1. Assignment # 1
Topic: Pak-India Long Term Relation
Submitted to MAAM RUBINA AZHAR
Submitted by Tayyab Husnain (0076)
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Introduction
India-Pakistan relations are characterized by the sharp hostility that has driven their
relations since independence in 1947. One also notices the 'low' and 'high' in the cycle
of hostility. There have been some years when relations were exceptionally unfriendly,
as against others, signifying a relative lull. Interestingly, the 'low' in hostility denotes
periods when Pakistan was less confident of its ability to challenge India militarily, as
opposed to other times, when it felt more confident in doing so. Another pattern could
be observed that is based on a time frame. Here, India-Pakistan relations may be
categorized into two major periods: (a) prior to acquisition of nuclear capabilities; and
(b) post acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. In both periods, the two countries
have allowed military prowess or comparative military technological capabilities to
underwrite the course of their relations. This fact is reflective of the nature of threat
perception, their respective determination of national objectives and the domestic
interplay of vested interests. In light of the above, the future of India-Pakistan relations
depends on their respective assessment of the qualitative shift in the geopolitical and
geo-strategic environment of the region. It is increasingly manifest over the years that
a nuclear South Asia cannot afford a cycle of hostility. The two countries need to
develop an understanding that can help normalize relations - a new equation that does
not necessarily mean lowering the guard by one or the other, but to find ways where
both could live peacefully, pursuing their independent national objectives. The
question at this juncture, when both neighbours have entered into a peace process, is
how these factors could be internalized by the two sides to allow the process to move
forward. Indeed, the strength of both countries individually in the South Asian region
lies in their ability to reconcile their differences and progress simultaneously without
threatening each other. Whether their vested interests will allow such a positive
outcome to materialize is an issue that is discussed in the following pages. This study
is an attempt to understand the various factors that have shaped the course of India-
Pakistan relations and how these relations are likely to unfold in the future.
Bilateral Disputes
India-Pakistan rivalry and their threat perceptions have a physical manifestation in the
form of the on-going Kashmir dispute and other boundary issues. Control of territory,
in fact, is central to the bilateral hostility and competition with India. Since no other
issue has gained the kind of salience that the Kashmir dispute has, its significance for
Pakistan's policymakers needs to be understood. The dispute is considered vitally
important to Pakistan's existence for a number of reasons. First, control of Indian
occupied-Kashmir (IoK) is vital for Pakistan for ideological reasons, intertwined with
the logic of Pakistan's existence itself. To quote Pakistan's President and Army Chief,
General Pervez Musharraf: '' Kashmir runs in our blood '' The partition of the
sub-continent took place on a religious-ideological basis. The Muslims of India, under
the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, wanted a separate homeland, an idea
opposed by the Indian Congress. The princely state of Kashmir was annexed by Indi a
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in contravention of the agreed upon principles of partition. India denied the people of
Kashmir the right to determine their political future, as promised in the UN resolutions
of 1948-49, and as initially agreed by India. The popular perception in Pakistan is that
given a fair chance, the Kashmiris would have opted to join Pakistan. Continued Indian
control of Kashmir is viewed as a challenge to Pakistan's existence as a state and its
ideology. On the other hand, any concession on the issue by New Delhi is seen as
compromising India's status as a secular state. Second, the control of Kashmir is held
as strategically important for Pakistan. The water resources and territorial security of
Pakistan can be better ensured through controlling the entire disputed territory. Recent
Indian statements hinting at stoppage of water to Pakistan tend to heighten the fears
of India's intent and capacity to make life difficult for Pakistan. In fact, since the ten-
month long troop mobilization in 2002, certain segments of the security elite have
vociferously argued about New Delhi's intention to strangulate Pakistan by blocking
the downstream flow of river waters. Water is an issue that allows the official threat
perception to permeate into areas such as Sindh, where people are otherwise not too
bothered by India. But the dominant view in Sindh is that the water crisis has less to
do with India's negative manipulation of water sources and is more due to the attitude
of Punjab. Since the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistan has objected to the
designs of India's upstream Salal Dam, Wullar Barrage and, lately, the Baglihar Dam,
for threatening to alter the flow of river water in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty.
