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Layer 7 DOS attack
 By :Oussama Elhamer Abdelkhalek.
Summary
•   The History of Dos attack .
•   Layer 4 Ddos : Overview.
•   Layer 7 Dos One attacker Brings Down one site .
•   Link-Local Dos : RA ip6 attack.
The Dos History
The Dos History
Layer 4 Ddos Attack :
• Primitive DDOS attack controlled via
  IRC.
• Sends Thousands of packets per second
  from the attacker directly to the target.
• Needs Thousands of participants to
  bring down a large site.
• Take down master card for more than a
  day (3.000 to 30.000)
• Nothing More Than Pressing F5. (The
  Low Orbit lon Cannon Do That For u
  /:p)
Layer 7 DOS
• Operates at the application protocol level
   (OSI Layer 7).
• Can Be routed through proxies .
• More Dangerous.
• Low Bandwidth .
• Can Be Very Difficult To Distinguish From normal trafic.
  Eg. HTTP(S), SMTP, FTP and etc.
Some Example Of Layer 7 Dos
         Attacks

We will focus on The weaknesses of The Http
Protocol .
HTTP GET
HTTP GET attack :
-Dont Send A Complete Request To The WebServer (Incomplete
Headers ) Send SomeThing That Will hold The Web Server
Continues To Send Headers at Regular intervals to keep the
Sockets active !
-So If You Open One Thousand Connection On A server That can Only
Handle Five Hundred It Will be Rejecting Requests .
Example Message syntax :
GET /indexPage.html HTTP/1.1 CRLF <- Request Line
Host : www.host.com:8080 CRLF
Content-Length :25 CRLF
CRLF
<Optional Messaga Body >


- The Server Stop Reading When See Two CRLF and Start generating
the response and sending feed back .
• Example
• The Server Will Drop The Connection If There Are No Data In 60 Seconds !


•         Get/http/1.1 rn
•         Host :Server rn
•         X-skdvbk :sdjvjrn

•                                ----59 Sec later
•          X-skdvbk :sdjvjrn
•                                ----59 Sec later
•         X-skdvbk :sdjvjrn
•                                ----59 Sec later
•         X-skdvbk :sdjvjrn
•                                ----59 Sec later
Client                                              Server

• This Attack Don’t Works With IIS because it Use a time out .
• No Realible Configurartion Universal To Protect your Web Server
• But there Are some Recommandation THAT minimize the damage
SlowLoris

•   Send Incomplete GET requests
•   And Freezes Apache With One Packet Per Second .
•   keeps sessions at halt
•   using neverending GET transmissions
HTTP post
• Similar To http gET.
• The Connections Whith The Server Stay Opened.
• instead of prolongating The Header Section Of The http
  Request It Prolongate The Message Body Section
R-U-Dead-Yet :
• Incomplete HTTP POSTs
• implements the generic HTTP DoS attack via long form field
  submissions.
• Stops IIS, But Requires Thousands Of packets per second.
More Variation

• Keep-Alive Dos: A variation of The incomplete http get
  requests But Less Powerful .
• XerXes A Tool Developped By Th3j35t3r
•
• -Can be Imported To a 3G cell phone
• -Can be run throught VPN.
Link-Local Dos
• IPv6 Router Advertisments

• In ip v4 :
• The Client Request An Ip
• The Router Provides One
• In ipv6
• The Router announces its presence
• Every client on the Lan Creates an adress and joins the
  network
•   The problem That you can Send A lot Of Router advertisement
•   The Lan Machines Will Join All Those Networks
•   And Windows Is inefficient in doing That
•   You can take Down all The Lan .
Demo :
• Slowloris .
• R-u-dead yet .
• RA ip6 attack .
Thanks

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BSides Algiers - Layer7 DoS Attacks - Oussama Elhamer

  • 1. Layer 7 DOS attack By :Oussama Elhamer Abdelkhalek.
  • 2. Summary • The History of Dos attack . • Layer 4 Ddos : Overview. • Layer 7 Dos One attacker Brings Down one site . • Link-Local Dos : RA ip6 attack.
  • 5. Layer 4 Ddos Attack : • Primitive DDOS attack controlled via IRC. • Sends Thousands of packets per second from the attacker directly to the target. • Needs Thousands of participants to bring down a large site. • Take down master card for more than a day (3.000 to 30.000) • Nothing More Than Pressing F5. (The Low Orbit lon Cannon Do That For u /:p)
  • 6. Layer 7 DOS • Operates at the application protocol level (OSI Layer 7). • Can Be routed through proxies . • More Dangerous. • Low Bandwidth . • Can Be Very Difficult To Distinguish From normal trafic. Eg. HTTP(S), SMTP, FTP and etc.
  • 7. Some Example Of Layer 7 Dos Attacks We will focus on The weaknesses of The Http Protocol .
  • 9. HTTP GET attack : -Dont Send A Complete Request To The WebServer (Incomplete Headers ) Send SomeThing That Will hold The Web Server Continues To Send Headers at Regular intervals to keep the Sockets active ! -So If You Open One Thousand Connection On A server That can Only Handle Five Hundred It Will be Rejecting Requests . Example Message syntax : GET /indexPage.html HTTP/1.1 CRLF <- Request Line Host : www.host.com:8080 CRLF Content-Length :25 CRLF CRLF <Optional Messaga Body > - The Server Stop Reading When See Two CRLF and Start generating the response and sending feed back .
  • 10. • Example • The Server Will Drop The Connection If There Are No Data In 60 Seconds ! • Get/http/1.1 rn • Host :Server rn • X-skdvbk :sdjvjrn • ----59 Sec later • X-skdvbk :sdjvjrn • ----59 Sec later • X-skdvbk :sdjvjrn • ----59 Sec later • X-skdvbk :sdjvjrn • ----59 Sec later Client Server • This Attack Don’t Works With IIS because it Use a time out . • No Realible Configurartion Universal To Protect your Web Server • But there Are some Recommandation THAT minimize the damage
  • 11. SlowLoris • Send Incomplete GET requests • And Freezes Apache With One Packet Per Second . • keeps sessions at halt • using neverending GET transmissions
  • 12. HTTP post • Similar To http gET. • The Connections Whith The Server Stay Opened. • instead of prolongating The Header Section Of The http Request It Prolongate The Message Body Section
  • 13. R-U-Dead-Yet : • Incomplete HTTP POSTs • implements the generic HTTP DoS attack via long form field submissions. • Stops IIS, But Requires Thousands Of packets per second.
  • 14. More Variation • Keep-Alive Dos: A variation of The incomplete http get requests But Less Powerful . • XerXes A Tool Developped By Th3j35t3r • • -Can be Imported To a 3G cell phone • -Can be run throught VPN.
  • 15. Link-Local Dos • IPv6 Router Advertisments • In ip v4 : • The Client Request An Ip • The Router Provides One • In ipv6 • The Router announces its presence • Every client on the Lan Creates an adress and joins the network
  • 16. The problem That you can Send A lot Of Router advertisement • The Lan Machines Will Join All Those Networks • And Windows Is inefficient in doing That • You can take Down all The Lan .
  • 17. Demo : • Slowloris . • R-u-dead yet . • RA ip6 attack .