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๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
1
๋ธ”๋ก์ฒด์ธ์˜ ์ด๋ก ์ 
ํ† ๋Œ€, ์•”ํ˜ธํ•™
๋ณด์•ˆ๊ณตํ•™์—ฐ๊ตฌ์‹ค
๊น€์Šน์ฃผ ๊ต์ˆ˜ (skim71@korea.ac.kr)
๋ฏธ๋ž˜์œตํ•ฉ๊ธฐ์ˆ ๊ด€ 610ํ˜ธ
์ € ์„œ
Security Assessment aNd Engineering Lab
www.KimLab.net / www.HackProof.systems
์ฃผ์š” ๊ฒฝ๋ ฅ :
1990.3~1999.2) ์„ฑ๊ท ๊ด€๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๊ณตํ•™ ํ•™์‚ฌยท์„์‚ฌยท๋ฐ•์‚ฌ
1998.12~2004.2) KISA ์•”ํ˜ธ๊ธฐ์ˆ ํŒ€์žฅ ๋ฐ CCํ‰๊ฐ€1ํŒ€์žฅ
2004.3~2011.2) ์„ฑ๊ท ๊ด€๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ์ •๋ณดํ†ต์‹ ๊ณตํ•™๋ถ€ ๋ถ€๊ต์ˆ˜
2011.3~ํ˜„์žฌ) ๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ์‚ฌ์ด๋ฒ„๊ตญ๋ฐฉํ•™๊ณผโˆ™์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์› ์ •๊ต์ˆ˜
(์‚ฌ)HARU & SECUINSIDE ์„ค๋ฆฝ์ž ๋ฐ ์ด์‚ฌ
2017.4~ํ˜„์žฌ) ๊ตญ๋ฐฉRMF์—ฐ๊ตฌ์„ผํ„ฐ(AR2C) ์„ผํ„ฐ์žฅ
2018.5~ํ˜„์žฌ) ๊ณ ์‹ ๋ขฐ๋ณด์•ˆ์šด์˜์ฒด์ œ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์„ผํ„ฐ(CHAOS) ์„ผํ„ฐ์žฅ
ๅ‰) ์œก๊ตฐ์‚ฌ๊ด€ํ•™๊ต ์ดˆ๋น™๊ต์ˆ˜
ๅ‰) ๊ฐœ์ธ์ •๋ณด๋ถ„์Ÿ์กฐ์ •์œ„์›ํšŒ ์œ„์›
ๅ‰) ๋Œ€ํ†ต๋ น์ง์† 4์ฐจ์‚ฐ์—…ํ˜๋ช…์œ„์›ํšŒ ์œ„์›
็พ) ํ•ฉ๋™์ฐธ๋ชจ๋ณธ๋ถ€ ์ •์ฑ…์ž๋ฌธ์œ„์›
็พ) ๊ตญ๋ฐฉ๋ถ€ CIO ์ž๋ฌธ์œ„์›
็พ) Black Hat Asia Review Board
- SCI(E) ๋…ผ๋ฌธ: 76ํŽธ, ์ธ์šฉํšŸ์ˆ˜: 4800+ (๊ตฌ๊ธ€ ๊ธฐ์ค€)
- '07, '18: ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ •๋ณด์›์žฅ ๋ฐ ํ–‰์ •์•ˆ์ „๋ถ€ ์žฅ๊ด€ ํ‘œ์ฐฝ
- '12, '16: ๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ์„ํƒ‘๊ฐ•์˜์ƒ (์ƒ์œ„ 5%)
- '19: ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ณต๋ฌด์›์ธ์žฌ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ์› ๋ฒ ์ŠคํŠธ๊ฐ•์‚ฌ ๋ช…์—์˜์ „๋‹น ํ—Œ์ • (์ƒ์œ„ 0.3% = 3๋ช…/800์—ฌ๋ช…)
- ACSAC (1ํŽธ), AsiaCrypt (1ํŽธ), BlackHat (6ํŽธ), CT-RSA (3ํŽธ), DEFCON (4ํŽธ), ICCC (8ํŽธ), Virus Bulletin (2ํŽธ)
- KBS '๋ช…๊ฒฌ๋งŒ๋ฆฌ', '์žฅ์˜์‹ค์‡ผ', '์Œค๊ณผ ํ•จ๊ป˜', EBS '๊ณผํ•™๋‹คํ ๋น„์š˜๋“œ', JTBC '์ฐจ์ด๋‚˜๋Š” ํด๋ผ์Šค' ๋ฐ tvN '๋ฏธ๋ž˜์ˆ˜์—…' ๋“ฑ ๋‹ค์ˆ˜ ์ถœ์—ฐ
์ฃผ์š” R&D ์„ฑ๊ณผ
2
Google์— DRM ํŠนํ—ˆ ๋งค๊ฐ (2020๋…„)
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๋ธ”๋ก์ฒด์ธ์—์„œ์˜ ์•”ํ˜ธํ•™์˜ ์ค‘์š”์„ฑ
3
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Bitcoin (2008)
(In October 2008, posted to the Cypherpunks mailing list)
4
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๋น„ํŠธ์ฝ”์ธ์€ ์˜จ์ „ํžˆ ๋…์ฐฝ์ ์ธ๊ฐ€?
5
Smart
Contract
PoW
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
(โˆš: zk-STARKs)
[1] Bitcoin Beginner, โ€œPrivacy Coin Comparisonโ€, December 30, 2017
[2] Felix Kรผster, "Privacy Coins Guide: Comparison of Anonymous Cryptocurrencies", Aug 23, 2017
Dark Coin, โ€˜๋ชจ๋„ค๋กœ(Monero)โ€™
6
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
7
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
(โˆš: zk-STARKs)
[1] Bitcoin Beginner, โ€œPrivacy Coin Comparisonโ€, December 30, 2017
[2] Felix Kรผster, "Privacy Coins Guide: Comparison of Anonymous Cryptocurrencies", Aug 23, 2017
Dark Coin, Zcash (2016)
8
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Zcash์™€ ์˜์ง€์‹ ์ฆ๋ช…
9
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
10
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์•”ํ˜ธ์˜ ๋Œ€์ค‘ํ™”์™€ ์—ญ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ
11
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
12
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
13
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
14
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
15
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
16
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
17
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
18
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
(Source: ํ•œ๊ฒจ๋ ˆ, 2013.12.)
(โ€œUpstreamโ€ Data)
19
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
20
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
ํ•œ๊ตญ์€ ์•ˆ์ „ํ• ๊นŒ?
21
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
ํ•œ๊ตญ์€ ์•ˆ์ „ํ• ๊นŒ?
22
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
(Source: ํ•œ๊ฒจ๋ ˆ, 2015.11.)
ํ•œ๊ตญ์€ ์•ˆ์ „ํ• ๊นŒ?
23
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
24
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
End-to-End Encryption (์ข…๋‹จ๊ฐ„ ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”)
25
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
a.k.a. Warrant-Proof Encryption
26
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
[Note] Telegram
27
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ Secure Messenger๋“ค
28
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
29
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
30
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
31
The Rise of Side Effects
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Privacy vs. Lawful Access
32
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Privacy vs. Lawful Access
33
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Privacy vs. Lawful Access
34
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Privacy vs. Lawful Access
35
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Privacy vs. Lawful Access
36
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
37
Privacy vs. Lawful Access in Korea
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
(์ถœ์ฒ˜ : Natureresearch Journal, doi: 10.1038/d41586-020-00740-y)
38
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์‚ฌ์ƒํ™œ์€ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์ด์ง€๋งŒ ์ ˆ๋Œ€์ ์ธ ๊ถŒ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์•„๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์‚ฌ์ƒํ™œ์€
์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์ด์ง€๋งŒ ์ ˆ๋Œ€์ ์ธ ๊ถŒ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์•„๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์‚ฌ์ƒํ™œ์€ ์ œํ•œ๋ 
์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์ง€๋งŒ, ๋ฒ•์˜ ํ…Œ๋‘๋ฆฌ ์•ˆ์—์„œ ์ œํ•œ๋ผ์•ผ ํ•˜๋ฉฐ ํ•œ๊ตญ์€ ๊ฐ•ํ•œ ๋ฒ•
์  ์ฒด๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค.
39
Privacy vs. Lawful Access in Korea
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
ํˆฌ๋ช…์„ฑ ๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ
40
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
ํˆฌ๋ช…์„ฑ ๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ
41
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณ ์ „ ์•”ํ˜ธ
42
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
What is Crypto?
Cryptology :
science of secret
communication
Cryptography :
design secret
systems
Cryptanalysis :
break secret
systems
43
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
What is Cryptoโ€™s Goal?
Symmetric-key
ciphers:
๏‚งBlock ciphers
๏‚งStream ciphers
Public-key
ciphers
Cryptographic goals
Confidentiality Data integrity Authentication Non-repudiation
Message authentication
Entity authentication
Arbitrary length
hash functions
Message
Authentication
codes (MACs)
Digital signatures
Authentication
primitives
Digital signatures
MACs
Digital
signatures
(a.k.a. Data origin authentication)
44
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Plaintext : the original message
๏ฎ Ciphertext : the coded message
๏ฎ Cipher : algorithm for transforming plaintext to
ciphertext
๏ฎ Key : information used in cipher known only to
sender/receiver
๏ฎ Encipher (Encrypt) : converting plaintext to
ciphertext
๏ฎ Decipher (Decrypt) : recovering plaintext from
ciphertext
๏ฎ Cryptanalysis : analyzing of encrypted without
legitimate access to the keys.
