HO_MB1e_ch13.ppt

© 2012 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall
R. GLENN
HUBBARD
ANTHONY PATRICK
O’BRIEN
Money,
Banking, and
the Financial
System

The Federal Reserve and
Central Banking
C H A P T E R
13
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
After studying this chapter, you should be able to:
13.1
13.2
13.3
Explain why the Federal Reserve System is structured the way it is
Explain the key issues involved in the Fed’s operations
Discuss the issues involved with central bank independence
outside the United States

IS THE FED THE GIANT OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM?
•In May 2010, Congress took the unusual step of ordering an audit of the
Fed’s emergency lending programs.
•The financial crisis highlighted the importance of the Fed and the strong
influence its chairman has on the economy.
•But should the unelected head of the central bank have so much power?
Economists and policymakers have debated this question for decades.
•An Inside Look at Policy on page 404 discusses how recent nominees
to the Fed’s Board of Governors support the Fed’s expanded role in the
financial system.
C H A P T E R
13
The Federal Reserve and
Central Banking

© 2012 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall 4 of 43
Key Issue and Question
Issue: Following the financial crisis, Congress debated reducing the
independence of the Federal Reserve.
Question: Should Congress and the president be given greater
authority over the Federal Reserve?

13.1 Learning Objective
Explain why the Federal Reserve System is structured the way it is.

The Structure of the Federal Reserve System
• The Bank of the United States was created to function as a central bank, but
the Bank rapidly accumulated enemies. Local banks resented the Bank’s
supervision of their operations.
• Congress granted the Bank a 20-year charter in 1791, but without enough
Congressional support to renew its charter, the Bank ceased operations in
1811.
• In 1816, Congress established the Second Bank of the United States, also
under a 20-year charter. The Second Bank encountered many of the same
controversies as the First Bank and its charter expired in 1836.
• Severe nationwide financial panics in 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907—and
accompanying economic downturns—raised fears in Congress that the U.S.
financial system was unstable without a central bank. Finally, the Federal
Reserve Act that created the Federal Reserve System became law in 1913.
Creation of the Federal Reserve System

Federal Reserve System The central bank of the United States.
• Economic power within the Federal Reserve System is divided in three
ways:
1. Among bankers and business interests
2. Among states and regions
3. Between government and the private sector
• Four groups within the system were empowered to perform separate duties:
1. The Federal Reserve Banks
2. Private commercial member banks
3. The Board of Governors
4. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
• All national banks—commercial banks with charters from the federal
government—were required to join the system. State banks—commercial
banks with charters from state governments—were given the option to join.

Federal Reserve Banks
Federal Reserve Bank A district bank of the Federal Reserve system that,
among other activities, conducts discount lending.
Figure 13.1 Federal Reserve Districts
Division of the United States into 12 Federal Reserve districts was designed so that each district
contained a mixture of urban and rural areas and manufacturing, agricultural, and service industries.
Note that Hawaii and Alaska are included in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District.•

Making the Connection
St. Louis and Kansas City? What Explains the Locations of
the District Banks?
• When the Fed was created, district banks were intended to have much more
independence than they have today.
• The Reserve Bank Organizing Committee was given the task of determining
district boundaries, which remain unchanged since 1914.
• Were the locations of Federal Reserve Banks influenced by politics? There
was agreement about six of the cities: Boston, Chicago, New York,
Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco.
• A study about this controversy concluded that economic variables could
correctly predict the cities chosen, while political factors could not. So, while
it may seem odd today for Missouri to have two Federal Reserve Banks, it
appears to have made economic sense in 1914.

• Who owns the Federal Reserve banks?
• When banks join the Federal Reserve System, they are required to buy
stock in their District Bank. So, in principle, the member banks own the
District Bank.
• To prevent one constituency from exploiting the central bank’s economic
power at the expense of another, Congress restricted the composition of the
boards of directors of the District Banks.
• The directors represent the interests of three groups:
1. Banks
2. Businesses
3. The general public
• Member banks elect three bankers (Class A directors) and three leaders in
industry, commerce, and agriculture (Class B directors). The Fed’s Board of
Governors appoints three public interest directors (Class C directors).

