The document provides background information on the insurgency in Algeria that occurred from the early 1990s through the late 1990s. It describes the key causes of the insurgency, including economic problems, unrest with the ruling government, and the rise of Islamic political groups. When the military canceled democratic elections that an Islamic party was winning, armed Islamic guerrilla groups formed to battle the government. The two main groups were the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), which targeted military and government sites, and the more violent Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which began attacking civilians as well. The GIA carried out a series of brutal massacres in the late 1990s, with hundreds of civilians killed at a time. In

1. INSURGENCY IN ALGERIA

2. INTRODUCTION

3. PREVIEW
• PART I - INFO OF ALGERIA.
• PART II - CAUSES OF INSURGENCY.
• PART III - MODUS OPERANDI OF TRTS.
• PART IV - THE START OF THE CHANGE.
• PART V - THE FINAL ROAD TO PEACE.

4. PART I
HISTORY OF ALGERIA

5. GEOGRAPHICAL LOC

6. FLAG OF ALGERIA

7. EMBLEM OF ALGERIA

8. GEOGRAPHICAL INFO
• ALGERIA COMPRISES 2,381,741 SQUARE
KILOMETERS OF LAND.
• MORE THAN FOUR-FIFTHS IS DESERT, IN
NORTHERN AFRICA, BETWEEN MOROCCO & TUNISIA.
• IT IS THE LARGEST COUNTRY IN AFRICA.
• ITS ARABIC NAME, AL JAZAIR (THE ISLANDS),
DERIVES FROM THE NAME OF THE
CAPITAL ALGIERS (AL JAZAIR IN ARABIC), AFTER THE
SMALL ISLANDS FORMERLY FOUND IN ITS HARBOR.

9. GEOGRAPHICAL INFO
• IT HAS A LONG MEDITERRANEAN COASTLINE,
MOST OF WHICH IS MORE PROPERLY TERMED
THE ALBORAN SEA, WHICH IS THE WESTERNMOST
ELEMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA.
• THE NORTHERN PORTION, AN AREA OF
MOUNTAINS, VALLEYS, AND PLATEAUS BETWEEN THE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA AND THE SAHARA DESERT,
FORMS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SECTION OF
NORTH AFRICA KNOWN AS THE MAGHREB. THIS AREA
INCLUDES MOROCCO, TUNISIA, AND THE
NORTHWESTERN PORTION OF LIBYA KNOWN
HISTORICALLY AS TRIPOLITANIA.

10. MILITARY INFO
• THE ARMED FORCES OF ALGERIA COMPRISE OF 319,000
SOLDIERS. THE MILITARY IS DIVIDED INTO THE FWG :
 THE LAND FORCES (ANP)
 NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
 AIR FORCE
 TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENCE FORCE
• FOUNDED IN 1954 ( ARMÉE DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE ).
• CURRENT FORM 1962 (ARMÉE NATIONALE POPULAIRE).
• LEADERSHIP :
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : PRESIDENT ABDELAZIZ
BOUTEFLIKA.
 MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : PRESIDENT ABDELAZIZ
BOUTEFLIKA.

11. PART II
CAUSES OF INSURGENCY

12. CAUSES OF INSURGENCY
• BY THE END OF 1987, THE SINGLE-PARTY SOCIALIST REPUBLIC UNDER
WHICH ALGERIA HAD FARED RELATIVELY WELL SINCE THE 1960s NO LONGER
SEEMED VIABLE.
• GOVERNMENT HAD RELIED HEAVILY ON HIGH OIL PRICES, AND WHEN, IN
1986, OIL PRICES WENT FROM $30 TO $10 A BARREL, THE PLANNED
ECONOMY CAME UNDER SEVERE STRAIN, WITH SHORTAGES AND
UNEMPLOYMENT RIFE.
• OCTOBER 1988 MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST PRESIDENT CHADLI
BENDJEDID TOOK PLACE THROUGHOUT ALGERIAN CITIES, WITH
AN ISLAMIST ELEMENT PROMINENT AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS.
• THE ARMY FIRED ON THE DEMONSTRATORS, LEAVING SOME DEAD AND
SHOCKING MANY.
• IN 1989, PRESIDENT CHADLI BROUGHT IN A NEW CONSTITUTION WHICH
DISESTABLISHED THE RULING PARTY, THE NATIONAL LIBERATION
FRONT (FLN)
• BY THE END OF THE YEAR, A VARIETY OF POLITICAL PARTIES WERE BEING
ESTABLISHED AND RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT—AMONG THEM,
THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT (FIS).