๏ฎ Brute Force Search : simply try every possible
key
Terminology
45
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Classic (~ 1976/77)
๏ฎ BC 487 : Transposition Cipher, โ€œScytaleโ€
๏ฎ BC 300 : Steganography
๏ฎ BC 100 ~ BC 44 : Substitution Cipher, โ€œCaesar
Cipherโ€
๏ฎ 1883 : Kerckhoffs' Assumption
๏ฎ WW II :
๏ฎ โ€œEnigmaโ€ and โ€œTuring Machineโ€ for Cryptanalysis
๏ฎ 1949 : Perfect Secrecy (C.E.Shannon)
๏ฎ โ€œConfusionโ€ and โ€œDiffusionโ€
Brief History
46
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Modern (1976/77 ~ Today)
๏ฎ 1976 : Public-Key Cryptography (Diffie,
Hellman)
๏ฎ 1977 : Data Encryption Standard, DES (NIST)
๏ฎ 1978 : RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
๏ฎ 1982/85 : Goldwasser presented 2
paradigms for firm foundations of
cryptography.
๏ฎ โ€œIndistinguishabilityโ€ and โ€œSimulatabilityโ€
๏ฎ 1999 : SEED (KISA)
Brief History
47
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ BC 2000 : Pictographs (์ƒํ˜•๋ฌธ์ž)
The Origin of Crypto
48
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ BC 487 : ๊ณ ๋Œ€ ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ์Šค ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค ์ค‘ ๊ฐ€์žฅ ๊ฐ•ํ•œ
๋„์‹œ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜€๋˜ ์ŠคํŒŒ๋ฅดํƒ€์˜ โ€œScytaleโ€ ์•”ํ˜ธ
๏ฎ ์ตœ์ดˆ์˜ ๊ตฐ์‚ฌ์  ์•”ํ˜ธ
The Origin of Crypto
Key (the circumference of the scytale)
49
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์ „์น˜(่ฝ‰็ฝฎ) ์•”ํ˜ธ
๏ฎ Permutation/Transposition ์•”ํ˜ธ
๏ฎ ๋ฌธ์žฅ ์•ˆ์— ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ธ€์ž์˜ ์ˆœ์„œ๋ฅผ ์„œ๋กœ ๋ฐ”๊ฟ”
์•”ํ˜ธํ™”ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐฉ์‹
Transposition Cipher
50
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์ „์น˜ ์•”ํ˜ธ
๏ฎ ์ œ1์ฐจ ์„ธ๊ณ„๋Œ€์ „ ๋™์•ˆ ๋…์ผ๊ตฐ์ด ์‚ฌ์šฉ
๏ฎ ๊ฒฉ์ž (Grille) :
Transposition Cipher โ€“ (e.g.) ๊ฒฉ์ž ์•”ํ˜ธ
51
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ โ€œWe need more machine gun
ammunition fast xxโ€๋ผ๋Š” ํ‰๋ฌธ์„ ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”ํ•˜
๋Š” ๊ณผ์ •
Transposition Cipher โ€“ (e.g.) ๊ฒฉ์ž ์•”ํ˜ธ
52
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Cipher vs. Steganography
Steganography
ํžˆ๋กœ๋ฝ• 1KG์„ XX๋กœ ๋ณด๋ƒ„
ํ‰ ๋ฌธ
์•” ํ˜ธ ๋ฌธ
53
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์Šคํ…Œ๊ฐ€๋…ธ๊ทธ๋ž˜ํ”ผ(steganography)๋Š” ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ์Šค์–ด
๋กœ โ€˜์ˆจ๊ฒจ์ง„ ๊ธ€(covered writing)โ€™์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๋œป
๏ฎ 2,300๋…„์ „ ์ด์˜ค๋‹ˆ์•„ ์ง€๋ฐฉ์˜ ๋ฐ€๋ ˆํˆฌ์Šค
(Miletus)์‹œ๋ฅผ ์ง€๋ฐฐํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋˜ ํžˆ์Šคํ‹ฐ์—์šฐ์Šค
(Histiaeus)๊ฐ€ ํŽ˜๋ฅด์‹œ์•„์˜ ๋‹ค๋ฆฌ์šฐ์Šค ์™• ๋ชฐ๋ž˜
๋ฐ€์„œ๋ฅผ ์ „๋‹ฌํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด ํšจ์‹œ
๏ฎ ๊ณ ๋Œ€ ๋กœ๋งˆ์ธ๋“ค์ด ๊ณผ์ผ์ฃผ์Šค, ์šฐ์œ , ์†Œ๋ณ€ ๊ฐ™์€
์ž์—ฐ์›๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•ด ๋งŒ๋“  ํˆฌ๋ช… ์ž‰ํฌ
๏ฎ ์ „์„ค์ ์ธ ๋…์ผ ์ฒฉ๋ณด์› ๋งˆํƒ€ ํ•˜๋ฆฌ์˜ ์•…๋ณด๋ฅผ ์ด
์šฉํ•œ ์•”ํ˜ธ
Steganography
54
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Steganography
Apparently neutral's protest is thoroughly discounted
and ignored. Isman hard hit. Blockade issue affects
pretext for embargo on by-products, ejecting suets
and vegetable oils.
WWII์—์„œ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋œ ์Šคํ…Œ๊ฐ€๋…ธ๊ทธ๋ž˜ํ”ผ ์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฌธ (โ€œPershing sails from NY June 1.โ€)
55
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Steganography
โ€œI AM TRAPPEDโ€๋ผ๋Š” ๋ฌธ์žฅ์˜ ์•…๋ณด ์•”ํ˜ธ
56
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Steganography
ํžˆ๋กœ๋ฝ• 1KG์„ XX๋กœ ๋ณด๋ƒ„
ํ‰ ๋ฌธ
์› ๊ทธ๋ฆผ ์‹ฌ์ธต์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฌธ
57
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ํ‰๋ฌธ์˜ ๋ฌธ์ž๋ฅผ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๋ฌธ์ž, ์ˆซ์ž ๋˜๋Š” ๊ธฐํ˜ธ
๋กœ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•˜๋Š” ์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฐฉ์‹
๏ฎ Plaintext) Come here at once
๏ฎ Ciphertext)
Substitution Cipher (ๆ›ๅญ— ์•”ํ˜ธ)
58
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Security) ๋‹จ์ˆœ ํ™˜์ž ์•”ํ˜ธ๋Š” ๋ฌธ์ž์˜ ๋นˆ๋„์ˆ˜
๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์— ์ทจ์•ฝ
Substitution Cipher (ๆ›ๅญ— ์•”ํ˜ธ)
0.127
0.091
0.082
0.075
0.070
0.067
0.063
0.061
0.060
0.043
0.040
0.028
0.028
0.024
0.023
0.022
0.020
0.020
0.019
0.015
0.010
0.008
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
0.080
0.100
0.120
0.140
E T A O I N S H RD L C UMWF G Y P B V K J Q X Z
59
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Geoffrey Chaucer, Treatise on the Astrolabe, 1391
60
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Substitution Cipher โ€“ (e.g.) ๋‚˜๋ฐ”ํ˜ธ ์•”ํ˜ธ
61
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ํ™˜์ž ์•”ํ˜ธ
๏ฎ ์ฐฝ์‹œ์ž๋Š” ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ํ•„๋ฆฝ ์กด์Šคํ„ด(Philip
Johnston)์œผ๋กœ, ์ œ2์ฐจ ์„ธ๊ณ„๋Œ€์ „ ๋™์•ˆ ๋ฏธ๊ตฐ
์ด ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•จ.
๏ฎ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ตฐ์‚ฌ์šฉ์–ด๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”
211๊ฐœ์˜ ๋‹จ์–ด์™€ ๋ฌธ์žฅ์œผ๋กœ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ๋จ.
๏ฎ ๊ณ ๋ž˜ โ†” ๊ตฐํ•จ, ์ฒ ๋ฌผ๊ณ ๊ธฐ(iron fish) โ†” ์ž ์ˆ˜ํ•จ,
๋ง๋˜ฅ๊ฐ€๋ฆฌ โ†” ํญ๊ฒฉ๊ธฐ, ์€๋ง‰๋Œ€ โ†” ์ค‘์œ„
Substitution Cipher โ€“ (e.g.) ๋‚˜๋ฐ”ํ˜ธ ์•”ํ˜ธ
62
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ 2์ฐจ ์„ธ๊ณ„ ๋Œ€์ „ ์ค‘ ๋‚˜๋ฐ”ํ˜ธ ์–ธ์–ด๋ฅผ ์•Œ๊ณ  ์žˆ
๋Š” ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ธ์€ 28๋ช…์— ๋ถˆ๊ณผํ–ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด์ค‘์—
์ผ๋ณธ๊ณ„๋‚˜ ๋…์ผ๊ณ„๋Š” ํ•œ ๋ช…๋„ ์—†์—ˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ํ•จ.
๏ฎ 1968๋…„ ์ด์ „๊นŒ์ง€ 1๊ธ‰ ๊ตฐ์‚ฌ๊ธฐ๋ฐ€๋กœ ๋น„๋ฐ€์—
๋ถ™์—ฌ์ ธ ์™”์Œ.
๏ฎ 2001๋…„์— ์™€์„œ์•ผ ์ƒ์กดํ•ด ์žˆ๋Š” 29๋ช…์˜ ์•”
ํ˜ธ๋ณ‘ ์ถœ์‹  ๋‚˜๋ฐ”ํ˜ธ ์ธ๋””์–ธ๋“ค์€ ๋ฐฑ์•…๊ด€์—์„œ
๋ถ€์‹œ ๋Œ€ํ†ต๋ น์œผ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์ตœ๊ณ  ๋ช…์˜ˆํ›ˆ์žฅ์„ ๋ฐ›
์•˜์Œ.
Substitution Cipher โ€“ (e.g.) ๋‚˜๋ฐ”ํ˜ธ ์•”ํ˜ธ
63
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์˜ ์ „์น˜ ๋˜๋Š” ํ™˜์ž ์•”ํ˜ธ๋Š” ์•”ํ˜ธ ๋ฐฉ
์‹ ์ž์ฒด๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ–๋Š” ํ†ต๊ณ„์  ์ทจ์•ฝ์„ฑ์„ ์™„์ „ํ•˜๊ฒŒ
๋ง‰์„ ์ˆ˜ ์—†์Œ.
