Disasters as Conflict Triggers: A New Framework for Analysis in Conflict-Affected & Post-Conflict States
1. D ISASTERS AS C ONFLICT T RIGGERS :
A N EW F RAMEWORK FOR A NALYSIS IN
C ONFLICT -A FFECTED & P OST -C ONFLICT S TATES
2. O VERVIEW OF P RESENTATION
Discussion of literature on disasters and
conflict link
Disaster Diplomacy & disasters in post-
conflict settings
Overview of analytical framework
Case Study – 2005 Pakistan Earthquake
Next steps for research
Conclusion
3. I NTRODUCTION
Little research on link between disasters
and conflict
Literature in this field remains ambiguous
Some evidence linking rapid onset
disasters to higher conflict risk
Little evidence to show that slow onset
disasters affect conflict
4. D ISASTER D IPLOMACY ?
Almost no research on effects of disasters
in post-conflict states
Some suggest “disaster diplomacy” effect
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Aceh
1999 Earthquakes in Turkey, Greece
5. D ISASTER D IPLOMACY ?
Disaster diplomacy far
from guaranteed
2004 Tsunami in Sri
Lanka conflict
2001 Gujarat
Earthquake in India
Given this fact:
What are pathways
connecting disasters &
conflict?
6. A N EW A NALYTICAL F RAMEWORK
1.) Weak State Hypothesis
• Opportunity Pathway
• Regime Weakness Pathway
• Rebel Legitimacy Pathway
2.) Disaster Politics
• Inequality Pathway
• Politicization of Response Pathway
• Conflict (In)sensitivity of Aid Pathway
3.) Disaster Economics
• Opportunity Costs Pathway
• Rebel Financing Pathway
4.) Migration & Demographics
• Sons of the Soil Pathway
• Migration Disruption Pathway
• Migration as Organization Pathway
7. W EAK S TATE H YPOTHESIS
Disasters may expose weak ruling
governments to rebellion
Rebel Legitimacy Pathway
2004 Tsunami in LTTE-held areas
Map overlaying % of
dead or missing from
2004 tsunami and LTTE-
held areas in Sri Lanka
Le Billon & Waaizenegger
(2007). “Peace in the wake of
disaster? Secessionist conflicts
and the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami.” pg, 416
8. D ISASTER P OLITICS
Disasters are not “natural” events - inherently
political & socially constructed
Conflict (In)sensitivity of Aid Pathway
Aid disparities in Aceh after Tsunami
Destruction in Aceh,
Indonesia after Indian
Ocean Tsunami
Courtesy of National Geographic
9. D ISASTER E CONOMICS
Disasters have economic costs, opportunities
Rebel Financing Pathway
Interahamwe extorted UN refugee aid after
Rwandan genocide
Refugee camp for Hutus
who fled into eastern
DRC in 1994
10. M IGRATION & D EMOGRAPHICS
Disasters can lead to large-scale population
movements, affect demographics
1. Sons of the Soil Pathway
2. Migration Disruption
3. Migration as Organization
12. M IGRATION & D EMOGRAPHICS
Disasters can lead to large-scale population
movements, affect demographics
Migration as Organization pathway
Burmese junta response to Cyclone Nargis
Cyclone Nargis affected areas
Courtesy of ReliefWeb
13. 2005 PAKISTAN E ARTHQUAKE
October 5, 2005: 7.6
magnitude earthquake
Affected 28,000km in
Azad Jammu Kashmir &
North West Frontier
Province
Kills 73,338 people,
seriously injures 73,000
14. 2005 PAKISTAN E ARTHQUAKE
Majority of damage done to housing,
public buildings
Damage to schools killed 18,000 children
“the disaster that wiped out a generation
of children” in Pakistan
Government completely unprepared for
disaster of this magnitude
15. U SING D ISASTER -C ONFLICT
F RAMEWORK FOR E ARTHQUAKE
Earthquake response effort has clear
conflict dynamics
Relevant pathways from framework:
Rebel Legitimacy
Conflict (In)sensitivity of Aid
Migration as Organization
16. R EBEL L EGITIMACY
Pakistani government
slow to respond
First step was reinforcing
Line of Control
Militant organizations
filled this gap
Saw response as
Earthquake victims receive food from Jamaat-
opportunity to win
ud-Dawa, front group for Lashkar-e-Taiba hearts & minds
17 banned groups played
role in response
17. C ONFLICT I N ( SENSITIVITY ) OF A ID
Humanitarians used to working in weak states
Had little experience in Pakistan, did not understand
political context
Organizations work directly with military regime,
bypass civil society
18. D ISASTER D IPLOMACY
Post-disaster changes largely path-
dependent
Disasters can help catalyze existing
diplomacy, cannot create it
Leaders must push diplomacy, but cannot
get ahead of constituents
Non-disaster issues often dominate,
undermine diplomacy potential
Need action by actors across scales on both
sides of conflict
19. M IGRATION AS O RGANIZATION
Earthquake left 2.8 million Pakistanis
homeless
Aid only provided to official IDP camps
Islamist groups took advantage of this
decision
20. R ESEARCH N EXT S TEPS
Conducting surveys, interviews with
practitioners and researchers
Demonstrate how conflict affected
earthquake vulnerability in Pakistan
Trace connections between peacebuilding &
disaster risk reduction (DRR)
Pressure and Release
(PAR) Model of disasters,
from Blaikie et al (1994)
21. C ONCLUSION
Research on disasters & conflict ambiguous,
doesn’t focus on post-conflict states
New framework traces 4 mechanisms, 11
possible pathways
Response to Pakistan Earthquake showed
multiple pathways at work
Links between disasters & conflict suggests
need to address both simultaneously
22. THANK YOU
QUESTIONS?
