1. Arming The Iraqi Security Forces
A number of countries, including the United States, Iran and Russia, have sent weapons and
State. However, the jury is still out on whether the strategy has had any real impact when it comes
to stemming the advance of ISIS.
By Matthew Hedges
T
he threat posed by the self-
named Islamic State (IS/ISIL/
ISIS, Daesh) was made evidently
clear in the summer of 2014 when the
group took control of large areas of
Iraq, moving troops close to the capital
Baghdad and the borders with Jordan
and Saudi Arabia. The incompetence of
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which
were trained and supervised by the
US military and a number of coalition
partners at a high cost (conservative
gures estimate the cost of training
totaled $25 billion), was alarming for
many. The Obama regime lacks a
long-term strategy for Iraq, as it toys
with policy decisions that are both short
sighted and encumbered by sectarian
politics in Iraq. This has allowed Iran
and ussia to e pand their in uence in
Iraq by aiding the al-Abadi regime in the
ght against ISIS.
THE US ROLE IN MODERNISING ISF
Following the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein, the United States implemented
the Coalition Military Assistance
IRAQI ARMY SOLDIERS WAIT TO QUALIFY WITH THEIR AK-47 RIFLES AT CAMP TAJI, IRAQ
(ALL PHOTOS BY US AIR FORCE SENIOR AIRMAN JAMES RICHARDSON)
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Training Team in a bid to recreate
the Iraqi Armed Forces and create an
institution capable of defending the
state from internal and external threats.
From the outset, sectarianism plagued
the development of both Iraqi society
and the ISF. Hussein’s Sunni-dominated
government and military subjugated the
Shi’a majority, and under the in uence
of Iran, Shi’a forces rose up to retaliate
for years of perceived oppression.
Backed by the former al-Maliki regime,
the Shi’a militias resurged in strength
and could, in effect, replace the largely
inef cient ISF.
The Iraqi Sunni population and
the Gulf Cooperation Council states
perceive the al-Abadi regime to have
taken a similar policy route to that of
al-Maliki. He had made attempts to
calm apprehensions about Shi’a-led
governance. His work was nearly
wholly undone in a single swoop
when the Iraqi military announced
the recent ISIS counter attack,
“Operation Labaik ya Hussein,” which
had sectarian connotations due to the
term’s heightened importance to Shi’a
Muslims, and stressed the already
fragile factional dynamics in Iraq.
The United States has made attempts
to assist Iraq in its defence against
ISIS. However, they have increasingly
become concerned about both the
ISF’s inability to counter ISIS and the
increasing in uence of Iran in Iraq. In
the summer of 2014, US Congress
approved a donation of $700 million
dollars worth of military aid, including
,000 Hell re missiles to combat what
turned out to be a successful assault
into Iraq by ISIS. Part of this deal
was the potential donation of up to
24 Boeing AH-64 Apache gunships.
This was later scrapped with American
Apache’s launching sorties against ISIS
on the Iraqi government’s behalf.
In 2011, Iraq ordered 18 American
made F-16s, with an option to order
another 18. Iraqi pilots were trained
to y the F-16s in the United States,
but with the deteriorating security
situation in Iraq, the United States
was reluctant to hand over the combat
aircraft. However, in a show of faith and
con dence, the rst four F-16s were
delivered to Iraq on the 13 July 2015.
In addition to these, the Iraqi’s have a
AN IRAQI ARMY SOLDIER CLEARS HIS AK-47 RIFLE DURING A WEAPONS QUALIFICATION AT CAMP TAJI, IRAQ

3. 30
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$790 million dollar deal in place for 24
AT-6C Texan IIs. Whilst these aircraft
expand Iraqi capabilities, they are
restricted to using dated armaments
such as the Paveway series laser-
guided bombs, the AGM-65 Maverick,
AIM-9L/M Sidewinder and the AIM-7M
Sparrow, which suggests continued
apprehension on the part of the United
States when it comes to ISF capabilities
and Iraqi foreign policy. In addition, the
United States has expanded Iraq’s ISR
capabilities by agreeing the $27 million
sale of the King Air 350 and a further
$90 million for seven aerostats and 14
rapid aerostat initial deployment towers.
