Any difference between indian and pakistan army in 1965 war

1. PART SEVEN-ANALYSIS CHAPTER OF 1965 WAR-FROM
THE PAKISTAN ARMY TILL 1965 BY MAJOR
AGHA.H.AMIN (RETIRED)-1999
Was there any difference in Indian Army and Pakistan Army in
1965 War
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2. About the Author
About the Author Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps major who served in five
tank regiments and commanded an independent tank squadron and served in
various staff , instructional and research assignments. In his Pakistan Army
tenure he wrote three original tactical papers on Reconnaissance Troops
Tactical handling, Reconnaissance support group , and RFS Concept. His
writings were published in Pakistan Armys prime journals , Pakistan Army
Journal and Citadel Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta. His
recommendations regarding bifurcation of officer corps into command and staff
cadre advanced in 1998 were later accepted. In addition his recommendation
of grouping various corps into army commands advanced in an article
published in Citadel Journal in 1998 were accepted in 2005 or so. Wrote The
Essential Clausewitz in 1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in 1998 , Pakistan
Army till 1965 in 1999 ,Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and
Pakistan (2010) ,Taliban War in Afghanistan (2009). Served as Assistant Editor
of Defence Journal ,Executive Editor of globe and Founder Editor of Journal of
Afghanistan Studies . An associate of the think tanks ORBAT and Alexandrian
Defense group. Carried out various oil and gas and power transmission line
surveys in West Asia. Editor in Chief of monthly Intelligence Review and
monthly Military and Security Review. Heads the think tank Centre for study of
Intelligence Operations established in early 2010.

16. THE INDIAN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY-MYTH
OR REALITY
After the war a myth was propagated that the Indians were
defeated or checked by Pakistani forces who were numerically
inferior but qualitatively more superior or more martial!Or that there
was something special in Muslim soldiers !
Modern wars or even ancient wars were never won on the basis
of numerical inferiority. Superior generalship and tactics were the
most important factor while morale was only second in importance

17. ; in a situation; where two armies with equally high
morale clashed;regardless of the fact whether they were Muslim
Christian Atheist Pagan or Communist !
After the invention of gunpowder and artillery however
numerical superiority even became less important.
Thus well drilled and organised European armies were able to
defeat numerically much larger asiatic armies.
The reason for this was not that the Europeans were more martial
or possessed more valour but were better organised,doctrinally
superior and more proficient in combining their infantry and artillery
to produce a greater net impact on their opponents.In the second
world war with the introduction of tanks as the decisive weapon
numerical superiority in infantry became even less important and
the Germans were able to decisively defeat the Russians with a
much larger infantry component by superior use of armour based on
a superior war doctrine.Technically their Centurion and Sherman
tanks were relatively inferior to the Patton tanks with which the
larger part of Pakistani armour was equipped.

18. In 1965 the Indians did not enjoy any superiority as far as the
offensive capability of their army by virtue of number/quality of
tanks was concernedAnother major force multiplier with which most
Indian attacks were defeated was the Pakistani artillery equipped
with the latest US guns.
The Indian artillery had mostly WW II vintage guns.Yet another
decisive organisational force multiplier for the Pakistanis was the
extremely well organised type 4 Corps Artillery Brigade which the
ranker type CGS General Malik Sher Bahadur did his best to
disband,and which to Pakistan's good luck survived Sher's bias
playing the most crucial role in Grand Slam and at Chawinda.
The Indians were superior only as far as their infantry
was concerned but infantry was no longer the arm of decision in
modern war and superiority in infantry did not give the Indians any
dominant offensive edge over the Pakistanis.
In addition the Pakistani infantry was mechanised and possessed
the M 113 tracked Armoured Personnel Carrier 300 of which were
supplied to Pakistan by USA during the period 1955-65.In addition
10 and 15 Division possessed the highly versatile and firepower
wise extremely effective R & S Battalions.

19. These infantry battalions were completely jeep mounted and
possesses 48 106 mm US recoilless rifles.It became fashionable in
Pakistan after the war to criticise their role,but there is no doubt that
these units played a major part at least in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor
in plugging many gaps in the exceptionally wide area of
responsibility of the 15 Division.
Infantry superiority was relatively more significant in the post
breakout phase;provided it was motorised and possessed cross
country mobility,while the Indian infantry was lorry borne and did
not possess any such capability.In any case the Indians failed to
achieve a breakthrough at Chawinda,and their superiority in infantry
could not be resultantly exploited .
Since the US Civil War the defensive potential of
infantry was increasinv and
infantry attack as the main means of decisive warfare was
becoming more and more costlier in terms of casualties.