Such issues strengthen the Pakistani establishment's resolve to question India's
control of Kashmir. Kashmir has been central to the hostile relations between the two
countries, often spilling over or getting channelized into other bilateral disputes, for
instance, the battle over the Siachin glacier or the mini-war in Kargil in 1999. The fight
for control over the controversial and undemarcated Siachin glacier started in 1984.
The Glacier is 20,000 ft above sea-level and stretches over 1000 square miles (see
Map). It had been left out from demarcation of the Ceasefire Line in 1949. The Indians
argue that since the 1970s Pakistan had been making moves to occupy it. During the
late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, Islamabad began to charge fees from
scouting expeditions which would visit the glacier. As a result, this land mass was
shown as falling into Pakistani territory in certain international maps. The Director of
the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in New Delhi claimed that through
the occupation of the Siachin glacier, Pakistan could directly threaten Indian territory.
Whether or not the Pakistani military could achieve such an objective, it has still been
argued that in the early 1980s both the countries had their 'eye' on the glacier.
According to a senior Pakistan Army officer, President Zia had ordered an occupation
in 1983. It was the army which had relaxed, and as a result, they were caught in 1984
with 'their pants down' when the Indian troops moved in.Robert Wirsing, an American
expert, is of the opinion that a delay in action was caused due to Pakistan's deeper
involvement with Afghanistan at that time. The Pakistani establishment holds the view
that India had wanted to threaten the Karakoram highway between itself and China.
The only possible benefit that India could have by its action was to undermine the
Pakistan-China border agreement. However, keeping in consideration the
geographical and atmospheric hazards which the militaries of both India and Pakistan
might have faced in using the glacier to invade each other's territories, such claims
appear dubious.In this respect the occupation of the glacier cannot be explained
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logically. The only rational explanation seems that the decisionmakers of both
countries continue to be obsessed with military/territorial security. This is being done
in an age when the definition of security has acquired multiple meanings. At best, the
issue is an extension of the larger Kashmir issue. It was certainly Kashmir that
prompted Islamabad to re-engage New Delhi militarily in 1999. This was done through
militarily occupying certain strategic heights in the Drass-Kargil area along the Line of
Control (LOC). The timing of the operation was indeed odd since it coincided with the
Indian Premier Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan on the invitation of Pakistan's Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, and expectations were high regarding improvement of relations
between the two states.
( http://thenetwork.org.pk/Resources/Magazines/PDF/12-8-2011-2-54-59-792-
Indo-Pak%20Relations.pdf )
POLITICAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
The participants from both countries in this group, most of who were retired diplomats
and military officials felt that disputes and differences between the two countries had
created a serious LACK OF TRUST as one of the first key factors between the two
countries affecting bilateral relations since they became independent in 1947.
According to the participants, lack of trust is one of the main factors that has influenced
the bilateral relationship and is responsible for recurrence of tensions. Given the three
wars fought by them, the relationship is an accident prone because of which the two
countries have come close to war on other occasions. The key factor which has
bedeviled Pakistan India relations is the KASHMIR dispute. The participants felt
Kashmir has been at the center of the conflict for the past 30 years, and could act as
a flashpoint for both the countries anytime. Currently, India demands the issue to be
resolved through bilateral negotiations to which both countries have agreed to the
SIMLA agreement of 1972.The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in his 2014 visit
to India to attend Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s inaugural ceremony said that he
intended to "pick up the threads" of the Lahore Declaration, referring to a pledge both
countries made in 1999 to cooperate more closely to ease tensions in the light of the
SIMLA agreement. However, Pakistan has been raising the Kashmir issue at the
United Nations General Assembly to remind the global community of their commitment
as per the relevant United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)
Resolutions of 1948 and 1949. Another factor which has become equally relevant in
the bilateral relations is the post 9/11 scenario of TERRORISM. The participants
highlighted the accusations often made in this regard from both sides. Examples of
these are the 2001 attack on the parliament in New Delhi and the Mumbai attack in
2008 both allegedly carried out by militants based in Pakistan. On the other hand,
Pakistani participants brought up the issue of India allegedly insurrecting the
insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan’s restive province where separatists are fighting
the Pakistani state. Also, Pakistani participants said their country’s leadership has
often accused India of supplying arms and funding to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) who are resorting to terrorism because of Pakistan’s support to the
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US/NATO/ISAF in the Afghan war. Some elements of TTP are comprised of the
Mujahideen, who were friendly to Pakistan and fought against the military occupation
of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union during the eighties. In this war, Pakistan was the
conduit for military support extended by the United States of America, Saudi Arabia
and other countries. These groups are not against Pakistan for supporting the US
military intervention in Afghanistan and are called TTP. The participants felt that
TERRORISM may have been a by-product of the above two factors, but after
consultations among the group, they decided to include it as a separate factor.
