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An introduction to game
theory
Today: The fundamentals of
game theory, including Nash
equilibrium
Today
 Introduction to game theory
 We can look at market situations with two
players (typically firms)
 Although we will look at situations where
each player can make only one of two
decisions, theory easily extends to three or
more decisions
Who is this?
John Nash, the person portrayed
in “A Beautiful Mind”
John Nash
 One of the early
researchers in
game theory
 His work resulted
in a form of
equilibrium
named after him
Three elements in every game
 Players
 Two or more for most games that are
interesting
 Strategies available to each player
 Payoffs
 Based on your decision(s) and the
decision(s) of other(s)
Game theory: Payoff matrix
 A payoff
matrix
shows the
payout to
each
player,
given the
decision of
each
player
Action C Action D
Action A 10, 2 8, 3
Action B 12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
How do we interpret this box?
 The first number in
each box determines
the payout for
Person 1
 The second number
determines the
payout for Person 2
Action
C
Action
D
Action
A
10, 2 8, 3
Action
B
12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
How do we interpret this box?
 Example
 If Person 1
chooses Action A
and Person 2
chooses Action D,
then Person 1
receives a payout
of 8 and Person 2
receives a payout
of 3
Action
C
Action
D
Action
A
10, 2 8, 3
Action
B
12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
Back to a Core Principle:
Equilibrium
 The type of equilibrium we are looking
for here is called Nash equilibrium
 Nash equilibrium: “Any combination of
strategies in which each player’s strategy
is his or her best choice, given the other
players’ choices” (F/B p. 322)
 Exactly one person deviating from a NE
strategy would result in the same payout or
lower payout for that person
How do we find Nash
equilibrium (NE)?
 Step 1: Pretend you are one of the players
 Step 2: Assume that your “opponent” picks a
particular action
 Step 3: Determine your best strategy (strategies),
given your opponent’s action
 Underline any best choice in the payoff matrix
 Step 4: Repeat Steps 2 & 3 for any other opponent
strategies
 Step 5: Repeat Steps 1 through 4 for the other
player
 Step 6: Any entry with all numbers underlined is NE
Steps 1 and 2
 Assume that
you are
Person 1
 Given that
Person 2
chooses
Action C,
what is
Person 1’s
best
choice?
Action
C
Action D
Action
A
10, 2 8, 3
Action B 12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
Step 3:
 Underline
best payout,
given the
choice of the
other player
 Choose
Action B,
since
12 > 10 
underline 12
Action
C
Action D
Action
A
10, 2 8, 3
Action B 12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
Step 4
 Now
assume
that Person
2 chooses
Action D
 Here,
10 > 8 
Choose
and
underline
10
Action C Action
D
Action A 10, 2 8, 3
Action B 12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
Step 5
 Now,
assume you
are Person 2
 If Person 1
chooses A
 3 > 2 
underline 3
 If Person 1
chooses B
 4 > 1 
underline 4
Action C Action D
Action
A
10, 2 8, 3
Action
B
12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
Step 6
 Which
box(es) have
underlines
under both
numbers?
 Person 1
chooses B
and Person
2 chooses
C
 This is the
only NE
Action C Action D
Action A 10, 2 8, 3
Action B 12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
Double check our NE
 What if
Person 1
deviates
from NE?
 Could
choose A
and get 10
 Person 1’s
payout is
lower by
deviating 
Action C Action D
Action A 10, 2 8, 3
Action B 12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
Double check our NE
 What if
Person 2
deviates
from NE?