20. By the time of Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 this trend was more
pronounced and the defensive value of machine gun and offensive
value of indirect artillery fire was a decisive factor in battle 7°
.
At Mukden Japanese superiority in machine guns i.e.
approximately 254 machineguns against 54 Russian machine guns
played a crucial role in the final defeat of a numerically stronger
Russian Army (approximately 276,000 Russians against 207,000
Japanese) 71
.
The Russian soldier is one of the most formidable infantry man in
attack and is known for immense stoicism and disregard for loss of
human life.
Despite this the Japanese by superior utilisation of machine guns
successfully repelled a large number of most determined Russian
infantry attacks during the 17 day battle fought along 90 miles
frontage 72
.
By 1914-18 infantry was no longer decisive as an instrument of
decisive warfare and the stalemate was broken only in 1917-18 by
employment of tanks which was the major factor in the allied

21. success against the German Army which otherwise could beat any
allied infantry attack.
By WW II decisive attack without tanks was simply not
possible.In 1965 no such thing like a paralysing headlong infantry
attack against an enemy in defence with reasonable artillery support
was possible,unless tanks and that too in considerable number were
in direct support regardless of the fact whether the defender was
a Muslim or Hindu or Zoroastrian or Deist Agnostic or Atheist!
It is important that the Indians were able to dislodge the 16
Punjab at Dograi only when tanks had left the 16 Punjab defended
area due to confusion in orders/poor navigation It is in this context
that we have to view the Indian superiority in infantry as
an insufficient ingredient for success.There is no doubt that the
Pakistani forces being numerically smaller as far as infantry was
concerned were more motivated but infantry it must be
remembered was no longer the arm of decision in 1965.
To achieve any breakthrough the minimum requirement was
superiority in tanks at the decisive point and this was mot achieved
at any place by the Indians in 1965 War.

22. lt was analytically fallacious on part of many Pakistani
military writers to draw wrong conclusions from poor
Indian performance in 1965 which had a deeper link with poor
training,numerical inferiority in quantity and quality of
tanks,inferior quality of artillery and lack of operational talent.

24. The Pakistanis were definitely better trained and equipped and
fought well,but were equally handicapped by poor leadership
beyond battalion level.
Apart from insufficient armour three other factors played a major
role in the reduction of Indian numerical superiority in infantry
which if properly regulated may have led to a situation seriously
upsetting the delicate operational equilibrium in favour of Pakistan
by virtue of possession of better and more numerous tanks.
First was " Kashmir" which absorbed some 38 out of the total of
103 infantry battalions deployed by the Indians for the war while
Pakistan deployed only 15 battalions against these out of which only
four were regular Pakistan Army while 11 were the Azad Kashmir
Battalions well trained but not as good as the regular battalions in
1965.
In this regard Operation Gibraltar and the resultant infiltration
scare was a success in the sense that it produced such a sense of
insecurity in the Indians that they decided to over garrison
Kashmir.Another reason why Kashmir absorbed about one third of

25. total Indian infantry was the particular lay of the ground with
bottlenecks on Pakistani side,which made defence easier, and a wide
valley on the Indian side along with the fact that the Indian line of
communication to Kashmir was long ,parallel to the border and
required more troops for protection.
This left the Indians with just 65 more infantry battalions out of
which just 29 were deployed in the Ravi-Chenab corridor while 30
were deployed in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and 6 south of it leaving
Indians to utilise just 18 battalions out of 29 in the Ravi-Chenab
Corridor to support their main 1 Corps attack.
Just imagine if 30 out of 38 battalions doing stationary guard
duty in Kashmir were pumped into Pakistani territory with the 1
Corps attack.In this regard Kashmir proved to be a political liability
rather than of any military advantage to the Indians.
Second was the immense obstacle value of the BRB canal which
reduced the actual combat potential of 30 Indian Infantry battalions
hurled against it to just one fourth enabling the Pakistanis to
economise on their relatively less numerous infantry and using it a
little more decisively.

