the poorest and largest foreign aid recipients in Asia.
Development in Bhutan is not judged simply in terms of material wealth. His Majesty the Kind has
stressed that other less quantifiable goals, such as the spiritual and emotional well being of the population,
should receive equal emphasis. His Majesty has also stated that preservation of Bhutan’s cultural heritage
and its rich and varied natural resources are as much a priority as economic development (Planning
Commission, 1995, p.2).

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There is officially only one history, one culture, one language and one social project imposed on
the masses. The State has appropriated for itself the expressions of culture of subordinate
sectors; some part of the latter has been preserved exclusively as museum exhibit at ceremonial
occasions and some incorporated in the officially prescribed customs and traditions albeit in a
limited and selected manner. Moreover, parts of the history and elements of culture have of late
been purposively selected from the past and reconstructed into an ‘invented’ tradition of the
nation. The nationalist official ideology permits the ruling oligarchy to attain the national agenda
through the two core medieval social institutions of Driglam Namjha and Tsa-wa-sum. The core
institutions are centered at maintenance of patron-clientele relations at the level of decentralized
units of society, based on customs and traditions of feudal medieval Bhutan. The power elite
and ruling oligarchy uses these institutions and the invented tradition for the so-called cultural
solidarity programme and national integration policy. The cultural plurality of a heterogeneous
and segmented society has conclusively been underplayed by the State, and the populist
nationalist ideology has recently embarked upon the project of cultural revivalism – a cultural
monolith.
The polity is founded upon hierarchic structures symbolizing the levels of ruthless power and
coercion. Despite attempts to project the façade of formal structures of democratization and
decentralization by the rulers, the political system is basically governed by the despotism of
monarchy in substantive spirit. The political system comprises of the three structures of national
legislative assembly and royal advisory council at Thimpu, the dzongkhags administration at the
district and gup and chimi panchayats at the village settlements level. The structure gives the
glimpse of the façade of decentralized political set up. Actually what is noteworthy is that the
efficacy of gup and chimi panchayats has long gone on the wane, and at present:
There is no formal constitution, but the written rules (which are changed periodically)govern procedures for
the election of members of the Royal Advisory Council (Lodoi Tsode) and the legislature/ National
Assembly (Tshogdu), and defines the duties and powers of those bodies ………………..…. The
peoples’ representatives have their names endorsed at the village assemblies …………………... The
Royal advisory Council is a sort of permanent government department and it is in permanent session
……………….... For administrative purposes, the country is divided into eighteen districts
(Dzongkhags) ………………….. Each district in Bhutan is headed by a chief administrator
(Dzongda) and a person in charge of Judicial matters (Trrimpon) …………………….. The lowest
administration unit in all districts is the bloc (Gewog) of several villages (Dogra, 1990, pp. xiii-xvii).

The philosophy of administrative decentralization of government (without financial
counterpart) is a widely popularized principle, which has been implemented in a few pockets.
The beneficiaries are however a small group of elite only till date.
The civil society is equally pyramidal in power, prestige and status. There are sharp cleavages
between the ruling elite and civil masses. Bhutanese civil masses comprise of three sections of
ethnic population-the drukpa (westerners of Tibetan origin), the scharchopa (easterners of
Indo-Tibetan root) and the Ihotshampa (southerners of Nepali stock). The social configuration
is as such that:
Broadly speaking, the Bhutanese people are composed of three different racial elements: the Mongoloid
and the Indo-Aryans of Assam and upper Burma. The majority of the people in Bhutan are called
Bhutias. They are of Tibetan descent and are also known as the Dragon people (Drukpas). Hindus of
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Nepali origin form 25 to 30 per cent of the population of Bhutan, while some small communities in
eastern Bhutan appear to be related to the hill tribes of Assam (Dogra, 1990, p. xii).

The drukpa is the most privileged and patronized ethnic sect; the Ihotshampa the least
privileged, and rather neglected one by the State machinery. The economic stratification,
continuing since the medieval period, set aside, the racial differences are kept alive by the
machinery of the State in the memory of the populace. The ruling and power elite positions are
occupied by the lyonpo (nominated ministers in the national assembly of the Government), the
dasho (recipients of the red scarf awarded by the kind) and the rabdey (spiritual heads in the
hierarchical structure of religious organization). The druk gyalpo (the hereditary king), the royal
family and the lodrey shogdey (Royal Advisory Council) members stand at the top in power,
status and prestige. The dominant positions give them the edge over value formations in the
society1.
The monarchy has always claimed that there exists a kind of symmetry and symbiosis among
para-institutions of the society. This is however merely a façade. The conflict and tensions are
endemic. This is certainly due to the monotony of civil life and lack of individual freedom.
These in turn are the outcomes of hegemonic relations of the ruling elite with the masses in this
Shangri-la of merely six lakhs population. A highly perceptive travel writer, associated with the
Times, London, has aptly remarked.
I began to detect another strain which has grown more apparent to me the longer I spent in the country:
the fact that the government is more than ready to make all the people’s decisions for them
……………………….…. what he [a top Bhutanese official] neglected to say-protesting so much –
was that the majority of the voters, and even the candidates they choose, were illiterates; that none of the
advisors [Royal Advisory Council members] wanted, or was likely to go against the kind; that in many
respects Bhutan is still in a state of benevolent despotism. The government provides all its people with free
education and health care; in return, however, it feels free to make certain demands of them. All buildings
must be constructed in the traditional style. No school trip may be taken out of the country. No
Bhutanese may study abroad unless he is sponsored by the government. If he is sponsored, he must sign a
pact promising to return to serve the country. And, when returns, he must go through a re-education
programme to remind him of his heritage. Christian churches are banned in Bhutan (Iyer, 1993, pp.
107-8).