 Could
choose D
and get 1
 Person 2’s
payout is
lower by
deviating 
Action C Action D
Action A 10, 2 8, 3
Action B 12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
Dominant strategy
 A strategy is
dominant if that
choice is
definitely made
no matter what
the other
person chooses
 Example:
Person 1 has a
dominant
strategy of
choosing B
Action C Action D
Action A 10, 2 8, 3
Action B 12, 4 10, 1
Person
1
Person 2
New example
 Suppose in
this example
that two
people are
simultaneousl
y going to
decide on this
game
Yes No
Yes 20, 20 5, 10
No 10, 5 10, 10
Person
1
Person 2
New example
 We will go
through the
same steps to
determine NE
Yes No
Yes 20, 20 5, 10
No 10, 5 10, 10
Person
1
Person 2
Two NE possible
 (Yes, Yes) and
(No, No) are
both NE
 Although (Yes,
Yes) is the
more efficient
outcome, we
have no way to
predict which
outcome will
actually occur
Yes No
Yes 20, 20 5, 10
No 10, 5 10, 10
Person
1
Person 2
Two NE possible
 When there are multiple NE that are
possible, economic theory tells us little
about which outcome occurs with
certainty
Two NE possible
 Additional information or actions may
help to determine outcome
 If people could act sequentially instead of
simultaneously, we could see that 20, 20
would occur in equilibrium
Sequential decisions
 Suppose that decisions can be made
sequentially
 We can work backwards to determine
how people will behave
 We will examine the last decision first and
then work toward the first decision
 To do this, we will use a decision tree
Decision tree in a sequential
game: Person 1 chooses first
A
B
C
Person
1
chooses
yes
Person
1
chooses
no
Person 2
chooses
yes
Person 2
chooses
yes
Person 2
chooses no
Person 2
chooses no
20, 20
5, 10
10, 5
10, 10
Decision tree in a sequential
game: Person 1 chooses first
 Given point B,
Person 2 will
choose yes
(20 > 10)
 Given point C,
Person 2 will
choose no
(10 > 5)
A
B
C
Person
1
chooses
yes
Person
1
chooses
no
Person 2
chooses
yes
Person 2
chooses
yes
Person 2
chooses no
Person 2
chooses
no
20, 20
5, 10
10, 5
10, 10
Decision tree in a sequential
game: Person 1 chooses first
 If Person 1 is
rational, she will
ignore potential
choices that
Person 2 will not
make
 Example: Person
2 will not choose
yes after Person 1
chooses no
A
B
C
Person
1
chooses
yes
Person
1
chooses
no
Person 2
chooses
yes
Person 2
chooses
yes
Person 2
chooses no
Person 2
chooses
no
20, 20
5, 10
10, 5
10, 10
Decision tree in a sequential
game: Person 1 chooses first
 If Person 1 knows
that Person 2 is
rational, then she
will choose yes,
since 20 > 10
 Person 2 makes a
decision from point
B, and he will
choose yes also
 Payout: (20, 20)
A
B
C
Person
1
chooses
yes
Person
1
chooses
no
Person 2
chooses
yes
Person 2
chooses
yes
Person 2
chooses no
Person 2
chooses
no
20, 20
5, 10
10, 5
10, 10
Summary
 Game theory
 Simultaneous decisions  NE
 Sequential decisions  Some NE may not
occur if people are rational
Can you think of ways game theory
can be used in these games?

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Introduction to game theory

  • 1. An introduction to game theory Today: The fundamentals of game theory, including Nash equilibrium
  • 2. Today  Introduction to game theory  We can look at market situations with two players (typically firms)  Although we will look at situations where each player can make only one of two decisions, theory easily extends to three or more decisions
  • 4. John Nash, the person portrayed in “A Beautiful Mind”
  • 5. John Nash  One of the early researchers in game theory  His work resulted in a form of equilibrium named after him
  • 6. Three elements in every game  Players  Two or more for most games that are interesting  Strategies available to each player  Payoffs  Based on your decision(s) and the decision(s) of other(s)
  • 7. Game theory: Payoff matrix  A payoff matrix shows the payout to each player, given the decision of each player Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 8. How do we interpret this box?  The first number in each box determines the payout for Person 1  The second number determines the payout for Person 2 Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 9. How do we interpret this box?  Example  If Person 1 chooses Action A and Person 2 chooses Action D, then Person 1 receives a payout of 8 and Person 2 receives a payout of 3 Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 10. Back to a Core Principle: Equilibrium  The type of equilibrium we are looking for here is called Nash equilibrium  Nash equilibrium: “Any combination of strategies in which each player’s strategy is his or her best choice, given the other players’ choices” (F/B p. 322)  Exactly one person deviating from a NE strategy would result in the same payout or lower payout for that person
