In February 2014, the people of Ukraine managed to topple their government by way of prolonged protest which was in part a call for the Eastern European nation to move closer to Europe and away from Russia. The deposed Russian-backed President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovych sparked the wrath of the Ukrainians by refusing to sign a ‘trade agreement’ that would have brought Ukraine closer to the EU. Instead he preferred closer ties with Russia which is sort of creating its own ‘EU’ called the Customs Union. This paper posits that Ukraine has been a battleground for power both between the West and Russia (external power) and that of the state versus the citizens (Internal). The paper will try to lay bare the various power struggles that were and are at play in the Ukrainian crisis and conclude that with the West looking like having won, the power play has only begun as Russia will not allow a nation so close to it and vital to its prestige get aligned with the West, its arch-enemy. Before the Ukraine case can be tackled, it is essential to discuss the notion of power as it occurs in the discipline of International Relations. It will also feature a summary of two prescribed course readings on Power.

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SHANDONG UNIVERSITY
山东大学
School of Political Science and Public Administration
MASTERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
TERM PAPER
Pinning down Power in Ukraine Crisis: West versus Russia
Presented By
Bright Mhango (M2013071)
Presented To
王学玉
Wang Xueyu, Professor
(Introduction to International Politics)

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February 2014
Pinning down Power in Ukraine Crisis: West versus Russia
In February 2014, the people of Ukraine managed to topple their government by way of
prolonged protest which was in part a call for the Eastern European nation to move closer to
Europe and away from Russia.
The deposed Russian-backed President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovych sparked the wrath of the
Ukrainians by refusing to sign a „trade agreement‟ that would have brought Ukraine closer to the
EU. Instead he preferred closer ties with Russia which is sort of creating its own „EU‟ called the
Customs Union.
This paper posits that Ukraine has been a battleground for power both between the West and
Russia (external power) and that of the state versus the citizens (Internal).
The paper will try to lay bare the various power struggles that were and are at play in the
Ukrainian crisis and conclude that with the West looking like having won, the power play has
only begun as Russia will not allow a nation so close to it and vital to its prestige get aligned
with the West, its arch-enemy.
Before the Ukraine case can be tackled, it is essential to discuss the notion of power as it occurs
in the discipline of International Relations. It will also feature a summary of two prescribed
course readings on Power.
Theory of Power in IR
The concept of power is one of the hotbeds of political scientists as it is yet to have one
definition agreed upon and yet very important in the study of International Relations (IR).
Power broadly put denotes the capacity of agents to bring about intended changes, or the ability
to overcome obstacles. Power in international relations may be defined as a state‟s ability to
control, or at least influence, other states or the outcome of events that are somewhat significant.
One of the most widely used delimitations of Power comes from Robert A. Dahl (1957). Dahl‟s
definition is useful in trying to marry the various terms that can be interchanged with the term

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„power,‟ terms like; influence, control, coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compellence,
inducement and so on.
Dahl suggested that underlying most such terms is the basic intuitive notion of A causing (or
having the ability to cause) B to do something that B otherwise would not do. Where A is the
influencer or nation with power and B is the one being coerced.
Barnett and Duvall (2005) warn however that Dahl‟s view of power which dominates the study
of IR ignores some crucial aspects of power.
In their paper, Power in International Politics, Barnett and Duvall warn that the Dahl‟s dominant
view of power obscure the full nature of power and call for the study of other forms of power
going on to say that without an adequate understanding of the nature of and the ways in that
power can differently affect different situations, the current work that is available on the concept
of power is not powerful.
The two offer four forms of power namely; compulsory power, institutional power, structural
power and productive power which they present in a 2 by 2 box (see figure below). The two axes
are separated based on the degree to which they emphasize the interaction of different units
being closely occurring in space/time, and secondly the degree to which power operates through
specific actors or through socially relationships.