What the travel writer probably forgot to mention is that the head of the State, Druk Gyalpo,
does not believe in the family institution of monogamy for himself. The foreign minister of the
country was the biggest landlord, and had held the portfolio for over two decades. The people
did not have quantified knowledge of their own life since there were no precise and reliable
estimates of the aggregate population, sex ratio, age distribution and classification of the
working population in the country. There are severe strictures on the freedom. The television
viewing was banned (in the early years of twenty-first century, the ban was surprisingly lifted).
There were only four movie halls across the country. The wearing of English caps, T-shirts and
trousers at public places were fined. The semi-literate section of the bureaucracy could still
project the nation as the only surviving reservoir of unique culture in the south Asia (Ansari,
1996).
The State sponsored spate of recent political violence, atrocity and brutality against the
Lhotshampa Bhutanese population set aside, the victims of such project of invented traditions
based cultural revivalism is whole civilian sector outside the power and ruling elite in this lonely
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Himalayan kingdom. The individuals are not able to realize their full human potentials in a free
and fair atmosphere. The family and school do work but at the mercy of the State (Ansari,
1998). The community is decaying and community values passed from generation to generation
are vanishing fast under the weight of monolithic nationalism. The State has become over
pervasive and over-arching enough to leave space for any other institutions of the community
and society to perform autonomously.

2.

Civil Servitude - Genesis

The suffocating survival matrix forced upon the civilian masses by the State has been
conducive in strengthening the hegemony of the apparatus of the state. This is the principal
strategy of legitimization under the monarchy. The legitimizations achieved on the basis of the
sound working of the overwhelmingly significant institutions of the driglam namjha and tsa-wasum. These help in sustaining the ethos at the centre of which the social institution of servitude
occupies an important place. The plight of poor, illiterate and unprivileged masses who are
victims of the grand nationalist ideology inspired monolithic practices are undoubtedly evident
to all traveling cross and staying in the country. The orchestration of civil servitude is at its peak
nowadays.
The driglam namjha is a set of manners, etiquette and conduct to be observed at public occasions
and parlance. It originated in the medieval period during Shabdrung Nwang Namggyel’s rule in
Bhutan. The Shabdrung initiated the process of political and administrative unification of the
county in the thirteenth century. It was accomplished through the twin strategies of
constructing defended monastic palaces-cum-fortresses at strategic locations for better
administrative governance, and implementing the driglam namjha codes to strengthen the
equation of super-ordination and subordination between the ruling class and the masses in
medieval Bhutan.
The legacy continues till today. It was herded down to the present generation through basically
oral tradition and therefore as modified codes of conduct. There were many additions made to
it by the local village headmen and dashos from time to time. It requires today on the part of socalled inferior people, comprising of peasantry, artisans and urban shop-keepers and traders,
facing the superior status citizens to follow a full three part prostration of body with the white
silken scarf (resting on the shoulder) touching the ground. One has to give un-obstructive pass
by cornering oneself to either side of the path way in the prostrating position. The wishes are
expressed by taking one step forward followed by two steps backward with hands wide open in
the same position of prostration. The dialogue is to be conducted with prior permission only
(sought through a suitable mediator) in the standing position with head bowed down, eyes
looking at the ground and statements uttered slowly in almost whispering tone and laden with
praise worthy adjectives and ornamental phrases. No element of criticism about any aspect of
life of the superior status person is permissible. The masses have to fail in the line for feast only
after the reversed person has finished roughly quarter of his food in the plate. The honourable
citizen maintains a straight standing position with head high, chest wide open and hands closed
on the back or comfortable sitting position with head high, chest wide open and hands closed
on the back or comfortable sitting position on a chair of certain exclusivity. The status is