  • 11. How do we find Nash equilibrium (NE)?  Step 1: Pretend you are one of the players  Step 2: Assume that your “opponent” picks a particular action  Step 3: Determine your best strategy (strategies), given your opponent’s action  Underline any best choice in the payoff matrix  Step 4: Repeat Steps 2 & 3 for any other opponent strategies  Step 5: Repeat Steps 1 through 4 for the other player  Step 6: Any entry with all numbers underlined is NE
  • 12. Steps 1 and 2  Assume that you are Person 1  Given that Person 2 chooses Action C, what is Person 1’s best choice? Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 13. Step 3:  Underline best payout, given the choice of the other player  Choose Action B, since 12 > 10  underline 12 Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 14. Step 4  Now assume that Person 2 chooses Action D  Here, 10 > 8  Choose and underline 10 Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 15. Step 5  Now, assume you are Person 2  If Person 1 chooses A  3 > 2  underline 3  If Person 1 chooses B  4 > 1  underline 4 Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 16. Step 6  Which box(es) have underlines under both numbers?  Person 1 chooses B and Person 2 chooses C  This is the only NE Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 17. Double check our NE  What if Person 1 deviates from NE?  Could choose A and get 10  Person 1’s payout is lower by deviating  Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 18. Double check our NE  What if Person 2 deviates from NE?  Could choose D and get 1  Person 2’s payout is lower by deviating  Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 19. Dominant strategy  A strategy is dominant if that choice is definitely made no matter what the other person chooses  Example: Person 1 has a dominant strategy of choosing B Action C Action D Action A 10, 2 8, 3 Action B 12, 4 10, 1 Person 1 Person 2
  • 20. New example  Suppose in this example that two people are simultaneousl y going to decide on this game Yes No Yes 20, 20 5, 10 No 10, 5 10, 10 Person 1 Person 2
  • 21. New example  We will go through the same steps to determine NE Yes No Yes 20, 20 5, 10 No 10, 5 10, 10 Person 1 Person 2
  • 22. Two NE possible  (Yes, Yes) and (No, No) are both NE  Although (Yes, Yes) is the more efficient outcome, we have no way to predict which outcome will actually occur Yes No Yes 20, 20 5, 10 No 10, 5 10, 10 Person 1 Person 2
  • 23. Two NE possible  When there are multiple NE that are possible, economic theory tells us little about which outcome occurs with certainty
  • 24. Two NE possible  Additional information or actions may help to determine outcome  If people could act sequentially instead of simultaneously, we could see that 20, 20 would occur in equilibrium
  • 25. Sequential decisions  Suppose that decisions can be made sequentially  We can work backwards to determine how people will behave  We will examine the last decision first and then work toward the first decision  To do this, we will use a decision tree
  • 26. Decision tree in a sequential game: Person 1 chooses first A B C Person 1 chooses yes Person 1 chooses no Person 2 chooses yes Person 2 chooses yes Person 2 chooses no Person 2 chooses no 20, 20 5, 10 10, 5 10, 10
  • 27. Decision tree in a sequential game: Person 1 chooses first  Given point B, Person 2 will choose yes (20 > 10)  Given point C, Person 2 will choose no (10 > 5) A B C Person 1 chooses yes Person 1 chooses no Person 2 chooses yes Person 2 chooses yes Person 2 chooses no Person 2 chooses no 20, 20 5, 10 10, 5 10, 10
  • 28. Decision tree in a sequential game: Person 1 chooses first  If Person 1 is rational, she will ignore potential choices that Person 2 will not make  Example: Person 2 will not choose yes after Person 1 chooses no A B C Person 1 chooses yes Person 1 chooses no Person 2 chooses yes Person 2 chooses yes Person 2 chooses no Person 2 chooses no 20, 20 5, 10 10, 5 10, 10
  • 29. Decision tree in a sequential game: Person 1 chooses first  If Person 1 knows that Person 2 is rational, then she will choose yes, since 20 > 10  Person 2 makes a decision from point B, and he will choose yes also  Payout: (20, 20) A B C Person 1 chooses yes Person 1 chooses no Person 2 chooses yes Person 2 chooses yes Person 2 chooses no Person 2 chooses no 20, 20 5, 10 10, 5 10, 10
  • 30. Summary  Game theory  Simultaneous decisions  NE  Sequential decisions  Some NE may not occur if people are rational
  • 31. Can you think of ways game theory can be used in these games?