26. In this regard all credit goes to the Pakistani Government in
early 1950 which initiated the excavation of this formidable (I
would say in sub continental terms) water obstacle which played as
crucial a role in saving Pakistan's political heartland from capture by
the Indians; as the English Channel against Napoleon and Hitler!
Thirdly the Indian obsession with security rather than
dynamic attack and the resultant inability to concentrate their
infantry to support the main attack led to under employment of their
infantry.
Thus 38 of their battalions deployed in the area north of Chenab
river apart from those in 10 Division area hardly saw any fighting.
Their utter disregard for properly utilising their infantry can be
gauged from the fact that they concentrated 11 infantry battalions in
their 26 Infantry Division sector against just 4 Pakistani battalions
and three of these battalions opposite Marala Headworks remained
largely inactive during the war.
One major factor which went against Indian numerical
superiority was qualitative superiority of Pakistani tanks and
artillery over the Indians.

27. The major part of Pakistani Armour consisted of M-47/M-
48 tanks 400 of which were supplied to Pakistan by the USA during
the period 1954-65.
This tank was far superior to the best two Indian tanks i.e. the
Sherman and the Centurion.The M-47/M-48 Tank had a
more powerful gun than both Centurion and Sliermans.M-48 had
much greater armour protection than any other tank i.e. its frontal
armour was 170 mm as against the frontal armour thickness of 152
mm of Centurion and 100 mm of Sherman.The M-48 had far
superior mobility than any Indian tank by virtue of having an
engine of 820 Horse Power against a total weight of 45 Tons.
Whereas the Power to Weight Ratio of Centurion was 650 Horse
Power to 51 Tons and that of Sherman,450 Horse Power to 33
Tons.Both M-47 & M-48 were one of NATOs principal Main Battle
Tanks in 1965.
In addition the Pattons as both M-47 & M-48 were called had a
range finder and night vision capability.As per Indian accounts
however the penetration of the Armoured Piercing ammunition fired

28. by this tank was not as good as that of as APDS ammunition
which the Indian Centurion tank could fire .
However India had just 210 Centurions as compared to 400 M-
47/M-48 supplied to Pakistan by USA.The other major tank on both
sides was the Sherman.180 Sherman Mark-4 were supplied to India
by USA in the period 1953 while a large number of the more
antiquated Sherman 75 mm version were supplied before I953.
Pakistan was supplied with at least 200 Mark-4 Shermans by
USA in the period 1954-55 74
..AMX-13 with which the Indians
defended Chhamb with its thin armour of 40 mm was an apology of a
tank and its lack of protection robbed its crews of any offensive or
will to manoeuvre potential.PT-76 was another light tank and of
little value.
Thus Shermans were of little consolation and did not give the
Indians any marked advantage in the battles fought opposite
Lahore.The 244
Independent Armoured Brigade opposite the
151
Pakistani Armoured Division had just one regiment of Centurions
and the other of AMX-13 tanks.

29. The above mentioned figures are self explanatory .The best
Indian antidote against Pattons i.e. Centurions consisted of just 12
squadrons as against 29 Patton Squadrons Only three of the total
12 Centurion Squadrons were in Khem Karan as against fifteen
Patton Squadrons in Khem Karan.While at Chawinda the Pakistanis
brought 11 Patton Squadrons by 11 September and a further six more
by 13th
September as against nine Centurion Squadrons.
Thus

30. there is no doubt that Pakistani armour was far superior
qualitatively and relatively superior numerically as compared with
the Indian armour and definitely acted as a tremendous force
multiplier in reducing the negative impact of Pakistani numerical
inferiority in infantry and in addition providing the Pakistanis far
greater offensive potential than the Indians.
At Chawinda it was superior armour as well superior artillery
which provided the "Cordon Sanitaire" apart from Indian
foolhardiness in repeatedly launching frontal attacks which ensured
that the Indians failed to achieve a breakthrough despite significant
superiority in infantry.Infantry it must be remembered becomes
decisive only once armour achieves a breakthrough and mere
superiority in infantry alone without relative superiority in armour
cannot lead to a breakthrough.The only short cut to this situation was
military talent in Indian higher commanders but this sadly although
luckily for Pakistan was absent.Gul Hassan the Pakistani DMO and
later C in C frankly admitted the fact that Pakistan enjoyed
numerical superiority in tanks at Chawinda and that the Indian
handling of armour was so poor that a sizeable part of Pakistani
armour,which was readily available for action; was never even
utilised at Chawinda right till ceasefire!Gulthusadmitted the factthat
the 10
Pakistani Armoured Division was never fully committed

