GAO Report Critical of USAID in Haiti

HAITI
RECONSTRUCTION
USAID Infrastructure
Projects Have Had
Mixed Results and
Face Sustainability
Challenges
Report to Congressional Requesters
June 2013
GAO-13-558
United States Government Accountability Office
This Report Is Temporarily Restricted Pending
Official Public Release.

United States Government Accountability Office
Highlights of GAO-13-558, a report to
congressional requesters
June 2013
HAITI RECONSTRUCTION
USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed
Results and Face Sustainability Challenges
Why GAO Did This Study
On January 12, 2010, an earthquake in
Haiti caused about 230,000 deaths,
resulted in 300,000 injuries, and
displaced about 2 million persons.
Following immediate relief efforts,
Congress provided $1.14 billion for
reconstruction in the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2010. USAID is
responsible for implementing $651
million of this amount, and it has
allocated about $268 million of this and
other funding to construct a power
plant and port to support the CIP in
northern Haiti and permanent housing
in several locations. The Act required
State to report periodically to Congress
on funding obligated and disbursed
and program outputs and outcomes.
GAO was asked to review USAID’s
efforts in Haiti. This report examines
USAID’s (1) funding obligations and
disbursements and State’s reports to
Congress on funding and progress; (2)
USAID’s progress in two CIP-related
activities—a power plant and port; and
(3) USAID’s progress in constructing
permanent housing. GAO reviewed
documents and interviewed U.S.
officials in Washington, D.C., and Haiti,
and visited planned and active sites.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring
State to provide it with periodic reports
on reconstruction progress, funding,
and schedules until most funding for
each program sector has been
disbursed. Also, GAO is
recommending USAID (1) hire a port
engineer to oversee port planning and
construction and (2) provide timely
community support mechanisms for
each new settlement to help ensure
sustainability of its permanent housing
program. USAID agreed with GAO’s
recommendations.
What GAO Found
As of March 31, 2013, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
had obligated $293 million (45 percent) and disbursed $204 million (31 percent)
of $651 million in funding for Haiti from the Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2010 (the Act). The Department of State (State) submitted four of five periodic
reports to Congress, as required by the Act. The reports included information on
funding obligated and disbursed and anecdotal information on outputs and
outcomes of some activities, as the Act required. The Senate Appropriations
Committee, in its Committee Report accompanying the Act, had also directed
State to report more detailed information on funding and sector activities in Haiti,
which State did not include in the reports. Although most funds have not been
disbursed, State’s reporting requirement ended in September 2012. As a result,
Congress lacks information on the amounts of funds obligated and disbursed and
program-by-program progress of U.S. reconstruction activities.
USAID has allocated $170.3 million to construct a power plant and port to
support the newly developed Caracol Industrial Park (CIP), with mixed results.
According to USAID documents and external studies, the sustainability of the
CIP, power plant, and port are interdependent; each must be completed and
remain viable for the others to succeed. USAID completed the power plant’s first
phase with less funding than allocated and in time to supply power to the first CIP
tenant. Port construction will not begin until at least 2 years later than originally
planned due in part to a lack of USAID expertise in port planning in Haiti. In
January 2011, the mission made an unsuccessful attempt to solicit a person to fill
a vacant port engineer position but made no additional attempts prior to May
2013 and this position currently remains unfilled. As a result, planning has been
hindered by (1) unrealistic initial timeframes, (2) delays in awarding the contract
for a feasibility study, and (3) incomplete information in the feasibility study.
According to initial estimates of port construction costs, USAID funding will be
insufficient to cover a majority of projected costs. The estimated gap of $117
million to $189 million is larger than initially estimated, and it is unclear whether
the Haitian government will be able to find a private sector company willing to
finance the remainder of the project.
USAID has reduced its permanent housing construction targets in Haiti. USAID
initially underestimated the funding needed for its New Settlements housing
program. As a result, the agency increased the amount allocated by 65 percent,
from $59 million to $97 million, and decreased the projected number of houses to
be built by over 80 percent, from 15,000 to 2,649. The estimated number of
beneficiaries was reduced from 75,000 to 90,000 to its current estimates of
approximately 13,200 to 15,900. Cost increases resulted from inaccurate original
estimates that used inappropriate cost comparisons and from the Haitian
government’s request for larger houses with improvements such as flush toilets.
USAID currently estimates construction will be completed almost 2 years later
than initially scheduled. Delays occurred due to the difficulties of securing land
titles and coordination issues with partner donors. USAID is attempting to
mitigate potential sustainability risks, such as the possible lack of economic
opportunities, affordability of housing and services, and community cohesion, but
gaps in the support of community development mechanisms may increase these
risks.
View GAO-13-558. For more information,
contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or
gootnickd@gao.gov.

Page i GAO-13-558 Haiti Reconstruction
Letter 1
Background 3
Most of USAID’s 2010 Supplemental Funds Have Not Been
Obligated or Disbursed, and State’s Reports to Congress
Generally Met Requirements but Were Incomplete and Not
Timely 8
USAID Completed the Power Plant for Less Than Allocated but the
Port Was Delayed; Their Sustainability Depends on the CIP’s
Success 11
USAID’s Development of New Housing Settlements in Haiti Has
Been More Costly and Slower Than Expected; Sustainability
Challenges Remain 25
Conclusions 37
Matter for Congressional Consideration 39
Recommendations for Executive Action 39
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41
Appendix II Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development 46
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49
Tables
Table 1: Fiscal Year 2010 Supplemental Funding for Post-
Earthquake Reconstruction in Haiti, as of March 31, 2013 4
Table 2: USAID Sector Activities and Amounts of Supplemental
Funding Allocated, Obligated, and Disbursed, as of March
31, 2013 9
Table 3: Total USAID Funding Allocated, Obligated, and Disbursed
for Components of the CIP Power Plant, as of March 31,
2013 15
Contents

Page ii GAO-13-558 Haiti Reconstruction
for Components of a New Northern Port in Haiti, as of
March 31, 2013 19
for Permanent Housing Activities, as of March 31, 2013 29
Figures
Figure 1: Development Corridors and Selected Sites Targeted by
the U.S. Post-Earthquake Assistance 6
Figure 2: Caracol Industrial Park under Construction, Haiti,
January 2013 14
Figure 3: USAID-Funded Power Plant at the Caracol Industrial
Park, Haiti, December 2012 16
Figure 4: Map of Ports in Haiti and Dominican Republic for
Potential Use by CIP Tenants 23
Figure 5: USAID Cost Estimates for Preparation of One Plot and
Construction of One House in Haiti 26
Figure 6: Permanent Houses to Be Constructed on USAID Plots in
Haiti, 2011 and 2013 Projections, as of April 2013 30
Figure 7: Number of Houses and New Settlement Locations
Planned in Haiti, as of April 2013 31
Figure 8: Unoccupied Permanent Houses, Water Distribution
Towers, and Sewage System Trenches in Caracol-EKAM,
Haiti, December 2012 32

Page iii GAO-13-558 Haiti Reconstruction
Abbreviations
the Act Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010
AAD Activity Approval Document
CIP Caracol Industrial Park
DLA Government of Haiti Decreed Land Area
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
the mission U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Haiti
NGO nongovernmental organization
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Red Cross American Red Cross
Sae-A Sae-A Trading Co. Ltd.
State Department of State
UN United Nations
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

GAO-13-558 Haiti Reconstruction
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
June 18, 2013
The Honorable Eliot Engel
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
House of Representatives
On January 12, 2010, an earthquake centered near Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
caused physical, social, and economic devastation to the poorest country
in the Western hemisphere. The earthquake is estimated to have caused
approximately 230,000 deaths, resulted in 300,000 injuries, and displaced
approximately 2 million people from their homes. According to the United
Nations (UN), the earthquake killed more than 16,000 of Haiti’s civil
service employees and destroyed almost all ministry buildings. The World
Bank reported that the earthquake caused $7.8 billion in damage (about
120 percent of Haiti’s 2009 gross domestic product). Following the
earthquake, the country received unprecedented pledges of support from
around the globe. The UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti reported in
December 2012 that, to help Haiti recover from the earthquake, bilateral
and multilateral donors, including the United States, have allocated $13.3
billion and so far disbursed $6.4 billion. Individuals, private firms, and
others gave an additional $3.1 billion in private donations.
In July 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 2010 (the Act),1
which provided more than $1.14 billion in
reconstruction funds for Haiti, $651 million of which was provided to the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for bilateral
1
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, 124 Stat. 2302, 2323 (July
29, 2010). In the Act, Congress also made funds available to GAO to monitor U.S. post-
earthquake assistance to Haiti. In response, in May 2011, we issued a report
(GAO-11-415) that described planning efforts and oversight structures. In November
2011, we issued a report (GAO-12-68) that addressed USAID’s progress, staffing,
continued planning, and sustainability challenges facing its activities. See GAO, Haiti
Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded Oversight Still to Be Implemented,
GAO-11-415 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2011); and Haiti Reconstruction: Factors
Contributing to Delays in USAID Infrastructure Construction, GAO-12-68 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 16, 2011).

