SlideShare a Scribd company logo

Black Hat Europe 2017. DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption Toolkit

•
•
Paula Januszkiewicz
Paula Januszkiewicz

On December 6th Paula Januszkiewicz delivered a session at Black Hat Europe 2017 Conference that was held in London. She spoke about DPAPI and DPAPI-NG and the CQURE's discovery in that matter.

Technology
1 of 33
Download to read offline
DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption aka. Hacking Toolkit @paulacqure @CQUREAcademy
Class names for keys from HKLMSYSTEMCCSControlLsa HKLMSECURITYCache HKLMSECURITYPolicySecrets HKLMSECURITYPolicySecrets
Based on the following components: Password, data blob, entropy Is not prone to password resets! Protects from outsiders when being in offline access Effectively protects users data Stores the password history You need to be able to get access to some of your passwords from the past Conclusion:OS greatlyhelpsus to protectsecrets
DPAPI (classic) A. MasterKey 1. pwdhash = MD4(password) or SHA1(password) 2. pwdhash_key = HMACSHA1(pwdhash, user_sid) 3. PBKDF2(…, pwdhash_key,…), another elements from the file. Windows 10 no domain: SHA512, AES-256, 8000 rounds 4. Control – HMACSHA512 B. CREDHIST 1. pwdhash = MD4(password) or SHA1(password) 2. pwdhash_key = HMACSHA1(pwdhash, user_sid) 3. PBKDF2(…, pwdhash_key,…), another elements from the file. Windows 10 no domain: SHA512, AES-256, 8000 rounds 4. Control – HMACSHA512 C. DPAPI blob Algorithms are written in the blob itself.
Used to group one or more Web Applications Purpose: Assign resources, serve as a security sandbox Use Worker Processes (w3wp.exe) Their identity is defined in Application Pool settings Process requests to the applications Passwords for AppPool identity can be ’decrypted’ even offline They are stored in the encrypted form in applicationHost.config Conclusion: IIS relies it’s security on Machine Keys (Local System)
DPAPI-PROTECTED BLOB CLIENT Local LSASS process (local masterkey can’t be decrypted) CryptUnprotectData() DPAPI AD SERVER LSASS process RPC Call BackupKey(masterkey) Decrypted masterkey 01 00 00 00 d0 8c 9d df 01 15 d1 11 8c 7a 00 c0 4f c2 97 eb 01 00 00 00 ...... G$BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED G$BCKUPKEY_940db612-ee8f-4a31-84b3-8f80c25be855 Scenario: offline changed user password or local masterkey can’t be decrypted
There is actually not much of a difference with XP / 2003! No additional salting. PBKDF2 introduced a new variable: the number of iterations SHA1 with the same salt as before (username).
Getting the: cached data MSDCC2 1.bootkey: classes from HKLMSYSTEMCCSControlLsa + [class names for: Data, GBG, JD, Skew1] (+arrays’ permutations) int[] permutationBootKey = new int[] { 0x8, 0x5, 0x4, 0x2, 0xb, 0x9, 0xd, 0x3, 0x0, 0x6, 0x1, 0xc, 0xe, 0xa, 0xf, 0x7 }; 2.PolEKList: HKLMSECURITYPolicyPolEKList [default value] 3.lsakey: AES_DECRYPT(key, data) -> AES(bootkey, PolEKList) 4.NL$KM secret: HKLMSECURITYPolicySecretsNL$KM 5.nlkm_decrypted: AES_DECRYPT(lsakey, NL$KM secret) 6.Cache_Entry{id} -> HKLMSECURITYCacheNL${id} 7.cache_entry_decrypted -> AES_DECRYPT(nlkm_decrypted, Cache_Entry{id})
DK = PBKDF2(PRF, Password, Salt, c, dkLen) Microsoft’s implementation: MSDCC2= PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA1, DCC1, username, 10240, 16) Legend
LSASS.EXE MEMORY LSASRV.DLL G$BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED G$BCKUPKEY_940db612-ee8f-4a31-84b3-8f80c25be855 GoldenKey.pfx LSASRV.DLL, LSASS.EXE, etc. PATTERNS (for different versions of modules)
LSASS.EXE MEMORY LSASRV.DLL G$BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED G$BCKUPKEY_940db612-ee8f-4a31-84b3-8f80c25be855 AD secret? HOW?! CQLsassSecretsDumper GoldenKey.pfx ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
DomainKey contains some GUID and 256-byte len secret – RSA?? Dude, look in the AD...
Legend The master password for KeePass files encrypted & stored as cipherText (80 bytes)
Getting the: DPAPI-NG Secrets DPAPI-NG A. RootKey Algorithms Key derivation function: SP800_108_CTR_HMAC (SHA512) Secret agreement: Diffie-Hellman B. DPAPI blob Key derivation: KDF_SP80056A_CONCAT After getting the key, there is a need for decryption: Key wrap algorithm: RFC3394 (KEK -> CEK) Decryption: AES-256-GCM (CEK, Blob)
SID-PROTECTED BLOB CLIENT Local LSASS processNCryptUnprotectSecret() CNGDPAPI AD SERVER LSASS process RPC Call GetKey(SID, L0, L1, L2 params) ACTIVE DIRECTORY RootKey RootKeyData? Group key
Looks familiar? It should! It’s DPAPI blob! Protection descriptor: LOCAL=user • KEK (Key Encryption Key) stored as DPAPI blob • Forced by protection descriptor LOCAL=user • Key Wrap (RFC3394) contains encrypted CEK (Content Encryption Key) • Data encrypted by CEK
Tool Description CQMasterKeyAD DPAPIBlobCreator CQDPAPIKeePassDBDecryptor DPAPINGDecrypter CQDPAPIEncDec CQAspNetCoreDecryptData. CQDPAPIExportPFXFromAD CQAspNetCoreMasterKeyCreate CQRDCManDecrypter CQAspNetCoreEncryptData CQDPAPINGPFXDecrypter CQDPAPINGDNCoreMasterKeyDecrypter *CQImpersonateWithSeTcb
DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption aka. Hacking Toolkit @paulacqure @CQUREAcademy
Black Hat Europe 2017. DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption Toolkit
Black Hat Europe 2017. DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption Toolkit