The 12 Federal Reserve District Banks support the Fed’s roles in the payments
system, control of the money supply, and financial regulation.
Specifically, the District Banks:
•Manage check clearing in the payments system
•Manage currency in circulation by issuing new Federal Reserve notes and
withdrawing damaged notes from circulation
•Conduct discount lending by making and administering discount loans to
banks within the district
•Perform supervisory and regulatory functions such as examining state member
banks and evaluating merger applications
•Collecting and making available data on district business activities and
publishing articles on monetary and banking topics written by professional
economists employed by the banks
•Serve on the Federal Open Market Committee, the Federal Reserve System’s
chief monetary policy body

• The Federal Reserve District Banks engage in monetary policy both directly
(by making discount loans) and indirectly (through membership on Federal
Reserve committees).
• In recent decades, the discount rate has been set by the Board of Governors
in Washington, DC, not by the District Banks.
• The District Banks also influence policy through their representatives on the
Federal Open Market Committee and on the Federal Advisory Council, a
consultative body composed of district bankers.

• Currently, only about 16% of state banks and about one-third of all banks are
members of the Federal Reserve System.
• Historically, state banks often chose not to join because they saw
membership as costly. Banks could also avoid the Fed’s reserve
requirements. The Fed did not pay interest on required reserves, so banks
were losing the interest they could have earned by lending the funds.
• The opportunity cost of being a member of the Fed increased during the
1960s and 1970s as nominal interest rates rose, and fewer state banks
elected to become or remain members.
• The Fed argued that declining bank membership eroded its ability to control
the money supply and urged Congress to compel all commercial banks to
join the Federal Reserve System.
• Congress has not yet legislated such a requirement, but the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980
required that all banks maintain reserve deposits with the Fed on the same
terms.
Member Banks

Solved Problem 13.1
How Costly Are Reserve Requirements to Banks?
Suppose that Wells Fargo pays a 3% annual interest rate on checking account
balances, while having to meet a reserve requirement of 10%. Assume that the
Fed pays Wells Fargo an interest rate of 0.25% on its holdings of reserves and
that Wells Fargo can earn 6% on its loans and other investments.
a. How do reserve requirements affect the amount that Wells Fargo can
earn on $1,000 in checking account deposits? Ignore any costs Wells Fargo
incurs on the deposits other than the interest it pays to depositors.
b. Is the opportunity cost to banks of reserve requirements likely to be
higher during a recession or during an economic expansion? Briefly explain.

Solved Problem
Step 2 Answer part (a) by calculating the effective cost of funds to Wells Fargo.
With a 10% reserve requirement, Wells Fargo must hold $100 of a $1,000 checking
account deposit in reserves with the Fed, on which it receives an interest rate of
0.25%. The bank can invest the remaining $900. So, it will earn ($900 x 0.06) +
($100 x 0.0025 = $0.25) = $54.00 + $0.25 = $54.25. If the bank did not need to hold
reserves against the deposit, it would earn $1,000 x 0.06 = $60. So, the reserve
requirement is reducing Well Fargo’s return by $5.75, or $5.75/$1,000 = 0.575%.
Step 3 Answer part (b) by explaining how the reserve tax varies over the business cycle.
The higher the interest rate banks can earn on their loans and other investments,
the higher the opportunity cost of having to hold reserves at the Fed that are
earning a low interest rate. As we saw in Chapter 4, interest rates tend to fall during
economic recessions and rise during economic expansions. So, the opportunity
cost to banks of reserve requirements is likely to be higher during economic
expansions than during economic recessions.
Solving the Problem
Step 1 Review the chapter material.
Solved Problem 13.1
How Costly Are Reserve Requirements to Banks?

• The Board of Governors is headquartered in Washington, DC. Its members
are confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
• Members serve 14-year, nonrenewable terms. The terms are staggered so it
is unlikely that one U.S. president will be able to appoint a full Board of
Governors. No Federal Reserve District can be represented by more than
one member on the Board of Governors.
• The president chooses one member of the Board of Governors to serve as
chairman. Chairmen serve four-year terms and may be reappointed. Board
members are professional economists from business, government, and
academia.
Board of Governors
Board of Governors The governing board of the Federal Reserve System,
consisting of seven members appointed by the president of the United States.

