The document discusses techniques for unconventional warfare and psychological operations (PSYOP) used to influence populations and undermine adversaries. It describes avoiding direct military confrontation and instead using propaganda, misinformation, sabotage, subversion and working with resistance groups to erode an enemy's power and will. The goal is to gain control of relevant populations through political, economic and psychological means rather than by conquering territory or enemy forces. PSYOP specifically aims to influence emotions, reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign groups and governments to support US objectives.
3. Cointelpro
• the Bureau tried to "deter or counteract" what
it called "propaganda" 26 -- the expression of
ideas which it considered dangerous. Thus,
the originating document for the "Black
Nationalist" COINTELPRO noted that
"consideration should be given to techniques
to preclude" leaders of the target
organizations "from spreading their
philosophy publicly or through various mass
communication media." 27
4. Sources cited in report
• 26 COINTELPRO unit chief, 10/12/75, P. 54.
• 27 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all
SAC's, 8/25/67.
5. Cointelpro
• Instructions to "preclude" free speech were
not limited to "black nationalists;" they
occurred in every program. In the New Left
program, for instance, approximately thirty-
nine percent of all actions attempted to keep
targets from speaking, teaching, writing, or
publishing.
6. Cointelpro
• The cases included attempts (sometimes
successful) to prompt the firing of university and
high school teachers; 29 to prevent targets from
speaking on campus; 30 to stop chapters of target
groups from being formed; 31 to prevent the
distribution of books, newspapers, or periodicals;
32 to disrupt or cancel news conferences; 33 to
interfere with peaceful demonstrations, including
the SCLC's Poor People's Campaign and
Washington Spring Project and most of the large
anti-war marches; 34 and to deny facilities for
meetings or conferences. 35
7. example
• 29 For instance, a high school English teacher
was targeted for inviting two poets to attend a
class at his school. The poets were noted for
their efforts in the draft resistance movement.
The Bureau sent anonymous letters to two
local newspapers, the Board of Education, and
the school board. (Memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office,
6/19/69.)
8. Cointelpro
• One technique used in COINTELPRO involved
sending anonymous letters to spouses intended,
in the words of one proposal, to "produce ill-
feeling and possibly a lasting distrust" between
husband and wife, so that "concern over what to
do about it" would distract the target from "time
spent in the plots and plans" of the organization.
87 The image of an agent of the United States
Government scrawling a poison-pen letter to
someone's wife in language usually reserved for
bathroom walls is not a happy one.
9. Cointelpro
• anonymous letters were sent to, among others, a
Klansman's wife, informing her that her husband had
"taken the flesh of another unto himself," the other person
being a woman named Ruby, with her "lust filled eyes and
smart aleck figure;" 38 and to a "Black Nationalist's" wife
saying that her husband "been maken it here" with other
women in his organization "and than he gives us this jive
bout their better in bed then you." 39 A husband who was
concerned about his wife's activities in a biracial group
received a letter which started, "Look man I guess your old
lady doesn't get enough at home or she wouldn't be
shucking and jiving with our Black Men" in the group. 40
The Field Office reported as a "tangible result" of this letter
that the target and her husband separated. 41
10. Cointelpro
• The Bureau also contacted employers and funding
organizations in order to cause the firing of the targets
or the termination of their support. 42 For example,
priests who allowed their churches to be used for the
Black Panther breakfast programs were targeted, and
anonymous letters were sent to their bishops; 43 a
television commentator who expressed admiration for
a Black Nationalist leader and criticized heavy defense
spending was transferred after the Bureau contacted
his employer; 44 and an employee of the Urban League
was fired after the FBI approached a "confidential
source" in a foundation which funded the League. 45
11. Cointelpro
• In another case, an anonymous letter was sent to
the leader of the Blackstone Rangers (a group,
according to the Field Offices' proposal, "to
whom violent-type activity, shooting, and the like
are second nature") advising him that "the
brothers that run the Panthers blame you for
blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a
hit out for you." The letter was intended to
"intensify the degree of animosity between the
two groups" and cause "retaliatory action which
could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against
its leadership." 48
12. Cointelpro
• Another technique which risked serious harm
to the target was falsely labeling a target an
informant. This technique was used in all five
domestic COINTELPROs. When a member of a
nonviolent group was successfully mislabeled
as an informant, the result was alienation
from the group. 49 When the target belonged
to a group known to have killed suspected
informants, the risk was substantially more
serious.