Recommended

Protecting browsers’ secrets in a domain environment
Protecting browsers’ secrets in a domain environmentProtecting browsers’ secrets in a domain environment
Protecting browsers’ secrets in a domain environmentItai Grady
 
ReVaulting! Decryption and opportunities
ReVaulting! Decryption and opportunitiesReVaulting! Decryption and opportunities
ReVaulting! Decryption and opportunitiesReality Net System Solutions
 
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat SheetMindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat SheetJuan F. Padilla
 
BloodHound Unleashed.pdf
BloodHound Unleashed.pdfBloodHound Unleashed.pdf
BloodHound Unleashed.pdfn00py1
 
A Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter HimselfA Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter HimselfSergey Soldatov
 
Hunting for Credentials Dumping in Windows Environment
Hunting for Credentials Dumping in Windows EnvironmentHunting for Credentials Dumping in Windows Environment
Hunting for Credentials Dumping in Windows EnvironmentTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
Not a Security Boundary
Not a Security BoundaryNot a Security Boundary
Not a Security BoundaryWill Schroeder
 
ReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 

Recommended

Protecting browsers’ secrets in a domain environment
Protecting browsers’ secrets in a domain environmentProtecting browsers’ secrets in a domain environment
Protecting browsers’ secrets in a domain environmentItai Grady
 
ReVaulting! Decryption and opportunities
ReVaulting! Decryption and opportunitiesReVaulting! Decryption and opportunities
ReVaulting! Decryption and opportunitiesReality Net System Solutions
 
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat SheetMindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat SheetJuan F. Padilla
 