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determined on the basis of bureaucratic rank or spiritual position in the hierarchy, with the
former presently occupying a more dominant criterion.
The Tsa-wa-sum is an official slogan emanating from the hard core of the nationalist ideology
of unbridled loyalty to the king and patriotism demanded from the masses for the sake of
national unity and integrity of the county. It is a modern weapon having its origin in the
invented tradition and custom of the nation. It is a highly evasive and slippery concept. The
literal meaning of the terminology is ‘King, Country and People’. It actually refers simply to the
faith in patriotism. In essence, it however works as a device to protect the hegemony of the
state machinery. It serves to indoctrinate the masses as well. The national policies, programmes
and directives issued by the government are all justified to be in accordance with the guiding
principles of tsa-wa-sum. The free of cost labour services to be performed by each and every
household annually under different categories like the goongda-woola, dzongsey-woola and
sapto-lemi (all indigenous Bhutanese terminologies) are declared compulsory in the name of this
nationalist slogan.
Under the goongda-woola, at least one member aged seventeen years or above from each
household (principally rural household) is annually recruited by the village headman to work for
15 days to repair and construct the district head-quarter dzongs, monasteries and connecting
feeder roads at the government prescribed wage rate of Rs. 15.00 for male and Rs.13.00 for
female. The dzongsey-woola requires a member of each household to work on seasonal
maintenance of dzongs twice a year at the wage rate of Rs. 7.00 for male and Rs. 6.00 for female
for unspecified period till the work is completed. The household individuals are recruited by the
village headman for so-called ‘service-oriented projects’ inside the villages on the reward of
‘certificates’ only under sapto-lemi. It is worth remembering that all these labour services are
compulsory; the failures to perform shaptolemi, for example, is fined at Rs. 24.00 per day to Rs.
35.0 per day per household, varying from areas to areas in the country (ILO, 1991).
The scope of control emanating from these institutions have of late been widened to such an
extent that a critical outlook and appreciation of the unique concept formulated by the King
called ‘Gross National Happiness’ is equally declared to be violation of the tsa-wa-sum.
Nowhere in the world is such a concept being coined and used. It is a completely alien concept
to both the western as well as oriental mind. However, no critical discussion on it is permitted.
The sound working of these institutions combined with the nationalist ideology of maintaining a
paternalistic regulated society has simply meant that the freedom of civilian population is
causality. The feudal lords of the yesteryears are the business magnets and political barons
today, the ordinary citizenry are bonded and their voices scuttled.

3.

Social Resistance - Origin

Bhutan is a monarchy; it is not at all a democratic set-up. The system could have worked
for long without the lubricants provided by the democratic aspirations and ideas. The state of
affairs is however not as such at present. It is true that the evaluative criteria of democratic
values, principles and practices can probably not be applied to judge the performance of the
system. The notion of freedom is however hot bound with the particular nature of political
system. The performance on this criterion has been rather highly disappointing in the country.
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That is one of the reason that masses could not keep themselves aloof, a civilian resistance has
built up over the last two decades2. The origin is of course to be traced back far in the history of
settlement and citizenship.
The Lhotshampa immigration in the southern Duars on the border of Assam and Bhutan,
presently located on the Indian side, had started well back in the nineteenth century, according
to the oral tradition. These immigrants of the Nepali ethnic origin had settled initially as
‘tangyas’ (forest labourers), and later on, as family labour-based households3 in the areas
presently demarcated as Samchi district and gradually in Chirang, Sarbhang, Geylegphug and
parts of Samdrup Jongkhar district in Bhutan in order of sequence. They were very popular with
the Drukpas. The then most powerful ponlop (the monastic title of the provincial governor
under Deb Rajah of Bhutan), the Tongsa Ponlop, gave urgent responsibility to then Bhutan
agent in India, Kazi Dorji, to recruit more Napalis for timber extraction works in the dense
tropical forests in southern foothills of the country (MHA, 1993, p.3). The event of formal
