SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 18
Accident (explosion succeeding to fire) at St
ROMAIN en JAREZ (France), 2 October 2003
(In confidence)
Contributors :
M-A KORDEK
C. MICHOT
G. MARLAIR
Approvals Division
Location of accident and time schedule of scenario
• Saint-Romain en Jarez,
 village located about 30 km from St-Etienne (France, Loire
Department), about 1000 inhabitants
• 2 October 2003 , timetable of events
 16h02 : fire brigade called for a farmhouse fire,
 16h24 : arrival of fire brigade : facing a warehouse fire
 17h12 : explosion occurrence
• Measures taken in the emergency
• 3 October : safety perimeter implemented by authorities after
the explosion (300 m at first, reduced to 100m by 6 October
morning)
• 5 October 2003 , end of evening : fire declared
extinguished
Casualties and structural damage
 26 casualties including 18 firemen (3 of which suffering
injuries compromising life), 3 policemen et 5 civilians
 82 houses suffering structural damage of varying
severity
View of building of origin before the accident
View of building ruins after the explosion
INERIS involvement into
first response to the “crisis”
• Arrival on site on 3 October 2003, by16:30
• Damage inspection and recording of observations,
compiling information, providing on-site support to
emergency teams being there to manage the emergency,
….
• Presence on site maintained up to 7 October.
First statements from damage observations and records
• 30 (among higher number of ) damage single inputs
(observations) being used in the first analysis regarding
the characterization of the explosion strength,
 about location of nearest dwellings : 60 m far from the warehouse,
 damage observed as far as 650m far from the warehouse
 significant damage limited to some 300m to 600 m
 very serious damage to structures : up to 150m
Artistic view
of the
accident
scene after
the
explosion
(R. Dosne)
greenhouses
Metallic Beam
element missiles
found up to 500
m
Crisis management
Control room installed in townhouse 4 helicopters
used
Advanced medical
teams
Fire hydrant
Evacuation
means
(12 vehicles)
Fire engine
destroyed
Schematic view of warehouse and stockpiles of materials, red spots indicating
firemen location and other operational circumstances when injured by the blaze
AN fertilizers storage
3 t , big bags
Presumed origin of
fire
on upper level
(hay ?)
Some 3000 plastic
boxes in piles Plastic
boxes
Flat on
1st floor
Cold storage area filled
with potatoes in boxes
Site access route
Gymnasium - 100 m
Estimation of ‘ TNT equivalent ’ of the explosion from
observed damage
Pressure effects deducted from observed damage, then use of charts of
‘hemispheric loading’ : referring to methodology used for the
investigation of the Toulouse accident,
Result : 80 kg to 160 kg of TNT equivalent
if detonation related to AN, then quantity in agreement with observation
is within the range :
160 kg to 533 kg
with proportionality rule from Circular of 21 January 2002:
1600 to 5330 kg of material, initially.
Notice : estimated quantity of AN fertilizer : 3 to 5 tons.
On the missile effect
• 26 missile elements identified
 wall lining elements : no use in the analysis as they have
experienced significant deformation before explosion due to the
preceding fire,
 concrete scraps,
 structural elements :
• beam type ‘IPN 120’, 6 m of length, 70 kg of weight,
• beam type ‘IPE 240’, 6m of length, 200 kg of weight,
• sectional steel pieces,
projection of scraps up to 800m,
IPE 240 beam elements : displaced some 250m
IPN 120 beam elements : displaced 310m to 350 m
Elements of wall linings
Beam type IPN 120 : located at 180 m from explosion area
Beam type ‘IPN 120’ : 330 m behind the chapel
Crater
(Plausibly) explosion-induced crater observed, located below the
concrete slab on which big-bags (500 kg each ) of products were stored
Open Literature available to date limited to :
a) Numerous Press releases
b) René Dosne, “Explosion of AN fertilizer storage in a farmhouse
building”, Face au Risque n°399, January 2004 (In French), 26-29
c) Le Sapeur-pompier magazine, n° 951, November 2003 (In French),
p15-17

More Related Content

Similar to Fire & Ammonium Nitrate Explosion in Saint-Romain-en-Jarez, France 2003 (6)

Chemical Disaster.pptx
Chemical Disaster.pptxChemical Disaster.pptx
Chemical Disaster.pptx
 
1.1 intro process_safety
1.1 intro process_safety1.1 intro process_safety
1.1 intro process_safety
 
Dust Explosions Silo Hopper Fires
Dust Explosions Silo Hopper FiresDust Explosions Silo Hopper Fires
Dust Explosions Silo Hopper Fires
 
Fire safety
Fire safetyFire safety
Fire safety
 
Fire and explosion hazards
Fire and explosion hazardsFire and explosion hazards
Fire and explosion hazards
 
Chernobyl disaster
Chernobyl disasterChernobyl disaster
Chernobyl disaster
 

More from Combustible Dust Policy Institute

More from Combustible Dust Policy Institute (11)

Hazardous Awareness Level (HAL) Chart-Combustible Dust Related Incidents
Hazardous Awareness Level (HAL) Chart-Combustible Dust Related IncidentsHazardous Awareness Level (HAL) Chart-Combustible Dust Related Incidents
Hazardous Awareness Level (HAL) Chart-Combustible Dust Related Incidents
 
Why Ammonium Nitrate, Should be Added to EPA list of EHS
Why Ammonium Nitrate, Should be Added to EPA list of EHSWhy Ammonium Nitrate, Should be Added to EPA list of EHS
Why Ammonium Nitrate, Should be Added to EPA list of EHS
 
Is your Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) Active?
Is your Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) Active?Is your Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) Active?
Is your Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) Active?
 