13. Cointelpro vs MLK
• The FBI's campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
began in December 1963, four months after the
famous civil rights March on Washington, 55 when a
nine-hour meeting was convened at FBI Headquarters
to discuss various "avenues of approach aimed at
neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader." 56
Following the meeting, agents in the field were
instructed to "continue to gather information
concerning King's personal activities ... in order that we
may consider using this information at an opportune
time in a counterintelligence move to discredit him."
57
14. Cointelpro vs MLK
• About two weeks after that conference, FBI agents
planted a microphone in Dr. King's bedroom at the
Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C. 58 During the next
two years, the FBI installed at least fourteen more
"bugs" in Dr. King's hotel rooms across the country. 59
Physical and photographic surveillances accompanied
some of the microphone, coverage. 60
• The FBI also scrutinized Dr. King's tax returns,
monitored his financial affairs, and even tried to
determine whether he had a secret foreign bank
account. 61
15. Cointelpro vs MLK
• In late 1964, a "sterilized" tape was prepared in a manner that
would prevent attribution to the FBI and was "anonymously"
mailed to Dr. King just before he received the Nobel Peace Prize. 62
Enclosed in the package with the tape was an unsigned letter which
warned Dr. King, "your end is approaching . . . you are finished." The
letter intimated that the tape might be publicly released, and closed
with the following message:
• King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is.
You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been
selected for a specific reason, it has definite practical significance).
You are done. There is but one way out for you . . . 63
• Dr. King's associates have said he interpreted the message as an
effort to induce him to commit suicide. 64
16. Why?
• Sullivan said that the purpose of sending the
tape was "to blackmail King into silence . . . to
stop him from criticizing Hoover; . . . to
diminish his stature. In other words, if it
caused a break between Coretta and Martin
Luther King, that would diminish his stature. It
would weaken him as a leader." (Sullivan,
11/1/75, 11/26/75, p. 152.)
17. Cointelpro vs MLK
• At about the same time that it mailed the
"sanitized" tape, the FBI was also apparently
offering tapes and transcripts to newsmen. 65
Later when civil rights leaders Roy Wilkins and
James Farmer went to Washington to
persuade Bureau officials to halt the FBI's
discrediting efforts, 66 they were told that "if
King want[s] war we [are] prepared to give it
to him." 67
18. Cointelpro vs MLK
• Shortly thereafter, Dr. King went to Europe to
receive the Nobel Peace Prize. The Bureau
tried to undermine ambassadorial receptions
in several of the countries he visited '68 and
when he returned to the United States, took
steps to diminish support for a banquet and a
special "day" being planned in his honor. 69
19. Cointelpro vs MLK
• The Bureau's actions against Dr. King included attempts to prevent
him from meeting with world leaders, receiving honors or favorable
publicity, and gaining financial support. When the Bureau learned of
a possible meeting between Dr. King and the Pope in August 1964,
the FBI asked Cardinal Spellman to try to arrange a cancellation of
the audience. 70 Discovering that two schools (Springfield College
and Marquette University) were going to honor Dr. King with special
degrees in the spring of 1964, Bureau agents tried to convince
officials at the schools to rescind their plans. 71 And when the
Bureau learned in October 1966 that the Ford Foundation might
grant three million dollars to Dr. King's Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, they asked a former FBI agent who was a
high official at the Ford Motor Company to try to block the award.
72
20. Cointelpro vs MLK
• The "neutralization" program continued until Dr. King's
death. As late as March 1968, FBI agents were being
instructed to neutralize Dr. King because he might become
a "messiah" who could "unify, and electrify, the militant
black nationalist movement" if he were to "abandon his
supposed 'obedience' to 'white liberal doctrines'
(nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism." 81 Steps
were taken to subvert the "Poor People's Campaign" which
Dr. King was planning to lead in the spring of 1968. 82 Even
after Dr. King's death, agents in the field were proposing
methods for harassing his widow 83 and Bureau officials
were trying to prevent his birthday from becoming a
national holiday. 84
22. Intended Effects of Cointelpro
• create a negative public image for target groups (e.g. by surveiling
activists, and then releasing negative personal information to the
public)
• break down internal organization (e.g. by having agents exacerbate
racial tensions, or send anonymous letters to try to create conflicts)
• create dissension between groups (e.g. by spreading rumors that
other groups were stealing money)
• restrict access to public resources (e.g. by pressuring non-profit
organizations to cut off funding or material support)
• restrict the ability to organize protests (e.g. agents sending letters
promoting violence against police at protests)
• restrict the ability of individuals to participate in group activities
(e.g. by character assassinations, false arrests, surveillance)
23. Brian Glick, FBI’s 4 main methods
1) Infiltration: Agents and informers did not
merely spy on political activists. Their main
purpose was to discredit and disrupt. Their
very presence served to undermine trust and
scare off potential supporters. The FBI and
police exploited this fear to smear genuine
activists as agents.