MILITARY AND SECURITY COOPERATION
The factors that the participants came up with were similar to the ones in the previous
focus area, but KASHMIR was the main factor as per their assessment. The
participants felt Kashmir could act either as a major deterrent to a peace process or
could lead to the end of conflict between the two nations. However, within the
plausibility funnel –the participants felt that given the nuclear capabilities of the two
countries, total war over KASHMIR was unlikely. At the same time, resolution of the
Kashmir issue did not appear to be possible within the ten year time-frame. Here
examples of terrorist attacks in Pakistan and India, alleged to have been planned on
each other’s territory, were mentioned in the historical context. The variations within
this factor ranged from a) strategic level triggers to b) enhance infiltration and
translocation to c) low profile triggers, and d) over all control of terrorism. The third
factor was PAKISTAN-INDIA TERRIRTORIAL DISPUTES. These include, firstly – SIR
CREEK, which is a dispute relating to the un-demarcated boundary of the coast of
both countries dividing Gujarat in India and Sindh Province in Pakistan – a water body
that comes under disputed territory, and of which poor fishermen on both sides of the
country are often victims. Secondly, the dispute over SIACHEN glacier located in the
mountainous area of Himalayas. Both India and Pakistan claim sovereignty over the
entire Siachen region and the dispute intensified in the eighties. Between 1984 and
1999, frequent skirmishes took place between India and Pakistan. However, more
soldiers have died from the harsh weather conditions in the region than from combat.
Both India and Pakistan continue to deploy thousands of troops in the vicinity of
Siachen and attempts to demilitarize the region have been so far unsuccessful. Prior
to 1984, neither country had any military forces in this area. Aside from the Indian and
Pakistani military presence, the glacier region is unpopulated. India is the upper
riparian in the flow of five rivers to Pakistan. The two countries signed the INDUS
WATER TREATY in 1960 which was brokered by the World Bank. In this treaty, as a
lower riparian Pakistan’s water sharing rights were protected. The implementation of
the treaty has led to serious differences between the two countries and is responsible
for increased tensions. On the positive side, the treaty remains intact despite many
wars, although Pakistan continues to allege that that India uses more than its due
share of water and at times, through the dams constructed is said to release more
water that the river can regulate downstream. However, Government of India
continues to refute this allegation. The final factor that affects Military And Security
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Cooperation is the Nuclear/Technological Advances. In this, the variations suggest
that there could be a possibility of a) total arms race, b) nuclear arms race, c)
conventional arms race and lastly d) arms control regime.
ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS
According to the participants, this key area carried the most promising outlook. There
appeared to be a consensus that even if the progress was not possible in the previous
two key areas, there was a degree of optimism with regard to improved economic and
trade relations. The participants came up with four factors affecting it – a) Trade Policy,
b) Transport Policy, c) Demand and Supply Dynamics, d) Administration of Borders.
The variations include an idealistic outlook for having no borders, a) similar to the
European Union (EU) model, or b) the situation remaining the same as it is today
where by the countries remain in economic competition with each other. The
participants in this group, which included those from the business community, pointed
out that even with the recent violent border clashes, trade continued uninterrupted
albeit on a low level, which reflects that despite the problematic nature of the
relationship, money matters. According to data released in May 2014 by the
Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Ministry of Commerce
and Industry India, the volume of bilateral trade recorded a net increase of $410 million
from April 2013 to March 2014. Pakistan’s exports to India grew by 28% while Indian
exports to Pakistan increased by 19%. Bilateral trade has increased to $2.4 billion,
which may soar to $6 billion in the next two years if both countries agree to grant “most
favored nation” (MFN) status to each other. Currently, most of the trade between India
and Pakistan takes place via Dubai and its volume is estimated at over $4 billion. The
Government of India has granted the MFN status to Pakistan whereas Pakistan has
not returned the gesture. The Pakistani Government maintains that it will grant MFN
status to India after the removal of Indian nontariff barriers which are a major inhibiting
factor in the Pakistani export to India.