reconstruction activities. The Act required the Department of State (State)
to provide periodic reports to Congress on funding obligated and
disbursed and program outputs and outcomes. USAID has allocated
approximately 40 percent of its supplemental funding,2
as well as other
funds, to support the construction of (1) a power plant that will provide
electricity for the new Caracol Industrial Park (CIP) in northern Haiti near
Cap-Haïtien; (2) a new port along Haiti’s northern coast near the CIP; and
(3) permanent housing in new settlements in the Port-au-Prince, St-Marc,
and Cap-Haïtien areas.
You asked us3
to examine U.S. reconstruction efforts in Haiti. This report
addresses (1) USAID’s progress in obligating and disbursing program
allocations and State’s periodic reporting to Congress on the status of the
U.S. reconstruction efforts; (2) USAID’s progress in planning and
constructing the CIP-related power plant and port; and (3) USAID’s
progress in planning and constructing permanent housing.
To address these objectives, we reviewed reports, documents, and
funding data and interviewed officials from USAID and State in
Washington, D.C., and Haiti. To assess the reliability of funding data, we
examined USAID and State data sources and conducted interviews with
cognizant officials from USAID and State.4
We determined that the data
we used were sufficiently reliable for our purpose of reviewing U.S.
funding provided for Haiti reconstruction. In Haiti, we visited sites under
construction or planned for construction for the power plant, port, and
permanent housing, and visited the CIP. To address the sustainability of
these projects, we used the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s definition of sustainability—”the continuation of benefits
from a development intervention after major development assistance has
been completed.” We operationalized this definition by specifying that
sustainability is the ability of the Haitian government and individuals to
2
The source of the Act’s funding allocated to USAID is the Economic Support Fund
account.
3
We performed this review in response to a June 2012 request from Representative
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Representative Howard Berman, Chairman and Ranking
Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee for the 112th Congress. In February
2013, the committee’s Ranking Member for the 113th Congress, Representative Eliot
Engel, signed on as a co-requester.
4
See appendix I for more information about how we assessed data reliability and our
overall scope and methodology.

operate and maintain the new infrastructure in such a condition as to
produce the projected benefits.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 through June
2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
More than 75 percent of Haiti’s population lives on less than $2 a day,
and Haiti’s unemployment rate is estimated at 60 to 70 percent. These
conditions were exacerbated when a large earthquake devastated parts
of the country, including the capital, on January 12, 2010. Since the
earthquake, Haiti has suffered from a cholera epidemic that, as of March
2013, had affected almost 650,000 persons and caused over 8,000
deaths. In March 2013, the International Organization for Migration
estimated that, of the original 2 million persons affected, about 320,000
individuals remained displaced in camps from the earthquake.
In response to the earthquake, Congress provided more than $1.14 billion
in reconstruction funds for Haiti in the Fiscal Year 2010 Supplemental
Appropriations Act. Of this amount, USAID received $651 million through
the Economic Support Fund for its bilateral reconstruction activities, as
shown in table 1.
Background

Table 1: Fiscal Year 2010 Supplemental Funding for Post-Earthquake
Reconstruction in Haiti, as of March 31, 2013
Dollars in millions
Recipient Reconstruction amount
State and USAID
State
USAID
Bilateral Reconstruction Activities
Transferred to Haiti Reconstruction Fund
a
Transferred to Smithsonian Institution
$917.7
144.7
773.0
651.0
120.0
2.0
Treasury 219.8
USAID Inspector General 4.5
Total $1,142.0
Source: USAID and the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (Pub. L. No. 111-212).
Notes: In November 2011, we reported that USAID and State were allocated $917.7 in supplemental
funding, including $770 million to USAID and $147.7 million to State (see GAO-12-68). State’s current
amount of $144.7 million is $3 million less and USAID’s current amount is $3 million more because
State transferred $3 million to USAID for bilateral reconstruction activities.
a
The Haiti Reconstruction Fund is a multidonor trust fund organized to help finance high-priority post-
earthquake reconstruction projects.
The Act required State to provide periodic reports to Congress on the
program. Specifically, the Act required State to submit five reports to the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, beginning in October 2010 and
every 180 days thereafter until September 2012, on funding obligations
and disbursements and program outputs and outcomes. In addition, the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, in its Committee Report
accompanying the Act,5
directed that State’s reports include, among other
things, (1) a detailed program-by-program description of USAID’s
activities; (2) a description, by goal and objective, and an assessment of
the progress of U.S. programs; and (3) amounts of funding obligated and
expended on the programs during the preceding 6 months.
In our November 2011 report on Haiti reconstruction,6
we reported that
USAID had difficulties securing staff—particularly technical staff such as
5
See S. Rep. 111-188, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Making Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs for the Fiscal Year
ending September 30, 2010, and for Other Purposes, May 14, 2010.
6
GAO-12-68.

contracting officers and engineers—who were willing to live and work in
the country after the earthquake and who could bring the expertise
necessary to plan and execute large, complex infrastructure projects. We
also reported that such difficulties had contributed to delays in U.S.
efforts. As of December 2012, the USAID mission in Haiti (the mission)
had increased its direct-hire staff positions filled from 7 of 17 (41 percent)
soon after the earthquake to 29 of 36 (81 percent) positions filled.
The overall 5-year U.S. reconstruction strategy for Haiti, known as the
Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic
Opportunity, is consistent with the government of Haiti’s development
priorities in that it seeks, among other goals, to encourage reconstruction
and long-term economic development in several regions of the country.
These areas, known as “development corridors,” include the Cap-Haïtien
region on Haiti’s northern coast and the St-Marc region on Haiti’s western
coast; these areas were not close to the earthquake epicenter but were
where some people from Port-au-Prince were displaced after the
earthquake. The strategy notes that 65 percent of Haiti’s economic
activity was located in greater Port-au-Prince and that the U.S.
government’s intent is to support new economic opportunities in other
development corridors, in addition to assisting with reconstruction in the
Port-au-Prince corridor, which suffered the most damage from the
earthquake (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Development Corridors and Selected Sites Targeted by the U.S. Post-Earthquake Assistance
Note: The selected sites in this map include the three USAID bilateral activities we focus on in this
report: CIP power plant, port, and permanent housing.
On January 11, 2011, the U.S. government, the government of Haiti, the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and a private South Korean
garment manufacturer, Sae-A Trading Co. Ltd. (Sae-A), signed an

agreement to support development of the CIP that included the following
commitments:
• the IDB committed to provide funding to the Haitian government to
build the CIP and some associated facilities;
• the U.S. government committed to build a power plant, contribute
toward the building of a nearby port, and support the construction of
5,000 nearby housing units with associated site infrastructure; and
• Sae-A committed to be the anchor tenant and hire 20,000 local
employees at the CIP.
In concert with its economic growth efforts, USAID, in coordination with
State’s Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator in Washington, D.C.,
developed the New Settlements program to address the severe post-
earthquake permanent housing shortage in Haiti. USAID’s goal was to
construct up to 15,000 new permanent houses on previously
undeveloped sites in three designated development corridors—10,000 in
Port-au-Prince and St-Marc, and 5,000 in Cap-Haïtien. In part, USAID’s
program aimed to support the Haitian government’s goal of decentralizing
economic growth outside Port-au-Prince by increasing the housing stock
in communities near the industrial park planned for northern Haiti. USAID
planned to provide funding for the preparation of all the settlement sites,
to include activities such as grading the land and providing proper
drainage, access roads, pedestrian pathways, and infrastructure for
delivery of utility services. Each new settlement site would include a
certain number of plots on which USAID or a partner nongovernmental
organization (NGO) would then construct a house. Of the 15,000 plots it
planned to develop, USAID planned to build 4,000 houses, while NGOs
and other donor partners would build 11,000 houses. USAID estimated
that, when completed, about 75,000 to 90,000 people would benefit.

As of March 31, 2013, the majority of supplemental funding for USAID’s
program sector activities had not been obligated7
or disbursed.8
The
Department of State submitted four of five reports to Congress, as
required in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010, but did not
submit them in a timely manner. State did not include some information
that the Senate Committee on Appropriations had directed State to
include in the report on funding, program sector activities, and progress
toward achieving the goals and objectives of the program. All reporting
requirements have now ended.
As of March 31, 2013, 31 percent of the supplemental funding provided
for Haiti reconstruction efforts had been disbursed. Of the $651 million in
funding from the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act that USAID has
allocated for bilateral earthquake reconstruction activities, USAID had
obligated about $293 million (45 percent) and disbursed about $204
million (31 percent). The amount of funds obligated and disbursed varies
among activities in the six sectors of activities to which supplemental
funds were allocated. For example, the majority of funding obligated to
date has been obligated in just two sectors (shelter and governance and
rule of law), as shown in table 2.
7
An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the U.S. government
for the payment of goods and services ordered or received. See GAO, A Glossary of
Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP (Washington, D.C.:
September 2005). This report defines obligations as the total amount of orders placed,
contracts awarded, services received, and similar transactions during a given period that
will require payments during the same or future period. USAID labels these actions
“subobligations.” In State’s reports to Congress on Haiti funding, for USAID-managed
accounts, funds listed as “total obligations” or “obligated” refer to these subobligations.
Nonetheless, consistent with 31 U.S.C. §1501, which defines when an agency can record
an obligation, USAID generally treats as an obligation the bilateral agreements it makes
with other countries to deliver assistance.
8
According to USAID, supplemental funds provided for Haiti post-earthquake recovery
were scheduled to be disbursed over the course of the 5-year period beginning with the
January 3, 2011, issuance of the Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy.
Most of USAID’s 2010
Supplemental Funds
Have Not Been
Obligated or
Disbursed, and State’s
Reports to Congress
Generally Met
Requirements but
Were Incomplete and
Not Timely
The Majority of
Supplemental Funding Has
Not Been Obligated and
Disbursed