16. CAUSES OF INSURGENCY
• THE FIS RAPIDLY BECAME BY FAR THE BIGGEST ISLAMIST PARTY,
WITH A HUGE FOLLOWING CONCENTRATED ESPECIALLY IN LARGE
URBAN AREAS.
• MAY 1991, THE FIS CALLED FOR A GENERAL STRIKE TO PROTEST THE
GOVERNMENT'S REDRAWING OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS, WHICH IT
SAW AS A FORM OF GERRYMANDERING.
• ON DECEMBER 26, THE FIS HANDILY WON THE FIRST ROUND
OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND AN FIS GOVERNMENT
SEEMED INEVITABLE.
• ARMY SAW THIS OUTCOME AS UNACCEPTABLE. ON JANUARY
11, 1992 THE ARMY CANCELLED THE ELECTORAL PROCESS,
FORCING PRESIDENT CHADLI BENDJEDID TO RESIGN AND
BRINGING IN THE EXILED INDEPENDENCE FIGHTER MOHAMMED
BOUDIAF TO SERVE AS A NEW PRESIDENT.

18. CAUSES OF INSURGENCY
• FIS WAS BANNED AND THOUSANDS OF ITS MEMBERS
ARRESTED.
• ISLAMIST GUERRILLAS RAPIDLY EMERGED AND BEGAN AN
ARMED CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS
SUPPORTERS.

21. CAUSES OF INSURGENCY
• FMN OF ISLAMIC ARMED MOVEMENT (MIA), BASED IN THE
MOUNTAINS, AND THE ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA), BASED IN
THE TOWNS.
• GUERRILLAS INITIALLY TARGETED THE ARMY AND POLICE, BUT
SOME GROUPS SOON STARTED ATTACKING CIVILIANS.
• IN 1994, AS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND
THE FIS'S IMPRISONED LEADERSHIP REACHED THEIR HEIGHT, THE
GIA DECLARED WAR ON THE FIS AND ITS SUPPORTERS.
• THE MIA AND VARIOUS SMALLER GROUPS REGROUPED,
BECOMING THE FIS-LOYALIST ISLAMIC SALVATION ARMY (AIS).
• A STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED, AND MANY ORDINARY
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE SUSPENDED. ANY PROTESTS THAT
OCCURRED WERE SUPPRESSED, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
REPORTED FREQUENT GOVERNMENT USE OF TORTURE AND
HOLDING OF SUSPECTS WITHOUT CHARGE OR TRIAL. THE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY DISSOLVED THE FIS ON MARCH 4.

22. PART III
MODUS OPERANDI

23. MODUS OPERANDI
• OF THE FEW FIS ACTIVISTS THAT REMAINED FREE, MANY
TOOK THIS AS A DECLARATION OF WAR.
• THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE COUNTRY, REMAINING FIS
ACTIVISTS, ALONG WITH SOME ISLAMISTS TOO RADICAL FOR
FIS, TOOK TO THE HILLS WITH WHATEVER WEAPONS WERE
AVAILABLE AND BECAME GUERRILLA FIGHTERS.
• THEIR FIRST ATTACKS ON THE SECURITY FORCES BEGAN
BARELY A WEEK AFTER THE COUP, AND SOLDIERS AND
POLICEMEN RAPIDLY BECAME TARGETS.
• AS IN PREVIOUS WARS, THE GUERRILLAS WERE ALMOST
EXCLUSIVELY BASED IN THE MOUNTAINS OF NORTHERN
ALGERIA, WHERE THE FOREST AND SCRUB COVER WERE WELL-
SUITED TO GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND IN CERTAIN AREAS OF
THE CITIES

25. MODUS OPERANDI
• BY 26 AUGUST 1992 , IT HAD BECOME APPARENT THAT SOME GUERRILLAS
WERE BEGINNING TO TARGET CIVILIANS AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT FIGURES:
THE BOMBING OF THE ALGIERS AIRPORT CLAIMED 9 LIVES AND INJURED 128
PEOPLE. THE FIS CONDEMNED THE BOMBING ALONG WITH THE OTHER
MAJOR PARTIES, BUT THE FIS'S INFLUENCE OVER THE GUERRILLAS TURNED
OUT TO BE LIMITED.
• THE INITIAL FIGHTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN LED BY THE SMALL
EXTREMIST GROUP TAKFIR WAL HIJRA AND ASSOCIATED EX-AFGHAN
FIGHTERS. HOWEVER, THE FIRST MAJOR ARMED MOVEMENT TO EMERGE,
STARTING ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COUP, WAS THE ISLAMIC ARMED
MOVEMENT (MIA).
• IN FEBRUARY 1992, EX-SOLDIER, EX-AFGHAN FIGHTER, AND FORMER FIS
HEAD OF SECURITY SAID MEKHLOUFI FOUNDED THE MOVEMENT FOR AN
ISLAMIC STATE (MEI)
• IN JANUARY 1993, ABDELHAK LAYADA DECLARED HIS GROUP INDEPENDENT
OF CHEBOUTI'S. THE NEW FACTION WAS CALLED THE ARMED ISLAMIC
GROUP (GIA, FROM FRENCH GROUPE ISLAMIQUE ARME). IT BECAME
PARTICULARLY PROMINENT AROUND ALGIERS AND ITS SUBURBS, IN URBAN
ENVIRONMENTS.