24. Brian Glick, FBI’s 4 main methods
2) Psychological warfare: The FBI and police used
myriad "dirty tricks" to undermine progressive
movements. They planted false media stories and
published bogus leaflets and other publications in
the name of targeted groups. They forged
correspondence, sent anonymous letters, and
made anonymous telephone calls. They spread
misinformation about meetings and events, set
up pseudo movement groups run by government
agents, and manipulated or strong-armed
parents, employers, landlords, school officials
and others to cause trouble for activists.
25. Brian Glick, FBI’s 4 main methods
3) Legal harassment: The FBI and police abused the
legal system to harass dissidents and make them
appear to be criminals. Officers of the law gave
perjured testimony and presented fabricated
evidence as a pretext for false arrests and
wrongful imprisonment. They discriminatorily
enforced tax laws and other government
regulations and used conspicuous surveillance,
"investigative" interviews, and grand jury
subpoenas in an effort to intimidate activists and
silence their supporters.
26. Brian Glick, FBI’s 4 main methods
4) Illegal force: The FBI conspired with local
police departments to threaten dissidents; to
conduct illegal break-ins in order to search
dissident homes; and to commit vandalism,
assaults, beatings and assassinations. The
object was to frighten, or eliminate, dissidents
and disrupt their movements.
28. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual (2008)
• Claus von Clausewitz famously characterized such
use of state military power as, “an act of violence
to compel the enemy to do our will.” This
assertion has been profoundly influential.
However, it is too constrained of a vision for
applying national power in today’s world. The
ancient Sun Tzu is more relevant today; although
battles should be won, “winning 100 victories in
100 battles is not the acme of skill; defeating the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
There is more than one way to compel an enemy.
29. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual
1-4. International actors in the current era have
awakened to the potential of such “unconventional”
methods for compelling an enemy to do one’s will.
Avoiding the advantages of U.S. military power, these
international actors seek to erode the ability of the
United States to employ that comparative advantage.
Using the other instruments of power—especially the
informational—they seek to employ what is variably
referred to as “irregular,” “asymmetric,” or
“unrestricted” warfare. Even when violence is joined,
direct methods are generally avoided for the classic
techniques of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage,
subversion, and insurgency.
30. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual
1-10. The current definition of UW is as follows:
Operations conducted by, with, or through
irregular forces in support of a resistance
movement, an insurgency, or conventional
military operations.
FM 3-05.201, (S/NF) Special Forces
Unconventional Warfare (U)28 September
2007
31. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual
Irregular Warfare (IW):
1-19. JP 1-02 defines IW as “a violent struggle
among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy
and influence over the relevant populations. IW
favors indirect and asymmetric approaches,
though it may 1-5 employ the full range of
military and other capacities in order to erode an
adversary’s power, influence, and will.”
Introduction 30 September 2008 FM 3-05.130
32. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual
1-20. IW is about people, not platforms. IW does
not depend on military prowess alone. It also
relies on the understanding of such social
dynamics as tribal politics, social networks,
religious influences, and cultural mores.
Although IW is a violent struggle, not all
participating irregulars or irregular forces are
necessarily armed.
34. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual
• 3-79. In contrast, IW focuses on the control or
influence of populations, not on the control of
an adversary’s forces or territory. Ultimately,
IW is a political struggle with violent and
nonviolent components. The struggle is for
control or influence over and the support of a
relevant population.
35. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual
• 3-80. IW operations also employ subversion, coercion,
attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode an
adversary’s power, influence, and will to exercise
political authority over a relevant population. What
makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations (a
relevant population), its strategic purpose (to gain or
maintain control or influence over), and the support of
that relevant population through political,
psychological, and economic methods. Creating and
maintaining an enduring, functioning state requires the
government to be legitimate in the eyes of the
population.
36. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual: PSYOP
• 4-74. JP 1-02 defines PSYOP as “planned
operations to convey selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning,
and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and
individuals.” The mission of PSYOP is to
influence the behavior of foreign TAs to
support U.S. national objectives.
37. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual: PSYOP
• 4-75. In the full range of military operations,
PSYOP take on an added significance. Modern
conflict is often a protracted political-military
struggle between political systems. It often
encompasses all spheres of national activity—
political, military, economic, social, and cultural.
In protracted operations (including most UW
campaigns), noncombat activities can be as
decisive as combat operations are decisive in
conventional warfare. Sometimes, failure to
achieve PSYOP objectives can mean defeat,
regardless of the outcome of combat operations.
38. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual: PSYOP
• 4-76. In modern conflict, emphasis on the
psychological or informational objective places
PSYOP in a unique position. During stability
operations, the USG can use PSYOP unilaterally or
with economic, social, and political activities to
limit or preclude the use of military force. In
some cases, the military objective may be
relevant only in terms of the psychological effect.
History has shown that conflict is a battle of wills
in which the intangible nature of morale and
willpower can be defeated more in psychological
terms than in physical terms.
39. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual: PSYOP
• 4-80. PSYOP objectives are typically oriented around the following
general topics:
• Creating popular support for the resistance movement.
• Developing support of the populace to allow the friendly forces
freedom of movement.
• Promoting the recruitment of others into the resistance movement.
• Discrediting the existing government or hostile nonstate actor.
• Discrediting external supporters of adversary governments or
nonstate actors.
40. Unconventional Warfare
Training Manual: PSYOP
• 4-80. PSYOP objectives are typically oriented around the following general
topics:
• Maintaining support of the indigenous populace for the U.S. presence.
• Dividing and inducing defection among hostile forces.
• Winning the support of uncommitted population groups and key
individuals.
• Preserving and strengthening friendly civilian support.
• Developing unity within the irregular force.
• Maintaining motivation within the irregular force.
44. Undermining Complex Adaptive
Systems. What are they?
They are unstable, subject to large effects being produced by small
inputs or changes;
• They appear random, though they are not—they are chaotic, in that
relatively simple deterministic process rules produce apparently
random behavior;
• They are irreducible into their independent components and
relationships between components—they defy decomposition;
• They are paradoxical in the sense that there may be multiple
independent solutions or explanations for behavior;
• Their behavior is emergent—it arises from the interaction of all of
the independent actors in the system. The emergent behavior
patterns form out of interactions and self-organization, not strategic
plans.
45. Undermining Complex Adaptive
Systems. The difficulty?
(1) results of the system cannot be predicted from separate
actions of individuals
(2) strategies of any actor depends upon the strategies of
others and
(3) the behaviors of interacting actors even changes the
environment in which they interact.
Due to complexity the emergent property of the
organization’s social behavior caused primarily by the
interactions of its independent actors, rather than on the
properties of the actors themselves, the organization
behavior cannot be predicted by models of the properties
of the actors nor by a simple linear combination of them.
46. Four “lines of effort” against CASs
• Defection: Recruit, train, and establish individuals within the organization
and the supporting population capable of conducting resistance and
dissent activities leading up to, if required, a coup d'etat.
• Division: Conduct psychological operations to disrupt the unity of purpose,
discipline, and agreement between government bodies and between the
government and population groups.
• Deception: Protect the true intentions of the counterorganization
operations by operational security while revealing selected opposition
activities and simulating false activities that cause the target to believe a
different adversary plan and approach is being implemented.
• Diversion: Divert or misdirect attention from the true sources of the
opposition; secure third-party support to divert attention from the
primary source of the attack.
54. Other goals
• Allocation of decision authority—too little or too much
local authority—leads to tradeoffs between safety and
agility.
• Loss of coordination and synchronization is common in
distributed control architectures as a well as in
management and command organizations.
• Deadlock is a deadly embrace in which several entities
hold up each other's resources.
• Thrashing and livelock—repetitive patterns of
unproductive actions—are common in computing
systems and in management.
56. How to Deceive
• Transfer an incorrect image of the situation (e.g.,
weakness where there is strength or incomplete
presented as complete) to induce specific
decision errors.
• Transfer an image of the situation that guides the
target to select goals that can be exploited.
• Transfer an image of the deceiver that leads the
target to incorrectly infer the deceiver's goals,
situation, and doctrine.