Table 2: USAID Sector Activities and Amounts of Supplemental Funding Allocated, Obligated, and Disbursed, as of March 31,
2013
Dollars in millions
Sector of USAID Activity Allocated
Total
obligations
a
Percentage
obligated Disbursements
Percentage
disbursed
Shelter
b
$83.1 $47.4 57 $30.6 37
Energy
b
135.1 41.1 30 32.8 24
Ports and transportation
b
84.2 4.3 5 3.9 5
Food security 82.5 29.6 36 24.7 30
Health and disabilities 99.4 38.1 38 17.7 18
Governance and rule of law 120.4 95.4 79 64.8 54
Operating and other expenses
c
46.2 37.2 81 29.4 64
Total $651.0
d
$293.0
d
45 $204.0
d
31
Source: USAID.
a
An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the U.S. government for the
payment of goods and services ordered or received. See GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the
Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP (Washington, D.C.: September 2005). This report defines
obligations as the total amount of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and similar
transactions during a given period that will require payments during the same or a future period.
USAID labels these actions “subobligations.” In States reports to Congress on Haiti funding, for
USAID-managed accounts, funds listed as “total obligations” or “obligated” refer to these
subobligations. Nonetheless, consistent with 31 U.S.C. § 1501 defining when an agency can record
an obligation, USAID generally treats as an obligation the bilateral agreements it makes with other
countries to deliver assistance.
b
Amounts of funding for the shelter, energy, and ports and transportation sectors include all fiscal
year 2010 supplemental funding for those sectors. Amounts of funding for the New Settlements
Program, the CIP power plant, and a new port, which we discuss later in this report, are subsets of
the funding amounts in each of these sectors.
c
Operating and other expenses apply to all sectors; they are not a specific sector of USAID activity.
d
Amounts of sector activities do not add to the total amounts allocated, obligated, and disbursed due
to rounding.
In its periodic reports to Congress, State reported on the general amounts
of supplemental funding obligated and disbursed, as required in the Act.
State also included some anecdotal information on program outputs and
outcomes, which the Act also required. For example, the report submitted
by State in January 2013 noted that work had begun to rehabilitate
damaged irrigation systems and that reconstruction of earthquake-
damaged health infrastructure was underway. However, State’s reports
did not include, among other things, (1) a detailed program-by-program
description of USAID’s activities; (2) a description, by goal and objective,
and an assessment of the progress of U.S. programs; and (3) amounts of
funding obligated and disbursed on the programs during the preceding 6
months, as directed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations in its
State’s Reports Generally
Met the Requirements of
the Act but Did Not
Include Detailed
Information as Directed by
the Senate Committee on
Appropriations

report accompanying the Act.9
For example, none of State’s reports
included a program-by-program description of USAID’s sector activities,
such as shelter and energy, or an assessment of sector progress. In
particular, State’s final report, submitted to Congress in January 2013, did
not mention that USAID had substantially reduced the number of
permanent shelters it had planned to construct. Further, State’s January
2013 report did not mention that USAID had not generated any outputs or
outcomes for the port construction project, even though the report did
mention that USAID had experienced significant delays in planning the
project, including a feasibility study that was initially scheduled to be
completed 7 months earlier in May 2012. Finally, while State’s reports
included overall cumulative amounts of funding obligated and disbursed,
they did not provide such information for specific programs during the
preceding 6 months. State’s inclusion of such information, as well as
sector-specific funding information directed by the Senate committee,
could have been useful in informing Congress of USAID’s progress.
State submitted four of the five required reports to Congress on the status
of U.S. efforts in Haiti, but none of the submitted reports was delivered in
a timely manner. The Act required State to submit the five periodic reports
beginning in October 2010 and approximately every 6 months thereafter
until September 2012. State did not submit the first report, required in
October 2010, because, according to State officials, the supplemental
funds had just been received, there was little to no activity to report, and
the Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy had not yet been approved.10
State submitted its initial report in July 2011—more than 2 months after
its April 29, 2011, due date for the second required report—included
funding and activities through March 31, 2011. The three subsequent
reports were submitted in January 2012, June 2012, and January 2013.
The submission dates for all four reports ranged from more than 1 month
to nearly 4 months late. In addition to the late submission of the reports,
the “as of” date of funding data presented in the reports was not timely.
For example, the report submitted in January 2013 included funding data
as of September 30, 2012—nearly 4 months earlier than the date the
9
S. Rep. 111-188, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Making Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs for the Fiscal Year
ending September 30, 2010, and for Other Purposes, May 14, 2010.
10
The strategy was approved on January 3, 2011.
State Prepared Four of
Five Required Reports to
Congress but Did Not
Submit Them in a Timely
Manner

report was submitted. All reporting requirements under the Act have
ended.
We discussed the reports with State officials, who noted that State and
USAID routinely provide funding and progress information to Congress
through other reporting mechanisms. For example, State and USAID
arrange oral briefings and periodic conference calls with congressional
staff about every 2 months, and other meetings as requested by
members of Congress. State officials emphasized that they considered
the reports to Congress to be only one tool in its range of reporting
mechanisms.
USAID has committed $170.3 million to construct a power plant and port
to support the newly developed CIP, with mixed results to date. In June
2012, the USAID mission completed the first phase of the CIP power
plant for $17.0 million, 11 percent less than the $19.1 million allocated,
and in time to supply the first CIP tenant with power. Planning for the port
is behind schedule and will result in port construction beginning at least 2
years later than initially planned. The mission has had a vacant port
engineer position for more than 2 years, having made one unsuccessful
attempt to fill this position prior to May 2013 when it issued a second
solicitation to fill the position. As of June 2013, this position remains
unfilled. The lack of port expertise at the mission has contributed to (1)
unrealistic initial time frames, (2) delays in awarding the contract for a
feasibility study, and (3) incomplete information in the feasibility study.
According to initial estimates of port construction costs, USAID funding
will be insufficient to cover approximately $117 million to $189 million of
projected costs, and it is unclear whether the Haitian government will be
able to find a private sector company willing to finance the remainder of
the project. Sustainability of the port and power plant depend on the
viability of the industrial park, which will generate a substantial portion of
the revenue for both facilities, as well as other factors such as the
government of Haiti’s capacity to manage or oversee these investments.
USAID Completed the
Power Plant for Less
Than Allocated but
the Port Was Delayed;
Their Sustainability
Depends on the CIP’s
Success

The U.S. government supports a public-private partnership to develop the
CIP in northern Haiti with $170.3 million in funding allocations to projects
related to a nearby power plant ($97.9 million) and port ($72.4 million).11
According to State officials, the U.S. government’s decision to provide
funding for the power plant and port was bolstered by review of an
economic impact study of the CIP commissioned by the IDB and State’s
own calculations.12
State officials acknowledge that the limited availability
of credible data for Haiti can introduce significant margins of error into
assessments of the CIP’s impact on the region’s net employment or
income. Therefore, such estimates are subject to considerable
uncertainty. The findings from the IDB study and State’s calculations
included the following:
• The IDB-commissioned study estimated that the CIP would increase
total employment by about 75,000 jobs, including 37,000 permanent
jobs at the CIP, and generate $360 million in annual income, including
approximately $150 million to CIP employees, most of whom are
projected to receive the minimum wage.13
• State officials calculated that the CIP will create up to 65,000 jobs on
site by using an estimate of the average number of square meters per
factory worker observed in light manufacturing facilities worldwide.14
This simple calculation assumes that all available factory space in the
CIP would be filled and that the tenants would be from those same
types of industries.
11
Public-private partnerships are contractual arrangements between public entities from
any level of government with private companies. Establishing public-private partnerships
is one of the goals of USAID Forward, USAID’s current reform agenda. USAID uses these
partnerships to leverage the resources and expertise of the private sector.
12
The IDB commissioned additional economic impact, environmental, and social
assessments of the CIP after signing the framework agreement, including both before and
after construction of the CIP began. According to State officials, it was more cost effective
for the IDB to commission intensive studies of the CIP after due diligence was performed
on the anchor tenant and an agreement was signed, to avoid the possibility of investing
larger amounts of funding in a project that would not move forward without private sector
interest.
13
See KOIOS Associates, Development of the Industrial Park Model to Improve Trade
Opportunities for Haiti (Acton, MA: Sep. 20, 2010).
14
State used this calculation to develop its projection that the CIP would create “up to
65,000 direct jobs,” which it has used in its public announcements about the U.S.
government’s support of the CIP. State officials have noted that they also expect
additional jobs to be created in the area surrounding the CIP that are not included in this
projection, such as jobs selling food and wares to CIP employees.
U.S. Government Supports
Power Plant and Port on
the Basis of Some Analysis
of CIP’s Impact

However, these estimates may overstate the impact on total employment
and income in Haiti because they do not account for the possibility that
people employed in CIP-related jobs might otherwise be employed in the
formal or informal sector in absence of the CIP.15
The IDB’s progress in building the CIP and filling it with tenants is still
ongoing (see fig. 2). Sae-A moved in to the first CIP building in March
2012. By December 2012, it had shipped its first container of clothes to
the United States and, by January 2013, was employing approximately
1,300 Haitian employees from the surrounding communities. Two other
companies, a paint manufacturer and a textile manufacturer, have also
moved into the CIP. According to the State Senior Advisor for the CIP,
these three tenants project they will together create approximately 21,000
jobs in the CIP by 2016. As of May 2013, according to State officials, the
government of Haiti was progressing in talks with four other potential
tenants.
15
According to the International Labour Organization, the informal sector comprises small-
scale, self-employment activities by households for which no complete sets of accounts
(including balance sheets of assets and liabilities) are available, making it difficult for
statisticians and policymakers to track jobs in this sector.