31. at Chawinda..Gul thus wrote; "When it (15t
Armoured
Division) reached
Sialkot ,except for some of its units which were employed in
panic,it remained uncommitted " 76
.19 Lancers (except at Jassoran
which was a minor affair keeping in view the casualties
of 19 Lancers!) and 5 Horse were hardly utilised and the bulk of the
fighting was done by just four armoured regiments!
These factors are sufficient to explode the myth that Chawinda
was a miracle!On the other hand Gadgor fought on 8th
September
1965 was a miracle ;where the Pakistani 25 Cavalry under
tremendous odds of nine to one and without the directions of
any higher brigade or division headquarter did stop the Indian
1°
Armoured Division.This had a deeper connection with
imperfection of human perception and irresolution at higher level
than any superior or inferior level at squadron troop or tank
commander level.The Indians fought with equal valour and the rot
that led to their unheroic and disgraceful withdrawal on
the fateful 8'1'
September developed from brigade and division downwards!

32. Thank God that no Pakistani brigade or division was controlling
25 Cavalry in this battle I 77
NO DIFFERENCE IN HIGHER AND MEDIUM LEVEL
LEADESHIP AS FAR AS BOTH PAKISTAN AND
INDIAN ARMIES WERE
CONCERNED
Leadership beyond battalion/regiment level was equally incompetent on both sides.All major failures on
both sides had a far greater link with poor higher leadership than any
enemy action.Thus the major reason for the Pakistanifailure at Khem
Karan was not Indian resistance but failure to concentrate maximum
strength of the 1°
Armoured Division across Rohi Nala because of
poor staff work and confused higher leadership.Similarly the
major reason for the Indian failure at Chawinda was the fact that
Commander I°
Indian Armoured Brigade lost his nerve without
having employed one fourth of his available armour and meekly
stopped both the Indian regiments from advancing on 8th
September
and staying on the defensive on 9th
and 10'1
' September without any
tangible reason!The other Indian failures at Chawinda from 11 to
18 September also had a direct link with a highly unimaginative and

33. mediocre leadership who unnecessarily exhausted their troops in
pointless frontal attacks at Chawind and surrounding villages.
Harbaksh Singh Abrar and Sarfaraz were some of the leaders
who performed relatively better.Harbaksh Singh's resolution in face
of demoralisation in 4 Mountain Division on 7th
and 8th
September
and on 10th
September when the Indian Chief asked him to readjust
his position rearwards were
one of the most resolute decisions on the Indian side.Abrar's
decision to stand at Chawinda despite advice to withdraw by some
armour advisers was the finest operational decision on the Pakistani
side for which Abrar was richly rewarded later by not being
promoted! l0 Division also performed well and its counterattack
on Li September was one of the
most bold feat of the war.
RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF TROOPS ON
BOTH SIDES ORANSWERING THE QUESTION
WHETHER THERE WAS ANYMAJOR INHERENT
QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
INDIAN AND PAKISTANI TROOPS?

34. There is a myth in Pakistan that the Indian soldier was less brave
because he was a Hindu than the Pakistani who was braver because
he was a Muslim!The authors of this ridiculous assertion cited
examples of many Indian units who disintegrated in face of fire in
1965 war or instances where the Indians performed poorly despite
overwhelming numerical inferiority.The authors of these outwardly
clever but essentially pedantic theories were either unaware of or
simply disregarded certain essential facts of military
history.Soldiering is a unique calling which asks those who follow
it to put at stake the most precious or supposedly most precious fact
of a man's existence i.e. human life itself!Abstract ideas like
"Glory" "Heroism" "Nationalism" "Ideology" etc were employed
with considerable success by kings generals leaders of all sorts on
the other side aim at conditioning the human mind to regard survival
of the individual as less important than collective ideals or vague
concepts.The monotheistic religions brought the concept of life in
the next world.Nationalism in Europe brought the concept of the
state organised on ethnic lines .The French Revolution brought the
concept of a secular ideology transcending race and langauge.Men
fought and died for all sorts of ideas and this process has gone on
since time immemorial.The essential problem of all armies
throughout history has been "How to maintain an orderly military