BloodHound Unleashed.pdf
BloodHound Unleashed.pdfBloodHound Unleashed.pdf
BloodHound Unleashed.pdfn00py1
 
A Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter HimselfA Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter HimselfSergey Soldatov
 
Hunting for Credentials Dumping in Windows Environment
Hunting for Credentials Dumping in Windows EnvironmentHunting for Credentials Dumping in Windows Environment
Hunting for Credentials Dumping in Windows EnvironmentTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
Not a Security Boundary
Not a Security BoundaryNot a Security Boundary
Not a Security BoundaryWill Schroeder
 
ReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryDerbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
A Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter HimselfA Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter HimselfTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryThe Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
Red Team Methodology - A Naked Look
Red Team Methodology - A Naked LookRed Team Methodology - A Naked Look
Red Team Methodology - A Naked LookJason Lang
 
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling Pickles
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling PicklesOWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling Pickles
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling PicklesChristopher Frohoff
 
Introduction to red team operations
Introduction to red team operationsIntroduction to red team operations
Introduction to red team operationsSunny Neo
 
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory PwnagePetros Koutroumpis
 
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundaclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundDirkjanMollema
 
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows InfrastructureHunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows InfrastructureSergey Soldatov
 
Detection and Response Roles
Detection and Response RolesDetection and Response Roles
Detection and Response RolesFlorian Roth
 
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdStrike
 
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security Descriptors
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security DescriptorsAn ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security Descriptors
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security DescriptorsWill Schroeder
 
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021Florian Roth
 
Responding to Cobalt Strike
Responding to Cobalt StrikeResponding to Cobalt Strike
Responding to Cobalt StrikeChristopher Gerritz
 
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CKIntroduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CKArpan Raval
 
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentation
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentationHunting for APT in network logs workshop presentation
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentationOlehLevytskyi1
 
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...Christopher Frohoff
 
XXE: How to become a Jedi
XXE: How to become a JediXXE: How to become a Jedi
XXE: How to become a JediYaroslav Babin
 
Detection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageDetection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageSunny Neo
 
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemFantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemRoss Wolf
 
DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017
DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017
DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017Paula Januszkiewicz
 
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?Paula Januszkiewicz
 

More Related Content

What's hot

Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryDerbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryThe Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
Red Team Methodology - A Naked Look
Red Team Methodology - A Naked LookRed Team Methodology - A Naked Look
Red Team Methodology - A Naked LookJason Lang
 
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling Pickles
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling PicklesOWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling Pickles
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling PicklesChristopher Frohoff
 
Introduction to red team operations
Introduction to red team operationsIntroduction to red team operations
Introduction to red team operationsSunny Neo
 
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory PwnagePetros Koutroumpis
 
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundaclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundDirkjanMollema
 
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows InfrastructureHunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows InfrastructureSergey Soldatov
 
Detection and Response Roles
Detection and Response RolesDetection and Response Roles
Detection and Response RolesFlorian Roth
 
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdStrike
 
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security Descriptors
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security DescriptorsAn ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security Descriptors
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security DescriptorsWill Schroeder
 
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021Florian Roth
 
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CKIntroduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CKArpan Raval
 
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentation
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentationHunting for APT in network logs workshop presentation
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentationOlehLevytskyi1
 
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...Christopher Frohoff
 
XXE: How to become a Jedi
XXE: How to become a JediXXE: How to become a Jedi
XXE: How to become a JediYaroslav Babin
 
Detection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageDetection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageSunny Neo
 
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemFantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemRoss Wolf
 

What's hot (20)

Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryDerbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
 
A Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter HimselfA Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter Himself
 
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryThe Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
 
Red Team Methodology - A Naked Look
Red Team Methodology - A Naked LookRed Team Methodology - A Naked Look
Red Team Methodology - A Naked Look
 
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling Pickles
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling PicklesOWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling Pickles
OWASP AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling Pickles
 
Introduction to red team operations
Introduction to red team operationsIntroduction to red team operations
Introduction to red team operations
 