Figure 2: Caracol Industrial Park under Construction, Haiti, January 2013
Note: The CIP land area is 252 hectares; one million square meters of factory space are planned to
be built in this area.
The USAID mission completed the first phase of the CIP power plant, with
a designed capacity of 10 megawatts,16
for $17.0 million, 11 percent less
than the $19.1 million allocated (see table 3). The power plant project
benefited from the mission having a Senior Energy Advisor on staff from
April 2011 through February 2013 who used his background in electrical
engineering to oversee and manage the project.17
16
Although the power plant has a designed capacity of 10 megawatts, it currently
produces 1.7 megawatts based on the current needs of CIP tenants. Megawatt is the
standard term of measurement for bulk electricity that is generally used to describe the
output of power plants. One megawatt is equal to 1 million watts, enough for 16,666 60-
watt light bulbs.
17
In addition, according to USAID mission officials, USAID was able to achieve these
lower costs through its competitive bidding process. The winning contractor for
construction of the plant was able to supply key equipment at a reduced price.
USAID Mission Completed
the First Phase of the
Power Plant for Less Than
Allocated, with
Environmental Studies
Completed and Plans for
Expansion

Table 3: Total USAID Funding Allocated, Obligated, and Disbursed for Components of the CIP Power Plant, as of March 31,
2013
Dollars in millions
CIP power plant components Allocated
Total
obligations
a
Percentage
Percentage
disbursed
Completion of a 10-megawatt power plant
(Phase I)
c
$19.1 $18.6 97 $17.0 89
Installation of electrical power distribution
systems to residential customers 10.9 2.4 22 1.1 10
Operations and maintenance of the power
plant for 3 years —-
b
0.0 0 0.0 0
Design and construction of at least 13
megawatts of additional power generation
(Phase II) —- 0.0 0 0.0 0
Design and construction of a 2- megawatt solar
energy farm at CIP —- 0.0 0 0.0 0
Other CIP power plant-related projects
d
1.7 0.0 0 0.0 0
Total for CIP power plant $97.9 $21.0 21 $18.1 18
e
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Notes: The funding allocations to the CIP power plant are from fiscal year 2010 supplemental funding,
as well as funding from the fiscal year 2010, 2011, and 2012 appropriations for the Economic Support
Fund. The funding allocations from the 2010 supplemental funding to the CIP power plant are a
subset of all funding allocations to the energy sector shown in table 2.
a
USAID labels these actions “subobligations.” In State’s reports to Congress on Haiti funding, for
b
For the three activities to which no funds have been obligated, individual amounts allocated are
procurement-sensitive and therefore not shown in the allocations column. However, USAID
documents indicate that together these three activities are allocated $66.2 million, which is included in
the total.
c
Funding for Phase 1 of the power plant went to two contracts for (1) design and supervision of
construction and (2) construction and short-term management.
d
The funding allocation to “other CIP power plant-related projects” is reserved for any unspecified
need during the CIP power plant’s development. For example, it could be used if a negotiated
contract were to be priced higher than the contract’s budgeted amount.
e
Total disbursements for all components of the CIP power plant are 18 percent of the amount
allocated because Phase I of the power plant was completed for less than expected and most other
activities have not begun, in accordance with USAID’s phased approach to building the plant.

The power plant was commissioned in June 2012, 5 months later than
initially planned, but in time to provide power to the CIP as needed (see
fig. 3).18
Figure 3: USAID-Funded Power Plant at the Caracol Industrial Park, Haiti, December
2012
A contractor completed a required environmental assessment of the
power plant project in June 2011, prior to the award of the construction
18
In April 2011, USAID projected that construction of Phase I of the power plant would be
completed by January 2012. However, the procurement period for the construction
contract took longer than expected in part due to questions from prospective offerors that
led to multiple amendments to the solicitation. In addition, construction of the CIP was a
few months behind schedule, so the first CIP tenant did not need power from the plant
until after June 2012.

contract for Phase I.19
The assessment produced more than 200
suggested mitigation measures to reduce the plant’s potential
socioeconomic and environmental impacts, all of which USAID has or
plans to have implemented.20
The contractor that performed the design
and oversight of construction for Phase I oversaw the implementation of
mitigation measures relevant to the construction phase. According to
USAID officials, relevant mitigation measures are also incorporated into
the operations and maintenance contract for the first 3 years of the plant’s
operations, making this contractor responsible for any measures needed
to mitigate the impact of the plant on the surrounding environment during
that time.
Future plans for the plant include:
• Distribution of electricity outside the CIP: USAID plans to distribute
electricity to as many households, local businesses, and public
buildings in local communities as feasible over the next 2 years, with
an interim goal of connecting 1,800 residences by May 2013. The first
several residences were connected in October 2012, and 243
residences and businesses were connected by February 2013.
• Plan for future expansion: To accommodate the CIP’s future energy
needs once it has expanded and the needs of local communities once
more of them are connected, USAID has plans (1) to build an
adjacent solar energy farm with 2-megawatts capacity and (2) to
expand the power plant to at least 25-megawatts capacity, including
power from any renewable sources. The time frame for these
expansions is dependent on the pace of development of the CIP and
its energy needs.
• Transfer of operations to Haitian government: After the first 3 years,
the Haitian government will take over plant operations and therefore
19
Federal regulations require that USAID ensure that environmental and socioeconomic
factors and values are integrated into decision making for new development projects. (22
C.F.R § 216.1). This environmental assessment of the CIP power plant was prepared in
accordance with required regulatory procedures, and also to comply with the
environmental requirements set forth by the Haitian government and the USAID Bureau
for Latin America and the Caribbean Region 22 C.F.R. § 216.6).
20
For example, for water quality, proposed measures included installing drip pans to
prevent oil leakage and storing potential pollutants on sealed surfaces to prevent soil
contamination. For air quality, proposed measures included designing generators and
smokestacks with available emissions control devices and controlling dust during the
construction phase. For the health and safety of workers at the plant, proposed measures
included installing a fire detection system and providing adequate ventilation.

will be responsible for implementing any mitigation measures,
including those needed to mitigate additional emissions from the
plant’s future expansion.
USAID has allocated $72.4 million to plan and contribute toward building
a new port in northern Haiti; however, only $4.3 million (6 percent) was
obligated as of March 2013 due to planning delays (see table 4). In an
August 2011 draft Activity Approval Document (AAD) for the port sector,21
USAID planned for a feasibility study to be completed by the second
quarter of fiscal year 2012, with construction to begin in spring 2013 by a
private company that would supplement USAID’s funding contribution for
construction and then operate the port once it is completed in fall 2015.22
However, the feasibility study was not completed until February 2013, and
the mission has no current projection for when construction of the port
may begin or how long it will take because more studies are needed
before the port site can be selected and the port designed. Nevertheless,
as a result of these planning delays, port construction will not begin until
at least two years after initially planned. In addition, USAID officials had
initially estimated that port construction would take 2.5 years; however,
USAID officials have since learned that port construction may take up to
10 years, depending on the complexity of the port designed.
21
According to USAID policy, AADs are detailed planning documents that include, at a
minimum, a description of the project or activity, including its intended results,
implementation methods, and financing plans. The AAD also demonstrates that all pre-
obligation requirements have been met; clarifies management responsibilities; and
summarizes environmental review requirements and gender issues. The AAD for the port
sector was first drafted in August 2011 and has not yet been approved.
22
This plan will allow USAID to leverage funds and expertise from the private sector
through a public-private partnership in the form of a build-operate-transfer concession.
Under this type of concession, a private company would contribute to the construction of
the port and then operate and retain revenues from the port for the term of the concession
contract. During operations, Haitian operators and officials would be trained by the private
operators so that the Haitian government would be able to manage the port at the end of
the concession contract.
Lack of USAID Mission
Technical Expertise
Contributed to Port
Planning Delays