invitation set the trend of immigration and settlement at a fast track which continued till 1950s.
The Nepalis were then conferred Bhutanese citizenship under the Nationality Law of Bhutan,
1958, it was one of the positive achievements of the political agitation in the southern Bhutan
carried out by the Nepali segment of population during 1952-54. Any further settler
immigration of Nepalis in the country was henceforth banned, particularly since 1959. The story
of settlement seemed to he ending there with the Lhotshampas establishing themselves. They
had started following the Government- prescribed norms of co-operative peaceful coexistence
as Law and tradition abiding citizens fulfilling the pledges, reflected in the Resolution No. 8 of
the 13th session of the National Assembly passed in 1959 (MHA, 1993, p.37). In other words,
they had also surrendered themselves to the life under civil servitude engineered by the twin
institutions of driglam namzha and tsa-wa-sum.
The developments were however bound to occur over three decades down the line. First,
despite best efforts on part of the Nepalese to internalize the social ethos based on Drukpa
Budhist customs and tradition, the Nepali ethnic culture remained resilient enough to evoke
fears among the ruling elite; the Lhostshampa’s little tradition survived. Second, the population
of southern Bhutan increased phenomenally; the production of orange fruit and its export to
Bangladesh expanded; and, the Nepali inhabited south excelled in regional economic prosperity.
Third, an elite section was born who started thriving to have a share in political power and
governance. These developments were however not acceptable to an anti-Nepali vested interest
group within the ruling Drukpa oligarchy.
A well devised national integration policy was invented; three crucial issues of so-called national
importance were raised to be resolved in the mid-1980s. These issues related to the citizenship,
human population census and national dress code. First, the Bhutan Citizenship Act was passed
in 1985. It offered tremendous opportunity to the royal Government. It enabled the
government to check not only the citizenship and naturalization procedures for immigrants but
also subsequently order deportation. The deportation provision affected mainly Lhotshampas of
the South. An interesting dimension is worth quoting:
A foreign woman who marries a Bhutanese man must wait fifteen years to gain Bhutanese Citizenship.
A Bhutanese woman who marries a foreign man immediately losses all her rights. The Bhutanese love
their country and just in case they don’t the government reminds them that they must (Iyer, 1993, p.
108).
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Moreover, the Act provided for the cassation of instruction in Napali language in the schools.
Such a ‘crassly insensitive’ provision amounted to ‘closing the stable door after the horse was
bolted’ (Griffin, 1995, p.87). In both letter and spirit, the Act was too hard to bear with for the
Lhotshampas in particular.
Second, demographic sample survey was undertaken in 1984. It was followed by the
comprehensive human population Census, first of its kind, in 1988. In many respects, it
departed from the methodology adopted in the partial Census of 1980. For example, in the
southern Bhutan, a conscious attempt on the part of census operation agents to advance the
enumeration work in arbitrary fashion was detected. Quite a significant size of the Lhotshampa
households was being missed from enumeration deliberately by the agents. The citizenship card
held by many Lhotshampas were declared fake and invalid4. The Government subsequently
ordered the several thousand people to leave the country, Since they were discovered to b ‘nonnationals’ on the basis of 1988 Census; the latter supposedly utilized the criteria laid down under
the Bhutan Citizenship Act of 1985.
Thirdly, the Government announced the most urgent agenda of its ‘invented’ tradition in the
name of national integration policy. It made legally binding for all citizens to speak Dzongkha as
national language and wear man’s Khoh and women’s Kira as national dress in all public places.
This was virtually amounting to adding fuel to the summering fire. A pertinent point to note in
this regard is that:
Though the Bhutanese national dress gives a distinct identity to its citizens and is very comfortable for
mountainous living, it is extremely difficult to wear in the South (especially during summers) which
experiences a subtropical hot and humid climate. While the wards of the rich people violate the dress
norms right in the national capital. Thimpu (a fact which was admitted in Bhutan’s national English
weekly, Kuensel), and tampering with the dress in the South, especially by the Napali-speaking, would
invite severe penal measures (Ramachandriaih, 1994. p. 1818).