27. MODUS OPERANDI
• IT WAS FAR LESS SELECTIVE THAN THE MIA, WHICH INSISTED
ON IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING; AS A RESULT, IT WAS REGULARLY
INFILTRATED BY THE SECURITY FORCES, RESULTING IN A RAPID
LEADERSHIP TURNOVER AS SUCCESSIVE HEADS WERE KILLED.
• THE MIA AND MEI, CONCENTRATED IN THE MAQUIS,
ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP A MILITARY STRATEGY AGAINST THE
STATE, TYPICALLY TARGETING THE SECURITY SERVICES AND
SABOTAGING OR BOMBING STATE INSTITUTIONS.
• IT ASSASSINATED JOURNALISTS AND INTELLECTUALS (SUCH
AS TAHAR DJAOUT), SAYING "THE JOURNALISTS WHO FIGHT
AGAINST ISLAMISM THROUGH THE PEN WILL PERISH BY THE
SWORD.“
• IT SOON STEPPED UP ITS ATTACKS BY TARGETING CIVILIANS
WHO REFUSED TO LIVE BY THEIR PROHIBITIONS, AND LATER IN
1993 BEGAN KILLING FOREIGNERS.

31. MODUS OPERANDI
• ON MARCH 10, 1994, OVER 1000 (MAINLY
ISLAMIST) PRISONERS ESCAPED TAZOULT PRISON IN
WHAT APPEARED TO BE A MAJOR COUP FOR THE
GUERRILLAS.
• THE NEXT FEW MONTHS SAW THE KILLING OF
SOME 100 ISLAMIST PRISONERS IN THE SERKADJI
PRISON MUTINY, AND A MAJOR SUCCESS FOR THE
SECURITY FORCES IN BATTLE AT AIN DEFLA,
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF HUNDREDS OF
GUERRILLA FIGHTERS.
• CHERIF GOUSMI WAS EVENTUALLY SUCCEEDED
BY DJAMEL ZITOUNI AS GIA HEAD.

33. MODUS OPERANDI
• ZITOUNI EXTENDED THE GIA'S ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS TO
FRENCH SOIL, BEGINNING WITH THE HIJACKING OF AIR FRANCE
FLIGHT 8969 AT THE END OF DECEMBER 1994 AND
CONTINUING WITH SEVERAL BOMBINGS AND ATTEMPTED
BOMBINGS THROUGHOUT 1995.
• IN ALGERIA ITSELF, HE CONTINUED LIKEWISE, WITH CAR
BOMBS AND ASSASSINATIONS OF MUSICIANS, SPORTSMEN,
AND UNVEILED WOMEN, AS WELL AS THE USUAL VICTIMS.
• THE REGION SOUTH OF ALGIERS, IN PARTICULAR, CAME TO
BE DOMINATED BY THE GIA, WHO CALLED IT THE "LIBERATED
ZONE“.
• REPORTS OF BATTLES BETWEEN THE AIS AND GIA INCREASED,
AND THE GIA REITERATED ITS DEATH THREATS AGAINST FIS AND
AIS LEADERS, ASSASSINATING A CO-FOUNDER OF THE
FIS, ABDELBAKI SAHRAOUI, IN PARIS. AT THIS POINT, FOREIGN
SOURCES ESTIMATED THE TOTAL NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS TO
BE ABOUT 27,000.