Table 4: Total USAID Funding Allocated, Obligated, and Disbursed for Components of a New Northern Port in Haiti, as of
March 31, 2013
Dollars in millions
Port components Allocated
Total
obligations
a
Percentage
Percentage
disbursed
Feasibility study $4.3 $4.3 100 $3.9 91
Any further studies, design, and U.S.
contribution to construction of port 68.1 0.0 0 0.0 0
Total for a new northern port $72.4 $4.3 6 $3.9 5
Notes: The funding allocations to a new northern port shown here are a subset of all 2010
supplemental funding allocations to the port sector shown in table 2.
a
The USAID mission in Haiti lacks staff with technical expertise in
planning, construction, and oversight of a port, as there is a vacant
position for a port engineer on staff. According to USAID officials, USAID
has not constructed a port anywhere in the world since the 1970s, and
USAID does not have a port engineer or port project manager among its
direct-hire staff. In January 2011, the mission in Haiti put out a solicitation
to fill the vacant port engineer position. This solicitation produced two
applicants, one of which was offered the position but declined it in May
2011. Since then, no attempts were made to fill the position until another
solicitation was sent out in May 2013 to which interested parties were to
respond by June 7, 2013. As a result, as of June 18, 2013, the position
remains unfilled. According to mission officials, it is difficult to find
someone with the right skill set who is willing to work in Haiti, although
USAID officials have also commented that, in hindsight, more effort
should have been put into ensuring that the mission had port expertise
earlier in the port planning process.
This lack of a USAID mission staff person with port expertise has
contributed to the port project being behind schedule. Delays in the port
feasibility study were caused by:

• Unrealistic initial time frames: Without port expertise, USAID
initially estimated that the planning and design process for the port,
including the port feasibility study, would take a little over 1 year to
complete. Since then, USAID officials have learned from the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), which has extensive port
expertise, that they expect the port planning and design process to
take 2.5 to 5 years. According to USAID officials, this estimate is
consistent with the time frames used by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, which has rehabilitated ports in developing countries.
• Delays in awarding the feasibility study: The contract for the
feasibility study was awarded 3 months later than initially planned
because at the time, according to USAID officials, mission staff were
focused on the CIP power plant. None of these staff had primary
responsibility for the port, so the port project did not move forward
simultaneously. In addition, USAID needed to clarify the technical
requirements and revise the statement of work for the port feasibility
study four times, thereby lengthening the time before companies
could submit proposals.
• Incomplete information in the feasibility study: Without a port
engineer or project manager to contribute to the statement of work for
the feasibility study, USAID did not require the contractor to obtain all
the information necessary to help select a port site.23
According to
USAID officials, when the study was completed as planned in May
2012, the contractor had met the requirements in its statement of
work. However, the Mission Environmental Officer determined that
multiple environmental issues not adequately addressed in the initial
study needed additional examination. Subsequently, the contract for
the feasibility study was amended six times and extended by 9
months to obtain more information. USAID officials stated that, in
retrospect, they realized it would have been helpful to involve other
U.S. agencies with port expertise when writing the original statement
of work to have avoided the need for so many revisions. In November
2012, the contractor submitted another draft of the study that USAID
23
The statement of work was initially focused on evaluating construction of a new port in
Fort-Liberté Bay in addition to the option of expanding the existing Cap-Haïtien port. Fort-
Liberté Bay had been chosen as a preferred location along the northern coast for a port by
two 2011 studies of the Haitian port sector conducted by the International Finance
Corporation and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency. For the purpose of the
preliminary environmental assessment in USAID’s port feasibility study, a baseline of a
“no action” alternative was also assessed in which the proposed port expansion
improvements in northern Haiti would not occur. In September 2012, the statement of
work was amended so that the contractor would also assess four alternative sites.

environmental staff determined to have some gaps. USAID then met
with officials from USACE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) in December 2012 to identify the additional economic,
environmental, technical, and other information needed to select a
site. Further information was added to the study before it was finalized
in February 2013. However, other studies strongly recommended by
USACE, EPA, and NOAA, such as building oceanographic navigation
models and completing marine mitigation work to protect endangered
species in the area, still need to be performed.24
Port construction costs remain uncertain because the port site, design,
and needed mitigation measures have not been determined. However,
rough estimates in the February 2013 feasibility study project that the cost
of port construction at the two locations still under consideration ranges
from $185 million to $257 million. In addition to funding for the port
feasibility study, USAID has $68.1 million allocated toward port planning
and construction. USAID does not know what portion of this funding is
needed for the additional studies and design; however, it is clear that the
amount remaining for construction will be a significantly smaller portion
than USAID had initially planned to contribute to the project’s total
construction cost.25
As a result, USAID officials recognize that there is a
risk that no private company interested in operating the port would be
willing to cover the entire remaining costs of construction, particularly
given the political risks of operating in Haiti. Therefore, the Haitian
government may need to secure additional donor funding to increase the
public sector contribution to building the port.
24
USAID is currently designing the scope of work for a site-specific environmental
assessment that will look in more depth at a site in Fort-Liberté Bay, as well as another
site from the feasibility study to be studied as an alternative. USAID also plans to have
officials from other agencies or contractors perform the additional studies needed.
According to USAID officials, in the absence of port expertise within the mission, they are
uncertain how long each assessment will take without consulting further with other
agencies. However, consultations with USACE indicate that the studies will take at a
minimum 1 year to complete.
25
In the draft AAD, USAID initially estimated that construction would cost $103 million,
approximately $40 million of which would be paid for by a private sector partner.

Sustainability of the CIP, port, and power plant are interdependent. We
identified a number of key issues to the sustainability of each of these
projects.
• The CIP depends on a functioning power plant and port access:
Before USAID began its CIP-related investments, northern Haiti did
not have reliable energy infrastructure or sufficient port capacity to
support a completed industrial park. Other power plants in the region
produce intermittent power.26
The existing ports in Haiti have high port
costs and those in the Dominican Republic that currently
accommodate cargo traffic are distant from the CIP, raising the cost of
doing business at the CIP (see fig. 4). In addition, according to the
port feasibility study, the Cap-Haïtien port, the closest current port to
the CIP, has limited capacity. The study concluded that the CIP will
only succeed if expanded, efficient port facilities are developed
nearby.27
26
According to a March 2012 study of Haiti’s energy sector, only about 15 percent of
businesses have access to electrical service. The study noted that many businesses
prefer to generate their own power to ensure its reliability.
27
Further, the State Senior Advisor for the CIP stated that additional port capacity would
be needed by 2015 to accommodate projected freight traffic to and from the CIP and the
increasing demand for oil to operate the power plant.
Sustainability of the CIP,
Power Plant, and Port Are
Interdependent and
Depend on Haitian
Government Capacity

Figure 4: Map of Ports in Haiti and Dominican Republic for Potential Use by CIP Tenants
a
The Manzanillo port is currently only used by two banana exporters, but plans are under way for its
expansion to accommodate greater cargo traffic. Current projections indicate fees at this port, once
developed, will be approximately $150 per container.
b
Estimated truck costs to the CIP demonstrate a combination of the distance to the CIP and the
condition of connecting roads, as truck costs are higher on roads that are more difficult to travel.
• The port and power plant depend on revenues from the CIP: CIP
tenants will generate a substantial portion of the revenue for the
power plant and port, so the sustainability of these projects will
depend on the Haitian government finding additional tenants and

maintaining the park. Potential tenants may be wary of moving to the
CIP because of Haiti’s history of instability and corruption or the lack
of Haitian government capacity, although as noted earlier, according
to State officials, there were four additional potential tenants for the
CIP as of May 2013.
• All three projects depend on Haitian government capacity: The
Haitian government will be responsible for maintaining and managing
the CIP and power plant and for overseeing the private company that
will operate the new port. Studies of the CIP have cited concerns
about the relevant Haitian government ministry’s ability to manage
and maintain the infrastructure in and around the CIP given their
limited staff and technical resources. Aware of such concerns, the CIP
has contracted a professional industrial facility management firm to
operate and maintain the park. According to the September 2011 AAD
for the energy sector, the sustainability of investments in the Haitian
energy sector depends on legal, regulatory, and management reforms
to improve the commercial viability of Haiti’s electrical system and
provide resources for its maintenance and operations. To address this
for its first 3 years, USAID will pay for a contractor to operate and
maintain the power plant, and to prepare the Haitian electricity
department to take over these functions after the 3 years. According
to USAID documents, Haiti will need institutional and regulatory
reforms to ensure efficient customs operations and competitive port
charges, to curtail monopolistic practices, and to facilitate private
investment in the port sector.
• Obtaining revenue for the power plant from electricity
distribution outside the CIP: As of February 2013, the few
customers connected to the power plant outside the CIP had largely
paid their initial bills on time.28
However, according to a 2010 report on
the Haitian energy sector, 64 percent of Haitians do not pay their
electricity bills in a timely manner and 33 percent do not pay at all. In
addition, USAID officials have recognized that it is common
throughout Haiti to tap into lines without paying, and this practice is
unlikely to have repercussions. As a result, the USAID operations and
maintenance contractor plans to provide training to local communities
on the use and value of electricity.
• Attracting a private company to construct and operate the port:
The government of Haiti has considered charging $260 for each
28
As of February 2013, 98 percent of the 243 residences and businesses then connected
to the CIP power plant had paid their initial bills on time, according to USAID officials.