( http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/pakistan/11370.pdf )
Nuclear Policy
India initiated its nuclear weapon programme in the South Asian region early on in
declared themselves nuclear weapons states in 1998. These nuclear tests helped
Pakistan restore strategic balance in the region. These nuclear tests also helped in
the achievement of deterrence in the region, which worked, somehow, during the
Kargil conflict as well as the 2002-2003 military stand-off. To enhance confidence
between the two countries, Pakistan and India released a joint statement on the issue
of nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in 2004.The process of nuclear
CBMs between the two countries is not new. This process was in place before
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the nuclear tests of 1998. Similar confidence-building agreements were signed in
1999, 2004 and 2012.
The following challenges to the deterrence stability posed by India were mentioned :
i. India’s cold start doctrine of 2004 which aims at exploiting the
perceived gap below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.
ii. Differentiated nuclear learning, doctrinal mismatch betweenthe two
countries.
iii. The anti-ballistic missile system, India’s defense research and
development organization as well as the growing conventional
asymmetry between Pakistan and India.
iv. Whereas India’s defence allocation budget is around 38.5 billion
dollars, Pakistan’s defence budget allocation is just around six
billion dollars.
There has been a difference of approach on Pakistan and India’s part on the concept
of maintaining strategic stability in South Asia. Pakistan’s approach on this issue has
been to promote over-arching concept of encompassing nuclear restraint and
conventional balance. India’s approach, on the other hand, has been to explore new
areas to introduce restrains on the use of nuclear weapons and looking to reverse the
lowering of nuclear threshold based on seeking official communication on nuclear
doctrines and taking a morally high position on global nuclear disarmament.
Kashmir
The people of Kashmir do not have high expectations with regard to the upcoming
elections in India and Kashmir. They believe there will be no change in India’s policies.
The dispute of Kashmir will continue to pose a threat to the stability of South Asia if it
remains unresolved. The policy-makers in Pakistan should take Article 257 of the
Constitution of Pakistan as the guiding principle, as far as the policy on Kashmir is
concerned. A development in the form of a local Kashmiri narrative on the dispute of
Kashmir has been observed in the past three or four years. A rapid increase in the
number of local Kashmiri youth involved in the dispute of Kashmir has been seen since
2008. These highly educated youth have been able to bring the dispute of Kashmir to
the forefront in the world media. A soft image of Kashmir needs to be developed.
Pakistan can help in this regard if credible people of the country lend support to the
dispute of Kashmir.
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Water
In order to avoid any future conflicts over the dispute of Kashmir, Pakistan and India
need to maintain their agreements and comply with the rulings of the International
Court of Justice and the International Laws of Seas.
Major Points
1. Pakistan, while adhering to its traditional stance over the dispute of Kashmir, should
continue its demand for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute under the UN
resolution. There is a need to convince India to achieve an early resolution of Kashmir
through political and diplomatic means which is acceptable to all stake-holders.
2. Pakistan and India should both reduce the heavy baggage of conflict and territorial
disputes by enhancing bilateral cooperation in all possible fields.
3. Bilateral trade between the two countries can prove to be an effective tool in order
to increase mutual dependency for sustainable and stable bilateral relations.
4. Pakistan and India can work together to achieve economic benefits from the Central
Asian markets as well. By utilizing Pakistan’s strategic location and India’s influence
in that region, both countries will be able to achieve economic prosperity.
5. The resolution of core disputes like Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek will not only
strengthen peace between the two countries but will also help reduce the existing level
of distrust.
6. India should respect human rights inside Kashmir, and Pakistan needs to effectively
highlight the cruel laws currently being enforced in the Indian-Occupied Kashmir.
Indian policies in the region need to change.
7. The two countries can work together and build a road-map based on non-kinetic
means to combat extremism.
8. The best guarantee to establish peace between Pakistan and India is if both
countries invest in joint infrastructural projects in the energy and other sectors. This
way, both will have a stake in the other’s stability and would further propel them to
adopt a peaceful posture in their policies regarding each other.
9. There is a dire need to establish nuclear transparency in order to establish trust
between the two countries.
10. All stake-holders in Pakistan need to be on the same page as far as relations and
the peace process with India is concerned.
11. Pakistan needs to internally educate and prepare its nation on core disputes
with India.
( http://cpakgulf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Pakistan-india-
Relations.pdf )
