Current status of important TADs in Taiwan

1. CURRENT STATUS OF TRANSBOUNDARY
ANIMAL DISEASES IN TAIWAN
Nein-Nung Lin1, and Shih-Tai Hwa1
1Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine (BAPHIQ),
Council of Agriculture, Taipei, Taiwan
e-mail: niennong@mail.baphiq.gov.tw
ABSTRACT
The major Transboundary Animal Diseases(TADs) in Taiwan are Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD),
and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). In the prevention and control of FMD, each cloven-
hoofed animal should be vaccinated with FMDvaccines, and all farmers should followthe Regulation
on FMD vaccination and farm biosecurity policy in Taiwan. The current FMD vaccination rate of
cloven-hoofed animal farms has been above 90%. Above 80% of cloven-hoofed animal farms had
herd level protection based on the results of serological surveillance in 2015. There is no FMD case
detected or found in Taiwan, Penghu, and Matsu Island since June 2013, and in Kinmen Island since
July 2015. Regarding HPAI in 2015, outbreaks of novel H5N2, H5N3 and H5N8 HPAI subtypes of
Eurasia H5 clade 2.3.4.4 were reported in wild birds and domestic poultry in Taiwan. Six basic
animal acids in their HA cleavage site, which have never been detected in Taiwan before and are
approximately 98-99% identical to the H5 gene of the 2014 Korean H5N8 HPAIV. There is no
evidence for these viruses to be zoonotic. In compliance with the no vaccination policy, 5,144,299
chickens,ducks, geese, and turkeys at 965 farms were culled, causing great impact on the economy
and animal health.With the concerted efforts of the central and local governments, related industries
and academia for HPAI control, the epidemic has been controlled, and no cases infections in humans.
Keywords: Transboundary Animal Disease (TAD), Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza (HPAI)
INTRODUCTION
In Taiwan, there are 11,952 cloven-hoofed animal farms and 9,012 poultry farms which included
2,089 cattle farms, 2,047 goat farms, 7,846 pig farms, 5,722 chicken farms, 2,693 duck farms, 515
goose farms, and 82 turkey farms. In 1997, there are severe FMD outbreaks with clinical lesions only
found in pigs. Those outbreaks were caused by Cathay topotype of O serotype of FMDV which only
infected pigs and was the predominant FMDV strain found in the field till now (Table 1). Avian
influenza is evolving and giving rise to a complex situation with multiple HPAI subtypes in four
continents - Asia, Europe, North America, and Africa. The spread of H5 HPAI lineage 2.3.4.4 is
unprecedented. Since January 2014, outbreaks have been reported in many countries, including South
Korea, Japan, China, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and
France. Unfortunately, there were also outbreaks in Taiwan starting from January in 2015 (Fig. 1).

2. Table 1. Cases of foot and mouth disease in Taiwan from 2009 to 2015.
Year
Cases Cases
NSPa Viralb Total
2009 5 3 8
2010 3 1 4
2011 7 4 11
2012 10 5 15
2013 3 0 3
2014 0 0 0
2015 1 1 2
Total 29 14 43
a
NSP case referred to positive result of Non Structural Protein antibody.
b
Viral case referred to positive result of RT-PCR or virus isolation.
Fig. 1. Number of AI outbreak on surveillance between January 1 to December 31, 2015;
cumulative total = 1,054 confirmed AI outbreaks
FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE
To control and eliminate the FMD, several measures were implemented in Taiwan as follows:
Blanket vaccination
Each cloven-hoofed animal should be vaccinated with FMD vaccine in Chinese Taipei. In order to
strengthen the FMD prevention and control measures, the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health
Inspection and Quarantine (BAPHIQ), Council of Agriculture (COA) had amended Regulation in
2012. If serum neutralization (SN) antibody geometric mean titers of FMD from pig samples were
less than 16 X (ruminant animals less than 32 X), those animals should be re-boosted one dose of
FMD vaccine under the supervision of Local Disease Control Center (LDCC). When SN antibody
titers of tested sera from a farm were below 4X, the owner or keeper of animals should be fined NTD

