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Agenda

–Thinking about the concept
–Introduction
–Types of defensive technology
–Raising the bar
–Typical assessment methodology
–Attacks
–Examples
–Conclusion
Thinking about the concept
We’re from South Africa:
  –Robbery on Atterbury Road in Pretoria
  –Electric fencing around my house
From the insect world:
  –Acid bugs – “I don’t taste nice”
  –Electric eel
Spy vs. spy:
  –Disinformation
Introduction
Current trends in “assessment” space:
  –Technology is getting smarter
  –People are getting lazy
  –Good “hacker” used to be technically clever
  –Tool/scanner for every level of attack

Perceptions:
  –Administrators are dumb, “hackers” are clever
  –Skill = size of your toolbox

In many cases the mechanic’s car is always broken.
Types of defensive technology
              Robbery analogy:
–Firewalls:   Amour plated windows
–IDS:         Police
–IPS:         Driving away
–Back Hack:   Carry a gun in the car
               Fence analogy:
–Firewalls:   Walls
–IDS:         Police
–IPS:         Armed response
–Back Hack:   Trigger happy wife…
Raising the bar
Raising the “cost” of an “assessment”:
   Attacking the technology, not the people
   Attacking automation; “lets move to the next target”

Used to be: “Are you sure it’s not a honey pot?”
Now:
   –Is YOUR network safe?
   –Are YOUR tools safe from attack?
   –Do YOU have all the service packs installed?

   –Do you measure yourself as you measure your targets?
Typical assessment methodology

 •   Foot printing
 •   Vitality
 •   Network level visibility
 •   Vulnerability discovery
 •   Vulnerability exploitation

 •   Web application assessment
Attacks
Types:
  -Avoiding/Stopping individual attacks
  -Creating noise/confusion
  -Stopping/Killing the tool
  -Killing the attacker’s host/network


Levels:
  -Network level
  -Network application level
  -Application level
Attacks
Attack vectors:
All information coming back to the attacker is under OUR
     control:
   –   Packets (and all its features)
   –   Banners
   –   Forward & reverse DNS entries
   –   Error codes, messages
   –   W eb pages


Used in the tool/scanner itself
Used in rendering of data, databases
Used in secondary scanners, reporters
Examples
               Foot printing:
Avoiding
    DNS obfuscation
Noise:
    “Eat my zone!”
Stopping:
    Endless loop of forward entries
Killing:
    Eeeevil named…reverse entries
Examples
                          Foot printing:
Tools:
Very basic – host, nslookup, dig
Domains: not a lot we can do there..
DNS entries: forward, reverse, axfr, ns

SensePost has some interesting foot printing tools…
Examples
Examples
                          Network level:
Avoiding
    Firewall
Noise:
    honeyd & transparent reverse proxies
   –   Random IPs alive
   –   Random ports open
   –   Traceroute interception/misdirection
   –   Fake network broadcast addresses
Stopping:
     ?
Killing:
     nmap with banner display??
Examples
               Network level:
Tools:
Ping sweeps / vitality checkers
Port scanners
   nmap, paketto/pulse, superscan,
   visualroute, some custom scripts, etc.
   etc.
Examples
               Network level:
Tools:
Ping sweeps / vitality checkers
Port scanners
   nmap, paketto/pulse, superscan,
   visualroute, some custom scripts, etc.
   etc.
Examples
Examples
                            Network application level

Avoiding
    Patches, patches
Noise:
    –      Fake banners
    –      Combined banners
    –      NASL (reverse) interpreter
Stopping:
    –      Tar pits
Killing:
    –      Buffer overflows
    –      Rendering of data – malicious code in HTML
    –      Where data is inserted into databases
    –      Scanners that use other scanners (e.g. using nessus,nmap)
Examples
         Network application level

Tools:
Shareware: Nessus, amap, httpprint, Sara &
  friends?
Commercial: ISS, Retina, Typhon,
  Foundscan, Qualys, Cisco
Examples
               Application level & (web server assessment)

Avoiding
     Application level firewall
Noise:
    –   On IPs not in use:
        •   Random 404,500,302,200 responses
        •   Not enough to latch “friendly 404”, or intercept 404 checking
    –   Within the application
        •   Bogus forms, fields
        •   Pages with “ODBC ….”
Stopping:
      Spider traps, Flash, Human detectors
Killing:
    –   “You are an idiot!”
    –   Bait files.. Admintool.exe and friends in /files,/admin etc.
Examples
Tools:
Shareware: Nikto, Nessus, Whisker?,
  WebScarab, Exodus, Pharos, Spike,
  Httrack, Teleport pro

Commercial: Sanctum Appscan, Cenzic
  Hailstorm, Kavado Scando, SPI
  Dynamics WebInspect, @stake webproxy
Examples
                                  Incoming
Armpit1                          connection



                                                                    Back to client
   Back to client


                                   Valid                 Relay
                                              yes
                       no         cookie?              connection




                      Valid                         Send valid
            no       request           yes          cookie and
                     string?                         redirect



         Build and
        send Flash
Examples
Examples
Armpit2                                             Incoming
                                                   connection

With IPS
                                     Bad
                                    cookie
    Back to client                    jar


                                                     Valid
                                                    cookie?
                                                                  yes



                               no                                                                  Back to client

                                                                                       BlackList
                                        Relay                      Evil                Cookie &
                                                        no                      yes
                                      connection                request?                 close
                                                                                      connection




                                                                        Send valid
     Build and            Valid request
                     no                               yes               cookie and
    send Flash               string?
                                                                         redirect
Combining with IPS
Conclusion
• These techniques do not make your
  network safer?
• IPS is getting smarter
  – The closer to the application level they go, the more
    accurate they become.
• IPS can easily switch on “armpits”
• It’s a whole new ballgame…
QUESTIONS??
COMMENTS??
FLAMES??

