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Risk Management: A Failed Strategy with
Unachievable Goals.

Richard Stiennon
Chief Research Analyst
IT-Harvest
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

What is risk?
Risk = Threat * Vulnerability * Asset Value
-or-

The probable frequency and probable
magnitude of future loss - FAIR
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Risk Management
101
• 1. Identify all critical assets
• 2. Score them by “value”
• 3. Discover all vulnerabilities
• All three are impossible.
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What is an IT asset?
Desktops

Laptops
Servers
Thumb drives

Switches
Applications
Data bases
Records
Artifacts (VM images)
Usernames, passwords, e
mail addresses

•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

IP addresses, domains
Digital certificates
(SSL, SSH, Kerboros, code
signing, identity)
Email, email archives
Business intelligence data
Logs
Policies, settings, configurations

Processes, work flow, authorization

•
•
•
•
•
•

IP. Designs, formulae, patent
applications, litigation
documents, spreadsheets, docs, Powe
r Point.
Real time data

Meta data

•
•

Software licenses and version data
Virtual data center (repeat most of
above)
Phones
Smart phones
Video conferencing

Firewalls, IPS, Content filtering, Log
management, patch
management, trouble
ticketing, AV, etc. etc. etc.
Active Directory,
Ephemeral assets
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

What is the value of an IT asset?

•
•
•
•
•
•

Replacement cost?
Purchase+shipping+config+restore+staging+d
eployment
Cost to reproduce data?

Loss of productivity?
Loss of business competitiveness?

Lost sales?
Lost battle?
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Can you really reduce the
surface area (exposed
vulnerabilities) ?
• Some systems cannot be patched

• Legacy
• Operations

• All systems have unknown
vulnerabilities
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Risk Manage This:
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Or this:
Athens 2004:
A series of software updates turns on
Lawful intercept function in Ericsson switch
104 diplomats and Olympic officials
spied on
Engineer mysteriously commits suicide
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Or this:
Cyber sabotage: Stuxnet
s7otbxdx.dll

Step 7 software

DLL
Rootkit

s7otbxsx.dll

DLL
original

New data blocks added
International Cybersecurity Dialogue
Trading losses

Or this:

2008, Jerome Kerviel covers up trading losses,
Largest trading fraud in history to be carried out by a single person.
$54 billion exposure, $7.14 Billion loss
5 year sentence reduced to 3
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Or this:
• Saudi Aramco, August 2012
• South Korea, March 2013
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Or this:
• Malware transmitted to SIPRNET

across an air gap by “foreign agents” in
an “overseas theater” according to
assistant defense secretary Lynn.

• Buckshot Yankee costs reputed to be
over $1 billion to re-image all machines
within DoD.
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Risk management is based on normal
distribution of events

• IT security is not subject to Gaussian
distributions

• The difference is: adversaries
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Targeted Attacks are Not Random

• Risk Management arose to

address “random attacks.”
Viruses, worms, opportunistic
hackers.

• Targeted attacks are Black
Swan events
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

So, if Risk Management is a failure
what should be done?

• Welcome to the world of threat based
security, the real world.
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Some scenarios
• A mass killer is on the loose. Find him

and stop him? Or protect every “asset”?

• Chinese Comment Crew is in your
network. Do a vulnerability scan?

• Rogue employee is accessing customer
database. Beef up security awareness
training?
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Cyber kill chain
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Security Intelligence is the key to
threat management

• Malware analysis
• Key indicators of attack
• Key indicators of compromise
• Threat actor intelligence
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

The Cyber Defense Team
Operations
Analysts

Red Team

Cyber Commander
International Cybersecurity Dialogue

Let’s be honest
• Risk Management was developed so
that IT security could “speak to
management.”

• Management understands threats not
risks.

• Show them the threats and they will
respond.

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Why Risk Management is Impossible

  • 1. Risk Management: A Failed Strategy with Unachievable Goals. Richard Stiennon Chief Research Analyst IT-Harvest
  • 2. International Cybersecurity Dialogue What is risk? Risk = Threat * Vulnerability * Asset Value -or- The probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss - FAIR
  • 3. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Risk Management 101 • 1. Identify all critical assets • 2. Score them by “value” • 3. Discover all vulnerabilities • All three are impossible.
  • 4. International Cybersecurity Dialogue • • • • • • • • • • What is an IT asset? Desktops Laptops Servers Thumb drives Switches Applications Data bases Records Artifacts (VM images) Usernames, passwords, e mail addresses • • • • • • • • • • IP addresses, domains Digital certificates (SSL, SSH, Kerboros, code signing, identity) Email, email archives Business intelligence data Logs Policies, settings, configurations Processes, work flow, authorization • • • • • • IP. Designs, formulae, patent applications, litigation documents, spreadsheets, docs, Powe r Point. Real time data Meta data • • Software licenses and version data Virtual data center (repeat most of above) Phones Smart phones Video conferencing Firewalls, IPS, Content filtering, Log management, patch management, trouble ticketing, AV, etc. etc. etc. Active Directory, Ephemeral assets
  • 5. International Cybersecurity Dialogue What is the value of an IT asset? • • • • • • Replacement cost? Purchase+shipping+config+restore+staging+d eployment Cost to reproduce data? Loss of productivity? Loss of business competitiveness? Lost sales? Lost battle?
  • 6. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Can you really reduce the surface area (exposed vulnerabilities) ? • Some systems cannot be patched • Legacy • Operations • All systems have unknown vulnerabilities
  • 8. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Or this: Athens 2004: A series of software updates turns on Lawful intercept function in Ericsson switch 104 diplomats and Olympic officials spied on Engineer mysteriously commits suicide
  • 9. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Or this: Cyber sabotage: Stuxnet s7otbxdx.dll Step 7 software DLL Rootkit s7otbxsx.dll DLL original New data blocks added
  • 10. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Trading losses Or this: 2008, Jerome Kerviel covers up trading losses, Largest trading fraud in history to be carried out by a single person. $54 billion exposure, $7.14 Billion loss 5 year sentence reduced to 3
  • 11. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Or this: • Saudi Aramco, August 2012 • South Korea, March 2013
  • 12. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Or this: • Malware transmitted to SIPRNET across an air gap by “foreign agents” in an “overseas theater” according to assistant defense secretary Lynn. • Buckshot Yankee costs reputed to be over $1 billion to re-image all machines within DoD.
  • 13. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Risk management is based on normal distribution of events • IT security is not subject to Gaussian distributions • The difference is: adversaries
  • 14. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Targeted Attacks are Not Random • Risk Management arose to address “random attacks.” Viruses, worms, opportunistic hackers. • Targeted attacks are Black Swan events
  • 15. International Cybersecurity Dialogue So, if Risk Management is a failure what should be done? • Welcome to the world of threat based security, the real world.
  • 16. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Some scenarios • A mass killer is on the loose. Find him and stop him? Or protect every “asset”? • Chinese Comment Crew is in your network. Do a vulnerability scan? • Rogue employee is accessing customer database. Beef up security awareness training?
  • 18. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Security Intelligence is the key to threat management • Malware analysis • Key indicators of attack • Key indicators of compromise • Threat actor intelligence
  • 19. International Cybersecurity Dialogue The Cyber Defense Team Operations Analysts Red Team Cyber Commander
  • 20. International Cybersecurity Dialogue Let’s be honest • Risk Management was developed so that IT security could “speak to management.” • Management understands threats not risks. • Show them the threats and they will respond.