Fertilizer Plants Defined 101
Fertilizer Plants Defined 101Fertilizer Plants Defined 101
Fertilizer Plants Defined 101
 
Dust Explosion Classifications
Dust Explosion ClassificationsDust Explosion Classifications
Dust Explosion Classifications
 
Fire Prevention Plan (FPP) Preventing Combustible Dust Fires and Explosions
Fire Prevention Plan (FPP) Preventing Combustible Dust Fires and ExplosionsFire Prevention Plan (FPP) Preventing Combustible Dust Fires and Explosions
Fire Prevention Plan (FPP) Preventing Combustible Dust Fires and Explosions
 
Proposed Combustible Dust Legislation H.R. 691
Proposed Combustible Dust Legislation H.R. 691Proposed Combustible Dust Legislation H.R. 691
Proposed Combustible Dust Legislation H.R. 691
 
Innovative Dust Explosion Prevention Technology
Innovative Dust Explosion Prevention TechnologyInnovative Dust Explosion Prevention Technology
Innovative Dust Explosion Prevention Technology
 
Milk Powder Combustible Dust Hazards
Milk Powder Combustible Dust HazardsMilk Powder Combustible Dust Hazards
Milk Powder Combustible Dust Hazards
 
Good Housekeeping
Good HousekeepingGood Housekeeping
Good Housekeeping
 
OSHA Dust NEP NAICS
OSHA Dust NEP NAICSOSHA Dust NEP NAICS
OSHA Dust NEP NAICS
 

Recently uploaded

Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
vu2urc
 

Recently uploaded (20)

How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a FresherStrategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
 
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
 
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
 
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdfGenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt RobisonData Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Evaluating the top large language models.pdf
Evaluating the top large language models.pdfEvaluating the top large language models.pdf
Evaluating the top large language models.pdf
 
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
 

Fire & Ammonium Nitrate Explosion in Saint-Romain-en-Jarez, France 2003

  • 1. Accident (explosion succeeding to fire) at St ROMAIN en JAREZ (France), 2 October 2003 (In confidence) Contributors : M-A KORDEK C. MICHOT G. MARLAIR Approvals Division
  • 2. Location of accident and time schedule of scenario • Saint-Romain en Jarez,  village located about 30 km from St-Etienne (France, Loire Department), about 1000 inhabitants • 2 October 2003 , timetable of events  16h02 : fire brigade called for a farmhouse fire,  16h24 : arrival of fire brigade : facing a warehouse fire  17h12 : explosion occurrence • Measures taken in the emergency • 3 October : safety perimeter implemented by authorities after the explosion (300 m at first, reduced to 100m by 6 October morning) • 5 October 2003 , end of evening : fire declared extinguished
  • 3. Casualties and structural damage  26 casualties including 18 firemen (3 of which suffering injuries compromising life), 3 policemen et 5 civilians  82 houses suffering structural damage of varying severity
  • 4. View of building of origin before the accident
  • 5. View of building ruins after the explosion
  • 6. INERIS involvement into first response to the “crisis” • Arrival on site on 3 October 2003, by16:30 • Damage inspection and recording of observations, compiling information, providing on-site support to emergency teams being there to manage the emergency, …. • Presence on site maintained up to 7 October.
  • 7. First statements from damage observations and records • 30 (among higher number of ) damage single inputs (observations) being used in the first analysis regarding the characterization of the explosion strength,  about location of nearest dwellings : 60 m far from the warehouse,  damage observed as far as 650m far from the warehouse  significant damage limited to some 300m to 600 m  very serious damage to structures : up to 150m
  • 8. Artistic view of the accident scene after the explosion (R. Dosne) greenhouses Metallic Beam element missiles found up to 500 m Crisis management Control room installed in townhouse 4 helicopters used Advanced medical teams Fire hydrant Evacuation means (12 vehicles) Fire engine destroyed
  • 9. Schematic view of warehouse and stockpiles of materials, red spots indicating firemen location and other operational circumstances when injured by the blaze AN fertilizers storage 3 t , big bags Presumed origin of fire on upper level (hay ?) Some 3000 plastic boxes in piles Plastic boxes Flat on 1st floor Cold storage area filled with potatoes in boxes Site access route
  • 11. Estimation of ‘ TNT equivalent ’ of the explosion from observed damage Pressure effects deducted from observed damage, then use of charts of ‘hemispheric loading’ : referring to methodology used for the investigation of the Toulouse accident, Result : 80 kg to 160 kg of TNT equivalent if detonation related to AN, then quantity in agreement with observation is within the range : 160 kg to 533 kg with proportionality rule from Circular of 21 January 2002: 1600 to 5330 kg of material, initially. Notice : estimated quantity of AN fertilizer : 3 to 5 tons.
  • 12. On the missile effect • 26 missile elements identified  wall lining elements : no use in the analysis as they have experienced significant deformation before explosion due to the preceding fire,  concrete scraps,  structural elements : • beam type ‘IPN 120’, 6 m of length, 70 kg of weight, • beam type ‘IPE 240’, 6m of length, 200 kg of weight, • sectional steel pieces, projection of scraps up to 800m, IPE 240 beam elements : displaced some 250m IPN 120 beam elements : displaced 310m to 350 m
  • 13. Elements of wall linings
  • 14.
  • 15. Beam type IPN 120 : located at 180 m from explosion area
  • 16. Beam type ‘IPN 120’ : 330 m behind the chapel
  • 17. Crater (Plausibly) explosion-induced crater observed, located below the concrete slab on which big-bags (500 kg each ) of products were stored
  • 18. Open Literature available to date limited to : a) Numerous Press releases b) René Dosne, “Explosion of AN fertilizer storage in a farmhouse building”, Face au Risque n°399, January 2004 (In French), 26-29 c) Le Sapeur-pompier magazine, n° 951, November 2003 (In French), p15-17