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When the tables turn

  • 1.
  • 2. Agenda –Thinking about the concept –Introduction –Types of defensive technology –Raising the bar –Typical assessment methodology –Attacks –Examples –Conclusion
  • 3. Thinking about the concept We’re from South Africa: –Robbery on Atterbury Road in Pretoria –Electric fencing around my house From the insect world: –Acid bugs – “I don’t taste nice” –Electric eel Spy vs. spy: –Disinformation
  • 4. Introduction Current trends in “assessment” space: –Technology is getting smarter –People are getting lazy –Good “hacker” used to be technically clever –Tool/scanner for every level of attack Perceptions: –Administrators are dumb, “hackers” are clever –Skill = size of your toolbox In many cases the mechanic’s car is always broken.
  • 5. Types of defensive technology Robbery analogy: –Firewalls: Amour plated windows –IDS: Police –IPS: Driving away –Back Hack: Carry a gun in the car Fence analogy: –Firewalls: Walls –IDS: Police –IPS: Armed response –Back Hack: Trigger happy wife…
  • 6. Raising the bar Raising the “cost” of an “assessment”: Attacking the technology, not the people Attacking automation; “lets move to the next target” Used to be: “Are you sure it’s not a honey pot?” Now: –Is YOUR network safe? –Are YOUR tools safe from attack? –Do YOU have all the service packs installed? –Do you measure yourself as you measure your targets?
  • 7. Typical assessment methodology • Foot printing • Vitality • Network level visibility • Vulnerability discovery • Vulnerability exploitation • Web application assessment
  • 8. Attacks Types: -Avoiding/Stopping individual attacks -Creating noise/confusion -Stopping/Killing the tool -Killing the attacker’s host/network Levels: -Network level -Network application level -Application level
  • 9. Attacks Attack vectors: All information coming back to the attacker is under OUR control: – Packets (and all its features) – Banners – Forward & reverse DNS entries – Error codes, messages – W eb pages Used in the tool/scanner itself Used in rendering of data, databases Used in secondary scanners, reporters
  • 10. Examples Foot printing: Avoiding DNS obfuscation Noise: “Eat my zone!” Stopping: Endless loop of forward entries Killing: Eeeevil named…reverse entries
  • 11. Examples Foot printing: Tools: Very basic – host, nslookup, dig Domains: not a lot we can do there.. DNS entries: forward, reverse, axfr, ns SensePost has some interesting foot printing tools…
  • 13. Examples Network level: Avoiding Firewall Noise: honeyd & transparent reverse proxies – Random IPs alive – Random ports open – Traceroute interception/misdirection – Fake network broadcast addresses Stopping: ? Killing: nmap with banner display??
  • 14. Examples Network level: Tools: Ping sweeps / vitality checkers Port scanners nmap, paketto/pulse, superscan, visualroute, some custom scripts, etc. etc.
  • 15. Examples Network level: Tools: Ping sweeps / vitality checkers Port scanners nmap, paketto/pulse, superscan, visualroute, some custom scripts, etc. etc.
  • 17. Examples Network application level Avoiding Patches, patches Noise: – Fake banners – Combined banners – NASL (reverse) interpreter Stopping: – Tar pits Killing: – Buffer overflows – Rendering of data – malicious code in HTML – Where data is inserted into databases – Scanners that use other scanners (e.g. using nessus,nmap)
  • 18. Examples Network application level Tools: Shareware: Nessus, amap, httpprint, Sara & friends? Commercial: ISS, Retina, Typhon, Foundscan, Qualys, Cisco
  • 19. Examples Application level & (web server assessment) Avoiding Application level firewall Noise: – On IPs not in use: • Random 404,500,302,200 responses • Not enough to latch “friendly 404”, or intercept 404 checking – Within the application • Bogus forms, fields • Pages with “ODBC ….” Stopping: Spider traps, Flash, Human detectors Killing: – “You are an idiot!” – Bait files.. Admintool.exe and friends in /files,/admin etc.
  • 20. Examples Tools: Shareware: Nikto, Nessus, Whisker?, WebScarab, Exodus, Pharos, Spike, Httrack, Teleport pro Commercial: Sanctum Appscan, Cenzic Hailstorm, Kavado Scando, SPI Dynamics WebInspect, @stake webproxy
  • 21. Examples Incoming Armpit1 connection Back to client Back to client Valid Relay yes no cookie? connection Valid Send valid no request yes cookie and string? redirect Build and send Flash
  • 23. Examples Armpit2 Incoming connection With IPS Bad cookie Back to client jar Valid cookie? yes no Back to client BlackList Relay Evil Cookie & no yes connection request? close connection Send valid Build and Valid request no yes cookie and send Flash string? redirect
  • 25. Conclusion • These techniques do not make your network safer? • IPS is getting smarter – The closer to the application level they go, the more accurate they become. • IPS can easily switch on “armpits” • It’s a whole new ballgame…