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The two argue that power in general terms, is the production, in and through social relations, of
effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate.
“The first dimension concerns whether power works in interactions or social constitution. One
position on this dimension treats social relations as composed of the actions of pre-constituted
social actors toward one another. Here, power works through behavioral relations or interactions,
which, in turn, affect the ability of others to control the circumstances of their existence…The
other position consists of social relations of constitution. Here, power works through social
relations that analytically precede the social or subject positions of actors that constitute them as
social beings with their respective capacities and interests” Barnett and Duvall (2005:9).
The second core analytical dimension concerns how specific—direct and immediate—are the
social relations through which power works.
Compulsory power means direct control over another and the classic illustration of which is
Dahl‟s definition where power is the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do.
The two however add that „Compulsory power is not limited to material resources and also
includes symbolic and normative resources” (15).
Structural power is the direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors.

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“Structural power shapes the fates and conditions of existence of actors in two critical ways.
One, structural positions do not generate equal social privileges; instead structures allocate
differential capacities, and typically differential advantages, to different positions…Two, the
social structure not only constitutes actors and their capacities; it also shapes their self-
understanding and subjective interests” (18).
Institutional power means actors‟ control over socially distant others
“Specifically, the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate
between A and, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions,
guides, steers, and constraints the actions…and conditions of existence of others, sometimes
even unknowingly” (15)
Productive power leads to the production of subjects through diffuse social relations.
“Productive power and structural power overlap in several important respects…Yet structural
and productive power differ in a critical respect: whereas the former works through direct
structural relations, the later entails more generalized and diffuse social processes…productive
power…is the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of
knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope” (20).
“This difference between direct and diffuse social relations of constitution has two important
implications for thinking about productive power. First, productive power concerns discourse,
the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed,
lived, experienced, and transformed…Second, discursive processes and practices produce social
identities and capacities as they give meaning to them…Discourse, therefore, is socially
productive for all subjects, constituting the subjectivity of all social beings of diverse kinds with
their contingent, though not entirely fluid, identities, practices, rights, responsibilities and social
capacities” (20-1)

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Thomas Volgy, Lawrence Imwalle and John Schwarz in their paper Where is the New World
Order? Hegemony, State Strength, and Architectural Construction in International Politics
also tackle the question of power.
The trio start by quoting scholars who say that after the Cold War, a new type of international
system which is based on economics has emerged.
Before the Kosovo conflict, a joint Russian/Chinese statement on their willingness to pursue a
“multipolar world” also stressed that “no country should seek hegemony … or monopolize
international affairs” (Gordon, 1997:A3). Soon after the Kosovo conflict began, Chinese official
organs publicly denounced America‟s “global strategy for world hegemony” (Eckholm 1999).
Even France wondered that America seemed imperialistic in its leadership of NATO.
All this to speak of a vacuum that formed after the Cold War. Obviously, with the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, America emerged a mild victor and along with the rest of the West can be said
to be the new hegemon.
The trio starts by discussing the notion of a hegemon and suggest that a typical hegemon enjoys
to types of power.
“...hegemonic strength can be viewed from two different perspectives (Strange 1989). One is
through the concept of structural power: the capability and willingness of the hegemon to create
essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of the international
system. The hegemon enjoys “structural power through the capacity to determine the terms on
which those needs are satisfied and to whom they are made available” (Strange 1989:165-6).”
Apart from structural power, Strange suggests Relational power which is the capabilities of the
hegemon vis-à-vis other actors in the system, and its ability to get some groupings of others, by
persuasion or coercion, to do what they would not otherwise do.