35. tactical formation in face of emotions of fear of death and
horrible dismemberment as a result of the weapons of destruction of
the post gunpowder discovery era".
"Discipline" was thusinventedand this discipline based on abstract
ideals including authority of civil institutions was the foundation of
supremacy of the "Greek City States" and of the "Roman Republic".
"Military Discipline" enabled the Roman Legions to defeat the
otherwise impregnable savage tribes of east and west Europe and West
Asia.
There never was an empire established for so long a period as the
mighty Roman Empire!Once discipline decayed and military virtue
was undermined the Romans were defeated first by Barbarians
and much later by Arab Muslims when the Byzantines did not even
have one tenth of the military prowess of the mighty Roman Empire.
The myth creationfound in todays Pakistan was started by the early
Arab Muslim historians who cited the defeat of the Romans by Arabs
as triumphs of ideology!They ignored the fact that many Barbarian
tribes had succeeded againstthe Romans longbefore the Arabs did and

36. that even the Arabs could not defeat the Byzantines apart from
wresting their eastern provinces from them!
Religion is an important factor in terms of morale but it is just one
of the many factors among others like superior military leadership
military organisation ,tactics ,equipmentetc.As the lethalityof weapons
increased following the introduction of gunpowder as an important
factor in armaments discipline in face of fire became a
greater problem.Ardant du Picq not a great philosopher of war but a
great philosopher of infantry combat summed the soldier's inner
resolve as a feeling ; "Man does not enter battle to fight,but for
victory.
He does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the
second ". 78
Ardant gave certain basic principles like he said; "These
contests generally lasted but a short time. With like morale ,the least
fatigued always won ".19
Ardant's principal achievement was singling
out the fact that human nature at the bottom was essentially similar ;
whether it was the "Calm English" "The Dashing French" or "The
Russian stoicism".As modern weapons grew more destructive fighting
became more expensive by virtue of much higher casualties and

37. finally in the first world war many armies mutinied once the soldiers
found that they were being aimlessly hurled against the enemy .
The reason was not that one race or men from one religion were
less brave but because military efficiency was undermined by lack of
faith in leaders or their tactical ability to led the rank and file to
victory or at least in a reasonable manner whatsoever it was.The role
of the officer in the EuropeanArmies of 18th
and 19th
Century became
more important as means of destruction grew
more powerful.Successfully standingenemy fire had a deeperlink with
good military tactics,sound leadership and intelligent utilisation of
weapons than with race or religion.The same Hindus whose conduct
was found by pedantic military observers like Brigadier GuIzar 'had
fought much better under British officers.lf there
were inure instances of Indian units disintegrating under fire as
was admitted by Indian commanders like Harbaksh Singh it was so
because of situational factors and had no link with religion.
There were more such cases of units disintegrating and bolting
from line of battle because the Indian Army resorted to
infantry attack with much larger frequency than the Pakistanis.Units

38. disintegrated mostly once under artillery fire and when in the open or
when attacked by tanks and not yet in deliberate defence.That this
happenedmore with Indian units was because the Indians were on the
offensive on most fronts in the war and used their infantry with
phenomenal inefficiency in attack.
Most of these cases occurred in the 15 Indian Division because
they failed to concentrate at Dograi on 6th
September because of lack
of darkness which is a pre requisite for infantry to dig in ,in order to go
into deliberate defence.The best infantry of the world
would disintegrate once attacked by artillery fire and when not dug
in..Conversely it is literally impossible to dislodge well dug in
infantry supported by tanks and artillery.There were cases of
demoralisation and units disintegrating of similar type in the Pakistan
Army too..
According to Brigadier Z.A Khan there was a total morale
breakdown in 6 Lancers when Colonel Sahibzad died and none of
the other officers was willing to lead the unit.In the same area
commanding officer of 24 Cavalry also collapsed because
of strain of Indian shelling and his unit went out of control. 8°

39. Such cases as a matter of fact had a more direct relation with
human nature than with Islam or Hinduism!
Clausewitz recognised this most natural fear in man once he
said ; "But wild as is the nature of War it still wears the chain of
human weakness,and the contradiction we see here,viz.that man
seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time will
astonish no one ".81
Thus troops on both sides fought equally well.Further both sides
performed well in defence and poorly in attack.There were various
reasons for this out of which the most important was the enormous
destructive power of modern weapons .Military history proves that
decisive victories or decisive breakthroughs were achieved in two
broad sets of conditions .
Firstly in case of overwhelming numerical superiority and
superior airpower as was the case in allied battles against the axis
powers in WW II,or because of a markedly superior way of warfare
like the Blitzkrieg which enabled the Germans to win even in face of
no numericalsuperiorityor even parity.Here in the Indo Pak war none
of the two conditions were present .Neither was one side having