The state succeeded in re-establishing the hegemony over the Lhotshampa masses for sometime
with these crass measures. The initial reaction of the Lhotshampa Bhutanese citizens was to flee
away to avoid social harassment, economic deprivation and erosion of their ethnicity. They
started to take shelter in the neighboring countries of Nepal and India. The refugee camps up in
these countries.

4.

Political Unrest – Facets

The Lhotshampas wanted to stay back with dignity. The choice of out migration under
distress was compelled upon the Lhotshampas and other Tibetan ethnic people in Bhutan as
exemplified by the recent political history. The passivity of people was of course not warranted
under the situation. The refugee camps facilitated the formation of associations, organizations
and parties. The political demonstrations were organized. This marked the beginning of the
social resistance turning into political turmoil inside Bhutan, however.
Mr. Tek Nath Rizal, whose immediate unconditional release from detention was recommended
on the basis of him being found the prisoner of conscience by the Amnesty International,
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London, way back in 1993, and presently appealed for by the Appeal Movement Co-ordination
Council, Nepal, was a southern Bhutanese member of the Lodery Tshogdey (Royal Advisory
Council) during the last quarter of 1980s. He wrote about the phenomenon of arbitrariness
resorted by the Census 1988 officials and agents in the southern Bhutan to the King. He was
expelled within months from Bhutan. He had to resort to distress-outmigration to Nepal, where
he subsequently engaged himself in advocating the cause during the short period of exile. He
also started publication of leaflets and booklets voicing his opinion and ideas, including the
publication of the famous piece titled “Bhutan: We want Justice”. The Amnesty International
Report of December, 1992 did not find anything in the latter publication that might contain
threats of armed uprising against the State of Bhutan or the advocacy of violence on the land
(A1, 1992, P.9). Still, the rules in Bhutan got the deportation order passed. He along-with 45
other activists, was later arrested in the land of Nepal and handed over to the Bhutanese
authority in November 1989. He was kept in shackles for nearly 20 months at Wangdiphodrang,
Bhutan, and subsequently, shifted from there. Despite frequent requests made by the Amnesty
International, his place of detention is yet not disclosed by the authority. He has been detained
by the Government till date without charge, trial and access to legal counsel. His wife was
permitted once to meet him; otherwise, no relatives have ever been allowed to meet him.
The detention and confinement of Mr. Rizal and other political asylum-seekers further
convinced the people of the necessity not only to stay back but also struggle for the just and
dignified existence inside the country. Mr. Rizal, while in exile, had already helped mobilization
of the deserted Lhotshampa Bhutanese, and contributed to the formation of the People’s
Forum for Human Rights at Kakarbhita in Nepal of 7th July 1989. The spirit was carried
forward and further facilitated by the formation of the Bhutan’s People Party at Garganda in
India in June 1990. The avowed express objectives of the party was declared to be the evolution
of parliamentary form of government, stoppage of violation of human rights and establishment
of independent judiciary in Bhutan. The fleeing swamp of people launched the Bhutan National
Democratic Party in February 1992 in Kathmandu in Nepal. These were the spontaneously
undertaken tactical steps in organizing the refugee settlers in Nepal camps as political pressure
group.
The political upheaval was manifested inside the country also. A series of public protest
demonstration as part of the collective self-ascertain were organized, supposedly under banner
of the Party, in different parts of the Southern Bhutan during 17 th September to 16th October,
1990. In Samchi district alone, 4000 people were estimated to be to be the participants in the
demonstration. The Royal Bhutan Army and Police were deputed to deal with the
demonstrators; they came heavy on the latter immediately. The arrests were made. The school
and hospitals in the southern Bhutan were turned into detention cells. Then came the Statedirected violence of all sorts. The State directed control as well as violence picked up as the time
went by. A leading international publication has summarized the political affairs in the following
way:
Bhutan’s politics in the 1990s have been characterized by ethnic unrest in the Southern region of the
country. Bhutan’s large Nepalese population (roughly half the population) joined by disaffected Bhutanese
elements, began to protest against what they regarded unreasonable domination by the Buddhist Drukpa
or indigenous Bhutanese. At the centre of dispute lay the Nepalese perception not entirely unjustified that
official Bhutanese policy envisaged the adoption of a Buddhist dominated Dzongkha (speaking culture).

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Tension was increased by the Nepalese community’s lack of voting and political rights, although many of
them were either born in Bhutan or had spent most of their lives in the country (Griffin, 1995, p.87).

5. State Terrorism – Dynamics
The monarchical state has got more alarmed since 1990. It has intensified the coercion
and terror which has not remained confined to police and army actions. The state machinery
has initiated several measures to redefine and further defend the status-quo, and alienate the
aspirants of democracy. A multi-pronged strategy has been devised. First, the systematic official
campaign has started which asserts that
Historical documents, including British records, do not report on the presence of any Nepalis in Bhutan
until the beginning of the twentieth century (MHA, 193, p.3).