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage
(Ab)Using GPOs for Active Directory Pwnage
 
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundaclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
 
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows InfrastructureHunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure
Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure
 
Detection and Response Roles
Detection and Response RolesDetection and Response Roles
Detection and Response Roles
 
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
 
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security Descriptors
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security DescriptorsAn ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security Descriptors
An ACE in the Hole - Stealthy Host Persistence via Security Descriptors
 
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021
Sigma Hall of Fame - EU ATT&CK User Workshop, October 2021
 
Responding to Cobalt Strike
Responding to Cobalt StrikeResponding to Cobalt Strike
Responding to Cobalt Strike
 
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CKIntroduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK
 
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentation
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentationHunting for APT in network logs workshop presentation
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentation
 
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...
OWASP SD: Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate ...
 
XXE: How to become a Jedi
XXE: How to become a JediXXE: How to become a Jedi
XXE: How to become a Jedi
 
Detection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageDetection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules Coverage
 
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemFantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
 

Similar to Black Hat Europe 2017. DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption Toolkit

DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017
DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017
DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017Paula Januszkiewicz
 
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?Paula Januszkiewicz
 
Dear Hacker: Infrastructure Security Reality Check
Dear Hacker: Infrastructure Security Reality CheckDear Hacker: Infrastructure Security Reality Check
Dear Hacker: Infrastructure Security Reality CheckPaula Januszkiewicz
 
CQURE_BHAsia19_Paula_Januszkiewicz_slides
CQURE_BHAsia19_Paula_Januszkiewicz_slidesCQURE_BHAsia19_Paula_Januszkiewicz_slides
CQURE_BHAsia19_Paula_Januszkiewicz_slidesZuzannaKornecka
 
Postgresql 12 streaming replication hol
Postgresql 12 streaming replication holPostgresql 12 streaming replication hol
Postgresql 12 streaming replication holVijay Kumar N
 
Sql injection with sqlmap
Sql injection with sqlmapSql injection with sqlmap
Sql injection with sqlmapHerman Duarte
 
No more (unsecure) secrets, Marty
No more (unsecure) secrets, MartyNo more (unsecure) secrets, Marty
No more (unsecure) secrets, MartyMathias Herberts
 
How to Secure Your Scylla Deployment: Authorization, Encryption, LDAP Authent...
How to Secure Your Scylla Deployment: Authorization, Encryption, LDAP Authent...How to Secure Your Scylla Deployment: Authorization, Encryption, LDAP Authent...
How to Secure Your Scylla Deployment: Authorization, Encryption, LDAP Authent...ScyllaDB
 
Playing With (B)Sqli
Playing With (B)SqliPlaying With (B)Sqli
Playing With (B)SqliChema Alonso
 
How to Design a Great API (using flask) [ploneconf2017]
How to Design a Great API (using flask) [ploneconf2017]How to Design a Great API (using flask) [ploneconf2017]
How to Design a Great API (using flask) [ploneconf2017]Devon Bernard
 
CONFidence 2018: Intel ME: Security keys Genealogy, Obfuscation and other Mag...
CONFidence 2018: Intel ME: Security keys Genealogy, Obfuscation and other Mag...CONFidence 2018: Intel ME: Security keys Genealogy, Obfuscation and other Mag...
CONFidence 2018: Intel ME: Security keys Genealogy, Obfuscation and other Mag...PROIDEA
 
Dynamic Database Credentials: Security Contingency Planning
Dynamic Database Credentials: Security Contingency PlanningDynamic Database Credentials: Security Contingency Planning
Dynamic Database Credentials: Security Contingency PlanningSean Chittenden
 
DOAG 2016 Oracle Logon Security
DOAG 2016 Oracle Logon SecurityDOAG 2016 Oracle Logon Security
DOAG 2016 Oracle Logon SecurityLoopback.ORG
 
introduction to jsrsasign
introduction to jsrsasignintroduction to jsrsasign
introduction to jsrsasignKenji Urushima
 