๏ฎ ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ โ€œํ™˜์ž์™€ ์ „์น˜๋ฅผ ์„œ๋กœ ์กฐํ•ฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ตฌ
์„ฑโ€ํ•จ์œผ๋กœ์จ, ๊ทธ ์•”ํ˜ธ์˜ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ์„ ํ˜„์ €ํ•˜
๊ฒŒ ํ–ฅ์ƒ์‹œํ‚ฌ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Œ.
๏ฎ 1945๋…„์— C.E.Shannon์ด ์ด๋ฅผ ์ •๋ณด์ด๋ก ์ ์œผ
๋กœ ์ฆ๋ช…ํ•จ.
Product Cipher
64
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Enigma & Alan Turing
65
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Enigma & Alan Turing
66
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ The Father of Information Theory
๏ฎ Information Theory
๏ฎ Worked at MIT / Bell Labs
๏ฎ โ€œThe Math. Theory of Communicationโ€ (1948)
๏ฎ Def. of the โ€œbinary digitโ€(bit) as a unit of info.
๏ฎ Def. of โ€œentropyโ€ as a measure of info.
๏ฎ Cryptography
๏ฎ Model of a secrecy system
๏ฎ โ€œCommunication Theory of Secrecy Systemsโ€ (1945, Bell
Labs memo, classified).
๏ฎ Def. of โ€œperfect secrecyโ€
๏ฎ Formulate the principles of โ€œconfusionโ€ (standing for
substitution) and โ€œdiffusionโ€ (standing for transposition)
Claude E. Shannon (1916~2001)
67
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Claude E. Shannon (1916~2001)
68
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
ํ˜„๋Œ€ ์•”ํ˜ธ
69
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Key : 5e d9 20 4f ec e0 b9 67
๏ฎ Plaintext : โ€œThe unknown message is:
The DES-test contest's plaintextโ€
๏ฎ Ciphertext : 3e a7 86 f9 1d 76 bb d3 66
c6 3f 54 eb 3f e3 3f 39 88 81 4c 8b a1
97 f7 be 1b dd 7e fb 39 96 31 3c 3d 3b
65 c8 b8 3e 31 89 f9 04 14 fb cd c3 70
c1 11 a5 2f 3a ef 80 f4 cf f5 43 a4 b1 65
5b ae
Modern Ciphers (e.g., DES)
70
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Modern Ciphers โ€“ Stream Cipher โ€“
Pseudo-Random
Sequence Generator
Plaintext Bitstream Ciphertext Bitstream
Key
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 โ€ฆ
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 โ€ฆ
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 โ€ฆ
Plaintext Stream
Pseudo-Random Stream
Ciphertext Stream
71
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Modern Ciphers โ€“ Block Cipher โ€“
ciphertext blocks n bits
n bits plaintext blocks
n bits
n bits
Common Block Sizes:
n = 64, 128, 256 bits
Common Key Sizes:
k = 40, 56, 64, 80, 128,
168, 192, 256 bits
k bits
Key
Block Cipher
n bits
72
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Block
Length
Algorithm
Key
Length
DES (Data Encryption Standard, IBM) 64 56
3DES (Triple DES) 64 168
IDEA (Lai / Massey, ETH Zรผrich) 64 128
RC2 (Ron Rivest, RSA) 64 40 ... 1024
CAST (Canada) 64 128
RC5 (Ron Rivest, RSA) 64 ... 256 64 ... 256
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) 128 128 ... 256
SEED (KISA, Korea) 128 128
Modern Ciphers โ€“ Block Cipher โ€“
73
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ 1973๋…„ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ NIST๋Š” ํ‘œ์ค€ ๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค ์•”ํ˜ธ์•Œ
๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ ์„ ์ •์„ ์œ„ํ•œ RFP๋ฅผ ๋ฐœํ‘œํ•จ.
๏ฎ ์ด์— ์ตœ์ข…์ ์œผ๋กœ IBM์ด ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ LUCIFER ์•”
ํ˜ธ(๊ฐœ๋ฐœ์ž : Horst Feistel et al.)์˜ ์ˆ˜์ •๋ณธ์ด
ํ‘œ์ค€์œผ๋กœ ์ฑ„ํƒ๋จ (์ผ๋ช…, DES).
๋น„๋ฐ€ํ‚ค(๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค)์•”ํ˜ธ DES์˜ ํƒ„์ƒ
74
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ 1975๋…„ 3์›”, DES๋Š” FIPS(Federal
Information Processing Standard) Draft
๋ฌธ์„œ๋กœ์„œ ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ ๊ด€๋ณด์— ๊ฒŒ์žฌ๋จ. ์ดํ›„ DES๋Š”
์„ธ๊ณ„ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜๋ผ์—์„œ ์ฑ„ํƒ๋˜์–ด ๋„๋ฆฌ ์“ฐ์ด๊ฒŒ
๋จ.
๏ฎ ์ดํ›„ DES์˜ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ์€ 1983๋…„, 1988๋…„,
1993๋…„ NBS์— ์˜ํ•ด ์žฌํ™•์ธ๋˜์—ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, 1998
๋…„ 12์›”์— ํ‘œ์ค€์œผ๋กœ์„œ ๊ทธ ์ˆ˜๋ช…์„ ๋‹คํ•˜๊ฒŒ
๋จ.
๏ฎ 1997๋…„ NIST๋Š” AES ๊ณต๋ชจ์‚ฌ์—…์„ ๊ฐœ์‹œํ•จ.
๋น„๋ฐ€ํ‚ค(๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค)์•”ํ˜ธ DES์˜ ํƒ„์ƒ
75
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ๋†’์€ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ
๏ฎ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ ๊ฐ„๋‹จ
๏ฎ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ์ด ํ‚ค์—๋งŒ ์˜์กด
๏ฎ ์‘์šฉ์ด ๋‹ค์–‘
๏ฎ ์ œ์ž‘์ž ๋ฐ ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž ์ด์šฉ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ
๏ฎ ์ „์ž์žฅ์น˜ ๊ฐ„๋‹จ
๏ฎ ์ œ์ž‘์ž์˜ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ ํƒ€๋‹น์„ฑ ๊ฒ€ํ†  ํ˜‘๋ ฅ
๏ฎ ์ˆ˜์ถœ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ
DES์˜ ๊ณต๋ชจ ์กฐ๊ฑด
76
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Data Encryption Standard
๏ฎ DES์˜ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ์ ์ธ ์ œ์›
๏ฎ ์ž…โˆ™์ถœ๋ ฅ ํฌ๊ธฐ : 64๋น„ํŠธ(์˜๋ฌธ 8๊ธ€์ž ๋˜๋Š” ํ•œ๊ธ€ 4๊ธ€
์ž ๋ถ„๋Ÿ‰) ๋‹จ์œ„๋กœ ๋ฉ”์‹œ์ง€๋ฅผ ๋Š์–ด์„œ ์•”โˆ™๋ณตํ˜ธํ™”
๏ฎ ํ‚ค ํฌ๊ธฐ (์•”ํ˜ธ๊ฐ•๋„) : 64๋น„ํŠธ ๊ธธ์ด์˜ ํ‚ค๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉ
๏ฎ 64๋น„ํŠธ ์ค‘ 8๋น„ํŠธ๋Š” ํŒจ๋ฆฌํ‹ฐ ๋น„ํŠธ(parity bit)์ด๋ฏ€๋กœ, ์‹ค์ œ
ํ‚ค๋กœ ์ด์šฉ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์€ 56๋น„ํŠธ์ž„
๏ฎ ๋ผ์šด๋“œ(round) ์ˆ˜ : 16๋ผ์šด๋“œ๋กœ ํ™˜์ž ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”์™€ ์ „
์น˜ ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”๋ฅผ 16๋ฒˆ ๋ฐ˜๋ณตํ•˜์—ฌ ์ฒ˜๋ฆฌ
๏ฎ confusion and diffusion
DES in a Nutshell (1977)
77
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Initial Permutation
F
+
F
+
F
+
F
+
โ€ฆ
Initial Permutation-1
(64)
(64)
(32)
(32)
(48)
(48)
(48)
(48)
Key
Scheduler
(56)
K
K1
K2
K16
K3
X
Y
๏ฎ F need not be invertible!
๏ฎ Have โ€œunstructuredโ€
behavior.
๏ฎ Decryption is the same as
encryption with reversed
key schedule (hardware
implementation!).
DES in a Nutshell (1977)
78
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
DES in a Nutshell (1977) โ€“ 1 Round โ€“
Expansion Permutation
48
P-Box Permutation
S-Box Substitution
32
Shift Shift
48
Compression
Permutation
Feistel
Network
56
32
32
Keyi-1
Ri-1
Li-1
Keyi
Ri
Li
32
32
56
79
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
DES in a Nutshell (1977) โ€“ 1 Round โ€“
80
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
DES in a Nutshell (1977) โ€“ 1 Round โ€“
81
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค์•”ํ˜ธ์™€ ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช… ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ํƒ„์ƒ (โ€˜76)
82
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ๊ธฐ์กด์—๋Š” ํŠน์ •ํ•œ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋ผ๋ฆฌ์˜ ์ •๋ณด ๋น„๋ฐ€์œ 
์ง€๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ์•”ํ˜ธํ†ต์‹ ์ด ์ด์šฉ๋˜์—ˆ๋Š”๋ฐ ๋ฐ˜ํ•ด
์ตœ๊ทผ์—๋Š” ์ธํ„ฐ๋„ท ์‡ผํ•‘๋ชฐ์—์„œ์™€ ๊ฐ™์ด ๋ถˆํŠน
์ • ๋‹ค์ˆ˜์˜ ์ผ๋ฐ˜์†Œ๋น„์ž๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ ์•”ํ˜ธ
ํ†ต์‹ ์ด ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ.