Tim Kovach
MA Candidate, Global Environmental Policy
timothy.kovach@american.edu
Editor's Notes
Discussion of literature on disasters and conflict linkDisaster Diplomacy & disasters in post-conflict settingsOverview of analytical frameworkCase Study – 2005 Pakistan EarthquakeNext steps for researchConclusion
to date, there has been relatively little research done on link between disasters and conflict the literature that has been conducted in this field remains largely ambiguousSome evidence linking rapid onset disasters to higher conflict risk other studies challenges their findings, however, arguing such disasters create greater empathy Little evidence to show that slow onset disasters affect conflict evidence that does exist remains uncertain, at best
increasing amount of research into links btwn disasters & conflict, almost none focuses on effects of disasters in post-conflict statesSome of the research that has occurred suggests a potential “disaster diplomacy” effect after 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Indonesian govt & Achenese rebels resolved their 30-year conflict following major earthquakes in Greece & Turkey during 1999, the two govts reached a rapprochementGreece agreed to drop opposition to Turkish candidacy for EU
Yet, disaster diplomacy remains far from guaranteed ceasefire agreement btwn Sri Lankan govt & Tamil Tiger rebels in place from 2002 after tsunami rebels boycotted national elections and resumed violent attacks major earthquake hit Gujarat Province in India during 2001Musharraf offered support, held summit with Indian PM summit was a failure, nearly led to second conflict in 3 years btwn two rival states Given this fact, I had a key research question:What are pathways connecting disasters & conflict in post-conflict/conflict-affected states?
after reading through the literature, I developed a new framework that outlines these potential pathways I propose that there are 4 key mechanisms linking conflict & disasters in post-conflict states: Weak State Hypothesis Disaster Politics Disaster Economics Migration & Demographic Changes as you can see, each of these mechanisms has multiple pathways I will explore four of these mechanisms
as an extension of Fearon & Laitin’s weak state hypothesis, a disaster could potentially expose the ruling government/regime in several ways Rebel Legitimacy Pathway – disasters during/after conflict often occur in rebel-held areasinability of ruling govt to adequately respond can create opportunity for rebels to fill this gapThis process can improve their status, provide them legitimacy2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami hammered Sri LankaAs the maps demonstrate, many of the most heavily affected areas were controlled by the Tamil TigersGovt was unable to provide direct assistance to many victims in these areasSome Tamils viewed it as intentional policy to punish them & weaken LTTELTTE considered itself legitimate representative of the Tamil people, demanded that it have control over reconstruction funds, planning processGovt rejected these demands, however, increasing resentmentPerception that govt was favoring Sinhalese in reconstruction & punishing Tamils contribute to renewal of conflict by end of 2005
important to recognize that disasters are not truly natural events they are inherently political phenomena, are socially constructed failure to consider & manage these political dynamics of disasters can have ramificationsConflict (In)sensitivity of Aid Pathway – disasters garner humanitarian responses, which may not be sensitive to existing conflict dynamicsFailure to consider important conflict context in affected areas may feed into existing conflicts, contribute to development of new conflictsIndian Ocean Tsunami also wreaked havoc on Aceh, a region in northern SumatraAceh had been home to a separatist insurgency – the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) – since 1976Unlike Sri Lanka, tsunami affected coastal areas, while conflict-affected areas were mostly in mountainous central AcehMassive influx of international support into Aceh created a “second tsunami” of humanitarian aidmost humanitarians were unfamiliar with the conflict contextAs noted, tsunami & response did not lead to resumed conflict – just the oppositeBut aid packages to tsunami survivors were twice as large as packages to households affected by conflictLack of livelihood support to ex-combatants & people affected by conflict created resentment, contributed to spikes in crime
just as disasters carry political consequences, they also generate significant economic costs & opportunities Rebel Financing Pathway – when disasters occur in rebel areas, rebel groups can get their hands on humanitarian aid streams most notorious example of rebels seizing humanitarian aid occurred in camps set up in eastern DRC for Hutus fleeing Rwanda after genocide thousands of Hutu Power leaders, interahamwe lived alongside innocent Hutus in the campsExtorted food aid, required innocent survivors to pay taxes & tribute to prop up their rebel group
disasters frequently lead to large-scale population displacements, which may affect demographics in source & destination communities research suggests that disasters can drive internal and international migration flows
Disaster-related displacement not confined to the developing world Map shows the displacement of victims of Hurricane Katrina following the storm 1.36 million people relocated to each of the 50 states displacement significantly affected demographics, power dynamics in New Orleans