Unix Security
Unix SecurityUnix Security
Unix Securityreplay21
 
9 password security
9 password security9 password security
9 password securitydrewz lin
 
Password (in)security
Password (in)securityPassword (in)security
Password (in)securityEnrico Zimuel
 
Cryptography for the mere mortals
Cryptography for the mere mortalsCryptography for the mere mortals
Cryptography for the mere mortalsM A Hossain Tonu
 
12 symmetric key cryptography
12 symmetric key cryptography12 symmetric key cryptography
12 symmetric key cryptographydrewz lin
 

Similar to Black Hat Europe 2017. DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption Toolkit (20)

DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017
DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017
DPAPI AND DPAPI-NG: Decryption toolkit. Black Hat 2017
 
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?
Adventures in Underland: Is encryption solid as a rock or a handful of dust?
 
Dear Hacker: Infrastructure Security Reality Check
Dear Hacker: Infrastructure Security Reality CheckDear Hacker: Infrastructure Security Reality Check
Dear Hacker: Infrastructure Security Reality Check
 
CQURE_BHAsia19_Paula_Januszkiewicz_slides
CQURE_BHAsia19_Paula_Januszkiewicz_slidesCQURE_BHAsia19_Paula_Januszkiewicz_slides
CQURE_BHAsia19_Paula_Januszkiewicz_slides
 
Postgresql 12 streaming replication hol
Postgresql 12 streaming replication holPostgresql 12 streaming replication hol
Postgresql 12 streaming replication hol
 
Sql injection with sqlmap
Sql injection with sqlmapSql injection with sqlmap
Sql injection with sqlmap
 
No more (unsecure) secrets, Marty
No more (unsecure) secrets, MartyNo more (unsecure) secrets, Marty
No more (unsecure) secrets, Marty
 
How to Secure Your Scylla Deployment: Authorization, Encryption, LDAP Authent...
How to Secure Your Scylla Deployment: Authorization, Encryption, LDAP Authent...How to Secure Your Scylla Deployment: Authorization, Encryption, LDAP Authent...
How to Secure Your Scylla Deployment: Authorization, Encryption, LDAP Authent...
 
Django cryptography
Django cryptographyDjango cryptography
Django cryptography
 
Playing With (B)Sqli
Playing With (B)SqliPlaying With (B)Sqli
Playing With (B)Sqli
 
How to Design a Great API (using flask) [ploneconf2017]
How to Design a Great API (using flask) [ploneconf2017]How to Design a Great API (using flask) [ploneconf2017]
How to Design a Great API (using flask) [ploneconf2017]
 
CONFidence 2018: Intel ME: Security keys Genealogy, Obfuscation and other Mag...
CONFidence 2018: Intel ME: Security keys Genealogy, Obfuscation and other Mag...CONFidence 2018: Intel ME: Security keys Genealogy, Obfuscation and other Mag...
CONFidence 2018: Intel ME: Security keys Genealogy, Obfuscation and other Mag...
 
Dynamic Database Credentials: Security Contingency Planning
Dynamic Database Credentials: Security Contingency PlanningDynamic Database Credentials: Security Contingency Planning
Dynamic Database Credentials: Security Contingency Planning
 
DOAG 2016 Oracle Logon Security
DOAG 2016 Oracle Logon SecurityDOAG 2016 Oracle Logon Security
DOAG 2016 Oracle Logon Security
 
introduction to jsrsasign
introduction to jsrsasignintroduction to jsrsasign
introduction to jsrsasign
 
Unix Security
Unix SecurityUnix Security
Unix Security
 
9 password security
9 password security9 password security
9 password security
 
Password (in)security
Password (in)securityPassword (in)security
Password (in)security
 
Cryptography for the mere mortals
Cryptography for the mere mortalsCryptography for the mere mortals
Cryptography for the mere mortals
 
12 symmetric key cryptography
12 symmetric key cryptography12 symmetric key cryptography
12 symmetric key cryptography
 