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Relational power is measurable by looking at the economy and size and strengths of the military
while structural power requires a more complex approach to gauge.
The paper then asks if the United States is a Hegemon and finds that while economically the US
is stronger than any other nation, it fails to satisfy the requirements of a hegemon when relational
power is inspected using the External Strength Index.
The paper then concludes that despite the US being weak in terms of external strength, its policy
makers parade and speak in hegemonic terms and will continue to do so which includes the
expansion of NATO.
But tables are turning for the US, suggests the paper.
“At the same time, such efforts at leadership have begun to encounter substantial resistance.
NATO allies are chaffing against US terms for NATO expansion and the US has been unable to
stop the thawing of Russian/Chinese relations to combat US „hegemony‟. In the economic realm,
the 1997 parliamentary elections in France may have provided a first indicator of growing
resistance to the American model of economic growth, with its attendant social welfare costs for
wealthy democracies. Recently, French, Russian and Third World policy makers have challenged
as well the right of the US to set rules for their multinationals to operate in regions identified by
the US as friendly to global terrorist activities (Cohen 1997)
…without a much stronger commitment of resources to develop a new, global architecture,
American interest in developing new global architecture may be insufficient to create new forms
of global order. American „hegemony‟ without additional capabilities will probably dissipate
under the onslaught of greater interdependencies, domestic constraints, increasing systemic
complexities, and the numerous states chaffing against US leadership.”
The problem is being compounded by the fact that the US‟ old enemy is no longer a bigger threat
to make the US policy makers to attribute more resources to boost external strength.

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The paper ends with a disclaimer saying the US should not be written off and has not been
dormant since the cold war and that it is and will continue to be a force to reckon with in
international affair especially because there are weaker rivals to challenge it.
On the theoretical level, neo-realists, the crucial feature of any system is the distribution of
material power, and hence the dominant political reality of the post-Cold War order is the
preponderance of the United States. (Hurrell, 2006)
For institutionalist liberals, globalization and ever denser networks of transnational exchange and
communication create increasing demand for international institutions and new forms of
governance. Institutions are important in helping to explain how new norms emerge and are
diffused across the international system, and how state interests change and evolve.
Systemic liberals build on many of the same core ideas but develop a broader Kantian image of
the gradual but progressive diffusion of liberal values, as a result partly of liberal economics and
increased economic interdependence, partly of a liberal legal order coming to sustain the
autonomy of a global civil society, and partly of the successful example set by the multifaceted
liberal capitalist system of states. (Hurrell, 2006:7)
Russia has been on the decline since the Cold War ended, the reality of the past two decades here
has been one of decline and the dissolution of power. Nevertheless, its foreign policy is focused
on trying to arrest that decline and seeking to reassert regional and global influence. (Hurrell,
2006:2)
Ukraine and its value
Ukraine

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Ukraine is Europe‟s second largest country seated on top or Romania and the Black Sea and half
wedged into Russia. With a population of 45 million people, Ukraine only got independence in
1991 after the Soviet Union fell apart.
Since then, the country has been caught between moving towards joinining the
European Union and reconciling with Russia.
The Russian factor in Ukraine is a very important factor, Russian is widely spoken in Ukraine,
and Russia provides most of Ukraine‟s energy needs and despite countries from Europe being its
biggest trading partners, Russia is the biggest single trading partner to Ukraine1
.
Russia‟s Black Sea Fleet is also based in Ukraine and this Ukraine joining NATO would mean a
big blow to Russia.
Russia, wanting to revive its influence on Ukraine has in the „punished‟ Ukraine for moving
towards Europe and has managed to have leaders such as Yanukovych dance to its tune.
In 2006, Ukraine was forced to agree to pay almost twice the former price for Russian gas after
Russia briefly to cut supplies in a move that sparked alarm in Western Europe as well. In January
2009, Russia again cut gas supplies in a row over unpaid fees.
To Russia, Ukraine is very important as it provides a buffer between it and NATO and losing it
to the West would leave Russia feeling naked as Putin once remarked in 2005, the very
dissolution of the Soviet Union was "a real drama." He said the break-up of the USSR in 1991
left tens of millions of Russians outside the Russian Federation2
.
Putin of course wants Ukraine in the Eurasian Union, which is widely seen as Russia‟s answer to
the emergence of the EU.
1
BBC (2014) Ukraine Profile retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
18018002
2
BBC (2005) Putin deplores collapse of USSR retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm

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The EU on the other hand, would get a boost of confident to have one more member added to the
club at a time when some members such as Britain want to leave the Union. The EU is also eying
the electricity and gas exports and the heavy industry that produce anything from war ships to
planes bigger than Jumbo jets.
And apart from 45 million more consumers, Europe will use Ukraine to prevent Russia from
sliding back westward.
So obviously, Ukraine is important to both Russia and EU. It has so far managed to balance
between the two hegemons all this while but in reality, it has always been toyed by Russia while
being lured by the EU.
Barrack Obama and policy makers from the EU have pleaded with Russia not to see Ukraine‟s
going West as a zero-sum game but it remains just a plea.
So far, Russia has pulled out its Ambassador from Kiev, has suspended the huge loan it offered
Ukraine, apparently as a move to influence it. The Russians has also declared that the interim
government in Ukraine is illegal and branded it a mutiny
Some of those so called Russians are Ukrainians that live in the east of the country and favour
stronger ties with Russia and would be happy to join Russia again while those in the east of the
country see Europe as the future and want to break away from Russia.
When Ukraine announced that it wanted to sign a trade agreement with the EU, Russia‟s
influence surfaced.
Russian health inspectors found fault with Ukrainian sweets, Russian customs officials slowed
down cross-border traffic and Russia's energy giant Gazprom reminded Ukraine's Naftogaz of its

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huge debt3
. But this coercion was only after Russia failed to entice Ukraine with significantly
lower gas prices, large-scale industrial co-operation projects, and soft credits.
The rest is now history.
In November 0f 2013, President Victor Yanukovych's government refused to sign an accord that
would have meant greater co-operation with the European Union and instead pivoted to Russia.
That deal that Yanukovych refused among other things demanded that the former Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko who until her release in 2014 had spent 2 years in jail.
Thousands of people, especially from the west of the country, outraged that a long-standing
aspiration for integration with Europe had been ditched overnight, poured into central Kiev for
peaceful protests occupying the Independence Square, known as Maidan and the crisis was to
drag on until the end of February.
And despite Obama‟s sweet talk, which analysts have said is fear of pushing Putin too far at a
time the US wants him in Syria, Iran and other trade issues, his government is still rooting for the
pro-EU camp in Ukraine and a leaked tape of the US officials suggests that the US role might be
bigger in the background4
.
United Kingdom Foreign Secretary William Hague was quoted at the height of the Ukraine
protest saying: "It's in the interests of the people of Ukraine and Russia to trade with the
European Union."
3
BBC (2013) Analysis: Russia's carrot-and-stick battle for Ukraine retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25401179
4
BBC (2014) Ukraine crisis: Leaked phone call embarrasses US retrieved on 23/02/14 from URL:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26072281

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He added: "It's important that Russia doesn't do anything to undermine that package... We don't
know, of course, what Russia's reaction will be5
."
Hague added that he would talk to the Russians to try to reason with them that Ukraine was not a
zero-sum game.
George Osborne, the Chancellor of Britain announced6
that his country and the EU were ready
with a chequebook to help the Ukrainians who are almost bankrupt and deep in debt. The debt
was to be alleviated by Russia‟s loan package which is now in limbo with the fall of the pro-
Russian regime.
As of February 26, there were still fears that the country might see Russian troops coming in to
intervene, but so far Putin has not made a move yet.
Hegemonic stability theory states that the international system stays stable if only one hegemon
is in power, and so far for Ukraine, Russia has always been the hegemon and with the fall of the
Soviet Union. Now a new hegemon is in town and as the theory states, instability is prevailing.
The newswire AFP quoted Russian Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev saying If Ukraine goes
ahead with signing a partnership deal with the European Union Moscow will punish it by raising
import duties on Ukrainian goods.
This apart from withholding the $15 billion loan package and calling the interim government
illegitimate.
5
BBC (2014) Ukraine crisis: William Hague warns of 'many dangers, retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26313075
6
Peter Dominiczak, and David Blair (2013) Ukraine revolution: Britain offers cash to Kiev as the world waits on
Putin, retrieved on 26/o2/04 from URL:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10657082/Ukraine-revolution-Britain-offers-cash-
to-Kiev-as-the-world-waits-on-Putin.html