Since the ISIS advance into Iraq, the
Obama-led administration has been
apprehensive about supporting the al-
Abadi regime in its battle against ISIS,
instead favouring to directly support
other regional allies such as Jordan.
US Central Command (CENTCOM)
has opted to position itself in Northern
Jordan rather than Iraq, which indicates
its uncertainty towards Iraq’s military
capabilities. There has, however, been
a gradual increase in training and
advisory support to Iraq. This has led to
the expansion of an American presence
in Iraq where it now operates out of ve
bases; Al-Asad, Besmaya, Irbil, Taji and
Taqaddum.
Part of the US’s training mission to
Iraq has entailed providing tactical
assistance to Iraqi forces where they
have analysed ISIS tactics, techniques
and procedures (TTPs) and identi ed
the use of Vehicle-borne Improvised
Explosive Devices in the guise of
US Humvees (ISIS captured 2,500
Humvees when it took over Ramadi) as
a particular threat. The United States
gifted the Iraqi’s 3,000 AT4 anti-tank
weapons to counter this increasingly
dangerous threat.
Assessing the current situation in
Iraq, it seems unlikely that the United
States will increase its support for
the al-Abadi regime and instead look
to fortify what assets it currently has
in Iraq. Senior White House of cials
have recently voiced the possibility of
increasing its footprint in Iraq through
larger troop numbers and increased
forward operating bases to aid the Iraqi
military. The emotional damage of the
US presence in Iraq, both for the Iraqis
and the Americans suggests that it is
unlikely that a large-scale American
presence will return to Iraq.
With US elections occurring in 2016,
the Obama regime will attempt to
ensure its legacy of the Iraq pullback is
not replaced with a return to a country
that has frustrated US foreign policy for
many years. Yet, according to recent
newspaper reports, the NATO alliance
is believed to be planning a return to
Iraq to help train of cers in the ght
against the Islamic State. The alliance
is said to be looking at short-, medium-
Kobane
Aleppo
Hassakeh
Raqqa
Deir al-Zour
Rutba
Qaim
Mount Sinjar
Tal Hamis
Mosul Dam
Mosul
Irbil
Kirkuk
Baiji
Tikrit
Ramadi
Falluja
Baghdad
Jalula
SYRIA
IRAQ
IRAN
Dominant as of April 2015
Territorial losses since August 2014
IS Syrian Kurds Contested city
Iraqi government Syrian government
Iraqi Kurdish security forces
SOURCE: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND BBC. TIKRIT WAS RETAKEN FROM ISIS IN APRIL 2015.

4. 31
and longer-term measures, including
training for the ISF, despite the failure
of previous attempts back in 2004 to
create an effective Iraqi force. In June,
the US ambassador to NATO, Douglas
Lute, was quoted in The Guardian
newspaper as saying: “Iraq came to us
with a list of speci c areas where
they wanted support. e gured that
within that, there were seven that made
sense for NATO.”
IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ
Under al-Maliki, the United States
and Gulf fears of growing Iranian
in uence in Iraq were realised. Iran has
a long history of regional involvement,
particularly supporting regimes and
groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah,
the Yemeni Houthis and Syria’s Assad
regime. Iranian material and nancial
assistance has steadily grown in
accordance with gains made by ISIS
in Syria, as it looks to assist the Iraqi
regime counter Sunni extremism, whilst
increasing in uence in the Levant region.
Key to the Iranian strategy has
been to ally with Shi’a militias such
as the Badr Organisation and Kata’ib
Hezbollah, as well as heavily supporting
the Kurdish Peshmurga. Iranian
advisors, weaponry and nancial
support have all been owing to the
aid of the Iraqi ght against ISIS and
have recently been instrumental in
the gains made against the extremist
organisation. Particular operational
successes have been made in the
disruption of ISIS communications
greatly in uencing battle eld
manoeuvres and ISIS’s TTPs.