container coming into the northern port to use the revenues generated
for social programs. However, the port feasibility study concluded that
such a government surcharge would make the project financially
infeasible. State officials have communicated this information to the
Haitian government to encourage them to lower the surcharge to
allow the port to be successful. Given this and other risks associated
with the port listed above, it is unclear whether the Haitian
government will be able to find a private company interested in
investing in port construction and operations. This uncertainty will
remain until USAID and the Haitian government begin work on the
solicitation for a private company after all port studies are completed,
the site is selected, and the port design is completed.
Since its initial planning and cost estimating began in 2010, USAID’s
funding for the New Settlements program has significantly increased,
while the number of permanent houses USAID projects will be completed
has been reduced by over 80 percent. USAID underestimated
construction costs at the time the New Settlements program was
developed, and construction costs further increased after the Haitian
government requested design changes that included larger houses with
features such as flush toilets. USAID experienced problems securing
clear land title for the new housing sites and in coordinating with NGOs
and other partner donors. These issues have resulted in delays, with the
program currently expected to be completed nearly 2 years later than
initially scheduled. Moreover, the sustainability of these new settlements
will depend heavily on the capacity of the Haitian government to provide
key services and the ability of residents to maintain their homes. In
addition, there is a potential gap in service to support the community
management mechanisms that USAID officials consider crucial to the
sustainability of each new settlement. If such support is reduced or
delayed for some settlements, sustainability risks may increase.
USAID underestimated the construction cost of its New Settlements
program. These costs are comprised of two main categories: (1) cost of
site preparation per plot and (2) cost of construction per house. In its
planning documents, USAID originally estimated costs at $1,800 per plot
and $8,000 per house. As of April 2013, average costs based on awarded
contracts have increased to $9,598 per plot and $23,409 per house.
Overall, the cost for USAID to prepare a plot and build a house increased
from original estimates of $9,800 to average costs of $33,007. These cost
differences stem primarily from the inaccuracy of USAID’s original
USAID’s Development
of New Housing
Settlements in Haiti
Has Been More Costly
and Slower Than
Expected;
Sustainability
Challenges Remain
USAID’s Cost Estimates
Increased Sharply

estimates, and secondarily from Haitian government requests for design
changes. Figure 5 compares the original estimates, initial contract costs,
and revised contract costs.
Figure 5: USAID Cost Estimates for Preparation of One Plot and Construction of
One House in Haiti
Note: Cost estimates are the weighted average costs of site preparation and house construction for
two active settlement sites designated by USAID as Caracol-EKAM and Government of Haiti Decreed
Land Area (DLA) 1.5. The costs are different at the two sites and may vary at future sites.
More details on the reasons for cost differences in this program are
outlined below.

• Original estimates: By November 2010, USAID had developed its
original cost estimates for the New Settlements program.29
Prior to the
earthquake, the mission had no housing programs in Haiti, and as a
result did not have its own historical data on construction costs and
few existing relationships with potential shelter sector partners. The
mission hired a Senior Shelter Advisor and staffed a shelter team to
develop the original cost estimates, layouts, and design concepts for
what would become the New Settlements program. According to
USAID officials, these estimates were not adequately supported; they
did not document the sources of data or the methodologies used to
derive these estimates. Rather, the original estimates were based in
part on the USAID shelter team’s calculations and costs reported by
the World Bank and an NGO that was building houses in northern
Haiti. USAID mission officials noted that these original cost estimates
were used to develop the budget and projected goals of the New
Settlements program. However, to meet certain technical and financial
planning requirements,30
the shelter team prepared independent
government cost estimates prior to issuing solicitations for bids for
each site preparation and each housing construction project. The first
independent government cost estimates for site preparation and
housing construction were conducted in September and November
2011, respectively. Those efforts provided the shelter team with more
detailed and accurate information to guide them through the
procurement process.31
• Initial contract costs: By April 2012, USAID awarded multiple
contracts for construction projects at two settlement sites, where costs
exceeded the original estimates. In particular, site preparation per plot
increased from $1,800 to $6,165, a 242-percent increase. The
inaccuracy of the site preparation estimates had a more substantial
impact on USAID’s program budget and goals than the inaccurate
estimates of housing construction costs because USAID planned to
29
Original cost estimates were included in draft versions of the Shelter AAD as early as
November 2010 and were finalized in August 2011. According to USAID officials, AADs
for all sectors of Haiti’s Relief and Reconstruction efforts went through a more extensive
and rigorous review process than usual.
30
See 22 U.S.C. § 2361(a) for grants requiring technical or financial planning.
31
An independent government cost estimate is conducted to check the reasonableness of
a contractor’s cost proposal and to make sure that the offered prices are within the budget
range for a particular program. In these two instances, USAID developed independent
government cost estimates of $4,929 per plot and $14,931 per house.

finance all site preparation costs, while NGOs and other partner
donors would finance and build the majority of houses. According to
USAID officials, original estimates did not adequately consider the
stringent international building codes and disaster resistance
standards planned for New Settlement houses and did not take into
account the extent or complexity of service infrastructure USAID
intended to provide. Furthermore, USAID officials noted that, as
multiple reconstruction efforts have progressed, the demand and cost
for construction materials has increased.
• Revised contract costs: By July 2012, USAID signed a revised
contract to accommodate design changes requested by the Haitian
government, which also increased costs. Specifically, the design
changes called for an increase in the size of housing units, from about
275 square feet to about 450 square feet, and the inclusion of flush
toilets, rather than a more traditional dry toilet system. USAID agreed
to these changes and revised the initial contracts to include these
modifications and allow for the increased costs. The Haitian
government’s design changes drove total cost increases up from the
initial contract costs by 34 percent, from $24,625 to $33,007. Officials
noted that providing housing with higher earthquake and hurricane
resistance standards and with electricity, plumbing, and flush toilets,
takes longer to construct and costs more than options provided by
other donors.
Based on original estimates, the New Settlements program was allocated
approximately $59 million under USAID’s Shelter AAD32
. However,
USAID increased the program budget after receiving multiple bids from
private sector contractors for both site preparation and housing
construction. USAID also dedicated additional funds to institutional
strengthening to support local organizations’ beneficiary selection, and
added a community development component. All together USAID
increased program funding to approximately $97 million, about a 65-
percent increase. As of March 31, 2013, USAID had obligated about $48
million and had disbursed about $32 million for New Settlements
permanent housing activities (see table 5).
32
This amount includes $3.5 million to fund technical assistance to strengthen the capacity
of national, local, and community institutions to improve urban management.
Program Funding Has
Significantly Increased

Table 5: Total USAID Funding Allocated, Obligated, and Disbursed for Permanent Housing Activities, as of March 31, 2013
Dollars in millions
New Settlements program components Allocated Total obligated
a
Percentage
Percentage
disbursed
Construction-related activities $79.4 $36.8 46 $21.8 27
Project management-related activities 8.0 6.5 81 4.9 61
Institutional strengthening (including
beneficiary selection and community outreach
activities)
b
4.8 4.8 100 4.8 100
Community development 5.0 0.0 0 0.0 0
Total for New Settlements program $97.2 $48.1 49 $31.5 32
Notes: The total funding allocations for the New Settlements Program include $83.1 million from fiscal
year 2010 supplemental funding (as shown in table 2 above) and about $14 million in annual
allocations from annual allocationsl from fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2012.
a
b
These funds went to support USAID’s Emergency Capacity Assistance Program which, in addition to
other responsibilities, was directed to support the development of the beneficiary selection process
and community management committees.
USAID has reduced its program targetss a number of times. As of April
2013, it had reduced the number of houses it expects USAID and its
partners to complete, and therefore the number of beneficiaries, by over
80 percent. Of the 15,000 houses originally planned,33
only 2,649 are
expected to be completed, with USAID building 906 houses and NGOs
and other partner donors estimated to build 1,743 (see fig. 6). USAID
officials noted that USAID would commit no further funds to housing
construction and will only commit funds for site preparation if USAID has
written agreements with partner donors. Therefore, the estimated number
of houses and completion dates may vary from current projections.
33
USAID planned to develop 15,000 plots, on which USAID planned to build up to 4,000
houses, while NGOs and other donor partners would build 11,000 houses.
USAID Reduced Projected
Numbers of Houses and
Beneficiaries and Shifted
Their Distribution

Figure 6: Permanent Houses to Be Constructed on USAID Plots in Haiti, 2011 and
2013 Projections, as of April 2013
USAID also reduced the total number of projected beneficiaries from an
original estimate of 75,000 to 90,000 to its current estimate of
approximately 13,200 to 15,900. USAID originally planned for new
settlements to be distributed geographically with 5,000 houses to be built
in the northern Cap-Haïtien corridor and 10,000 houses to be built in the
Port-au-Prince and St-Marc corridors, closer to where the earthquake’s
epicenter occurred. In addition to the overall decline in housing numbers,
the distribution of these houses between the north and south also shifted.
Current projections are for the Cap-Haïtien corridor to have 1,967 houses,
or 74 percent of the total. A combined 682 or 26 percent of the total are to
be built in the Port-au-Prince and St-Marc corridors. Of those houses in
the Cap-Haïtien corridor, over 90-percent are planned to be within a 13-
mile radius of the CIP (see fig. 7).

Figure 7: Number of Houses and New Settlement Locations Planned in Haiti, as of April 2013
Note: At least one additional site is planned in the Cap-Haïtien corridor, but its precise location has
not yet been finalized.