The Board of Governors:
•Administers monetary policy; it has authority to determine reserve requirements
and effectively sets the discount rate charged on loans to banks
•Influences the setting of guidelines for open market operations
•Informally influences national and international economic policy decisions
•Advises the president and testifies before Congress on economic matters, such
as economic growth, inflation, and unemployment
•Is responsible for some financial regulation. It sets margin requirements and
determines permissible activities for bank holding companies
•Exercises administrative controls over individual Federal Reserve banks

• Members of the FOMC are the chairman of the Board of Governors, the
other Fed governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, and the presidents of four of the other 11 Federal Reserve Banks (who
serve on a rotating basis).
• The chairman of the Board of Governors serves as chairman of the FOMC.
Only five Federal Reserve bank presidents are voting members of the
FOMC, but all 12 attend meetings and participate in discussions.
• The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is always a voting
member. The committee meets in Washington, DC, eight times each year.
• Prior to each meeting, FOMC members access data from three books:
1. The “Greenbook,” which contains a national economic forecast for the
next two years
2. The “Bluebook,” which contains projections for monetary aggregates
3. The “Beige Book,” which contains summaries of economic conditions in
each district.
The Federal Open Market Committee
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) The 12-member Federal Reserve
committee that directs open market operations.

• The FOMC sets a target for the federal funds rate. To reach its target for the
federal funds rate, the Fed needs to adjust the level of reserves in the
banking system by buying and selling Treasury securities.
• The FOMC doesn’t itself buy or sell securities for the Fed’s account. Instead,
it issues a directive to the Fed’s trading desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. There, the manager for domestic open market operations carries
out the directive by buying and selling Treasury securities with primary
dealers, which are private financial firms that deal in these securities.

On the Board of Governors, Four Can Be a Crowd
• In 1976, Congress passed the Government in the Sunshine Act, which
requires most federal government agencies to give public notice before a
meeting.
• If four or more members of the Board of Governors meet to consider a policy
action, it is considered an official meeting under the act and cannot be held
without prior public notice.
• During the financial crisis of 2007–2009, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
instituted a series of policy actions, some of which were unprecedented.
• Given that Bernanke needed to make decisions rapidly, the requirement of
prior public notice made it infeasible for him to meet with more than two
other members. As a result, Bernanke relied on an informal group of
advisers consisting of Board of Governors members Donald Kohn and Kevin
Warsh and New York District Bank president Timothy Geithner. Geithner was
a member of the FOMC but not of the Board of Governors.
• The “four musketeers,” as they came to be called, were the key
policymaking body at the Fed for the duration of the crisis.

• During its first 20 years, the decentralized District Bank system could not
adequately respond to national economic and financial disturbances.
• The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 centralized the Board of Governors’
control of the system, giving it a majority of seats (7 of 12) on the FOMC. In
addition, the secretary of the Treasury and the comptroller of the currency
were removed from the Board of Governors, thereby increasing the Fed’s
independence.
• The informal power structure within the Fed is more concentrated than the
formal power structure (see Figure 13.2). The Fed chairman wields the most
power in the system. The distinction between ownership and control is clear:
Member banks own shares of stock, but this ownership confers none of the
rights that are typically granted to shareholders of private corporations.
Power and Authority within the Fed

Figure 13.2 Organization and Authority of the Federal Reserve System
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the Federal Reserve System and incorporated a series
of checks and balances into the system. However, informal power within the Fed is more concentrated
in the hands of the chairman of the Board of Governors than the formal structure suggests.•

The following are the main provisions of the bill that affect the Fed:
• The Fed was made a member of the new Financial Stability Oversight Council,
which was charged with preventing the failure of large financial firms that may
threaten the stability of the system.
• One member of the Board of Governors, designated as the vice chairman for
supervision, will coordinate the Fed’s regulatory actions.
• The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was ordered to perform an audit
of the emergency lending programs the Fed carried out during the crisis.
• Class A directors will no longer participate in elections of the bank presidents.
• The Fed was ordered to disclose the names of financial institutions to which it
makes loans and with which it buys and sells securities.
• A new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was established at the Fed to
write rules concerning consumer protection that will apply to all financial firms.
Changes to the Fed Under the Dodd-Frank Act
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Legislation
passed during 2010 that was intended to reform regulation of the financial
system.

