On Sunday, November 25, 2018, Russia has seized three Ukrainian naval ships off the coast of Russia-annexed Crimea. After ramming into, fire was opened on Ukrainian ships, as the result of which six sailors were wounded, and all crew members – as reported, 24 persons - were taken as prisoners of war.

1. WHY RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
IN AZOV SEA AREA
IS IMPORTANT FOR NORD STREAM 2 CASE
UKRAINE’S VESSELS ATTACKED AND SEIZED
OFF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF UKRAINE
Source: Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs of Ukraine (https://mtot.gov.ua/russia-neglected-the-immunity-of-ukrainian-warships-on-the-high-seas-map/)
Source: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/all-eyes-on-denmark-after-sweden-awards-nord-stream-2-permit/
On Sunday, November 25, 2018, Russia has seized three Ukrainian naval ships
off the coast of Russia-annexed Crimea. After ramming into, fire was opened
on Ukrainian ships, as the result of which six sailors were wounded, and all
crew members – as reported, 24 persons1
- were taken as prisoners of war2
.
By arguing that “Ukrainian vessels have violated
Russia’s borders”, Russia lied twice. First, the UN
General Assembly, the U.S., the EU, Canada and
many other countries, consistently deny any claims
by the Russian Federation to the territorial waters of
Ukraine along Crimea peninsula as illegitimate3
.
Second, capturing of Ukrainian vessels took place on
the territory, which is beyond 12 nautical miles zone
around Crimea4
, after the ships attempted to
exercise the right of peaceful passage through the
Kerch Strait on their route to Ukrainian port of
Mariupol as provided by the 2003 bilateral maritime
agreement between Russia and Ukraine and as some
other Ukrainian ships have done earlier 2018 year5
.
Beside that, Russia violated a number of international agreements. In
particular - the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which demands the
freedom of maritime traffic, and abovementioned bilateral Ukrainian-Russian
Agreement on the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov, which provides for
freedom of navigation in the Sea of Azov as well as access to it through the
Kerch Strait6
.
ALTHOUGH A BLATANT ACT OF UNDISCLOSED AGGRESSION BY ITSELF, THIS
CRIME MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE IMPLICATIONS FOR NORD STREAM 2 PIPELINE
THAT IS SET TO CROSS THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF DENMARK AND GERMANY,
ALONG WITH THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES (EEZ) OF FINLAND, SWEDEN,
DENMARK AND GERMANY7
.
INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATED
MILITARIZING OF THE BALTIC SEA
MITIGATION OF THE THREAT FROM RUSSIANON-COMBAT INTERVENTIONS
Taking to the account impudence of the recent attack, it could be expected that Russia will use Nord Stream 2 pipeline
protection as an excuse for expanding its presence in the territorial waters of these countries. One day, Russian forces – be it
regular army, private military companies or Gazprom's security units – could break into 12-miles zone, as in case of Ukraine, but
there might be no direct response, in order not to escalate tensions.
In 2007, the law was passed in Russia8
allowing two biggest energy
monopolies, Gazprom and Transneft, to
employ private security units and
purchase weapons - under the pretext
that strategic infrastructure has to be
protected from terrorist attacks . This
fact is particularly important as the
number of incidents in the Baltic Sea,
involving Russian military, in the recent
years is growing10
– posing a threat to
fragile security balance in the region.
Also, Russia might use Nord Stream 2
pipeline protection as an argument to
control vessels traffic in the Baltic Sea.
Starting from formal procedures, then –
as in case of Ukraine – it might move to
more aggressive control and blocking of
ship traffic, possible delays in their
schedules and influence on trade
activities in the region. For this purpose,
electronic warfare and surveillance
systems could be used to track other
targets than Nord Stream 2 pipeline
monitoring11
.
1 https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/11/27/7199515/
2 https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/548183.html
3 https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/experts/2018/11/26/7089884/
4 https://mtot.gov.ua/russia-neglected-the-immunity-of-ukrainian-warships-on-the-high-seas-map/
5 http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_205
6 https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/experts/2018/11/26/7089884/
7 https://www.nord-stream2.com/construction/country-country/
8 http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=102033428&backlink=1&&nd=102115975
9 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/05/russia.oil
10 https://www.americansecurityproject.org/us-russia-relationship/russian-military-incident-tracker/
11 https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/NSTS_HybridTechWar.pdf
12 https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR151AR%20Nordstream2.pdf
These threats are substantiated by the long visible strategy of the Russian
government to try violating the rules, track the response and, if not paying
sufficient price for its actions, intensify its coercive actions. Recent years of
countering the Russian aggression in Crimea and in the eastern regions of Ukraine
provide for nothing but a clear and simple rule: the Russian government only stops
where the price for continuing of intimidation and offence becomes too high to
pay. Preventive actions by the West may include:
strict and explicit condemnation of the Russia’s aggression in the Sea of Azov;
unequivocal sign of readiness for military support through increased NATO
presence in the Black and Azov seas;
cancellation of permits provided for Nord Stream 2 based on security
considerations and abundant legal grounds of the 3rd
Energy Package of the EU12
.
This alert is prepared by the Kyiv-based think-tank
DiXi Group.
For further details please contact us via
author@dixigroup.org.