Migration as Organization Pathway – many displaced persons end up in relief campsCamps may become target for rebel recruitment, organizationDisasters may also undermine state’s ability to monitor & control these activities, facilitating rebellionInteresting wrinkle to this pathway – Cyclone Nargis hammered Burma in 2008, killing 138,000 peopleCyclone affected the Irrawady Delta, home to large population of ethnic Karen peopleKaren rebels have been engaged in conflict w/ Burmese govt for decadesMilitary feared that Karen rebels would use survivor camps to organize further attacksForcibly evicted tens of thousands of survivors just 2-3 weeks after the stormRequired many to return to villages/homes that had been completely washed away by storm
October 5, 2005: 7.6 magnitude earthquakeAffected 28,000km in Azad Jammu Kashmir & North West Frontier ProvinceKills 73,338 people, seriously injures 73,000
Majority of damage from earthquake was done to housing stock & public buildings600,000 houses & nearly 8,000 public buildings damaged or destroyed 12,000 schools destroyed or irreparably damaged – killed 18,000 children earthquake to be remembered as “the disaster that wiped out a generation of children” Pakistani Government completely unprepared for disaster of this magnitude first major earthquake since 1935 Quetta Earthquake no disaster management/disaster risk reduction agency existed beforehand
Earthquake response effort has clear conflict dynamicsSeveral pathways from my framework are relevant to this case; I will focus on 3:Rebel LegitimacyConflict (In)sensitivity of AidMigration as Organization
Pakistani government slow to respond to the disaster, initial response was highly self-servingMilitary’s first step was replacing troops killed or wounded along Line of Control with IndiaTook military 3 days to reach major towns, relief never arrived for many in secluded areasMilitant organizations worked to fill this gapSaw response as opportunity to win hearts & mindsInternational aid, incl. US aid, inevitably ended up in hands of militant orgsJamaat-ud-Dawa, a front organization for Lashkar-e-Taiba, distributed US govt aidISI directly provided humanitarian aid to militant groups in order to “craft a new image” for the militant orgs they preferred
Majority of humanitarian actors had experience working in fragile states with weak or non-existentgovts, like Somalia & DRCMost had little experience in Pakistan, did not understand itspolitical contextMilitary has ruled Pakistan directly for half of its history since 1947 “Every country has an army, but Pakistan’s army has a country” Humanitarian orgs, esp. UN agencies, appeared eager to work directly with military regime appropriate for humanitarians to work closely w/ military during rescue & relief efforts but they continued to work directly w/ military during recovery & reconstruction process complicity of humanitarian orgs helped Musharraf regime consolidate its control over govt, sidelined civil society response colored by Global War on Terror priorities US, allies wanted to show support for Musharraf regime, located on front line of War on Terror
Social & political changes in the post-disaster setting are largely path-dependentDisasters can help catalyze existing diplomacy, cannot create ite.g. peace process in Aceh was already ongoing before the tsunamiLeaders must be at the forefront of push for disaster diplomacy, but they cannot get ahead of constituentsIf citizens and/or elite actors don’t want to pursue peace, they can undermine effortsNon-disaster issues often dominate, undermine diplomacy potential continued mistrust btwn India & Pakistan over Kashmir issue continued to dominate discussion Pakistani govt rejected Indian offer to provide helicopters for relief effortNeed action by actors across scales on both sides of conflict Ian Kelman: disaster diplomacy is “an encouraging concept in theory…[but]appears to be unrealistic in many situations”
earthquake left 2.8 million Pakistanis homeless despite extensive need, Pakistani govt & UNHCR agreed to only provide aid to “official” camps w/ 50+ tents just 25 official camps set up; more than 1,000 unofficial camps settled, which received no formal aid>100,000 people ended up settling in periurban areas, exposing them to serious protection issues Islamic militant orgs took advantage of this opportunity ½ of camps outside of Muzzafarabad were run by banned Islamist groups replaced many of the destroyed state schools with madrassahs Al-Rasheed Trust intentionally set up camps adjacent to World Vision camps, because it was a Christian org widespread evidence that Islamist groups adopted orphans in the affected areas, enrolled them in madrassahs
currently conducting survey and interviews with practitioners, donors, and researchers familiar w/ response to the earthquake results will help to inform my analysis further, provide anecdotal evidence plan to demonstrate how decades of conflict in Pakistan and Afghanistan influenced socioeconomic, political, & environmental vulnerability to the earthquake will allow me to complete process tracing analysis, show that disasters & conflicts influence each other after showing the important, bidirectional links btwn disasters & conflict, will trace the connections between peacebuilding & DRR concepts share a number of similarities; propose that pursuing them together can harness synergies, create spillover benefits
Research on links between disasters & conflict largelyambiguous, largelydoesn’t focus on post-conflict & conflict-affected statesNew framework I have proposed traces 4 mechanisms, 11 possible pathways to make this link from disaster to conflictResponse to Pakistan Earthquake showed multiple pathways at work; demonstrated 3 of these in this presentationLinks between disasters & conflict suggests need to address both simultaneouslyMutually beneficial process, can take advantage of their synergies