Explain the key issues involved in the Fed’s operations.

• The structure of the Fed is designed to operate largely independently of
external pressures from the president, Congress, the banking industry, and
business groups.
• Not only is the Fed exempt from having to ask Congress for the funds to
operate, but it is also a profitable organization.
• Most of the Fed’s earnings come from interest on the securities it holds,
interest on discount loans, and fees for check-clearing and other services.
• In 2009, the Fed’s net income exceeded $50 billion—substantial profits when
compared with even the largest U.S. corporations.
• But the Fed isn’t completely insulated from external pressure:
• The president can exercise control over the membership, and may appoint
a new chairman every four years.
• The U.S. Constitution does not specifically mandate a central bank, so
Congress can amend the Fed’s charter and powers—or even abolish it
entirely. Nevertheless, in practice, Congress has not limited the Fed’s ability
to conduct an independent monetary policy.
How the Fed Operates
Handling External Pressure

• Elected officials lack formal control of monetary policy, which has occasionally
resulted in conflicts between the Fed and the president, who is often
represented by the secretary of the Treasury.
• During World War II, the Roosevelt administration increased its control over
the Fed. To help finance wartime budget deficits, the Fed agreed to hold
interest rates on Treasury securities at low levels.
• When the war ended in 1945, the Treasury wanted to continue this policy, but
the Fed didn’t agree. The Fed’s concern was inflation: Larger purchases of
Treasury securities by the Fed could increase the growth rate of the money
supply.
• On March 4, 1951, the federal government formally abandoned the wartime
policy of fixing the interest rates on Treasury securities with the Treasury–
Federal Reserve Accord. This accord was important in reestablishing the
ability of the Fed to operate independently of the Treasury.
Examples of Conflict between the Fed and the Treasury

• President Ronald Reagan and Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker
argued over who was at fault for the severe economic recession of the early
1980s.
• Similar conflicts occurred during the administrations of George H. W. Bush
and Bill Clinton, with the Treasury frequently pushing for lower short-term
interest rates than the Fed considered advisable.
• During the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the Fed worked closely with the
Treasury. The frequent consultations between Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
and then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson during the height of the crisis in
the fall of 2008 were a break with tradition. If such close collaboration were to
continue, it would raise the question of whether the Fed would be able to
pursue policies independent of those of the administration in power.
• A proposal in early 2010 that the president of the United States appoint the
presidents of the District Banks raised further concerns about Fed
independence. In the end, the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act did little to
undermine Fed independence.

The Public Interest View
Factors That Motivate the Fed
Public interest view A theory of central bank decision making that holds that
officials act in the best interest of the public.
• The Fed seeks to achieve economic goals that are in the public interest.
Examples of such goals are price stability, high employment, and economic
growth.
• Does the evidence support the public interest view of the Fed? Some
economists argue that it doesn’t appear to with regard to price stability. The
record of persistent inflation since World War II undercuts the claim that the
Fed has emphasized price stability. Other economists argue that the Fed’s
record with respect to price stability is relatively good.
• There are similar debates over the Fed’s contributions to the stability of other
economic indicators.

The Principal–Agent View
Principal–agent view A theory of central bank decision making that holds
that officials maximize their personal well-being rather than that of the general
public.
• This view predicts that the Fed acts to increase its power, influence, and
prestige as an organization, subject to constraints placed on it by principals
such as the president and Congress.
• If the principal–agent view holds, we would expect the Fed to fight to maintain
its autonomy—which it does. The Fed has frequently resisted congressional
attempts to control its budget.
• The Fed successfully lobbied Congress to strip most of the provisions that
would have reduced its independence from the final version of the Dodd-Frank
Act.