More from Paula Januszkiewicz

rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewicz
rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewiczrsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewicz
rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewiczPaula Januszkiewicz
 
Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2018
Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2018Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2018
Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2018Paula Januszkiewicz
 
Fatal signs: 10 symptoms when you think you’ve been hacked
Fatal signs: 10 symptoms when you think you’ve been hackedFatal signs: 10 symptoms when you think you’ve been hacked
Fatal signs: 10 symptoms when you think you’ve been hackedPaula Januszkiewicz
 
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth TakingTop 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth TakingPaula Januszkiewicz
 
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...Paula Januszkiewicz
 
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2018
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 201812 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2018
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2018Paula Januszkiewicz
 
Top 10 ways to make hackers excited: All about the shortcuts not worth taking
Top 10 ways to make hackers excited: All about the shortcuts not worth takingTop 10 ways to make hackers excited: All about the shortcuts not worth taking
Top 10 ways to make hackers excited: All about the shortcuts not worth takingPaula Januszkiewicz
 
The hacker playbook: How to think and act like a cybercriminal to reduce risk...
The hacker playbook: How to think and act like a cybercriminal to reduce risk...The hacker playbook: How to think and act like a cybercriminal to reduce risk...
The hacker playbook: How to think and act like a cybercriminal to reduce risk...Paula Januszkiewicz
 
30 Cybersecurity Skills You Need To Become a Windows Security Pro
30 Cybersecurity Skills You Need To Become a Windows Security Pro 30 Cybersecurity Skills You Need To Become a Windows Security Pro
30 Cybersecurity Skills You Need To Become a Windows Security Pro Paula Januszkiewicz
 
RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...
RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...
RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...Paula Januszkiewicz
 
RSA Conference 2017 session: What System Stores on the Disk Without Telling You
RSA Conference 2017 session: What System Stores on the Disk Without Telling YouRSA Conference 2017 session: What System Stores on the Disk Without Telling You
RSA Conference 2017 session: What System Stores on the Disk Without Telling YouPaula Januszkiewicz
 
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2017
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 201712 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2017
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2017Paula Januszkiewicz
 
Microsoft Ignite session: Look under the hood: bypassing antimalware tactics ...
Microsoft Ignite session: Look under the hood: bypassing antimalware tactics ...Microsoft Ignite session: Look under the hood: bypassing antimalware tactics ...
Microsoft Ignite session: Look under the hood: bypassing antimalware tactics ...Paula Januszkiewicz
 
Microsoft Ignite session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techn...
Microsoft Ignite session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techn...Microsoft Ignite session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techn...
Microsoft Ignite session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techn...Paula Januszkiewicz
 

More from Paula Januszkiewicz (14)

rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewicz
rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewiczrsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewicz
rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewicz
 
Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2018
Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2018Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2018
Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2018
 
Fatal signs: 10 symptoms when you think you’ve been hacked
Fatal signs: 10 symptoms when you think you’ve been hackedFatal signs: 10 symptoms when you think you’ve been hacked
Fatal signs: 10 symptoms when you think you’ve been hacked
 
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth TakingTop 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
 
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...
 
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2018
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 201812 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2018
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2018
 
Top 10 ways to make hackers excited: All about the shortcuts not worth taking
Top 10 ways to make hackers excited: All about the shortcuts not worth takingTop 10 ways to make hackers excited: All about the shortcuts not worth taking
Top 10 ways to make hackers excited: All about the shortcuts not worth taking
 
The hacker playbook: How to think and act like a cybercriminal to reduce risk...
The hacker playbook: How to think and act like a cybercriminal to reduce risk...The hacker playbook: How to think and act like a cybercriminal to reduce risk...
The hacker playbook: How to think and act like a cybercriminal to reduce risk...
 
30 Cybersecurity Skills You Need To Become a Windows Security Pro
30 Cybersecurity Skills You Need To Become a Windows Security Pro 30 Cybersecurity Skills You Need To Become a Windows Security Pro
30 Cybersecurity Skills You Need To Become a Windows Security Pro
 
RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...
RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...
RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...
 