USAID is nearing completion of two settlement sites, Caracol-EKAM in
the Cap-Haïtien corridor and DLA 1.5 in the St-Marc corridor. The
Caracol-EKAM settlement is projected to provide permanent houses to
approximately 3,750 to 4,500 residents,34
and the DLA 1.5 settlement is
projected to provide permanent houses to approximately 780 to 936
residents. Beneficiaries will begin to occupy houses once all construction
is complete. The planned move-in date for beneficiaries at both
settlements is July 2013 (see fig. 8).
Figure 8: Unoccupied Permanent Houses, Water Distribution Towers, and Sewage
System Trenches in Caracol-EKAM, Haiti, December 2012
The U.S. government’s January 2011 strategy projected that all USAID
permanent housing construction and site preparation under the New
Settlements program would be completed by July 2012, but the current
estimated completion date for planned sites is March 2014, nearly 2 years
later. Housing construction began at Caracol-EKAM and at DLA 1.5 in
April 2012. NGO and other partner donor financed housing construction
on USAID prepared sites is planned but has not yet begun.
34
At Caracol-EKAM, USAID is trying to develop public-private partnerships to facilitate
construction of additional houses, according to USAID officials. However, as of April 2013,
there were no formal commitments.
USAID’s Program Plans
Have Been Delayed by
Land Title Issues and
Reduced Partner Donor
Participation

According to State and USAID officials, USAID faced difficulties trying to
secure proper land title for permanent housing, which resulted in delays.
These delays affected the implementation of the program and availability
of NGO and other partner donor financing. For example, according to
USAID officials, USAID spent a substantial amount of time trying to
secure clear title to private and government-owned land but was able to
acquire only one site through private owners because of difficulties in
confirming legitimate ownership. USAID discontinued attempts to partner
with private owners in August 2011. Additionally, land titling issues arose
with government-owned land. For example, although USAID officials
reported that the agency had conducted due diligence and approved 15
potential housing sites in November 2010, USAID later found that the
secure land titles for some of these sites could not be confirmed due to
unclear or disputed ownership, and thus reduced the number of site
options and further delayed site selection.
Partnering with NGOs and other donors on the planning and construction
of permanent houses was more complicated and time consuming than
USAID originally expected.35
According to USAID officials, NGOs and
other partner donors have their own processes, procedures, and goals
that often differ from those of USAID. According to USAID officials, the
mission shelter team was involved in negotiations with several key donor
partners as early as November 2010. In January 2011, the President of
the American Red Cross (Red Cross) announced its intention to partner
with USAID and provide $30 million to build homes on at least two sites.
Later, in June 2011, USAID signed a memorandum of understanding with
the Red Cross to build more than 3,000 houses; however, according to
USAID officials, that partnership did not materialize because of difficulties
and delays in securing land title from privately owned sites near Port-au-
Prince. In addition, according to USAID officials, the partnership was
further delayed because of turnover in various Red Cross leadership
positions, resulting in shifting approaches to the development of housing
settlements.36
According to officials, USAID also had plans to partner with
35
Examples of other donor partners that are not NGOs include the Qatar Haiti Fund, the
Inter-American Development Bank, and the Fund for Economic and Social Assistance, a
Haitian government entity,
36
USAID officials stated that discussions with the Red Cross did not cease after the July
2011 memorandum of understanding failed to progress. In October 2012, USAID and the
Red Cross signed a letter of intent to create a partnership to build houses at a USAID site
and have been in ongoing negotiations to finalize an agreement, although with a much
reduced scope.
Land Titling Issues Created
Delays
NGO and Other Partner Donors
Will Build Fewer Houses Than
USAID Anticipated

Food for the Poor, an NGO with experience building houses in Haiti, to
build 750 of the houses at Caracol-EKAM. However, this discussion
ended in part because that NGO decided it did not want to assist in
building communities that large.37
The success of USAID’s New Settlements program relied heavily on
partner NGOs. The USAID mission was confident that the program would
attract partners because one of the primary challenges NGOs faced in the
first year after the earthquake was finding suitable land with clear title.
According to one of USAID’s implementing partners, NGOs providing
housing assistance hesitate to invest in land for new housing if legal proof
of ownership cannot be secured. By securing land title, the program
would help partners avoid the complex land tenure issues that were
already seriously impeding many of their shelter programs. However,
lengthy delays in resolving land title issues contributed to difficulties in
solidifying partnerships because the delays allowed time for potential
NGO partners to change their shelter strategies or commit their funds to
other reconstruction activities.
According to USAID, the sustainability of the new housing settlements will
depend on broad factors such as the capacity of the Haitian government
and regional economic opportunities. USAID is attempting to ensure the
viability of settlements by locating them in areas with employment,
healthcare, education, and transportation. In the Cap-Haïtien corridor, the
United States and other international donors are making multiple
investments in new infrastructure, such as the CIP and potential port, to
create an economic growth pole in the region. If those efforts do not
successfully provide adequate economic opportunities, beneficiaries may
not be able to afford the fees and services connected with their new
homes, or may have to relocate altogether. USAID is also working with
the Haitian government in areas where capacity issues exist, such as
energy sector management.
In addition, more site-specific factors will affect sustainability. USAID has
made some limited mitigation efforts, but notes that further support for
community development is necessary to maintain the settlements over
37
USAID currently has a memorandum of understanding signed with Food for the Poor
and the Fund for Economic and Social Assistance to build houses at various USAID sites
in the Cap-Haïtien corridor.
New Housing Settlements
Have Numerous
Sustainability Challenges

time. Local governments and community members need to provide
ongoing support, maintenance, and management of the new settlements
to ensure their sustainability. Specifically, beneficiaries will face site-
specific issues related to affordability, community management, and the
possibility of informal expansion or sprawl of shantytowns.
• Affordability: According to USAID officials, the Haitian government
has indicated that beneficiaries must make some number of monthly
payments, in an amount to be determined, before title to the house is
conferred. Beneficiaries will also face charges for utilities and
services, such as electricity and sewage.
• Housing payments: According to USAID officials, although
beneficiaries are scheduled to move into the Caracol-EKAM and
DLA 1.5 settlements as early as July 2013, a beneficiary
agreement has not yet been finalized, and the exact amount and
structure of the monthly payments remain uncertain. USAID
officials have said that a contract, or occupancy agreement, will be
signed before beneficiaries move in. Fees for utilities and services
may or may not be rolled into, collected, and paid through these
monthly housing payments. The monthly housing payment
structure may be flat or tiered, meaning amounts may be set at a
flat rate for every household or may be progressive depending on
income level.
• Electricity: USAID plans to install electricity, with individual meters,
in each new house. USAID officials acknowledged that non-
payment for electricity is a fairly common practice in parts of Haiti
where electrical grids exist. Therefore, it remains to be seen
whether the practice of non-payment may also be a challenge at
the new settlement locations.
• Sewage: Prior to the January 2010 earthquake, there were no
wastewater treatment plants in Haiti. A temporary facility has been
constructed at the CIP and there are plans to build a permanent
facility there as well. In addition, a treatment plant was opened in
May 2012 near the Port-au-Prince metro area. These facilities
may be able to serve some settlements, but it is unclear if they will
be able to serve all of the facilities and at what cost to beneficiary
households. One senior USAID official acknowledged that if septic
tanks are not emptied regularly, there is a potential for a public
health risk.
• Community management: The New Settlements program currently
plans to create eight new “communities,” of between 148 to 1,283
households, each with beneficiaries from various locations in Haiti and
with varied income levels. USAID officials acknowledged concerns

about issues that might arise among the beneficiaries themselves and
between the settlement and surrounding communities.
• Shantytowns: There is a risk that informal dwellings, or shantytowns,
may be built around the new settlements to take advantage of the
economic opportunities or services available near those locations. If
employment opportunities at the CIP draw a large number of people,
the current housing stock may be too low to accommodate them.
To mitigate these types of site-specific sustainability concerns, USAID
obligated $4.8 million for development of the Emergency Capacity
Assistance Program to establish community management committees,
self-governing bodies made up of selected beneficiaries, and to create
other mechanisms intended to support community development. To
address issues related to affordability, USAID, through this assistance
program, worked to ensure that the household income and employment
status were criteria addressed in the beneficiary selection process.38
To
address other issues, USAID planned for the community management
committees to promote social cohesion, to serve as a decision-making
body, and to act as the residents’ representatives with government
counterparts. At the Caracol-EKAM settlement, a provisional community
management committee was formed and will be trained to engage with
local and national authorities to help ensure that community services such
as grounds keeping, infrastructure maintenance, and solid waste
collection are undertaken.39
However, funding for ECAP only allowed for
some of these initial activities to take place at the Caracol-EKAM
settlement, and, according to officials, the program ended in April 2013.
USAID allocated $5 million to support community development efforts at
the new settlements. In April 2013, USAID issued a request for
applications to find an implementing partner for a community
development program for Caracol-EKAM, at an estimated cost of $1.3 to
$1.5 million. This partner would provide support for the phased
occupation and management of the settlement and engage in an array of
38
At Caracol-EKAM, 74 percent of selected beneficiary households have monthly incomes
over 4,000 gourds. The remaining 26 percent with lower monthly incomes are considered
to be economically vulnerable households. Although not finalized, USAID has stated that
monthly housing payments will be designed to be affordable for all households, including
those that are economically vulnerable.
39
This provisional committee was formed from an initial pool of beneficiaries, but a
permanent committee will be formed once all beneficiary households have moved in.