40. overwhelming numerical or material superiority and nor was any
side having a superior operational philosophy Most attacks were
defeated not by actualphysical combat between the opposing infantry
but by weight of artillery fire or by water obstacles .
We have the example of the Iran-Iraq war fought in between two
third world countries where because of similar reasons two armies
fighting for ten years failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough but
performed equally well in defence .
The reason for this phenomenon was not that one army was braver
or one less brave but the fact that the immense rise in the lethality of
modern munitions as well as mobility of forces made offensive
operations more difficult and defensive operations easier where both
sides did not have a decisive edge over each other
either martially/numerically or by virtue of having a conceptually
superior military organisation/doctrine.
Clausewitz the greatest philosopher of war singled out three
factors which were the "Chief Moral Powers" of an army i.e.
"Talents of the Commander" "The Military Virtue or Esprit de
Corps of the Army" and "Its National Feeling".As far as "Talents
of the Commanders" was concerned both the armies were equally

41. handicaped.Itappears that the "Military Virtue" of the Indian Army to
some extent was undermined by the negative attitude of the Indian
political leadership towards the army during the period 1947-62.Thus
in 1962 when the Sino Indian conflict took place the Indian Army
was poorly equipped specially as far as its infantry's basic weapon i.e.
the rifle was concerned.After the war the Indian Army was rapidly
expanded and many units which fought the 1965 war were newly
raised units.lt is incorrect to think that newly raised units are bad
units.But there is no denying the fact that it is more difficult to train a
newly raised unit and produce in it esprit de corps and mutual
understanding than in an older unit.Some of the best units of the war
on both sides were newly raised units like 25 Cavalry etc.This
negative aspect may have slightly undermined the military virtue of
the Indian Army as a whole.The Pakistan Army on the other hand had
a smaller number of newly raised units than the Indian Army and
concentration was on acquiring sophisticated equipment thanks to US
aid rather than on new raisings.The typical Pakistani myth that
the Hindus were less brave was false.A truer explanation which
explains some Indian failures at unit level as far as military cohesion
in face of fire;a case of lack of military virtue ;which was the result
of a political leadership's negative attitude towards the army during
the period 1947-62 and was bound to affect any army in a similarly

42. adverse manner regardless of religion.Clausewitz offered some
advice about fostering military virtue,he said; "This sprit can only be
generated from two sources,and only by these two conjointly;the
first is a succession of campaigns and great victories;the other is an
activity of the Army carried sometimes to the highest pitch.Only by
these the soldiers learns to know his powers.
The more a
General is in the habit of demanding from his troops,the surer
he will be that his demands will be answered.The soldier is as
proud of overcoming toil as he is of surmounting danger.Therefore
it is only in the soil of incessant activity and exertion that the germ
will thrive,but also only in the sunshine of victory.Once it becomes
a strong tree,it will stand against the fiercest storms of misfortune
and defeat,and even against the indolent activity of peace,at least for
a time" . 82
The fact that the same people qualified as martial races by many
Pakistani hi storians,were ruled by the qualitatively superior Sikhs
who were just a ten percent minority minority from 1799-1849
proves that martial fervour had much lesser relation with both race
or religion and a much greater link with peculiar situational

43. circumstances including the net psycho-social historical experiences
of a particular community.
Thus both sides performed equally well in defence in own
territory and equally poorly in offence in enemy territory.Thus
Pakistanis did well in defence inside own territory with the safety of
BRB acting as a force multiplier or at Chawinda where parity in
tanks and superior artillery led to Indian failure in achieving a
breakthrough-The initial reason for success of Grand Slam was
local numerical/material superiority particularly in tanks which were
both more numerous and more technically superior ,at the decisive
point combined with superior artillery made further more lethal by
dynamic leadership of Akhtar Malik while the pace of advance slowed
down later when the Indians brought in two more brigades.Tbe
Indians performed well in defence at Assal Uttar but poorly
when again tasked to resume offensive operations in Khem Karan
after withdrawal of Pakistani 1't
Armoured Division after 12
September.Pakistanis who did well in defence similarly
performed equally poorly when in offensive role at Khem Karan
during the period 7-10 September.Offensive operations required
more executive competence in officers and this was lacking in
both the armies-Defence was simple as an operation and thus easier