In other words, the Nepali-Bhutanese have been declared to have migrated to Bhutan
‘uninvited’. The so-called authentic papers and historical documents, whatsoever if these really
exist, are however never cited. The British records on marauding raider and violent blackmailer
Drukpa Bhutanese visiting duar areas of Indo-Bhutan boarder, presently in Assam (Pemberton,
1835; Unauthored, 1991-1992), are on the other hand suppressed.
Second, the Nepalis who could not be declared illegal migrants have unfailingly been made
victims of human rights violation by the State machinery. There were instances whereby the
funeral processions of Nepali people were being stopped in the way, and forced to perform the
last rites according to the dominant Buddhist customs in the post-190 political demonstration
era in Bhutan. The Brahmin Nepalese had been forced to wear the dresses of Lamas, Buddhist
monks. The elderly ladies been forced to cut their long hairs since the social customs and mores
of life of the Drukpa sect did not permit it. The ornaments of young females-so dear to
Lhotshampa women-were forcibly removed from their bodies. The vermilions from the
forehead were washed away forcibly. In other words, there had been various dimensions of
encroachment of human rights in the country notwithstanding the changing ‘forms of denial
from the King’ advertised from time to time (Mukherjee, 1996). According to the testimonies
gathered by the Amnesty International (1992) from the Lhotshampa Bhutanese in the refugee
camps of Nepal, the police and army personnel’s had continuously been committing atrocities in
Bhutan. The familiar mode of tortures had been raping the women, beating the men and
forcibly evicting the households of civilians by taking them under custody without charges since
1990. Thousands of Nepali speaking people was arrested under unfounded charges of suspected
involvement in the activities harmful to the government policy of national integration. Many
detained women died later as a result of rapes and gang rapes by the militia; a few became
pregnant and ultimately mother of unwanted babies. Men were tortured, and threatened with
dire consequences in case of failure to leave the country at once. The detained people were
given inadequate diets, and kept under the unhygienic conditions of the jail. Their deaths in
custody are not reported to their relatives.
The Amnesty International Report also brings to light the case-study of one Mr. H P Sapkota:
he was arrested in Assam and handed over the Bhutanese authority in September, 1990 and died
in January 1992 due to malnutrition and poor prison conditions, but the death was never
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reported to his relatives. Many prisoners have died in the course of time due to illness like
malaria, dysentery and diarrhea. The convicts used to be kept under shackles till mid-1992.
Despite serious requests made by the Amnesty International, the delegation was neither
permitted to visit the places of detention in the country nor were they allowed to watch any
judicial proceedings of the High Count of Bhutan against the convicts on the plea of
unacceptability by the officials and people of Bhutan. The Amnesty International Report finds
the violations of the International Human Rights standard rampant in Bhutan.
Third, the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and India are declared to be possessing fake Bhutanese
Citizenship Identity cards. The Lhotshampa in Bhutan occupying important civil servant
positions are implicated in financial embezzlement. And, those Nepalis who want to join the
mainstream of the nation are pushed to the police stations to acquire No Objection Certificates.
The Bhutanese officials’ position circulate through print media as well as oral discourse is that
the Bhutanese Citizenship Identity cards were printed in the commercial press in Calcutta in a
great haste4, and henceforth the possibility of duplication of cards can not be ruled out (MHA,
1993). The implication is that a large number of Lhotshampa Bhutanese taking refuge in Nepal
is holding this fake identity card. Many Lhotshampa civil servants have been implicated in
financial embezzlement, either after outmigration from the country or just before, to tarnish the
image among other officials. The requirement of getting a No Objection Certificate from the
police station to be eligible for admission in the institutions of higher learning from class X
onward and seek a job in the country has been introduced as a strict rule since 1991. It is the
Lhotshampa students, who end up not getting an NOC under the prevailing situations in the
country. There has been substantial decline in the enrolment of Nepali students, who have
already been deprived of taking Lhotshampa as optional language in schools, in the Sherubtse
College over the years. To quote an observation:
During my two year’s stay at Sherubtse College, Kanglung (affiliated to India’s Delhi University and the
only degree College in Bhutan) as a Lecturer during 1991-93, I was a witness o a substantial decline in
the intake of Nepali-speaking students due to this stipulation of NOC. There were several students who
were summoned, in the middle of the academic year or during exams, by the census authorities and told to
leave the country. The discrimination is much worse in giving the jobs (Ramachandraiah, 1994,
p.1818).

Fourth, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Thimpu, has started publishing booklets periodically,
with colored photographs and prints inside. The literature accuses the Lhotshampa Bhutanese
dissidents as anti-national and terrorists responsible for peace-less-ness in the nation. All
activities in the southern Bhutan are periodically attributed to the Lhotshampa Bhutanese
refugees in Nepal. The ministry declares that 40 rapes, 58 murders in 211 kidnaps had been
committed by the anti-national terrorist, who comes from the refugee camps in Nepal to
Bhutan occasionally, till 5th June, 1993. The coloured photographs of the victims of violence of
all sorts are published to arouse the sentiments of people against the Nepali Bhutanese – the socalled anti-national terrorists. One such publication is titled ‘The Southern Bhutan Problem:
Threat to Nation’s Survival’ and other titled ‘A Brief Pictorial Summery of the Terrorists
Activities in Southern Bhutan’, both published in the first half of 1993. The literature is
especially distributed in the schools and other educational institutions. It asserts with confidence
that the so-called anti-nationals always come from the refugee camps in Nepal to Bhutan. Such
propaganda is however not backed by any kind of reasonable evidence in the literature
circulated by the Ministry. It is further worth remembering that these publications have come to
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arouse the sentiments of youth population in the school and educational institutions, and have
only become permanent feature after the submission of Amnesty International Report on
Bhutan in December, 1992.
Last, a government weekly newspaper and the only newspaper (or call it a news magazine) in the
country, the Kuensel, has continuously been engaged in the divine task of reporting unfailingly
almost all kinds of violence and criminal activities of individuals or groups in the southern
Bhutan by attributing these to Ngolops (anti-nationals) and terrorists without publishing any
legal evidence or otherwise of the political motivations behind the acts. The editor of Kuensel
once argued with an interviewer that the paper did not publicise the southern Bhutanese
problems throughout the late eighties because it feared a serious ethnic rift; the paper started
publishing news stories on the anti-government protests when these acquired the dimensions of
serious violence (Rhodes, 1995, p.41). Is there anybody to digest the logic of such morality of a
mass media? The fact is that paper started doing so since only 1991 on a warpath. It was the
time the government had already controlled successfully the demonstrations and unrest. The
purpose of mass media news was merely to consolidate the position of the government.
Such a multi-pronged strategy, centered at the operational method of curbing violence with
violence, has continuously been misfiring. The demand for democracy has become rather
widespread. The orchestration of civil servitude through the social institutions of driglam
namjha and tsa-wa-sum had been adding fuel to the simmering fire. The strategy of counter to
the social resistance by the political unrest among the civilian masses with the state terrorism
has brought the fire almost in the open.