activities designed to help ensure its long‐term sustainability. Although
still in the planning stage, USAID’s current budget indicates over half of
the community development funds will go toward assisting just three
sites, including Caracol-EKAM. The remaining five or more settlement
sites face the possibility of delayed or reduced support. To address that
gap, USAID plans to foster partnerships with other organizations to assist
and contribute to these activities. USAID has entered into such a
partnership with the International Federation of the Red Cross to provide
community development support at DLA 1.5. Additionally, in a
memorandum of understanding between USAID and partner donors, it is
noted that partner donor funds are to be provided for community
development activities at those settlements; however that understanding
does not fully secure such a financial commitment. Similarly, according to
USAID officials, the agreement USAID is attempting to finalize with the
Red Cross will budget for community development activities to be
covered with Red Cross funds. However, there is the possibility that such
partnerships will not be available to support all the settlements. USAID
officials responsible for key parts of the New Settlements program have
stated that it is crucial to have these support mechanisms in place to
ensure a smooth transition when beneficiaries move in, to set the tone for
interaction among beneficiaries moving forward, and to ensure that
community management needs are understood and acted upon.
Furthermore, USAID documents state that it is critical to initiate the
beneficiary organization process as soon as beneficiaries occupy their
homes because it may be difficult to work with beneficiaries before they
arrive. Failure to find an implementing partner to provide and create these
support mechanisms for each settlement may further increase the
sustainability risks inherent in large-scale housing reconstruction projects,
thus endangering the significant investments already committed to these
efforts.
Following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the U.S. government
made a strong commitment to Haiti’s reconstruction and economic
development. As of March 2013, more than 3 years after the earthquake,
USAID had obligated only 45 percent and disbursed only 31 percent of
the $651 million in supplemental funding it was provided. State’s most
recent report to Congress on program funding and progress—its final
mandated report—was submitted in January 2013. However, the majority
of reconstruction funding has not been disbursed, and a substantial
amount of progress on project activities remains to be completed. Without
complete and accurate reporting from State, Congress lacks the critical
Conclusions

information on program funding and progress it needs to fully oversee the
use of the Haiti reconstruction supplemental funding.
USAID’s progress in supporting the CIP-related investments of the power
plant and port have had mixed results. The power plant was completed in
time to provide electricity for the CIP’s first tenant, in part because the
USAID mission in Haiti had on staff a senior energy advisor to help plan
and oversee the project. However, the mission has not filled an equivalent
position to oversee the port project and has experienced delays and
challenges associated with this significant project. The USAID mission
continues to lack technical port expertise to oversee this project to which
more than $72 million in U.S. funding has been allocated, is at least 2
years behind schedule, and has been found to be more complex than
initially envisioned. Further, USAID’s contribution to port construction was
not intended to fund the entire port, and it is unclear whether the Haitian
government will be able to find a private sector company willing to
contribute the large amount of remaining funding through a public-private
partnership. This uncertainty puts at risk USAID’s investments in port
planning and design, as well as the sustainability of the CIP and power
plant due to the three projects’ interdependence.
USAID developed the budget and projected targets of the New
Settlements program using faulty and inaccurate cost estimates, which
has led to a significantly reduced number of USAID-funded houses for the
Haitian people. USAID agreed to the Haitian government’s request to
enlarge and upgrade the houses, further reducing the number of houses it
would build. As a result, USAID currently has plans to provide less than a
quarter of the houses it originally projected it would build, and at a much
greater cost. Difficulties in securing land title and challenges in
establishing partnerships with NGOs also delayed and further reduced
USAID’s targets. Furthermore, the sustainability of USAID’s New
Settlement program is uncertain. The agency has dedicated some
funding to help ensure sustainability through the development of
community support mechanisms; however, it is unclear if funding for
these support mechanisms will be available for each new settlement. In
addition, USAID has taken steps to secure commitments for partner
donor funding to assist in these efforts, but has not yet secured such
commitments for all planned settlements and it is uncertain whether the
partner organizations will be able to fulfill their commitments. These
community support mechanisms are essential to helping ensure that the
settlements become viable, cohesive communities and that beneficiaries
maintain them once they move in. Without this support in place,

sustainability issues may be exacerbated and USAID’s housing efforts
placed at risk of deterioration.
To ensure that Congress has current information on the status of Haiti
earthquake reconstruction activities and is able to provide appropriate
oversight at a time when most funding remains to be disbursed, Congress
should consider requiring State to reinstitute the requirement to provide it
with periodic reports until most of the funds in each sector are disbursed.
In these reports, Congress should consider requiring State to provide
information such as progress in U.S. program sectors; amounts of funding
obligated and disbursed in each specific sector; sector and project cost
increases; changes in project schedules; and existing difficulties and
challenges to successful project completion.
To strengthen USAID’s ability to complete its projects in Haiti and to
maintain their sustainability, we recommend that the USAID Administrator
take the following two actions.
• To ensure proper oversight over the continued planning for and
construction of a new port in northern Haiti and to enable the project
to move forward in a well planned and timely manner, USAID should
fill the vacant port engineer position at its Haiti mission within time
frames that avoid future project delays.
• To promote the sustainability of the New Settlements permanent
housing program, and to protect the significant investments already
made, the USAID Administrator should direct the USAID Haiti mission
to ensure that each new settlement has community support
mechanisms in place prior to beneficiary occupation. As part of that
process, the mission should consider making additional funds
available, as needed, to help ensure this support.
We provided a draft of this report to USAID and State for review and
comment. USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report,
which are reprinted in appendix II. State did not provide written
comments. USAID agreed with both of our recommendations.
USAID agreed with our recommendation that it fill the vacant port
engineer position at the Haiti mission within time frames that avoid future
project delays. In its letter responding to our draft report, USAID noted
that, in May 2013, it issued a solicitation for a ports advisor, recognizing
the need to fill the position to move its program forward. In June 2013,
Matter for
Congressional
Consideration
Recommendations for
Executive Action
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation

USAID noted that it expected to fill the position soon; however, as of June
18, 2013, the position was vacant.
USAID also agreed with our recommendation that each new permanent
housing settlement have community support mechanisms in place before
the beneficiaries occupy the houses. As noted in our report, USAID stated
that $5 million has been set aside to finance community development
activities. In its comments on this report, USAID added that the mission is
prepared to provide additional resources, if required. USAID also
elaborated on the ongoing and planned activities intended to facilitate
community development and sustainability at the first two settlement
sites. We acknowledge USAID’s efforts to provide community
development support at these two sites and support the agency’s
intentions to implement our recommendation at future settlement
locations.
State and USAID both provided technical comments. We incorporated
those comments, along with information contained in USAID’s written
response, into the report where appropriate
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
the report earlier, we are planning no further distribution until 30 days
after the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested
congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and the USAID
Administrator. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or any of your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix III.
David Gootnick
Director, International Affairs and Trade

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Page 41 GAO-13-558 Haiti Reconstruction
We reviewed infrastructure-related post-earthquake reconstruction efforts
in Haiti undertaken by the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID).1
This report addresses (1) USAID’s progress in obligating and
disbursing program allocations and the Department of State’s (State)
periodic reporting to Congress on the status of the U.S. reconstruction
efforts; (2) USAID’s progress in planning and constructing two activities
related to the Caracol Industrial Park (CIP)—a power plant and port; and
(3) USAID’s progress in planning and constructing permanent housing.
In response to a congressional request to examine the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2010 (the Act), we focused our review on three
sectors of USAID reconstruction activities: power plant, port, and
permanent shelter. These three activities comprise about $268 million of
the overall $651 million in supplemental and other funds allocated to
USAID for bilateral reconstruction activities. We also included lesser
amounts of regular fiscal year appropriations allocated to the three
activities within our scope.
To obtain information on the appropriations, allocations, and planned and
ongoing uses of U.S. reconstruction funding for Haiti,2
we reviewed the
Act, enacted by Congress in July 2010; State and USAID FY 2010
Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, issued by State in
September 2010; and the interagency Post-Earthquake USG Haiti
Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity, issued by State in
January 2011. We also reviewed the Action Plan for National Recovery
1
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, 124 Stat. 2302, 2323 (July
29, 2010). The law mandated that funds previously available to GAO pursuant to Title I,
Chapter 4 of Pub. L. No. 106-31 (to monitor provision of assistance to address the effects
of hurricanes in Central America and the Caribbean) also be available to GAO to monitor
post-earthquake expenses related to Haiti, including relief, rehabilitation, and
reconstruction aid. In May 2011, we issued a report that described the planned uses for
U.S. reconstruction assistance, USAID’s internal controls for overseeing U.S.
reconstruction funds, and Interim Haiti Recovery Commission governance and oversight
structures. In November 2011, we issued a report that described planned and ongoing
uses for U.S. reconstruction assistance and identified factors contributing to delays in
USAID infrastructure construction. See GAO, Haiti Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have
Begun, Expanded Oversight Still to Be Implemented, GAO-11-415 (Washington, D.C.:
May 19, 2011); and Haiti Reconstruction: Factors Contributing to Delays in USAID
Infrastructure Construction, GAO-12-68 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2011).
2
USAID and State have changed amounts allocated for infrastructure construction
activities as plans have developed. We are reporting amounts allocated based on the
most current information we received.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

GAO Report Critical of USAID in Haiti

GAO Report Critical of USAID in Haiti

Recommandé

Recommandé

Contenu connexe

Similaire à GAO Report Critical of USAID in Haiti

Similaire à GAO Report Critical of USAID in Haiti (20)

Plus de Stanleylucas

Plus de Stanleylucas (20)

Dernier

Dernier (20)

GAO Report Critical of USAID in Haiti