3. 30,000-150,000 (USD 1,000-5,000). The LDCCs inspect FMD vaccination situation of cloven-
hoofed animal farms simultaneously to enhance the FMD immunization coverage.
Enhance cleaning and disinfection program in animal conveyances,auction market, and farms
For elimination of FMD virus which circulated in environment, COA had adopted the Regulations on
Cleaning and Disinfection of Animal Transportation vehicles and Cages in 2015. The Branches of
BAPHIQ and the LDCCs have also strengthened the cleaning and disinfection procedures in animal
conveyances in auction markets and slaughter houses. LDCCs and industry organizations still guide
cloven-hoofed animal farms implementing on-farm biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of
spreading of the disease.
Surveillance
Farms
Six hundred pig farms and 300 ruminant farms per year were stratified and randomly sampled with a
95% level of confidence and 1% prevalence rate. Eight hundred pig farms and 160 ruminant farms per
year were collected for target surveillance (e.g. low SN antibody titer farms). Those samples were
collected for SN and non structural protein (NSP) antibody tests. Clinical inspection of animals would
be conducted simultaneously when collecting serum samples.
Auction markets
At least 1-2 pigs per source farm are randomly selected for NSP antibody testing on a daily basis.
Positive samples should be traced back to the source farms for further sampling and testing.
HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA
Epidemic risk assessment
Epidemic risk assessment on the 2015 HPAI outbreaks in Taiwan showed that the epidemic virus
strains, novel H5N2, H5N3, and H5N8 subtypes of Eurasian H5 clade 2.3.4.4 are originated from the
Korean strain and firstly introduced into Taiwan by migratory birds, and then transmitted among
poultry farms by movement of people, vehicles, utensils, wild birds. HPAI outbreaks were mostly
reported in central and southern Taiwan because the poultry industry are more concentrated in these
areas than in northern Taiwan and most of domestic goose and duck farms in Taiwan use the open
types of raising. Further analysis of the risks of transmission between poultry farms indicated that the
major risks were posed by a) open type of raising, b) transport vehicles entering and exiting the
premises, c) farm employees entering and exiting the premises without performing disinfection
procedure, d) feed trucks and rendering trucks entering and exiting the premises, and e) possible
contact of poultry with wild birds from nearby farmlands or wetlands.
Emergency response
The outbreak of this epidemic is the first time that Taiwan has experienced an HPAI with high
mortality rate to water fowls. Also, outbreaks have been reported in several counties and cities.
Immediately afterwards, in the evening of January 9 of this year, the Council of Agriculture has
established an Animal Epidemic Disease Disaster Emergency Response Task Force, which activated
an emergency epidemic prevention mechanism that included central government and local
government authorities and held video conferences, studied the epidemic, and developed epidemic
prevention measures. Given the abnormally high mortality rate, the detection of new types of HPAI
cases and the increasing number of cases, the "Executive Yuan Avian Influenza Response Center" was
established on January 14. High-level meetings were held as needed, depending on the severity of the
outbreaks. Central and local government resources were coordinated and integrated to implement
disease control measures. The preemptive detailed plans and standard operating procedures were
formulated as soon as possible in order to cope with the HPAI situation.

4. Control and prevention measures
Controlling an epidemic is like fighting a war; the government has invested much in terms of
financial, administrative and human resources to effectively control and eliminate HPAI. To prevent
the further spread of HPAI, the following strong measures were implemented:
1. Detection, diagnosis and culling were accelerated on infected farms;
2. Active surveillance of all poultry farms within a 1-kilometer radius of all infected farms was
introduced;
3. Commercial slaughtering was suspended between January 12 and 14 and between January 24
and 28 to stop the movement of poultry and related vehicles;
4. Ten quarantine stations were set up from January 28 to April 25 in the 5 hot spots of AI
outbreaks, i.e., Changhua, Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan and Pingtung. Vehicles carrying eggs, feed,
poultry and carcasses from the hot spots had to be disinfected at quarantine stations and obtain
disinfection proof. Also, poultry health certificates were checked;
5. Only poultry with health certificates were allowed into slaughter houses;
6. Eggs had to be fumigated with chlorine dioxide before leaving farms;
7. Defensive quarantine and biosecurity measures were implemented on farms;
8. "H5, H7 subtypes avian influenza control measures" were formulated; and
9. “Regulations on Cleaning and Disinfection of Animal Transportation Vehicles and Cages” were
implemented.
ACHIEVEMENT
The current FMD vaccination rate of cloven-hoofed animal farms has been above 90%. Above 80%
of cloven-hoofed animal farms had herd level protection based on the results of serological
surveillance in 2015. There is no FMD case detected or found in Taiwan, Penghu, and Matsu Island
since June 2013. Only 2 yellow cattle cases of A serotype of FMD were detected by our active
surveillance in Kinmen Island in May and June 2015, and were quickly eradicated by stamping out,
intensified surveillance program and control measures. After the implementation, prevention and
control measures of avian influenza, and strict surveillance program, the avian influenza cases have
decreased from 1,054 cases in 2015 to 43 cases in 2016.
CONCLUSION
Cross-border spread of animal diseases, such as the FMD and the HPAI, is still a threat to the
livestock industry. Effective biosecurity facilities coupled with good practices in animal health,
hygiene and animal welfare should be incorporated into the livestock industry to minimize the
threat of FMD and avian influenza in Taiwan. In addition, an early warning response network with
good veterinary governance and strong scientific support is a must. Stakeholders of the livestock
industry also play an important role in disease control and elimination. To reduce the risk of virus
circulation, we introduced concepts of production medicine to improve on-farm biosecurity
measures.