๏ฎ ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ DES ์•”ํ˜ธ ๊ฐ™์€ ์†Œ์œ„ โ€˜๋Œ€์นญ
ํ‚ค ์•”ํ˜ธ ๋ฐฉ์‹(ๅฐ็จฑํ‚ค ๆš—่™Ÿ ๆ–นๅผ, symmetric
key cryptosystem)โ€™์—์„œ๋Š” ๋น„๋ฐ€ํ†ต์‹ ์„ ํ•˜
๊ณ ์ž ํ•˜๋Š” ์Œ๋ฐฉ์ด ์‚ฌ์ „์— ๋ฏธ๋ฆฌ ๋˜‘๊ฐ™์€ ํ‚ค
๊ฐ’์„ ๋น„๋ฐ€๋ฆฌ์— ๋‚˜๋ˆ  ๊ฐ–๊ณ  ์žˆ์–ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฌธ
์ œ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์Œ.
๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค์•”ํ˜ธ์™€ ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช… ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ํƒ„์ƒ (โ€˜76)
83
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Symmetric Cipher
(Secret Key Encryption)
: Encryption Key =
Decryption Key
๏ฎ Asymmetric Cipher
(Public Key Encryption)
: Encryption Key โ‰ 
Decryption Key
๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค์•”ํ˜ธ์™€ ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช… ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ํƒ„์ƒ (โ€˜76)
84
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Public Key Private Key
Encryption Key Decryption Key
PKC in a Nutshell (1976)
85
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Alice Bob
Directory
Alice
+ +
Bob
+
Encryption Decryption
PKC in a Nutshell (1976)
86
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
PKC in Formal (1976)
87
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค์•”ํ˜ธ์™€ ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช… ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ๊ตฌํ˜„ (โ€˜78)
88
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค์•”ํ˜ธ์™€ ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช… ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ๊ตฌํ˜„ (โ€˜78)
89
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค์•”ํ˜ธ์™€ ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช… ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ๊ตฌํ˜„ (โ€˜78)
90
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
RSA in a Nutshell (1978)
Alice
+ +
Bob
+
Alice Bob
Directory
31 13
โ€Aโ€ 13
6513 369,720,589,101,
871,337,890,625
1/13
(6513)1/13 = 65 = โ€œAโ€
Encryption Decryption
91
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Hard
(NP)
317 = 129,140,163
129,140,163 โ–ก = 3
โ†’ โ–ก = 1/17
317 mod 2773 = 1553
1553 โ–ก mod 2773 = 3
โ†’ โ–ก = 157
Easy
(P)
RSA in a Nutshell (1978)
92
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
RSA in a Nutshell (1978)
Alice
+ +
Bob
+
Directory
โ€!โ€
(7, 55) 23
Encryption Decryption
Bob
7, 55(= 5ร—11)
337 mod 55 = 22
22 2223 mod 55 = 33 = โ€œ!โ€
93
โ‘  Select two random primes : 5, 11
โ‘ก Select random number : 7
โ‘ข Compute EUCLID(7,5,11)=23
โ‘ฃ Compute 5ร—11=55
โ‘ค Publish (7,55) as Public Key
โ‘ฅ Keep 23 as Private Key
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ M = 10101111010011111โ€ฆโ€ฆ(2)
= aร—55n-1 + bร—55n-2 + โ€ฆ. cร—550
(where, 0 โ‰ค a, b, โ€ฆ, c โ‰ค 54)
๏ฎ C = M7 mod 55
= (a7 mod 55, b7 mod 55, โ€ฆ, c7 mod 55)
RSA in a Nutshell (1978)
94
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
m 00โ€ฆ0 r
G(r)
m1
*
H(m1
*)
m2
*
G
H
( ) :
โ€ข
f one-way permutation
C = f(OAEP(m,r)) = (m1
*||m2
*)e mod N
RSA-OAEP (1994)
95
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Martin Gardner column and RSA-129 challenge
๏ฎ Described public-key and RSA cryptosystem in his Scientific
American column, Mathematical Games (1977)
๏ฎ Ron Rivest offered copy of RSA technical memo.
๏ฎ Ron Rivest offered $100 to first person to break challenge
ciphertext based on 129-digit product of primes.
๏ฎ Ronโ€™s estimated time to solution: 40 quadrillion years
RSA์™€ ์†Œ์ธ์ˆ˜๋ถ„ํ•ด๋ฌธ์ œ
96
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Question (1977) :
๏ฎ N=114,381,625,757,888,867,669,235,779,976,146
,612,010,218,296,721,242,362,562,561,842,935,70
6,935,245,733,897,830,597,123,563,958,705,058,9
89,075,147,599,290,026,879,543,541
๏ฎ Answer (1994, 8 months work by about
600 volunteers from more than 20
countries; 5000 MIPS-years.) :
๏ฎ p=32,769,132,993,266,709,549,961,988,190,834,4
61,413,177,642,967,992,942,539,798,288,533
๏ฎ q=3,490,529,510,847,650,949,147,849,619,903,89
8,133,417,764,638,493,387,843,990,820,577
RSA์™€ ์†Œ์ธ์ˆ˜๋ถ„ํ•ด๋ฌธ์ œ
97
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
RSA์™€ ์†Œ์ธ์ˆ˜๋ถ„ํ•ด๋ฌธ์ œ
98
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค ์•”ํ˜ธ vs. ๋น„๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค ์•”ํ˜ธ
๊ตฌ๋ถ„ ๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค ์•”ํ˜ธ ๋ฐฉ์‹ ๋น„๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค ์•”ํ˜ธ ๋ฐฉ์‹
์—ญ์‚ฌ BC 487๋…„ ๊ฒฝ 1976๋…„
ํ‚ค ๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค(๋น„๋ฐ€ํ‚ค) ๋น„๋Œ€์นญํ‚ค(๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค, ๊ฐœ์ธํ‚ค)
ํ‚ค์˜ ์ƒํ˜ธ ๊ด€๊ณ„ ์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ํ‚ค = ๋ณตํ˜ธํ™” ํ‚ค ์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ํ‚ค โ‰  ๋ณตํ˜ธํ™” ํ‚ค
์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ํ‚ค/๋ณตํ˜ธํ™” ํ‚ค ๋น„๋ฐ€/๋น„๋ฐ€ ๊ณต๊ฐœ/๋น„๋ฐ€
์•”ํ˜ธ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ ๊ณต๊ฐœ ๊ณต๊ฐœ
ํ‚ค์˜ ๊ฐœ์ˆ˜ n*(n-1)/2 2*n
์žฅ์  ๊ณ„์‚ฐ์†๋„ ๋น ๋ฆ„
์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ํ‚ค ์‚ฌ์ „ ๊ณต์œ  ๋ถˆํ•„์š”
ํ†ต์‹  ๋Œ€์ƒ์˜ ์ถ”๊ฐ€๊ฐ€ ์šฉ์ด
์ธ์ฆ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ ์ œ๊ณต
๋‹จ์ 
ํ‚ค ๋ถ„๋ฐฐ ๋ฐ ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์˜ ์–ด๋ ค์›€
๊ธฐ๋ฐ€์„ฑ๋งŒ ๋ณด์žฅ
๊ณ„์‚ฐ์†๋„ ๋Š๋ฆผ
๋Œ€ํ‘œ์ ์ธ ์˜ˆ DES, AES, IDEA, SEED, ARIA DH, RSA, ECC
99
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Bobโ€™s Public Key
Asymmetric
Cipher
(RSA)
Secret Key
Symmetric
Cipher
(AES)
Plaintext
Encrypted Key
hdr45bceuh73
6&%ewv3445
Ciphertext
50$4gbsghh73
6&355hk3445
Asymmetric
Cipher
(RSA)
Symmetric
Cipher
(AES)
Ciphertext
50$4gbsghh73
6&355hk3445
Encrypted Key
hdr45bceuh73
6&%ewv3445
Bobโ€™s Private Key
Plaintext
Secret Key
[Alice] [Bob]
Hybrid Encryption (Digital Envelope)
100
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Alice Bob
35 = 243
37 = 2187
K = 21875 = (37)5 = 335
= 50,031,545,098,999,707
์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ณต๊ฐœ์ •๋ณด
3
K = 2437 = (35)7 = 335
= 50,031,545,098,999,707
101
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Alice Bob
35 mod 127 = 116
37 mod 127 = 28
K = 285 = (37)5 = 335
= 90 (mod 127)
์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ณต๊ฐœ์ •๋ณด
3, 127
K = 1167 = (35)7 = 335
= 90 (mod 127)
102
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Hard
(NP)
gโ–ก = Y
10 โ–ก = 10,000,000,000
โ†’ โ–ก = 10
gโ–ก mod p = Y
10 โ–ก mod 19 = 9
โ†’ โ–ก = 10
Easy
(P)
์ด์‚ฐ๋Œ€์ˆ˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ
103
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ด์‚ฐ๋Œ€์ˆ˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ
Z Z23 (mod 23)
51
5 5
52
25 2
53
125 10
54
625 4
55
3125 20
56
15625 8
โ€ฆ โ€ฆ โ€ฆ
104
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
ํƒ€์›๊ณก์„  ์•”ํ˜ธ (Elliptic Curve Crypto)
105
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์•”ํ˜ธํ•™์—์„œ "ํƒ€์›๊ณก์„ "์€ ํƒ€์›ํ˜•๋„ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ฉฐ
์—ฐ์†์ ์ธ ๊ณก์„ ๋„ ์•„๋‹˜.
