Personal Identity

1. Chapter 7Chapter 7
Personal IdentityPersonal Identity

2. Questions ofQuestions of
Physical (Bodily) IdentityPhysical (Bodily) Identity
If a person loses an arm, is she still the same
person? Two arms and two legs? Is there
some specific point at which she would lose
her identity?
The cells making up our bodies die and are
replaced constantly; would this mean that our
identities are constantly shifting?
Does a person’s brain continuity guarantee
the continuity of his individual identity?

3. Souls and PersonalSouls and Personal
IdentityIdentity
The dominant view of personal identity from the
time of Plato until the 17th century asserted that:
Personal identity is centered in the immaterial soul, a
single indivisible substance
If ongoing personal identity is determined by the
continuing indivisible presence of the soul, we need
not worry about bodily continuity or memory
continuity: the soul can easily transcend both.
But how does the continuity of a person’s soul
guarantee his or her continuing existence?
If the soul lives on without the person’s body,
memories, beliefs, or desires, it is difficult to imagine a
continued existence for that individual.

4. Memory and IdentityMemory and Identity
Locke: The criterion for personal identity must be
continuity of memory.
Challenges to the memory account of personal
identity:
Memories fade as the person ages.
Theoretically, the two hemispheres of a person’s
brain, and thus the memories retained by that
brain, could be transplanted into two different
bodies; there would then be two versions of the
same person—but two different persons cannot
be identical with a single individual.

5. Science Fiction andScience Fiction and
Personal Identity ProblemsPersonal Identity Problems
If a molecule-by-molecule scan of one
individual could create multiple duplicate
of a person, and if each of those
duplicates then had differing
experiences and thus developed
different sets of memories, could we
ultimately and rightly say that all of the
duplicates share a single personal
identity?

6. Beyond Personal IdentityBeyond Personal Identity
Some contemporary philosophers have
concluded that perhaps personal identity
is not really as important as we
traditionally thought.
Such philosophers concern themselves
with continuity of experience.

7. David Hume and IdentityDavid Hume and Identity
Our sense of personal identity develops from
the easy transition among our ideas.
That transition is a matter of degree, not a
clear marker of identity:
“We have no just standard by which we
can decide any dispute concerning the
time when [our bundle of ideas] acquire or
lose a title to the name of identity.”
We can decide to define a standard for what
counts as identity—but we are then
stipulating a definition of identity, not
identifying an actual identity.

8. Identity and the OneIdentity and the One
For Spinoza, the Taoists, and some
versions of Buddhism:
The world is One.
All distinct individuals are an illusion.
All personal identity is submerged into the
One.
The question of personal identity is a
question of why people mistakenly suppose
that they have separate individual identities.

9. The Narrative Account ofThe Narrative Account of
Personal IdentityPersonal Identity
Our personal identity is NOT set by a
specific body (which changes), or a set
of memories (which also change).
The only way to secure a genuine
personal identity is to pull the strands of
your life together in a personal narrative
(story) that unifies the changes and the
continuities.

10. The Narrative Account ofThe Narrative Account of
Personal IdentityPersonal Identity
The events of our lives don’t gain
significance until we invest them with
that significance: until we fit them into a
pattern of purposive behavior.
We aren’t just given a personal identity;
rather, we actively make it by fitting the
disparate parts into a cohesive narrative.

11. Narrative TruthNarrative Truth
Generally, our life narratives are systematically
inaccurate and distorted—so can they serve
effectively as grounds for marking our personal
identity?
The basic existence of the narratives themselves
could be more important than narrative accuracy:
Personal narratives, with their faulty and self-
serving “memories,” can give some coherent form
and unity to our senses of our personal identities.

12. Alasdair MacIntyreAlasdair MacIntyre
Promotes a narrative account of personal
identity as grounds for the meaning of life
Asserts that the narrative account of life is
also essential for accountability
“To be the subject of a narrative that runs
from one’s birth to one’s death is . . . to be
accountable for the actions and
experiences which compose a narratable
life.”
Argues that the narrative model is essential
as an element of taking moral responsibility
for one’s life and acts

13. The Constructivist Model ofThe Constructivist Model of
Personal IdentityPersonal Identity
Contends that personal identity is not a
given, but is instead constructed out of
elements that may not otherwise have
any real unity:
“…It is through narrative that we create
and recreate selfhood, that self is a
product of our telling and not some
essence to be delved for in the recesses
of subjectivity” (Bruner).