• According to the principal–agent view, the Fed could manage monetary policy
to assist the reelection efforts of presidential incumbents who are unlikely to
limit its power.
• The result would be a political business cycle, in which the Fed would try to
lower interest rates to stimulate economic activity before an election to earn
favor with the incumbent party running for reelection.
• The facts for the United States don’t generally support the political business
cycle theory. Nevertheless, the president’s desires may subtly influence Fed
policy.
• One study found a close correlation between changes in monetary policy and
signals from the administration that they desired a policy change.

Arguments for Fed Independence
Fed Independence
• The main argument for Fed independence is that monetary policy—which
affects inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, and economic growth—is too
important and technical to be determined by politicians.
• Because of the frequency of elections, politicians may be shortsighted,
concerned with short-term benefits without regard for potential long-term costs.
• The public may well prefer that the experts at the Fed, rather than politicians,
make monetary policy decisions.
• Another argument for Fed independence is that complete control of the Fed by
elected officials increases the likelihood of political business cycle fluctuations
in the money supply.

Arguments against Fed Independence
• The importance of monetary policy for the economy is also the main argument
against central bank independence.
• In a democracy, elected officials should make public policy. The public could
hold elected officials responsible for perceived monetary policy problems.
• If the central bank was controlled by elected officials, monetary policy could be
coordinated and integrated with government taxing and spending policies.
• Some critics note that the Fed failed to assist the banking system during the
economic contraction of the early 1930s. Also, Fed policies were too
inflationary in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, some analysts believe that the Fed
ignored the housing market bubble in the early 2000s and then moved too
slowly to contain the effects on the financial system when the bubble finally
burst in 2006.

End the Fed?
• The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give the federal government the
authority to establish a central bank.
• Opponents of the First and Second Banks saw them as a means of
unconstitutionally exerting federal power over the states.
• The standard argument in favor of the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve
is that Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress has
the power “To coin money [and] regulate the value thereof. . .” Congress
delegated this power to the Federal Reserve under the Federal Reserve Act.
• Modern arguments against the Fed have been mostly based on whether an
independent central bank is the best means of carrying out monetary policy.
During 2008, Congressman Ron Paul ran for the Republican nomination for
president and argued forcefully that the Federal Reserve should be
abolished.
• Given the Fed’s power and the fact that its officials are unelected, its role will
remain a subject of debate among economists and policymakers.

Discuss the issues involved with central bank independence outside the United
States.

• The degree of central bank independence varies greatly from country to
country.
• In the United States, board members serve longer terms than in other
countries, implying nominally greater independence. In other countries, the
head of the central bank serves a longer term than the chairman in the United
States, implying somewhat greater political control in the United States.
• An independent central bank is free to pursue its goals without direct
interference from government officials and legislators. An independent central
bank can more freely focus on keeping inflation low.
• The European Central Bank is, in principle, extremely independent, whereas
the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England traditionally have been less
independent. By the late 1990s, both had become more independent and
more focused on price stability.
Central Bank Independence outside the United States

• The Bank of England, founded in 1694 and one of the world’s oldest
central banks, obtained the power to set interest rates independently in
1997.
• The Bank of Japan Law, in force since April 1998, gives the Policy Board
more autonomy to pursue price stability.
• The Bank of Canada has an inflation target as a goal, which is set jointly
by the Bank of Canada and the government. While the government has
the final responsibility for monetary policy, the Bank of Canada has
generally controlled it.
• The push for central bank independence to pursue a goal of low inflation
has increased in recent years. Indeed, in most of the industrialized world,
central bank independence from the political process is gaining ground as
the way to organize monetary authorities.

• What conclusions should we draw from differences in central bank
structure?
• Many analysts believe that an independent central bank improves the
economy’s performance by lowering inflation without raising output or
employment fluctuations.
• The most independent central banks had the lowest average rates of
inflation during the 1970s and 1980s.
• The central bank also must be able to set goals for which it can be held
accountable. The leading example of such a goal is a target for inflation.
• Central banks in Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom have official inflation targets, as does the European Central Bank.
The U.S. Fed has only an informal inflation target.