44. to execute-Offensive operationsto be successful required ,a capacity
to act decisively without waiting for orders,something which
was beyond the potential of the orders oriented Indian and Pakistan
Armies!This was not something just peculiar to the subcontinent but
a tendency found in plenty in many armies all over the
world including many European armies.Thus Montgomery after
Alamein,despite all the overwhelming numerical and material
superiority that he enjoyed, decided in favour of cautious advance
rather than quick advance because he thought that, the standard of
training of the Eighth Army formations was such that he was not
prepared to loose them headlong into the enemy-In words of an
eminent British military analyst Captain Miller "Montgomery knew
that he could not risk handling his divisions with the boldness
expected of a German commander" and that "British
senior commanders,painfully aware of the executive weakness of
their staffs and subordinates,could never confidently run comparable
operational risks".83
If this was the condition of the army of a
more advanced European country,due allowance has to be given to
both the Indo Pak armies fighting a war involving tanks and quick
movements with little leadership tradition in the officer rank and poor
staff procedures and an unimaginative battle doctrine.

45. Coming back to the highly erroneous and essentially fallacious
view that prevails in Pakistan that the Pakistani troops (Particularly
those from north of Chenab river ) were intrinsically more brave than
the Hindus!There was no racial difference racially between the two
armies and religion has little connection with individual bravery or
even the military virtues of an army as a group.
The races that inhabited Pakistan had no connection with
Muslim invaders of India except in having a common religion.In
any case India was invaded by many invaders before the Muslims
who conquered India despite being non Muslim !So being Muslim
was not the governing factor but being from north of Hindu Kush
may be classified as a common factor!
However hard Shaukat Riza may have tried to prove that the
ancestors of Pakistan's soldiers were Arab Mongol or Turkish the
the fact remains all the races that constituted the Pakistan Army had
no connection with invaders of India.Even the Pathans had little
connection with the last predator from the north i.e. Ahmad Shah
Abdali since most of Ahmad's army was recruited from Pathan
territories outside Pakistan.

46. This settles the first ridiculous assertion!We have already seen
how the Punjabis became a martial race or came to be classified as a
martial race!This had less to do with proven fighting qualities as far
as the Punjabi Muslims were concerned (The Sikhs by on ground
military achievements from 1700-1849 had proved that they were
the most martial race of the entire region India-Afghanistan) and
more to do with reliability and availability of eligible manpower at
a time when the British were challenged by the most formidable
armed insurrection in India.The second question i.e. whether the
Muslims of the areas inhabiting Pakistan were more brave than the
Hindus or any non Muslims in the Indian Army is not difficult
to resolve.In the first place individual bravery has nothing to do
with race or religion.We are left with collective bravery or group
cohesion in face of fire.This has to do with a large number of
factors out of
which motivation based on some idea may be
Nationalism.,Ideology both based on religion or based on
other secular beliefs like socialism communism

47. etc,Regimental spirit etc,is just one of the many
factors.The other factors being common historical
experience,quality of
leadership,training,doctrine ,doctrine,operational
strategy,organisation etc.Man can fight for anything and
the important fact here is not whether what he is fighting
for is essentially Islam or Christianity or Hinduism or
Buddhism or Nationalism or Communism but the
intensity with which he believes in it and is willing to
sacrifice his life for it.Thus there may be the case of a
more motivated communist army against Muslims or a
more motivated Hindu Army against Muslims or vice
versa but nothing else.A simple quantitative way of

48. comparing relative performance of Hindus Muslims Sikhs etc
is their performance in the pre 1947 British Indian
Army.At least 50 % of the fighting arms in that army on the
average were Muslims.We will compare combat
performance at random by studying the figures of the
religious groups awarded the Victoria Cross for which the
Indians became eligible from 1911.85
It is important to keep
this year in mind since we have already discussed that by
1911 the Indian Army was a Punjabi dominated army in
with fighting arms that had at least 50 % Muslims from
Punjab and Frontier in their total strength.The contention

49. before us is whether the non Muslim soldier of the Indian
Army ,was less brave than a Muslim soldier and in
particular
the Punjabi Muslim who constituted three fourth of the
fighting arms of the Pakistan Army as well as the Pathan
Muslim who constituted the second largest ethnic group
in the fighting arms of the Pakistan Army.
We will examine the number of Victoria Crosses awarded
to both Muslim as well as non Muslim soldiers in the
Indian Army.We will exclude Gurkhas,who although

50. Hindu by religion , were a small part of Indian Army
infantry in 1965.In principle at least 50 % or 40 % of the
Victoria Crosses awarded to the Indian Army in the period
1911-1945 should have gone to the Muslims in general
since they were more than 40 % of fighting arms of Indian
Army with at least 45 to 50 % representation in the
fighting arms.Further more than three fourth of these
Victoria Crosses should have gone to the Punjabi Muslims
who were more than three fourth of the total Muslim
fighting arm component in the period 1911-45.We are
only interested in ascertaining whether these figures prove
that the non Muslims were less brave or equally brave.