The in uence of Iranian af liated
personnel cannot be underestimated,
as their experience and boost to
morale has greatly assisted the counter
offensive against ISIS in Iraqi territory.
The most signi cant Iranian gure in
Iraq is General Qassem Soleimani, the
head of the Al Quds Force within the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC). This is of utmost importance
due to the signi cance of the
organisation and the direct command
of Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, the principal gure within
Shi’a Islam.
Iran has delivered light and heavy
weaponry, as well as ammunition,
which while it may question the effect
of international sanctions against Iran,
have greatly bene tted the Iraqi ght
against ISIS. These weapons have
not only been delivered to Iraq but
also Syria and, due to the operational
success of ISIS, they have coincidently
been used by the foe they were
originally set out to counter. More
recently, T-72S Iranian tanks, armoured
Sa r’ eeps, Sayyad’ . 0 calibre sniper
ri es, Shaher’ 14. mm anti-material
sniper ri es, communication systems,
artillery, 122 mm rocket systems and
surveillance and reconnaissance
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were
delivered to Iraq as Iranian involvement
has increased. This is an indication of
the growing capabilities of the Iranian-
backed forces in Iraq.
Iranian assistance in Iraq has been
predominantly to aid the Shi’a militias,
Kurdish Peshmurga, YPG and ethnic
minority groups. They have been
heavily involved in the counter-offensive
in the Anbar province that has further
complicated Iraq’s already fragile
sectarian tensions. There is a potential
for Iraq to break up along ethnic lines,
which would greatly diminish Iranian
in uence in the region. By combining
Kurdish, Shi’a and Christian forces
against Sunni extremists, Iran is
attempting to unify Iraqi forces against
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an external threat; albeit at the expense
of Sunni involvement. There are also
reports that Iran is training and arming
Afghan Taliban in Eastern Iran in an
attempt to send them to Ira to ght
ISIS.
RUSSIAN – IRAQI RELATIONS
High-level delegations from Iraq
and Russia have met on a number of
occasions with Iraqi Prime Minister
al-Abadi recently visiting Moscow in
May 2015, where increased military and
technical cooperation was discussed
with a potential $3 billion deal looming.
It is suggested that more attack
helicopters, ground support aircraft and
specialised urban warfare equipment
will be delivered to Iraq.
Iraq is reported to have received
an uncon rmed number of RSIS
T-5000 ri es, which have aided their
urban warfare capabilities. Russia
has traditionally been a key partner
for Iraq, which is looking to diversify
its international allies. As recently as
last year Russia delivered a number
of Mi-28 attack helicopters, whilst
also delivering ve Su-2 ground
attack aircraft. Increased cooperation
between Russia and Iraq also looks to
bolster Iranian-Iraqi relations providing,
potentially, a huge setback for the
United States and its Gulf partners.
BRITISH EFFORTS TO AID IRAQ
With budget constraints and an
apprehension to commit soldiers
overseas, the United Kingdom is
largely holding back on material
assistance to Iraq, and instead vying
for marginal training support. In June
2015 the United Kingdom announced
that it would treble its Counter-IED
presence by sending 125 supervisors
to Iraq, boosting the total number in
Iraq to around 300. There are also
reports that the United Kingdom will
increase its intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance assistance by
deploying more UAVs in support of
Iraq’s counter-attack against ISIS.
The total number of UK troops in Iraq
is now reported to be around 1,000,
with Prime Minister David Cameron
struggling to appease American
concerns that the United Kingdom will
be able to maintain its contribution to
combined defence efforts. With a likely
escalation of migration troubles in the
Mediterranean and a resurgent Russia
destabilising Europe, it is unlikely that
further British contributions to Iraq’s
ght against ISIS will be substantial.