57. How to Deceive
• Party A defines the desired goals and the effects (perceptions,
attitudes, decisions, behaviors) within the target, B, that will
support those goals.
• Party A develops multiple-representation reflexion models of itself,
of B, and of B's perception of A's self-model. Using these models, A
conducts assessments of alternative control actions to influence B
to make decisions favorable to A.
• Once a deception plan is accepted and information is presented to
B, the effects are observed and compared to the expected
responses by the reflexion model of B.
• Differences in anticipated and actual responses may be used to
refine the deception plan in a typical feedback control manner and
refine (or choose among alternative) reflexion models of B.
59. Gossip Matters
In A. Kott (ed.) Information Warfare and
Organizational Decision Making
Michael Prietula
Professor of Information Science
Emory University
Kathleen M. Carley
Professor of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
60. Gossip Matters
Correctness of the information flowing through
an organization is critical to its ability to
function. We have seen that even a modest
increase in the error rate generated in one
node of an organization can induce a
profound, far-ranging degradation of the
entire organization’s performance. –p. 159
61. Gossip Matters
• Gossip is dysfunctional not because the agents
are wasting time gossiping, but because the
existence of gossip can reduce listening to any
information, including that which is valuable.
63. Gossip Matters
• These networks are susceptible to deception. It is not
surprising that deception reduces performance. What
is more interesting is that it increases effort, in part,
because of the reduction of valuable information and,
in part, because of second-order effects such as
decreasing listening to any information by making the
information in the gossip more prone to error. A key
issue that should be further explored is when effort is
increased to the extent that the group is no longer
viable. Since individuals tend to leave groups when the
effort or workload becomes extreme, group viability
becomes a key issue .
65. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
J: i have no time to explain that and given you don't need to
know it; next...
J: i know why you were asking which makes it all the more
infuriating
D: so why am i asking?
J: some moronic disinformation campaign
D: no. i am asking because i am putting my ass out there on
the line for an official position that you have claimed,and
that i get asked about
J: lawyers names can't be given, they're not our lawyers
names to give. They're bradley's lawyers, blah lbah
J: you don't need to know because you can't tell people, bah
blah, hence waste of time
66. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
In late June, Birgitta and I chatted about a conversation
she'd had with Julian. She said that he had told her not
to trust me and described me as his adversary.
D:makes no sense
B: no he thinks it is deeper, that you want to take over
D:deeper in what way? thats BS
B: money and credit
D:yes, right, hahaha. well, this is clarified with everyone
else, and we all agree on this being BS
67. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
B: yes, good
D: the only one that doesnt get it is J, will be sorted out sometime, i know
why he thinks that way
B: i hope so. why
D: few remarks that i made for example, re money for example we had a
discussion once about me spending some of that money
B: he thinks you keep taking huge amounts of money
D: and i said that if he doesnt talk to me, i will spend money for
necessary expenses, in part because the money here in .de is in large
parts a consequence of my work
D: LOL [Laugh out Loud], i took like i5-2ok out of this account or so,
maximum and all was spent for servers we needed, and stuff like this
all 100% accounted for
B: and i kept asking him to just meet you and go over all of these things
68. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D: this is all not what will make people that feel hurt or whatever go away, in contrary so
D: the reaction to it triggers people to come out of the closet
J: that's the line you're trying to push around?
D: what line?
J: if so, i will destroy you.
D: lol
D: wtf [what the fuck] j
D: seriously
D: whats that bullshit?
D: are you out of your fuckin mind?
D: i am not taking this bs much longer j
D: seriously
D: you are shooting a messenger here, and this is not acceptible
D: the one that faces serious problems is you
D: and by that the project might be harmed
D: and thats my concern
69. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D: my interest in helping you does not really thrive the way you are dealing with this
D: cant even believe this
D: have you ever, just once, in all this hybris you seem trapped in considered that not
everything is someone elses fault?
D: good luck man, i am tired of doing damage control for you there D: so take a pick
J: Go away and think about your actions and statements. I know of many you do not
think I do. I will not tolerate disloyalty in crisis.
D: i think you misunderstand the situation here j
D: quite frankly
D: but as i said, i will not cover for you anymore or do any further damage control
D: good luck with your attitude
D: i for myself have nothing i need to be ashamed for
J: So be it
70. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D: what are the agreements re iraq? i need to understand what the
plan is there, and what the constraints are
J: "A person in close contact with other WikiLeaks activists around
Europe, who asked for anonymity when discussing a sensitive topic,
says that many of them were privately concerned that Assange has
continued to spread allegations of dirty tricks and hint at
conspiracies against him without justification. Insiders say that
some people affiliated with the website are already brainstorming
whether there might be some way to persuade their front man to
step aside, or failing that, even to oust him."