๏ฎ ํƒ€์›๊ณก์„ ์€ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ํ˜•ํƒœ์˜
๋ฐฉ์ •์‹์œผ๋กœ ์ •์˜๋œ ํ‰๋ฉด ๊ณก์„ ์ž„.
y2 = x3 + ax + b mod n (๋‹จ, 0 โ‰ค x,y < n)
ํƒ€์›๊ณก์„ (Elliptic Curve)์ด๋ž€?
106
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Diffie-Hellman
๏ฎ Keys generated by exponentiation over the
group.
๏ฎ Exponentiation defined by repeated
multiplication
๏ฎ Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
๏ฎ ECC was introduced by Victor Miller and Neal
Koblitz in 1985.
๏ฎ Keys generated by multiplication over elliptic
curves.
๏ฎ Multiplication through repeated addition
๏ฎ Cryptanalysis involves determining k given a
and (k x G)
ํƒ€์›๊ณก์„  Diffie-Hellman
107
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
ํƒ€์›๊ณก์„  Diffie-Hellman
108
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
109
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…, ํ•ด์‰ฌํ•จ์ˆ˜ ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ
110
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…(Digital Signature)์˜ ์กฐ๊ฑด
Data integrity + Message authentication + Non-repudiation
111
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…(Digital Signature)์˜ ๋™์ž‘์›๋ฆฌ
Public Key Private Key
Encryption = Verification Decryption = Signing
112
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
message
Signing
algorithm
message signature
Signerโ€™s private key
Unsecured channel
Signer
Signature
verification
algorithm
Signerโ€™s public key
Verifier
Ok / not Ok
์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…(Digital Signature)์˜ ๋™์ž‘์›๋ฆฌ
113
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
RSA Digital Signature
๊ฐ‘ ๋Œ ์ด ๊ฐ‘ ์ˆœ ์ด
์„œ๋ช…์ƒ์„ฑ ์„œ๋ช…๊ฒ€์ฆ
๊ฐ‘๋Œ์ด ๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค ๊ฐ‘์ˆœ์ด ๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค
๊ณต๊ฐœํ‚ค ์ €์žฅ์†Œ
31 13
+ 31
651/31 = 0.032258 0.03225831 = (651/31)31
= 65 =? โ€œAโ€
+
โ€œAโ€ 1/31
โ€œAโ€
0.032258
0.032258
114
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
RSA Digital Signature & Hash Function
115
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Public Key = (17, 2773), Private Key (157)
๏ฎ M = โ€œEBS Korea Educational Broadcasting
Systemโ€ :
๏ฎ H(โ€œEBS Korea Educational Broadcasting
Systemโ€) = 3
๏ฎ 3157 mod 2773 = 441
RSA Digital Signature & Hash Function
116
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Hash Function (ํ•ด์‹œ ํ•จ์ˆ˜)
Message M (arbitrary length)
Hash Value h
(fixed length)
H
117
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Hash Function (ํ•ด์‹œ ํ•จ์ˆ˜)
118
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Cryptographic Hash Function
SHA256 SHA256 SHA256
X
? ?
Different
? Hello! ?
334d016f755cd6do58c53a86e1
a3b8ef80c14f52fb05145b87ce3
a5edd42c87b?
334d016f755cd6do58c53a86e1
a3b8ef80c14f52fb05145b87ce3
a5edd42c87b?
Collision resistance Preimage resistance 2nd-preimage resistance
119
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Cryptographic Hash Function
120
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Cryptographic Hash Function
121
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ 1990๋…„) Ron Rivest๋Š” MD4(Message Digest
Algorithm 4)๋ผ๋Š” ํ•ด์‰ฌ ํ•จ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ๋งŒ๋“ฆ.
๏ฎ 1992๋…„) Ron Rivest๋Š” MD4๋ฅผ ๊ฐœ๋Ÿ‰ํ•ด MD5๋ผ
๋Š” 128๋น„ํŠธ ํ•ด์‰ฌ ํ•จ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ๋งŒ๋“ฆ.
๏ฎ ํ˜„์žฌ MD5๋Š” ์ถฉ๋Œ ํšŒํ”ผ์„ฑ์—์„œ ๋ฌธ์ œ์ (์ผ๋ช…
โ€œcollisions for random IVโ€)์ด ์žˆ์œผ๋ฏ€๋กœ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์‘
์šฉ๊ณผ์˜ ํ˜ธํ™˜์œผ๋กœ๋งŒ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๊ณ  ๋” ์ด์ƒ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š
๋„๋ก ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ.
๏ฎ 1993๋…„) ็พŽ NSA๋Š” MD5์™€ ๋งค์šฐ ์œ ์‚ฌํ•œ
SHA(Secure Hash Algorithm)์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ๋ถˆ๋ฆฌ๋Š”
ํ•ด์‰ฌ ํ•จ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ๋‚ด๋†“์Œ.
Cryptographic Hash Function์˜ ์—ญ์‚ฌ
122
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ 1995๋…„) 1995๋…„์— SHA์— ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์ทจ์•ฝ์ ์ด
๋ฐœ๊ฒฌ๋˜์ž NSA๋Š” SHA๋ฅผ ๊ฐœ๋Ÿ‰ํ•œ SHA-1์„ ๋ฐœ
ํ‘œ
๏ฎ 1998๋…„) ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ KISA์™€ KIISC๋Š” MD5์™€
SHA-1์˜ ์žฅ์ ์„ ์ทจํ•˜์—ฌ ํ‘œ์ค€ํ•ด์‰ฌํ•จ์ˆ˜ HAS-
160(160-bit Hash Algorithm Standard)์„ ๊ฐœ
๋ฐœ
๏ฎ 2005๋…„) 2005๋…„ ์ค‘๊ตญ ์‚ฐ๋™๋Œ€ํ•™์˜ Wang
Xiaoyun ๊ต์ˆ˜ํŒ€์ด 160๋น„ํŠธ ๊ธธ์ด์˜ SHA-1์—
๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ถฉ๋Œ ํƒ์ƒ‰ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ฐœํ‘œ. ๋‹น์ดˆ 280์ •
๋„์˜ ํ•ด๋… ์ž‘์—…๋Ÿ‰์„ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋กœ ์„ค๊ณ„๋œ
SHA-1์˜ ํ•ด๋… ์ž‘์—…๋Ÿ‰์„ 269๊นŒ์ง€
๋‚ฎ์ถค.
Cryptographic Hash Function์˜ ์—ญ์‚ฌ
123
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Digital Signature in E-Certificates
124
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Loren Kohnfelder โ€“
Invention of Digital
Certificates
๏ฎ Loren Kohnfelderโ€™s
B.S. thesis (MIT
1978, supervised by
Len Adleman),
proposed notion of
digital certificate โ€”
a digitally signed
message attesting
to another partyโ€™s
public key.
์ธ์ฆ์„œ ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ํƒ„์ƒ (1978)
125
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Alice Bob
Directory
Alice
+ +
Eve
+
Encryption Decryption
Bob
์ธ์ฆ์„œ ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ํƒ„์ƒ (1978)
126
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ธ์ฆ์„œ ๊ฐœ๋…์˜ ํƒ„์ƒ (1978)
127
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ์˜ ์ •๊ถŒ๋ณ„ ๋ณ€์ฒœ์‚ฌ
128
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ 1999๋…„ 7์›” ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…๋ฒ•์„ ์ œ์ •. ๊ฐ™์€ ํ•ด 9์›”
์ตœ์ดˆ์˜ ๊ตญ๋‚ด ํ‘œ์ค€ ์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ๊ธฐ์ˆ  โ€˜SEEDโ€™ ๋ฐœํ‘œ.
๏ฎ โ€˜๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ๊ธฐ๊ด€์ด ๋ฐœ๊ธ‰ํ•œ ์ธ์ฆ์„œ์— ๊ธฐ์ดˆํ•œ ์ „์ž์„œ
๋ช…โ€™์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๋ฒ•๋ น์ด ์ •ํ•œ ์„œ๋ช… ๋˜๋Š” ๊ธฐ๋ช…๋‚ ์ธ๊ณผ ๋™
๋“ฑํ•œ ํšจ๋ ฅ์„ ๊ฐ–๋„๋ก ํ–ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋•Œ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ๊ธฐ๊ด€์˜
์ง€์ •์€ ์ •๋ณดํ†ต์‹ ๋ถ€์žฅ๊ด€์ด ํ•˜๋„๋ก ํ•จ.
๏ฎ 2002๋…„ 4์›”์— ๋ฒ• ๊ฐœ์ •.
๏ฎ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ๊ธฐ๊ด€์ด ๋ฐœ๊ธ‰ํ•œ ์ธ์ฆ์„œ โ†’ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ
๏ฎ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ๊ธฐ๊ด€์ด ๋ฐœ๊ธ‰ํ•œ ์ธ์ฆ์„œ์— ๊ธฐ์ดˆํ•œ ์ „์ž์„œ
๋ช… โ†’ ๊ณต์ธ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋ž€?
129
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋ž€?
130
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…์ด๋ž€? โ€“ NPKI vs. GPKI
๋ง‰๋„์žฅ ์ธ๊ฐ๋„์žฅ ๊ด€์ธ
NPKI GPKI
์‚ฌ์„ค์ธ์ฆ
131
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ 1์ฒœ๋งŒ๋ช… ๋ณด๊ธ‰ ์šด๋™
132
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ ์‚ฌ์šฉ ์˜๋ฌดํ™” (2006)
133
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ฒœ์†ก์ด ์ฝ”ํŠธ ๋…ผ๋ž€ (2014)
134
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ฒœ์†ก์ด ์ฝ”ํŠธ ๋…ผ๋ž€์˜ ์ง„์‹ค (2014)
135
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ฒœ์†ก์ด ์ฝ”ํŠธ ๋…ผ๋ž€์˜ ์ง„์‹ค (2014)
136
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ฒœ์†ก์ด ์ฝ”ํŠธ ๋…ผ๋ž€์˜ ์ง„์‹ค (2015)
137
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ ์˜๋ฌด์‚ฌ์šฉ ํ์ง€ (2015)
138
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์ œ๋„ ํ์ง€ (2020)
139
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ์˜ โ€˜๊ณต์ธโ€™์ด๋ผ๋Š” ์šฐ์›”์  ์ง€์œ„๋ฅผ
์—†์•ฐ์œผ๋กœ์จ, ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ํ˜•ํƒœ์˜ ์‚ฌ์„ค์ธ์ฆ ์ˆ˜๋‹จ
๋“ค๊ณผ ๋™๋“ฑํ•œ ์œ„์น˜์—์„œ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿํ† ๋ก ํ•จ.