51. The following table may enable the dispassionate reader in
arriving at some conclusions:--
ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OFINDIAN RE
CIPIENTS OF VICTORIA CROSS FROM THE INDIAN ARMY-
1911-1945 86
RELIGIOUS
GROUP
WORLD
WAR ONE
WORLD WAR
TWO
TOTAL
GURKHA-
HINDU
210 12
SIKH 13 4
HINDU -
INDIAN
49 13
MUSLIM 24 6
TOTAL 926 35
NOTE:--This table may not
be wholly correctbut is
the result of going through
various books

52. Note-86 Some of the figures or facts are based on the authors'
approximate personal assessment.
None of these figures prove that the Punjabi Muslims or Pathans
were braver than Hindus or Punjabi Sikhs.The Hindu percentage in the
fighting arms in the Indian Army in WW One was approximately half
of that of Muslims but Hindus got four Victoria Crosses as against
two Muslim VCs and two of these were from Garhwal which was not
part of Punjab,while the third was again a non Punjabi from
Rajputana.
The fourth Hindu in WW One was a Punjabi Hindu Dogra.This
Clearly illustrates that bravery had no connection with being from
Punjab or being a Hindu or a Muslim!
Something which may be equated with blasphemy in
Pakistan,but all the same true!The same is true for WW Two.It is
absolutely ridiculous to equate religion or ethnic origin with valour!
To conclude and wind up this most ridiculous controversy
propagated in both the countries by superficial historians and in
Pakistan in particular by men like Brigadier Gulzar and Altaf Gauhar
; a closer and more dispassionate examination of the various battles

53. reveals that the differences in unit performance in both sides had a far
more closer link with situational factors than with religion or race
which although relatively important were not as important as many
other factors like the "particular tactical situation", "personality of the
higher commanders", nature of operation whether "attack or
defence". Material or numerical factors like number of men
,tanks,guns and quality of equipment played a relatively
significant role but again this too depended on the quality of higher
leadership and doctrine.Some units like 3 Jat 25 Cavalry 7 Punjab
(Pakistani) etc performed outstandingly well but their successes
depended more on the situational factors listed above than on which
country they hailed from.
There were some general tactical rules of the thumb which
explained all successes and failures like "Infantry Attack
against an enemy in deliberate defence whether behind a
natural obstacle or artificial obstacle reasonably well
supported by artillery and armour was a far more

54. difficult operation as far as likelihood of success was
concerned ; than lets say an attack mounted by one side
while both sides were in the process of advancing and
the enemy attacked was not in deliberate defence as was
the case in Khem Karan when both the Indian and
Pakistani troops were attacking each other
simultaneously on 6th September.The same Pakistani
troops found it more difficult to dislodge the same
Indian infantry division once it occupied deliberately
defended infantry positions at Assal-Uttar.Similarly the
same Indian division found it difficult to dislodge the
Pakistanis in the same area afterl2th September once the

55. Indians attacked Khem Karan later to evict the
Pakistanis out of Khem Karan. This explains the 4 Sikh
and 2 Mahar fiasco of 12th September.The only major
breakthrough of the war achieved during Grand Slam
can also be similarly explained.
The Pakistanis achieved
total surprise,possessed six to one superiority in
tanks ,were
well led and were not impeded by any natural
obstacle.Their failure to maintain their initial impetus
had a
far greater connection with Ayub and Musa's hesitation

56. out of fear of provoking India into starting a full scale war
which resulted in delaying the progress of the operation
hidden under the pretext of change of
command.Another rule of the thumb in all unit actions
was the fact that no major breakthrough was achieved
both sides once surprise was lost.Yet another rule of the
thumb was the fact that the enemy was defeated not by
direct physical assault but by mental dislocation.
Thus 3
Jat's success at Dograi ; which was well executed by an
otherwise excellent unit ; had more to do with a brilliant
plan involving attack from the flank ,and absence of

57. Pakistani tanks .