6. Present Stalemate - Long March
The dynamic situation of unrest has arrived at a dead end where neither the monarchy is
ready to voluntarily dismantle the political system in favour of democracy nor the refugees have
been left with any other option than intensified struggles to return home with safety and dignity.
India being the Big Brother in the south Asia could have agree to mediate; the appeal for
mediation has been raised from the quarters of both the refugees as well as royal establishment.
The Big Brother however has chosen to remain neutral – calling the issue of settlement of
refugees a bilateral one between Nepal and Bhutan5. Such a stand on part of India is reason
enough to further cement the stalemate.
The stalemate was in retrospect triggered by three crucial developments in succession. First, the
voice of dissent spearheaded by an ethnic minority of Lhotshampa of south Bhutan, with the
newly emerging tacit support of Scharchopa of eastern Bhutan has recently taken the form of a
Long March from Nepal to Bhutan’s capital, Thimpu. It began on 14 th January 1996. It was
organized by the Appeal Movement Coordinating Council (AMCC) on behalf of more than
70,000 ‘Lhotshampa Bhutanese’. The refugees were surviving a life of miserable dislocations in the
five camps located in districts of Jhapa and Morang in the eastern Nepal under the humanitarian
assistance of food and shelter regularly donated by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). The March was morally backed by the Support Organization for
Bhutanese Refugees (SOBR) and various other India groups. It aimed at pleading the State to
end the widespread gross violation of human rights, make arrangements conductive for the
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repatriation of Bhutanese refugees and release Mr. Tek Nath Rizal (Pradhan, 1995). However,
the proposed rallies, meetings and March were banned by the Indian government. Many of
them were detained by the Indian Police in the month of January and again in June in 1996 to
thwart their efforts to reach to Thimpu via West Bengal districts (Nagchaudhury, 1996). The
interception by the Indian police on the border continued throughout 19955. The peace
marchers had refused to furnish bail and instead had lodged petitions in the High Court for
quashing the proceedings against them. Moreover, Mr. Dorji, who is the chairperson of the
United Front for Democracy in Bhutan, was assessed by the Indian security personal on 18th
April 1997 in New Delhi, on the request of Bhutanese government for deportation (Dhakal,
1997). Dorji was sought by Bhutan on charges of financial irregularities and sedition. A special
aircraft of the Royal Bhutanese Airline arrived in Delhi to carry back the rebel leader. His
extradition proceedings went to the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court gave release order
of R K Dorji (SCs, 18th, 20th and 30th May, 1997). These developments meant that the next
phase of the long march has been put in abeyance.
Second, His Majesty the Kind and Dasho Jigme Thinley, the UN permanent representative,
have for a long time maintained liberal positions intact during the proceeding of the various
National Assembly Sessions since the days of unrest in the Southern Bhutan as the perusal of
National Assembly Resolutions brings the fact to light Till December, 1992, almost
approximately 1500 political prisoners had been granted amnesty by the King-unbelievable
though very true (AI, 1992, p. 23). A small passage from the interview of the present King
conducted by an Indian journalist showed his liberal political stand pursued in the beginning of
the 1999s. It is worth-quoting:
Bhutan is too small a country to be divided. The one nation and one people concept is essential for
survival of Bhutan. But, I am sorry to say that some of the things we did to implement this have been
unfortunate. We meant well, but these did not have a very god impact (Sen, 1990, pp.27-8).

The liberal position of the king did evaporate by mid-1090s, however. He was gripped by the
fear psychosis, more so inflated by the sway of reactionary elements in the government. To
quote a finding:
The fear uppermost in the mind of King Jigme Singye Wangchuk is that this dissident movement might snowball
into an anti-monarchy agitation in near future and the involvement of the CPM [Communist Party of India
(Marxist)] in looking after the welfare of the refugees in different camps in North Bengal has added fuel to his
suspicion (Mukherjee, 1996, p.18).

He consequently started a well thought out diplomatic mission to counter the democratic
movement. He invited the Chief Minister of West Bengal to Bhutan. He visited India quite a
few times. He tried to put the ball in the Indian court. Another passage from the personal
interview of the King conducted recently is again worth quoting:
There is something for India to worry about. The Indian government is aware of the situation. Everyday
hundred of Nepalis are trekking into India in search of livelihood ………………….… Thousand
have found a home in the Kalimpong, Darjeeling, the Dooars and Assam ………………….. All
these people one day will agitate for statehood …………………….... the game plan for a Greater
Nepal is gaining a momentum everyday (Bhanumathy, 1996, p.16).