๏ฎ ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…๋ฒ•์—์„œ โ€˜๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œโ€™ ๋ฐ โ€˜๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ
์— ๊ธฐ์ดˆํ•œ ๊ณต์ธ์ „์ž์„œ๋ช…โ€™ ๊ฐœ๋…์„ ์‚ญ์ œ
๏ฎ ๋ฒ•๋ น ์™ธ์— ๋‹น์‚ฌ์ž ๊ฐ„์˜ ์•ฝ์ •์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ํ•œ ์ „
์ž์„œ๋ช… ๋˜ํ•œ ๊ทธ ํšจ๋ ฅ์„ ์ธ์ •ํ•จ.
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์ œ๋„ ํ์ง€ (2020)
140
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์ธ์ฆ ๊ด€๋ จ ์„œ๋น„์Šค๋ฅผ ์ œ๊ณตํ•˜๋ ค๋Š” ์‚ฌ์—…์ž๋“ค
์˜ ์‹ ๋ขฐ์„ฑ ๋ฐ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ์„ ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ํ‰
๊ฐ€โ€ง์ธ์ • ์ œ๋„๋ฅผ ๋„์ž…
๏ฎ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋Š” ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์ธ์ฆ ์ˆ˜๋‹จ์˜ ์ด์šฉ ํ™œ์„ฑํ™”๋ฅผ
์œ„ํ•ด ๋…ธ๋ ฅํ•จ๊ณผ ๋™์‹œ์— ์ด์šฉ์ž์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ณดํ˜ธ
์กฐ์น˜๋ฅผ ๊ฐ•ํ™”ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•จ.
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์ œ๋„ ํ์ง€ (2020)
141
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋Š” ๋ณธ์ธ ํ™•์ธ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ ์™ธ์— ์ „์ž๋ฌธ
์„œ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ฒฐ์ œ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ๊นŒ์ง€๋„ ๋™์‹œ์— ์ œ๊ณตํ• 
์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Œ.
๏ฎ ์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ์˜ ๋ณธ์ธ ํ™•์ธ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์„
๋Œ€์‹ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์€ ์‰ฝ๊ฒŒ ์ฐพ์„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์œผ๋‚˜,
๏ฎ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ์˜ ๊ฒฐ์ œ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ ์ฆ‰, ๋ฌธ์„œ์˜ ์œ„โ€ง๋ณ€์กฐ
๋ฐ ๊ฑฐ๋ž˜์‚ฌ์‹ค์˜ ๋ถ€์ธ ๋ฐฉ์ง€ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ๊นŒ์ง€๋„ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•˜
๋Š” ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์„ ๋งŒ๋“ค๊ธฐ๋ž€ ์‰ฝ์ง€ ์•Š์Œ.
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•˜๋ ค๋ฉด โ€“ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ
142
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•˜๋ ค๋ฉด โ€“ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ
๋ณธ์ธ ์‹ ์› ํ™•์ธ (Easy) ๋ฌธ์„œ์˜ ์œ„โ€ง๋ณ€์กฐ ๋ฐ ๊ฑฐ๋ž˜์‚ฌ์‹ค์˜ ๋ถ€์ธ ๋ฐฉ์ง€
143
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
144
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
DID๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ ๊ฐ์ข… ์ด๋ ฅ ์ฆ๋ช…์€
๋ฒ•์  ํšจ๋ ฅ์„ ๊ฐ€์งˆ ๋•Œ ํ™œ์šฉ๋„๊ฐ€
๋”์šฑ ์ฆํญ๋œ๋‹ค (์ผ๋ช… โ€˜Provableโ€™
ํŠน์„ฑ). ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋ฏ€๋กœ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ ๋“ฑ์„
ํ™œ์šฉํ•œ ๋ฒ•์  ํšจ๋ ฅ์„ ์ง€๋‹Œ ์ „์ž์„œ
๋ช… ๊ธฐ์ˆ ๊ณผ DID๋Š” ์„œ๋กœ ๋Œ€์ฒ™์ ์—
์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ์ƒํ˜ธ ๋ณด์™„์ ์ธ
๊ด€๊ณ„์— ์žˆ๋‹ค.
145
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์ตœ์ดˆ ๋ฐœ๊ธ‰์ด โ€˜๋Œ€๋ฉด ํ™•์ธโ€™์„ ํ†ตํ•ด์„œ๋งŒ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•จ.
๏ฎ ์ด์šฉ์ž๋Š” ์‹ ์ฒญ์„œ๋ฅผ ์ž‘์„ฑํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ณต์ธ๊ธฐ๊ด€ ๋˜๋Š” ์ง€์ •
๋œ ๋“ฑ๋ก ๋Œ€ํ–‰๊ธฐ๊ด€์„ ์ง์ ‘ ๋ฐฉ๋ฌธํ•˜์—ฌ ์‹ค๋ช… ํ™•์ธ์„
๊ฑฐ์นœ ํ›„ ๋ฐœ๊ธ‰๋ฐ›์•„์•ผ ํ•จ.
๏ฎ ๋น„๋Œ€๋ฉด ํ™•์ธ์ด๋ž€ ๊ฒƒ์ด ๋ณธ๋”” ์˜จ๋ผ์ธ์œผ๋กœ ์ง„ํ–‰
๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ˆ ๋งŒํผ ์œ„์กฐ ์‹ ๋ถ„์ฆ์ด๋‚˜ ๋Œ€ํฌํฐ ๋“ฑ
์„ ํ†ตํ•œ ์‹ ์› ์œ„์กฐ์— ์ทจ์•ฝํ•  ์ˆ˜๋ฐ–์— ์—†์Œ.
๏ฎ ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋ฏ€๋กœ ๋Œ€์ฒด ์ˆ˜๋‹จ๋“ค์ด ์ด ๋ถ€๋ถ„์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์–ด๋– ํ•œ
๋ณด์™„์ฑ…์„ ๋งˆ๋ จํ•ด ๋†“๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š”์ง€ ํ™•์ธํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์€ ๋งค์šฐ
์ค‘์š”ํ•จ.
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•˜๋ ค๋ฉด โ€“ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ
146
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
147
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
148
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๋น„๋Œ€๋ฉด ํ™•์ธ์ด๋ž€?
149
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ๋ ฅ๊ณผ ๋ฒ”์šฉ์„ฑ
๏ฎ ๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋Š” ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋‚˜๋ผ ๊ฒฝ์ œํ™œ๋™์ธ๊ตฌ์˜ 90%
์ด์ƒ์ด ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” 1๋…„์— 4์ฒœ์›์ธ ๋ณดํŽธ์ 
์ธ์ฆ ์ˆ˜๋‹จ์ž„.
๏ฎ ์•ž์œผ๋กœ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์ธ์ฆ ์ˆ˜๋‹จ๋“ค์ด ์‹œ์žฅ์—์„œ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ
์„ ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ด๊ณ  ์‹œ์žฅ ์ง€๋ฐฐ์  ์‚ฌ์—…์ž ๋˜ํ•œ
๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ž„.
๏ฎ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์‹œ์žฅ ์ง€๋ฐฐ์  ์‚ฌ์—…์ž๊ฐ€ ํ–ฅํ›„ ๊ณผ๋„ํ•œ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋ฃŒ
๋ฅผ ์š”๊ตฌํ•  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ๋˜๋Š” ๋ฌด๋ฃŒ๋กœ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ฒŒ ํ•ด์ฃผ
๋Š” ๋Œ€์‹  ๊ทธ ๋Œ€๊ฐ€๋กœ ๊ฐœ์ธ์ •๋ณด ์ œ๊ณต์„ ์š”๊ตฌํ•  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ
์ด๋ฅผ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ํ†ต์ œํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ธ์ง€์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ณ ๋ฏผ์ด ํ•„์š”.
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•˜๋ ค๋ฉด โ€“ ๋น„์šฉ ๋ฐ ํšจ๊ณผ
150
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ณต์ธ์ธ์ฆ์„œ๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•˜๋ ค๋ฉด โ€“ ๋น„์šฉ ๋ฐ ํšจ๊ณผ
151
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์˜์ง€์‹ ์ฆ๋ช…
152
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Dawn of Provable Security (1982)
153
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ โ€œProbabilistic Encryptionโ€, Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali (1982)
(Encryption should be randomized!)
๏ฎ โ€œA Digital Signature Scheme Secure Against Adaptive Chosen
Message Attacksโ€, Goldwasser, Micali, Rivest (1988) (Uses well-
defined game to define security objective.)
Dawn of Provable Security (1982)
154
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Dawn of Provable Security (1982)
155
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
It's not at all
clear how to
formalize the
notion that
"nothing is
learned".
156
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
What Is โ€œNothing Is Learnedโ€œ?
Plaintext is โ€œI found a
solution to the calendar
sync problemโ€.
157
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
What Is โ€œNothing Is Learnedโ€œ?
Plaintext is
english!
Plaintext is โ€œI found a
solution to the calendar
sync problemโ€.
Plaintext is โ€œโ€ฆ. solution
โ€ฆ. calendar sync โ€ฆ.โ€.
158
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Semantic Security
159
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Perfect secrecy : if a passive adversary,
even with infinite computational
resources, can learn nothing about the
plaintext from the ciphertext, except
possibly its length.