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While Russia throws in tough cards, the West has been buoyed by Ukraine‟s brave moves and
many European parties and organizations such as the International Monetary Fund have said they
stand ready to pump cash into Ukraine.
So, in theory, Russia which has power and influence over Ukraine looks to have fallen to the
attraction (soft power) of the EU, which really did not do a lot of stunts to actively woo Ukraine.
And the EU being a new and rising hegemon is eager to partner with the US to counter Russia
which is also trying to wake up as a new hegemon.
Russia can cause a war in Ukraine by fanning the Pro-Russian sentiment in the east, it can
directly intervene and restore the order it wants. It can squeeze the insolvency of Ukraine even
more by raising tax on Ukrainian exports to Russia or it can raise the prices of gas and freeze
Ukraine to submission.
Doing this however would only push Ukraine further West which seems ready to assume the
burden of the ailing state.
The EU have little options in Ukraine, they can defend it from a Russian invasion which would
only trigger World War 3 and this option might now even be possible with the rigidity of the EU
and the reluctance of some members such as Germany to involve in war.
The EU can only play underground politics, appeasing Russia by appealing to international law
while letting the protest movement which is pro-EU pivot to Brussels and naturally boot out
Russia. The EU can also cause Ukraine to break up into two with one part going east.
The US can challenge a Russian invasion, but lessons from the Russian-Georgia war indicate
that the stakes are not big enough with the elections coming up soon and domestic politics taking
center stage in the US.
The only option the US has is to support the protest movement and to engage the Russian
machine in diplomacy to let it take defeat without losing too much face.

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That is on an external power note. Internally, the power play in Ukraine was between state and
citizens and on a lesser extent between eastern citizens and western citizens.
The state had all the material power that a realist would think as enough to get by on, but it
lacked the moral support and was faced with a citizenry that in part was also materially
equipped. Thus influence, force and power of the state failed to beat the moral power of the
population and the population won.
The future looks dark for Ukraine however, as power politics will continue between, on the
inside, those that are pro-Russia and those that want Brussels and on the outside, those from the
West and those from Russia.
The game will largely rely on Putin, which the hegemon with most to lose incase Ukraine moves
to the EU. As the paper went to print, Putin had ordered his army to practice for war7
, a tactic
Morgenthau would describe as psychological show of power to Ukraine and NATO.
The Russian Parliament quickly gave Putin power to invade Ukraine and Obama and Nato
warned Russia that there would be consenquences if it used troops in Ukraine, but the warning
was too late and Russian troops were said to be in Crimea already and had a say on business
there, including knocking down the internet and telephone services8
.
Now the ball
In a nutshell, Power is the ability of any actor to persuade, influence, force or otherwise induce
another actor to undertake an action or change an objective that the latter would otherwise prefer
not to do. It is also the ability of one actor to persuade, influence, force or otherwise induce an
actor to refrain from an action it would prefer to undertake.
7
RT (2014) Putin orders ‘combat readiness’ tests for western, central Russian troops
Retrieved on 27/02/14 from URL: http://rt.com/news/putin-drill-combat-army-864/
8
Michael Weiss (2014) Russia Stages Coup in Crimea retrieved on 02/03/14 from URL:
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/01/so-russia-invaded-crimea.html

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Power can be seen in the population of a country, its size, its natural resources, its industrial
capabilities, its leadership and its diplomatic ability among others.
The paper has discussed the notion of power and hegemony and used it to argue that the
Ukrainian crisis is more about power politics between Russia and the West.
Bibliography
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BBC (2014) Ukraine crisis: William Hague warns of 'many dangers, retrieved on 24/02/14
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BBC (2013) Analysis: Russia's carrot-and-stick battle for Ukraine retrieved on 24/02/14
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URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26072281
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18018002

16. 16
BBC (2005) Putin deplores collapse of USSR retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm
Guzzini, S (2010) Power analysis: Encyclopedia entries (DIIS Working Paper 2010:34)
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powers? International Affairs 82, pp 1-19
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Retrieved on 27/02/14 from URL: http://rt.com/news/putin-drill-combat-army-864/
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