D: what does that have to do with me?
D: and where is this from?
J: Why do you think it has something to do with you?
D: probably because you alleg this was me
71. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D: but other than that just about nothing
D: as discussed yesterday, this is an ongoing discussion that lots of people have voiced concern
about
D: you should face this, rather than trying to shoot at the only person that even cares to be
honest about it towards you
J: No, three people have "relayed" your messages already.
D: what messages?
D: and what three people?
D: this issue was discussed
D: A [Architect] and i talked about it, Hans* talked about it, B talked it, Peter* talked about it
D: lots of people that care for this project have issued that precise suggestion
D: its not me that is spreading this message
D: it would just be the natural step to take
D: and thats what pretty much anyone says
J: Was this you?
D: i didnt speak to newsweek or other media representatives about this
72. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D: i spoke to people we work with and that have an interest in and care about this
project
D: and there is nothing wrong about this
D: it'd actually be needed much more, and i can still only recommend you to finally
start listening to such Concerns
D: especially when one fuckup is happening after the other J: who, exactly?
D: who exactly what?
J: Who have you spoken to about this issue?
D: i already told you up there
J: those are the only persons?
D: some folks from the club have asked me about it and i have issued that i think this
would be the best behaviour
D: thats my opinion
D: and this is also in light to calm down the anger there [...]
J: how many people at the club?
D: i dont have to answer to you on this j
73. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D: this debate is fuckin all over the place, and no one understands why you go into
denial [...]
J: How many people at the club?
J: In what venue?
D: in private chats
D: but i will not answer anymore of these questions
D: face the fact that you have not much trust on the inside anymore
D: and that just denying it or putting it away as a campaign against you will not
change that it is solely a consequence of your actions
D: and not mine
J: How many people are represented by these private chats? And what are there
positions in the CCC?
D: go figure
D: i dont even wanna think about how many people that used to respect you told me
that they feel disappointed by your reactions
D: i tried to tell you all this, but in all your hybris you dont even care
D: so i dont care anymore either
74. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D: other than that, i had questions first, and i need answers
D: like what agreements we have made
D: i need to understand this so we can continue working
D: you keep stalling other peoples work
J: How many people are represented by these private chats? And what are there positions
in the CCC?
D: start answering my questions j
J: This is not a quid-pro-quo.
J: Are you refusing to answer?
D: i have already told you again that i dont see why i should answer to you anymore just
because you wantanswers, but on the same hand refuse to answer anything i am asking
D: i am not a dog you can contain the way you want to j
J: i am investigation a serious security breach. Are you refusing to answer?
D: i am investigating a serious breach in trust, are you refusing to answer?
J: No you are not. I initiated this conversation. Answer the question please.
D: i initiated it
D: if you look above
75. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D: twice already
D: i want to know what the agreements are in respect to iraq
J: That is a procedural issue. Don't play games with me.
D: stop shooting at messengers
J: I've had it.
D: likewise, and that doesnt go just for me
J: If you do not answer the question, you will be removed.
D: you are not anyones king or god
D: and you're not even fulfilling your role as a leader right now
D: a leader communicates and cultivates trust in himself
D: you are doing the exact opposite
D: you behave like some kind of emporer or slave trader
J: You are suspended for one month, effective immediately.
D: haha
D: right
76. WikiLeaks Destabilizes
D:because of what?
D:and who even says that?
D:you? another adhoc decision?
J: If you wish to appeal, you will be heard on Tuesday.
D:BAHAHAHA
D:maybe everyone was right, and you really have gone
mental j
D:you should get some help
J: You will be heard by a panel of peers.
J: You are suspend for disloyalty, insubordination and
destabalization in a time of crisis.
78. How to resist destabilization?
Typical organizational design solutions for resisting
attacks directed at the human capital include the
following:
• Periodic training to increase workload and stress
tolerance thresholds;
• Keeping reserve staff or having a part of the
workforce significantly underloaded, coupled with
rotation of the reserve staff to maintain proficiency;
• Having multidisciphnary and multifunctional experts
within the workforce;
• Rotation of positions to increase mutual awareness;
• Protection and security.