Any increases will most likely be
in the guise of training and support
missions rather than combat troops.
However, in mid-July at an International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
brieing on this autumn’s Strategic
Defence and Security Review (SDSR),
General Lord David Richards, senior
advisor to IISS and former UK Chief of
Defence Staff (2011-2014), questioned
the scale of effort required to tackle
ISIS. “We need to put in tens of
thousands of trainers,” he says. “We
need to work aggressively and quickly
against ISIS. An SDSR that doesn’t
do that is not an SDSR worth having.
Referring to reported comments by
Prime Minister David Cameron that the
battle against ISIS was a “generational
struggle”, Lord Richards said: “We don’t
have a generation to control ISIS.”
SECTARIAN COMPLICATIONS
The susceptibility of Sunni
extremism in Iraq, combined with the
increased complication of sectarian
jockeying, has thwarted potential efforts
to modernise the Iraqi military. This
attitude has trickled down to coalition
states with the GCC nations reportedly
refusing to continue air sorties against
ISIS whilst Iran increases its in uence
in the nation. The United States also
faces a dilemma as it needs to increase
training programmes in Iraq. However,
its policy suggests it needs to reach
out to Sunni tribesmen. But with a
Shi’a led government in Baghdad, it is
often blocked and coerced into training
predominantly Shi’a troops within the
Iraqi military. With Shi’a forces often
accused of reprisal attacks against
Sunni populations, it leaves this section
of society between a rock and a hard
place; lay down and allow Shi’a forces
to potentially attack you or join extremist
groups and defend yourself.
CONCLUSION
The threat posed by ISIS in Iraq
has the potential to destroy the unity of
AN IRAQI ARMY SOLDIER (U.S.AIR FORCE PHOTO BY SENIOR AIRMAN JAMES RICHARDSON

6. Defence Procurement International - Summer 2015
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the state. With the United States largely
lacking a uni ed strategy, Iraq is looking
to other partners for cooperation in its
ght against ISIS. Russia and Iran will
continue the delivery of assets and
personnel in support of the Iraqi ght
against ISIS with further ground attack
aircraft and training missions seemingly
imminent. ISIS has greatly affected oil
output from Iraq, which, as a result, has
relatively sparse nances.
The United States will continue to
be the preferred supplier of training
and weapons for Iraq. However, in the
current political environment it remains
likely that the majority of supplies will
continue to ow from Russia and Iran.
The coming months will determine
how capable the Iraqi forces are and
evaluate how instrumental material
assistance from Iran and Russia has
aided the Iraqi ght against ISIS.
The ISF has traditionally played a
signi cant role in Iraqi society with the
armed forces often seen as a loyal
tool of the ruling regime. In a widening
sectarian divide, the delicate civil-
military relationship has often been
an arena for power struggles between
Iraq’s different sects.
Recently, the Iraq Chief of Staff,
General Babaker Zebari (a Kurdish
Sunni) was forcibly retired following the
Iraqi militaries’ numerous failures in the
face of ISIS. The role of Chief of Staff
has normally been reserved for the
Kurdish minority and it would remain
likely that this position stays within this
sect so as to avoid further sectarian
tensions.
If denominational strains do continue
to spread within Iraqi society, the
integrity of the state, in its current
form, will be at a heightened risk of
disintegration. Critically, the ISF needs
to display tenets of leadership in its bid
to steer Iraq through the current crisis.
It is more likely to do this in a position
of strength where it can be a credible
counter weight to the non-state actors
that haunt the weak Iraqi state.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Matthew Hedges holds a Masters
degree from the University of Exeter.
He is a PhD candidate at Durham
University where he is researching
defence and security policy in the GCC
states.
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TRANSFERS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO IRAQ BY COUNTRY FROM 2013 TO 2015
SOURCE: SIPRI ARMS TRANSFER DATABASE AND OTHER SOURCES