๏ฎ Semantic security : a passive adversary
with polynomially bounded
computational resources can learn
nothing about the plaintext from the
ciphertext.
Semantic Security
160
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Semantic Security in Formal
161
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Zero-Knowledge Interactive Proofs
162
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Zero-Knowledge Interactive Proofs
163
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
(CRYPTOโ€™89)
ZKIP for Kids
164
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
1. V stands at A.
2. P walks to C or D.
3. V walks to B.
4. V asks P to come L or R.
5. P follows the request.
6. Repeat 1 ~ 5, n times.
ZKIP for Kids
A
B
D
C
165
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Applications of ZKIP
(CRYPTOโ€™86)
166
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Applications of ZKIP
167
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Secure Computation
168
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
169
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Cryptographic protocol for emulating a
trusted party (already started in the late 1970s)
๏ฎ MPC enables decentralization and privacy!
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
Goal :
- Correctness : Everyone computes y=f(x,y)
- Security : Nothing but the output is revealed
170
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์ต๋ช…์„ฑ ๋ณด์žฅ ๊ธฐ์ˆ 
171
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Ring Signature
172
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Dark Web
173
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Tor
174
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์ธํ„ฐ๋„ท ์ƒ์—์„œ์˜ '๋ฏธํ–‰'์„ ๋ง‰์•„์ฃผ๋Š” ๋Œ€ํ‘œ์ 
์ธ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋กœ์„œ, ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”ํ์˜ ์•„๋ฒ„์ง€๋กœ ์ผ์ปฌ์–ด
์ง€๋Š” David Chaum ๋ฐ•์‚ฌ๊ฐ€ 1981๋…„์— ์ „์ž
๋ฉ”์ผ์„ ์ต๋ช…์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜โˆ™๋ฐœ์‹ ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๋ชฉ์ ์œผ
๋กœ ๋ฏน์Šค ๋„ท์„ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ
๏ฎ ์ดํ›„ 'Onion Routing', 'ํ† ์–ด(TOR: The Onion
Routing)', 'I2P(Invisible Internet Project)' ๋“ฑ
์˜ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์„ ํƒ„์ƒ์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์ด ๋จ.
175
Mix Networks
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Mix Networks
176
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๊ธฐํƒ€ ์ฃผ๋ชฉ๋ฐ›๋Š” ์ตœ์‹  ์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋“ค
177
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE)
๏ฎ Format-Preserving Encryption (FPE)
๏ฎ Fully Homomorphic Encryption
๏ฎ Searchable Encryption (for Cloud)
Database Encryption
178
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE)
๏ฎ OPE์˜ ๊ฐœ๋…
๏ฎ R. Agrawal, J. Kiernan, R. Srikant, and Y. Xu,
โ€œOrder-preserving encryption for numeric
dataโ€, SIGMOD 2004, pp. 563~574
eA eD eC eB
OPE
key
Plain data (A > B > C >D)
cipher data (eA > eB > eC >eD)
eA eB eC eD
A B C D
A D C B
179
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE)
๏ฎ OPE์˜ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ
๏ฎ A. Boldyreva, N. Chenette, Y. Lee, A. O'Neill,
โ€œOrder-Preserving Symmetric Encryptionโ€,
EUROCRYPT 2009, pp. 224~241
๏ฎ IND-CPA๋Š” ๋ถˆ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ
๏ฎ ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์ œํ•œ์ ์ธ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์—์„œ๋Š” CPA ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์„ ์–ด๋Š
์ˆ˜์ค€๊นŒ์ง€๋Š” ๋ฐฉ์–ดํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Œ์„ ์ฆ๋ช…
180
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Format-Preserving Encryption (FPE)
181
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Format-Preserving Encryption (FPE)
182
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Format-Preserving Encryption (FPE)
183
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Format-Preserving Encryption (FPE)
184
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Whose Privacy?
Data subject whose
personal data is in DB
Questioner
Searchable Encryption (for Cloud)
185
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Searchable Encryption (for Cloud)
186
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
187
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ In 1978, Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos asked,
โ€œCan one compute on encrypted data, while
keeping it encrypted?โ€
๏ฎ In 2009, Craig Gentry (Stanford, IBM) gave solution
based on use of lattices. If efficiency can be greatly
improved, could be huge implications (e.g. for cloud
computing).
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
188
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
๏ฎ C. Gentry, โ€œFully homomorphic
encryption using ideal latticesโ€, STOC
2009
๏ฎ ๋ชจ๋“  ์—ฐ์‚ฐ์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜๋‚˜ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์— ๋ฌธ์ œ
189
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
190
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
191
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Currently there is no โ€œsilver bulletโ€ solution, said Lynne
Parker, White House deputy chief technology officer.
She pointed to several reasons: โ–ฒData de-identification
can be accidentally undone when the scrubbed data is
combined with other sources of information. โ–ฒData
aggregation limits analytics. โ–ฒSimulating data raises
concerns about accuracy and reverse engineering, while
homomorphic encryption โ€” which allows data to be
mined without sacrificing privacy โ€” hurts performance
and speed.
Other techniques and technologies also have their
weaknesses, she said. โ–ฒDifferential privacy, or systems
that publicly share information on group patterns while
withholding information on individuals in a dataset, water
down insights.
192
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๋งŒ๋ณ‘ํ†ต์น˜์•ฝ์€ ์—†๋‹ค! Define & Design!!
Identify privacy
breach
Design a new
algorithm to fix the
privacy breach
Breach and Patch Approach
Formally specify
the privacy model
Define and Design Approach
Design an algorithm
that satisfies the
privacy conditions
Derive conditions
for privacy
193
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
194
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
195
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
โ€œTo help more researchers with their work, IBM released the
open-source Differential Privacy Library.โ€
196
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
197
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์•”ํ˜ธ๊ธฐ์ˆ  ๊ตฌํ˜„์˜ ์ค‘์š”์„ฑ : ๋ถ€์ฑ„๋„ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ
198
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Magnetic Card vs. Smart Card
199
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Smart Card
200
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ROM : Holds the Operating System
๏ฎ EEPROM : Holds the application programs
and their data
๏ฎ PROM : Holds the card number
๏ฎ RAM : Used as temporary storage space for
variables
๏ฎ Processor : 8 bit processor based on CISC
architecture. Moving towards 32 bit due to
JavaCards
๏ฎ I/O Interface for data transfer to and from
the card.
Smart Card
201
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Smart Card
Vcc (=5V)
RST
CLK
RFU (์˜ˆ๋น„)
Vpp (EEPROM ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ
์ „์••. ์ดˆ๊ธฐ์˜ IC์นด๋“œ์—์„œ
์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์˜€์œผ๋‚˜, ์ตœ๊ทผ์—๋Š”
์‚ฌ์šฉ ์•ˆ ํ•จ.)
I/O
GND
RFU (์˜ˆ๋น„)
202
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Smart Card
203
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ๊ฐœ์ธํ‚ค K๊ฐ€ ์ ˆ๋Œ€๋กœ ์นด๋“œ๋ฅผ ๋– ๋‚˜์ง€ ์•Š์Œ!
์™œ Smart Card๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋‚˜?
private
key K
CPU
challenge c
response fK(c)
204
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Smart Card Security
205
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Smart Card Security
206
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Smart Card Security
Invasive Analysis Non-invasive Analysis
Side Channel Attacks
Probing Fault-based
Analysis
Timing Analysis Power Analysis
A technique to probe
signal after exposing
surface of chips and
removing protective
coating
A technique to derive
internal confidential
information using the
difference between
normal output and
faulty output caused
artificially
A technique to
estimate confidential
information by
analyzing processing
time
A technique to
estimate confidential
information by
observing power
consumption
207
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Paul Kocher et al. introduced
๏ฎ Timing attacks (CRYPTO โ€™96)
๏ฎ Differential Power analysis (CRYPTO โ€™99)
๏ฎ Differential fault analysis (Eurocrypt โ€™97)
๏ฎ induce a fault and โ€œsee what happensโ€
๏ฎ a.k.a. micro-wave attack
๏ฎ Sound of computer while computing RSA
๏ฎ Van Eck phreaking :
๏ฎ eavesdropping on screen output displayed on a CRT or
LCD monitor by measuring electromagnetic emissions
๏ฎ emissions from keyboard
Brief History of Side Channel Attacks
208
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Power Attack
Data input
Data output
Terminal
IC chip
Power supply
0111011011111
0111011101110
1111000001
Measure power
consumption
Guess secret information
stored on IC chip memory
209
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Power Attack
Can sample voltage
differences at around
1GHz with less than
1% error. It also transfers
Data to a PC. Cost around
$400.