37. MODUS OPERANDI
• IN JULY 1996 GIA LEADER DJAMEL ZITOUNI WAS KILLED BY ONE OF
THE BREAKAWAY EX-GIA FACTIONS AND WAS SUCCEEDED BY ANTAR
ZOUABRI, WHO WOULD PROVE AN EVEN BLOODIER LEADER.
• STARTING AROUND APRIL (THE THALIT MASSACRE), ALGERIA WAS
WRACKED BY MASSACRES OF INTENSE BRUTALITY AND
UNPRECEDENTED SIZE. GIA GUERRILLAS KILLED TENS, AND
SOMETIMES HUNDREDS, OF CIVILIANS AT A TIME.
• THESE MASSACRES CONTINUED THROUGH THE END OF 1998,
CHANGING THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION
CONSIDERABLY.
• PREGNANT WOMEN WERE SLICED OPEN, CHILDREN WERE
HACKED TO PIECES OR DASHED AGAINST WALLS, MEN'S LIMBS WERE
HACKED OFF ONE BY ONE, AND, AS THE ATTACKERS RETREATED, THEY
WOULD KIDNAP YOUNG WOMEN TO KEEP AS SEX SLAVES.
• ARMY BARRACKS WERE STATIONED WITHIN A FEW HUNDRED
METERS OF THE VILLAGES, YET DID NOTHING TO STOP THE KILLINGS.

38. ALGERIAN MASSACRES
• IN 1997, MASSACRES IN WHICH OVER 50 PEOPLE WERE KILLED:
 THALIT MASSACRE3 - 4 APRIL
 HAOUCH KHEMISTI MASSACRE - 21 APRIL
 DAIRAT LABGUER MASSACRE -16 JUNE
 SI-ZERROUK MASSACRE -27 JULY
 OUED EL-HAD AND MEZOUARA MASSACRE -3 AUGUST
 SOUHANE MASSACRE -20 - 21 AUGUST
 BENI-ALI MASSACRE -26 AUGUST
 RAIS MASSACRE -29 AUGUST
 BENI-MESSOUS MASSACRE -5 - 6 SEPTEMBER
 GUELB EL-KEBIR MASSACRE -19 SEPTEMBER
 BENTALHA MASSACRE- 22 SEPTEMBER
 SID EL-ANTRI MASSACRE -23 - 24 DECEMBER
 WILAYA OF RELIZANE MASSACRES- 30 DECEMBER

40. MODUS OPERANDI
• THE AIS, WHICH AT THIS POINT WAS ENGAGED IN AN ALL-OUT WAR
WITH THE GIA AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT, FOUND ITSELF IN AN
UNTENABLE POSITION.
• THE GIA SEEMED A MORE IMMEDIATELY PRESSING ENEMY, AND AIS
MEMBERS EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE MASSACRES—WHICH IT HAD
CONDEMNED MORE THAN ONCE—WOULD BE BLAMED ON THEM.
• ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1997, THE AIS' HEAD, MADANI MEZRAG,
ORDERED A UNILATERAL AND UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE STARTING
OCTOBER 1, IN ORDER TO "UNVEIL THE ENEMY THAT HIDES BEHIND
THESE ABOMINABLE MASSACRES.“
• THE AIS THUS LARGELY TOOK ITSELF OUT OF THE POLITICAL
EQUATION, REDUCING THE FIGHTING TO A STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT, THE GIA, AND THE VARIOUS SPLINTER GROUPS THAT
WERE INCREASINGLY BREAKING AWAY FROM THE GIA.
• ALI BENHADJAR'S FIS-LOYALIST ISLAMIC LEAGUE FOR DA'WA AND
JIHAD (LIDD), FORMED IN FEBRUARY 1997, ALLIED ITSELF WITH THE
AIS AND OBSERVED THE SAME CEASEFIRE.
• OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS, THE AIS WOULD GRADUALLY
NEGOTIATE AN AMNESTY FOR ITS MEMBERS.

41. PART IV
THE START OF THE CHANGE

43. GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES
• AFTER RECEIVING MUCH INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO ACT,
THE EU SENT TWO DELEGATIONS, ONE OF THEM LED BY MÁRIO
SOARES, TO VISIT ALGERIA AND INVESTIGATE THE MASSACRES
IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1998.
• THE REPORTS CONDEMNED THE ISLAMIST ARMED GROUPS.
TOWNS SOON BECAME SAFER, ALTHOUGH MASSACRES
CONTINUED IN RURAL AREAS.
• THE GIA'S POLICY OF MASSACRING CIVILIANS HAD ALREADY
CAUSED A SPLIT AMONG ITS COMMANDERS, WITH SOME
REJECTING THE POLICY.
• ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1998, THIS DISAGREEMENT WAS
FORMALIZED WITH THE FORMATION OF THE SALAFIST GROUP
FOR PREACHING AND COMBAT (GSPC), BASED IN THE
MOUNTAINS WEST OF KABYLIE AND LED BY HASSAN HATTAB.

46. GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES
• ELECTIONS WERE ARRANGED, AND ON APRIL 15, 1999, THE
ARMY-BACKED EX-INDEPENDENCE-FIGHTER ABDELAZIZ
BOUTEFLIKA WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT.
• BOUTEFLIKA CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIS,
AND ON JUNE 5 THE AIS AGREED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO DISBAND.
• BOUTEFLIKA FOLLOWED UP THIS SUCCESS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT BY PARDONING A NUMBER OF ISLAMIST
PRISONERS CONVICTED OF MINOR OFFENSES AND PUSHING
THE CIVIL HARMONY ACT THROUGH PARLIAMENT, A LAW
ALLOWING ISLAMIST FIGHTERS NOT GUILTY OF MURDER OR
RAPE TO ESCAPE ALL PROSECUTION IF THEY TURN
THEMSELVES IN.

48. GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES
• THIS LAW WAS FINALLY APPROVED BY REFERENDUM ON
16 SEPTEMBER 1999, AND A NUMBER OF FIGHTERS,
INCLUDING MUSTAPHA KARTALI, TOOK ADVANTAGE OF IT
TO GIVE THEMSELVES UP AND RESUME NORMAL LIFE—
SOMETIMES ANGERING THOSE WHO HAD SUFFERED AT THE
HANDS OF THE GUERRILLAS.
• FIS LEADERSHIP EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
RESULTS, FEELING THAT THE AIS HAD STOPPED FIGHTING
WITHOUT SOLVING ANY OF THE ISSUES; BUT THEIR MAIN
VOICE OUTSIDE OF PRISON, ABDELKADER HACHANI, WAS
ASSASSINATED ON NOVEMBER 22.
• VIOLENCE DECLINED, THOUGH NOT STOPPING
ALTOGETHER, AND A SENSE OF NORMALITY STARTED

49. PART V
THE FINAL ROAD TO PEACE

51. THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE
• WITH THE GIA'S DECLINE, THE GSPC WAS LEFT AS THE MOST
ACTIVE REBEL GROUP, WITH ABOUT 300 FIGHTERS IN 2003.
• IT CONTINUED A CAMPAIGN OF ASSASSINATIONS OF POLICE
AND ARMY PERSONNEL IN ITS AREA, AND ALSO MANAGED TO
EXPAND INTO THE SAHARA, WHERE ITS SOUTHERN DIVISION, LED
BY AMARI SAIFI. HE KIDNAPPED A NUMBER OF GERMAN TOURISTS
IN 2003, BEFORE BEING FORCED TO FLEE TO SPARSELY POPULATED
AREAS OF MALI, AND LATER NIGER AND CHAD, WHERE HE WAS
CAPTURED.
• BY LATE 2003, THE GROUP'S FOUNDER HAD BEEN SUPPLANTED
BY THE EVEN MORE RADICAL NABIL SAHRAOUI, WHO
ANNOUNCED HIS OPEN SUPPORT FOR AL-QAEDA, THUS
STRENGTHENING GOVERNMENT TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
ALGERIA.

53. THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE
• THE RELEASE OF FIS LEADERS MADANI AND BELHADJ IN 2003 HAD
NO OBSERVABLE EFFECT ON THE SITUATION, ILLUSTRATING A
NEWFOUND GOVERNMENTAL CONFIDENCE WHICH WOULD BE
DEEPENED BY THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION .
• THE VOTE WAS SEEN AS CONFIRMING STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT
FOR BOUTEFLIKA'S POLICY TOWARDS THE GUERRILLAS AND THE
SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION OF LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE
• IN SEPTEMBER 2005 A NATIONAL REFERENDUM WAS HELD ON
AN AMNESTY PROPOSAL BY BOUTEFLIKA'S GOVERNMENT, SIMILAR TO
THE 1999 LAW, TO END LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
WHO WERE NO LONGER FIGHTING, AND TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION
TO FAMILIES OF PEOPLE KILLED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES.

54. THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE
• THE PROPOSAL WAS IMPLEMENTED BY PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE IN FEBRUARY 2006, AND ADOPTED ON SEPTEMBER
29, 2006. PARTICULARLY CONTROVERSIAL WAS ITS PROVISION
OF IMMUNITY AGAINST PROSECUTION TO SURRENDERED EX-
GUERRILLAS AND ARMY PERSONNEL.
• OVER 400 GSPC GUERRILLAS SURRENDERED UNDER ITS
TERMS; ESTIMATES OF THE GSPC'S SIZE IN 2005 HAD RANGED
FROM 300 TO 1000
• THE FIGHTING HAS CONTINUED TO DIE DOWN BUT A
STATE OF EMERGENCY REMAINED IN PLACE.
• THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS LIFTED IN FEBRUARY
2011.

56. CONCLUSION