RSA Conference 2017 session: What System Stores on the Disk Without Telling You
RSA Conference 2017 session: What System Stores on the Disk Without Telling YouRSA Conference 2017 session: What System Stores on the Disk Without Telling You
RSA Conference 2017 session: What System Stores on the Disk Without Telling You
 
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2017
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 201712 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2017
12 Crucial Windows Security Skills for 2017
 
Microsoft Ignite session: Look under the hood: bypassing antimalware tactics ...
Microsoft Ignite session: Look under the hood: bypassing antimalware tactics ...Microsoft Ignite session: Look under the hood: bypassing antimalware tactics ...
Microsoft Ignite session: Look under the hood: bypassing antimalware tactics ...
 
Microsoft Ignite session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techn...
Microsoft Ignite session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techn...Microsoft Ignite session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techn...
Microsoft Ignite session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techn...
 

Recently uploaded

AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024The Digital Insurer
 
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor PresentationDBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor PresentationDropbox
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...Zilliz
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...apidays
 
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : UncertaintyArtificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : UncertaintyKhushali Kathiriya
 
Exploring Multimodal Embeddings with Milvus
Exploring Multimodal Embeddings with MilvusExploring Multimodal Embeddings with Milvus
Exploring Multimodal Embeddings with MilvusZilliz
 
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdfRansomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdfOverkill Security
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerThousandEyes
 
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In PakistanCNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistandanishmna97
 
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdfRising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdfOrbitshub
 
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Victor Rentea
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfsudhanshuwaghmare1
 
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdfCyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdfOverkill Security
 
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 AmsterdamDEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 AmsterdamUiPathCommunity
 
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businesspanagenda
 
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesrafiqahmad00786416
 

Recently uploaded (20)

AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
 
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor PresentationDBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
 
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : UncertaintyArtificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
 
Exploring Multimodal Embeddings with Milvus
Exploring Multimodal Embeddings with MilvusExploring Multimodal Embeddings with Milvus
Exploring Multimodal Embeddings with Milvus
 
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdfRansomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In PakistanCNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
 
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdfRising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
 
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdfCyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
 
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 AmsterdamDEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
 
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
 
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
 

Black Hat Europe 2017. DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption Toolkit