Courtesy: Side-Channel Analysis Lab,
210
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Simple Power Attack (SPA)
๏ฎ Makes use of characteristics that are directly
visible in a single measurement trace
๏ฎ Differential Power Attack (DPA)
๏ฎ Looks for side channel differences that are NOT
directly visible in one measurement trace
๏ฎ Statistical methods have to be applied
๏ฎ Divide-and-conquer tactics: finding small
pieces of the key at a time
๏ฎ Harder to prevent
๏ฎ DPA = SPA + Statistical Analysis
SPA vs. DPA
211
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
SPA on PIN
for i = 0 to 2
if (INPUT[i] โ‰  PWD[i])
return(โ€œREJECTโ€)
return(โ€œACCEPTโ€)
212
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
SPA on PIN
3 1 2
PWD
3 1 0
INPUT
3 1 1
INPUT
3 1 2
INPUT
1 0 0
INPUT
2 0 0
INPUT
3 0 0
INPUT
0 0 0
INPUT
3 1 0
INPUT
3 0 0
INPUT
213
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
SPA on RSA
z = 1
for i = k-1 downto 0 {
z = z2 mod n
if ei = 1 then z = z ร— m mod n
}
return (z)
me = m(e3 e2 e1 e0) mod n
214
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
SPA on RSA
310 = 3(1 0 1 0) mod 15
3 1 12ร—3 mod 15 = 3
2 0 32 mod 15 = 9
1 1 92ร—3 mod 15 = 3
0 0 32 mod 15 = 9
i ei z
215
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
SPA on RSA
Test key value : 0F 00 F0 00 FF 00
216
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Hack 4096-bit RSA Keys via CPU Sound
217
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
Hack 4096-bit RSA Keys via CPU Sound
218
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์–‘์ž ๋ณด์•ˆ (Quantum-Safe Security)
219
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ 1982๋…„ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ์ด๋ก ๋ฌผ๋ฆฌํ•™์ž ๋ฆฌ์ฒ˜๋“œ ํŒŒ์ธ
๋จผ์— ์˜ํ•ด ์ฒ˜์Œ ์ œ์•ˆ
๏ฎ 1985๋…„ ์˜๊ตญ ์˜ฅ์Šคํผ๋“œ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์˜ ๋ฐ์ด๋น„๋“œ
๋„์ด์น˜์— ์˜ํ•ด ๊ทธ ๊ตฌ์ฒด์  ๊ฐœ๋…์ด ์ •๋ฆฝ๋จ
๏ฎ 1994๋…„ ๋ฒจ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์†Œ์˜ ํ”ผํ„ฐ ์‡ผ์–ด(Peter Shor)
์— ์˜ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ตœ์ดˆ์˜ ์–‘์ž์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜(์ปค๋‹ค๋ž€ ์ˆ˜
์˜ ์†Œ์ธ์ˆ˜๋ถ„ํ•ด ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜)์ด ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌ๋จ
๏ฎ 1997๋…„ IBM์˜ ์•„์ด์ž‘ ์ถ”์•™์ด 2๋น„ํŠธ ์–‘์ž
์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ์ฒ˜์Œ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ
์–‘์ž ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ (Quantum Computer)
220
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์›์ž ์ดํ•˜์˜ ๋ชจ๋“  ์‹ค์ฒด๋Š” ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ๋ณด๋Š” ๊ด€์ ์—
๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋•Œ๋กœ๋Š” ํŒŒ๋™์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ, ๋•Œ๋กœ๋Š” ์ž…์ž์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ ํ–‰๋™
ํ•˜๋Š” ์–‘๋ฉด์„ฑ์„ ๊ฐ–๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ.
๏ฎ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ์˜ ์†Œ์ž๊ฐ€ ๋งค์šฐ ์ž‘์•„์ ธ์„œ ์›์ž ๋‹จ์œ„๊ฐ€
๋œ๋‹ค๋ฉด ์–‘์ž ํฌ๊ธฐ์˜ ์†Œ์ž๋“ค์€ ๋ฐ”๋กœ, ์–‘์ž์—ญํ•™
์˜ ๋ฒ•์น™์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ์ž‘๋™ํ•จ. ์–‘์ž์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋Š” ์–‘์ž์—ญ
ํ•™์˜ โ€œ์ค‘์ฒฉํ˜„์ƒโ€๊ณผ โ€œ์–ฝํž˜ํ˜„์ƒโ€์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•œ ์ปดํ“จ
ํ„ฐ.
๏ฎ ์ค‘์ฒฉํ˜„์ƒ (superposition) : ์ž…์ž๊ฐ€ ๋™์‹œ์— ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ
๊ฐœ์˜ ์ƒํƒœ์— ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ
๏ฎ ์–ฝํž˜ํ˜„์ƒ (entanglement) : ๋‘ ์ž…์ž๊ฐ€ ๊ฑฐ๋ฆฌ์™€ ๋ฌด
๊ด€ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๊ฒฐํ•ฉ๋˜์–ด ์ƒํƒœ์— ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์ƒํ˜ธ์ž‘์šฉ
221
์–‘์ž ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ (Quantum Computer)
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์–‘์ž์ •๋ณด์˜ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ ๋‹จ์œ„์ธ ํ๋น„ํŠธ(qubit) ๋˜
๋Š” ์–‘์ž๋น„ํŠธ๋Š” ์ค‘์ฒฉํ˜„์ƒ์ด ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•˜๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ
์— 0๊ณผ 1, 2๊ฐœ์˜ ์ƒํƒœ๋ฅผ ๋™์‹œ์— ๊ฐ€์งˆ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ
์Œ. ๋˜ํ•œ ์–ฝํž˜ํ˜„์ƒ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— 2๊ฐœ์˜ ํ๋น„ํŠธ๋Š”
4๊ฐœ์˜ ์ƒํƒœ 00, 01, 10, 11์„ ๋™์‹œ์— ๊ณต์œ 
ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Œ.
๏ฎ ์ฆ‰, n๊ฐœ์˜ ํ๋น„ํŠธ๋กœ 2n๋งŒํผ์˜ ์—ฐ์‚ฐ์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜๊ฒŒ
๋˜๋ฏ€๋กœ, ์ž…๋ ฅ ์ •๋ณด๋Ÿ‰์˜ ๋ณ‘๋ ฌ ์ฒ˜๋ฆฌ์— ์˜ํ•ด ์—ฐ์‚ฐ
์†๋„๋Š” ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ์™€ ๋น„๊ตํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†
์„ ๋งŒํผ ๋นจ๋ผ์ง.
222
์–‘์ž ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ (Quantum Computer)
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์–‘์ž์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ ์†Œ์ธ์ˆ˜๋ถ„ํ•ด?
๏ฎ 1994๋…„ ํ”ผํ„ฐ ์‡ผ์–ด(Peter Shor)๋Š” (๊ฐ€์ƒ์˜) ์–‘
์ž์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ์ƒ์—์„œ ์ž‘๋™ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ณ ์†(polynomial
time) ์†Œ์ธ์ˆ˜๋ถ„ํ•ด ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜์„ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ•จ.
๏ฎ 2001๋…„ IBM์˜ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์›๋“ค์€ ์ด ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜์„ (์‹ค
์ œ) ์–‘์ž์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ์— ์ ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ 15 = 3 * 5๋ฅผ ์†Œ์ธ
์ˆ˜๋ถ„ํ•ด ํ•˜๋Š”๋ฐ ์„ฑ๊ณตํ•จ.
RSA์™€ ์–‘์ž์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ
โ‡’
223
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์ •์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ์†Œ์ธ์ˆ˜ ๋ถ„ํ•ดํ•  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ๊ฐ€๋ น 400 ์ž๋ฆฟ
์ˆ˜๋Š” ๊ฐ€์žฅ ๋น ๋ฅธ ๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋กœ ์ˆ˜์‹ญ์–ต๋…„
์ด ์†Œ์š”๋˜์ง€๋งŒ, ์‡ผ์–ด์˜ ์–‘์ž ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜์œผ๋กœ
๋Š” 1๋…„์—ฌ ์ •๋„๋ฐ–์— ๊ฑธ๋ฆฌ์ง€ ์•Š์Œ.
๏ฎ ํฌ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ N์ธ ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ์†Œ์ธ์ˆ˜ ๋ถ„ํ•ดํ•  ๋•Œ O((log N)3)
์˜ ์‹œ๊ฐ„๊ณผ O(log N)์˜ ์ €์žฅ๊ณต๊ฐ„์ด ํ•„์š”ํ•จ.
224
RSA์™€ ์–‘์ž์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
RSA์™€ ์–‘์ž์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ
225
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ์–‘์ž ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ(quantum computer)์˜ ์—ฐ์‚ฐ ๋Šฅ
๋ ฅ์œผ๋กœ๋„ ๋šซ์„ ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋Š” ๋ณด์•ˆ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์„ ์˜๋ฏธ
์–‘์ž ๋ณด์•ˆ์ด๋ž€?
226
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ ํ•˜๋“œ์›จ์–ด ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์˜ ์–‘์ž ๋ณด์•ˆ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ,
QKD(Quantum Key Distribution, ์–‘์ž์•”ํ˜ธํ‚ค
๋ถ„๋ฐฐ)
๏ฎ SKT, KT ๋“ฑ
๏ฎ ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์˜ PQC(Post-Quantum
Cryptography, ์–‘์ž๋‚ด์„ฑ์•”ํ˜ธ)
๏ฎ LGU+ ๋“ฑ
์–‘์ž ๋ณด์•ˆ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์˜ ์ข…๋ฅ˜
227
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
์–‘์ž ๋ณด์•ˆ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์˜ ์ข…๋ฅ˜
228
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
229
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘ (Source: https://amhoin.blog.me/222076260058)
230
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ In 1967 David Kahn published The Codebreakers
โ€” The Story of Secret Writing.
๏ฎ A monumental history of cryptography.
๏ฎ NSA attempted to suppress its publication.
To Learn More
231
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ฎ Established 1982 by David Chaum, Ron Rivest, and
others, to promote academic research in cryptology.
๏ฎ Sponsors three major conferences/year (Crypto,
Eurocrypt, Asiacrypt) and four workshops; about 200
papers/year, plus another 600/year posted on web.
๏ฎ Publishes J. Cryptography
๏ฎ Around 1600 members, (25% students), from 74
countries, 27 Fellows.
To Learn More
232
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
๏ถ ยฉ2021 by Seungjoo Gabriel Kim. Permission to
make digital or hard copies of part or all of this
material is currently granted without fee
provided that copies are made only for personal
or classroom use, are not distributed for profit
or commercial advantage, and that new copies
bear this notice and the full citation.
233
๊ณ ๋ ค๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์ •๋ณด๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€ํ•™์›
๋งˆ์Šคํ„ฐ ์ œ๋ชฉ ์Šคํƒ€์ผ ํŽธ์ง‘
234
๋ธ”๋ก์ฒด์ธ์˜ ์ด๋ก ์ 
ํ† ๋Œ€, ์•”ํ˜ธํ•™

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