The European Central Bank
• The European Central Bank (ECB) is charged with conducting monetary policy
for the 16 countries that participate in the European Monetary Union, or
Eurosystem, and use the euro as their common currency.
• The ECB’s organization is similar to that of the U.S. Fed. The ECB’s executive
board, chaired in 2010 by Jean-Claude Trichet who serves as president of the
ECB, has six members who work exclusively for the bank.
• Board members are appointed by the heads of state and government, based
on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers of Economics and Finance,
after consulting the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the
ECB.
• Executive board members serve nonrenewable eight-year terms. The
governors of each of the member national central banks serve a term of at
least five years. The long terms are designed to increase the political
independence of the ECB.

• In principle, the ECB has a high degree of overall independence, with a clear
mandate to emphasize price stability, following the lead of the Bundesbank
(Germany’s central bank).
• Whether legal independence is enough to guarantee actual independence is
another matter, however. National central banks have considerable power in
the ECB. The governors of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)
hold a majority of votes in the ECB’s governing council.
• While the ECB statute emphasizes price stability, countries have argued over
the merits of expansionary or contractionary monetary policy. This conflict
became particularly evident during the financial crisis of 2007–2009, when
countries such as Greece, Spain, and Ireland urged that the ECB follow a
more expansionary policy. Countries such as Germany that had fared better
during the financial crisis were reluctant to see the ECB abandon its inflation
target.

The European Central Bank and the 2010 Sovereign Debt Crisis
• The 2007-2009 financial crisis affected the 16 countries of the European Union
to differing extents, but the individual countries were not able to pursue
independent policies in response.
• During the crisis, these countries also suffered from large government budget
deficits. To finance the deficits, they issued bonds, or sovereign debt. A
sovereign debt crisis ensued when the debt issued by Greece, Ireland, Spain,
and Portugal came into question.
• On May 10, 2010, the ECB intervened by buying 165 billion worth of bonds.
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet argued that the intervention was
necessary to ensure that the affected governments would still be able to raise
funds and to protect the solvency of European banks that had purchased large
amounts of these government bonds.

Answering the Key Question
At the beginning of this chapter, we asked the question:
“Should Congress and the president be given greater authority over the
Federal Reserve?”
Economists and policymakers have debated how independent the Fed should
be from the rest of the government. In 1913, the Federal Reserve Act placed
the secretary of the Treasury and the comptroller of the currency—both
presidential appointees—on the Federal Reserve Board. In 1935, Congress
removed these officials from the board to increase the Fed’s independence.
During the debate over financial reform in 2010, Congress gave serious
consideration to allowing the president to appoint the presidents of the 12
reserve banks, although this proposal was dropped from the final version of
the Dodd-Frank Act. Given its importance in the financial system, it seems
inevitable that economists and policymakers will continue to debate the merits
of the Fed’s independence.

AN INSIDE LOOK AT POLICY
U.S. Senate Questions Three Nominees to Fed’s Board of Governors
NEW YORK TIMES, Fed Nominees Support Expanded Duties
• As the U.S. Senate was nearing passage of a financial reform bill in 2010, the
Senate Banking Committee heard testimony from three nominees to the
Federal Reserve Board.
• In their testimonies, Janet Yellen stated that job creation would be a high
priority for monetary policy; Sarah Bloom Raskin expressed concern for the
social costs of joblessness; and Peter Diamond commented on the relevance
of behavioral economics in interpreting complicated financial events.
• Christopher Dodd, chairman of the Banking Committee, said that the draft
financial reform legislation called for removing much of the Fed’s authority in
areas where it did not perform well during the financial crisis. But in the end,
the Senate supported retaining and strengthening the Fed’s supervisory role.
Key Points in the Article

AN INSIDE LOOK AT POLICY
In July 2010, when the Senate Banking Committee was drafting the reform
bill to deal with the financial crisis, there were only four members of the
Board of Governors, including the chairman, Ben Bernanke.

HO_MB1e_ch13.ppt

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