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Come June 1998. He changed the track of strategy. The proposal to have a Constitution of the
country was then introduced for discussions. It was promised that people’s participation
indecision making would increase. He replaced a few old ministers with new ones and promised
that there would be devolution of power. The Royal Advisory Council and 22 members cabinet
was proposed to be dismantled. The national assembly of Bhutan had been urged to pass the
provisions for replacement of the king by majority voting (AIR, 5th July, 1998). Was it a move
toward democratization? The Chairman, United Democratic Front of Bhutan, Mr. Penjore,
however opined that the so-called democratic reforms brought about by the kind were a
deception. It was a faux pass to impress the world Community. Actually, the kind has
strengthened the safety net and security around himself by appointing his royal relatives as
ministers in important positions. No Nepali had been appointed as the ministers. The kind
should organize an impartial and fair election in the country, according to the UDFB (BBC
News, 9th July, 1998). In short, the royal establishments have to sound convincing, and see
credentiality brought back in committed actions.
Third, India has an open border with Bhutan. The Indo-Bhutan treaty of 1949 provided for the
free movement of Bhutanese inside India. The Bhutanese refugees were granted 80 kms access
to India territory in the beginning of 1990s. Given the privilege of free passage, 40,000 refugees
entered India eight years ago (SC, 4 June, 1997). Again, following improvements in Indo-Bangla
ties, the United Liberation Front of Assam militants hiding in the training camps in Bangladesh
left this base and crossed to Bhutan. The ULFA militants have recently cemented ties with and
extended helping hand to the UDFB activist rebels (SC, May, June and July, 1997). Moreover,
Bhutan emerged to be a conduit in the trade of Indian rhinoceros horns. The fact came to light
to light when the Taiwanese authority arrested Mr. Deiky Wangchuk, the aunt of the Kind of
Bhutan, on entry with a consignment of nine bear gall bladders and twenty two rhino horns
worth $ 769,000 in 1993 (SC, 26 June, 1997).
Under such circumstance, India stopped the passage of refugees via Indian territory. Moreover,
around two thousand Bhutan army is being trained by the Indian army for joint operations
against ULFA camps inside Bhutan (SC, 29 June, 1997). The prime minister of India, Mr. I K
Gujral, has categorically announced that India is not involved in the refugee issue of Bhutan.
Notwithstanding the official perception in the Indian bureaucracy, the fact remains that the
stalemate can not be broken without the Indian involvement.

Conclusion
It is in the backdrop of alternative reconstruction of the narratives of historical
development of political affairs and civil life under the monarchical state in Bhutan that the
violent appeals to the single, homogenous and emancipatory tradition and culture made by the
ruling oligarchy of Dashos, Lyonpos and Rabdeys in order to re-establish the hegemony of
repressive instruments of the State is to be analysed, conceived and understood. The
background also serves to evaluate the recently proposed Long March undertaken by the
Lhotshampa Bhutanese refugees and their supporter and sympathizers in Nepal and India.
Unless India comes forward to amicably solve the political turmoil in Bhutan neither the
Nepalis would have a life of safety nor Bhutan as a nation would come on the world map in
perceptible way. Will the liberation and emancipation come? When? How? The only feasible
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answer may be: Let the history unfold itself in Bhutan. The proposed Long March is probably a
provocation to the history to unfold itself positively on a fast track of events.

Notes:
1. Such a time-tested strategy of legitimization under the Wangchuk dynasty in Bhutan had become

inevitable with the downfall of the Chhogyal monarchy in neighbouring Sikkim in the mid
1970s. The ruling elite in Bhutan do not wish to open scope for the masses to ask ‘one-menone-vote’ system of democracy – a prototype of what was a battle-cry in Sikkim in 1973. Again,
the fear is from the Nepali section of population. This is why one often comes across the
interesting biased interpretations of downfall of the Lepcha-Bhutia dominated (Kagupa sect)
Buddhist Kingdom in Sikkim, obsessively furnished by the dashos in Bhutan-probably as part of
the political lesson-learning exercises.

2. In a country where group representation is forbidden and every act of common people

representation is forbidden and every act of common people is treated a violation of driglam
namzha and tsa-wa-sum, such a massive demonstration was unique, undoubtedly, reflection of
too deep a resentment. The irony is however that the government press itself informed the
world community that there had been civil and political unrest in South Bhutan. See MHA
(1993).

3. The government publications in Bhutan boast of self-sufficiency of farming households in the

medieval period in the country. The characterization of Nepali households as self-sufficient
family-labour-based form units by the author is therefore deduced from that literature.

4. Bhutan is commercially highly dependent upon Calcutta in India. A section of ruling elite, who

are often termed as pro-China anti-India pressure group, is highly critical of this dependence.
Such an argument about the possibility of fake presses in India is the master-mind work of this
group, apart from anti-Nepali vested in the government.

5. A series of news items was covered by the Indian print media. See Special Correspondent
(1996a), Special Correspondent (1996b), Special Correspondent (1996c), Express News Service
(1996) and Nagchoudhury (1996).

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References
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Ansari, Mahmood (1996), ‘Fire Breathing Dragon’, The Telegraph, 27th February
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Bhanumathy, K.P. (1996), ‘Problem of Greater Nepal: Rumblings in Bhutan’, The Mainstrem, vol. -34, no.
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