  • 1.
  • 2. DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption aka. Hacking Toolkit @paulacqure @CQUREAcademy
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6. Class names for keys from HKLMSYSTEMCCSControlLsa HKLMSECURITYCache HKLMSECURITYPolicySecrets HKLMSECURITYPolicySecrets
  • 7. Based on the following components: Password, data blob, entropy Is not prone to password resets! Protects from outsiders when being in offline access Effectively protects users data Stores the password history You need to be able to get access to some of your passwords from the past Conclusion:OS greatlyhelpsus to protectsecrets
  • 8. DPAPI (classic) A. MasterKey 1. pwdhash = MD4(password) or SHA1(password) 2. pwdhash_key = HMACSHA1(pwdhash, user_sid) 3. PBKDF2(…, pwdhash_key,…), another elements from the file. Windows 10 no domain: SHA512, AES-256, 8000 rounds 4. Control – HMACSHA512 B. CREDHIST 1. pwdhash = MD4(password) or SHA1(password) 2. pwdhash_key = HMACSHA1(pwdhash, user_sid) 3. PBKDF2(…, pwdhash_key,…), another elements from the file. Windows 10 no domain: SHA512, AES-256, 8000 rounds 4. Control – HMACSHA512 C. DPAPI blob Algorithms are written in the blob itself.
  • 9.
  • 10. Used to group one or more Web Applications Purpose: Assign resources, serve as a security sandbox Use Worker Processes (w3wp.exe) Their identity is defined in Application Pool settings Process requests to the applications Passwords for AppPool identity can be ’decrypted’ even offline They are stored in the encrypted form in applicationHost.config Conclusion: IIS relies it’s security on Machine Keys (Local System)
  • 11. DPAPI-PROTECTED BLOB CLIENT Local LSASS process (local masterkey can’t be decrypted) CryptUnprotectData() DPAPI AD SERVER LSASS process RPC Call BackupKey(masterkey) Decrypted masterkey 01 00 00 00 d0 8c 9d df 01 15 d1 11 8c 7a 00 c0 4f c2 97 eb 01 00 00 00 ...... G$BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED G$BCKUPKEY_940db612-ee8f-4a31-84b3-8f80c25be855 Scenario: offline changed user password or local masterkey can’t be decrypted
  • 12. There is actually not much of a difference with XP / 2003! No additional salting. PBKDF2 introduced a new variable: the number of iterations SHA1 with the same salt as before (username).
  • 13. Getting the: cached data MSDCC2 1.bootkey: classes from HKLMSYSTEMCCSControlLsa + [class names for: Data, GBG, JD, Skew1] (+arrays’ permutations) int[] permutationBootKey = new int[] { 0x8, 0x5, 0x4, 0x2, 0xb, 0x9, 0xd, 0x3, 0x0, 0x6, 0x1, 0xc, 0xe, 0xa, 0xf, 0x7 }; 2.PolEKList: HKLMSECURITYPolicyPolEKList [default value] 3.lsakey: AES_DECRYPT(key, data) -> AES(bootkey, PolEKList) 4.NL$KM secret: HKLMSECURITYPolicySecretsNL$KM 5.nlkm_decrypted: AES_DECRYPT(lsakey, NL$KM secret) 6.Cache_Entry{id} -> HKLMSECURITYCacheNL${id} 7.cache_entry_decrypted -> AES_DECRYPT(nlkm_decrypted, Cache_Entry{id})
  • 14. DK = PBKDF2(PRF, Password, Salt, c, dkLen) Microsoft’s implementation: MSDCC2= PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA1, DCC1, username, 10240, 16) Legend
  • 15.
  • 18. DomainKey contains some GUID and 256-byte len secret – RSA?? Dude, look in the AD...
  • 19.
  • 20. Legend The master password for KeePass files encrypted & stored as cipherText (80 bytes)
  • 21.
  • 22. Getting the: DPAPI-NG Secrets DPAPI-NG A. RootKey Algorithms Key derivation function: SP800_108_CTR_HMAC (SHA512) Secret agreement: Diffie-Hellman B. DPAPI blob Key derivation: KDF_SP80056A_CONCAT After getting the key, there is a need for decryption: Key wrap algorithm: RFC3394 (KEK -> CEK) Decryption: AES-256-GCM (CEK, Blob)
  • 23. SID-PROTECTED BLOB CLIENT Local LSASS processNCryptUnprotectSecret() CNGDPAPI AD SERVER LSASS process RPC Call GetKey(SID, L0, L1, L2 params) ACTIVE DIRECTORY RootKey RootKeyData? Group key
  • 24. Looks familiar? It should! It’s DPAPI blob! Protection descriptor: LOCAL=user • KEK (Key Encryption Key) stored as DPAPI blob • Forced by protection descriptor LOCAL=user • Key Wrap (RFC3394) contains encrypted CEK (Content Encryption Key) • Data encrypted by CEK
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 27. Tool Description CQMasterKeyAD DPAPIBlobCreator CQDPAPIKeePassDBDecryptor DPAPINGDecrypter CQDPAPIEncDec CQAspNetCoreDecryptData. CQDPAPIExportPFXFromAD CQAspNetCoreMasterKeyCreate CQRDCManDecrypter CQAspNetCoreEncryptData CQDPAPINGPFXDecrypter CQDPAPINGDNCoreMasterKeyDecrypter *CQImpersonateWithSeTcb
  • 28.
  • 29.
  • 30.
  • 31. DPAPI and DPAPI-NG: Decryption aka. Hacking Toolkit @paulacqure @CQUREAcademy